JUDGMENT
Venkataramana Rao, J.
1. This is a suit upon a promissory note dated the 20th June 1925 executed by the first defendant for himself and as agent of the second defendant in favour of Anantha-narayana Brothers of Tellicherry. The plaintiff’s case is that the second defendant was a cart contractor of Messrs. Aspinwall & Co., at Tellicherry, that in respect of dealings had by the second defendant with the said company Messrs. Ananthanarayana Brothers & Company stood surety for him, that the said Ananthanarayana Brothers was carried on by the plaintiff and his elder brother K. Ananthan, that the first defendant was the duly constituted agent of the second defendant, and the first defendant on behalf of the second defendant settled accounts with them, that a sum of Rs. 365 was found due and payable to Ananthanarayana Brothers and the suit promissory note was executed by the first defendant in his own capacity and in the capacity of the agent on behalf of the second defendant, that the said Ananthanarayana Brothers ceased to exist, that the said note was assigned on the 25th July 1925 exclusively to the plaintiff in his capacity as the proprietor of the plaintiff Company by K. Ananthan who was the owner of the said company and the elder brother of the plaintiff and therefore as such assignee he has now filed this suit. The defence of the second defendant is that the first defendant had no authority to execute the note, that on the note the second defendant could not be rendered liable, that there was no valid assingment in favour of the plaintiff and he is not entitled to sue. Both the Courts have decreed the plaintiff’s claim.
2. On appeal Mr. Variar has raised two contentions on behalf of the second defendant: (1) that on the note as it stands the second defendant could not be made liable; (2) that the words on the back of the note do not constitute either an endorsement or assignment and the plaintiff is not entitled to sue.
3. In regard to the first contention the main argument of Mr. Variar is that the promissory note purports to be executed by the first defendant in his individual name and the form of the note is such that the second defendant could not in law be made liable. The note runs as follows:
Promissory note dated 20-6-1935.
Tellicberry,
20th June 1935.
Rs. 365 (Rupees three hundred and sixty five only) on demand, I Thorappa Thennu’s son Ahammad Kutty of Valluvampra amsom and desom, Ernad taluk, hereby promise and agree to pay to Ananda Narayana Brothers of Tellicherry amsom and desom, Kottayam Taluk, or order (the above said sum) with interest sccruing thereon at the rate of 2 per cent per month.-
The above said consideration Rs. 365 has been received by me in ready cash this day.
(Two one anna stamps affixed).
(Left thump impression of) Ahmmad Kutty in his own capacity and on behalf of P.V. Govindan.
4. Stress is laid on the words, ‘I, Thorappa Thennu’s son Ahmad Kutty’ as indicating that it was only intended that Ahmad Kutty should be bound in his individual capacity; The mere fact that he purports to sign also on behalf of the second defendant could not in law render the second defendant liable. In my opinion, this contention is not tenable. The note is a joint and several one having been executed by the first defendant both in his individual capacity and the capacity of an agent. Under the Negotiable Instruments Act an agent can sign a promissory note on behalf of his principal. If the words ‘Ahmmad Kutty, in his own capacity’ were not there but had stood ‘Ahammad Kutty, on behalf of P.V. Govindan’, there could be no question that on the note as it stands the second defendant would be liable. A case similar in point can be found in Alexandar v. Sizer (1869) L.R. 4 Ex. Cases 102. where the note ran as follows:
$1500. On demand I promise to pay Messers. Alexander & Co., or order the sum of one thousand five hundred pounds, with legal interest thereon until paid, value received the 16th of August, 1865. For Mistley, Thorpe, and Walton Railway Company – John Sizer, Secretary.
5. A similar argument was addressed laying stress on the use of the word I to the effect that John Sizer was personally liable. The contention was negatived. Baron Pigott dealing with the contention observed:
Mr. Mathews contends and lays much emphasis on the word T as showing personal liability, in the body of the note. But in any other form the note would have been ungrammatical, and the form, which is the same as is used in an ordinary Bank of England note, does not in this case any more than in that necessarily create a personal liability.
6. This case was followed in Chapman v. Smethurst (1909) 1 K.B. 927, where the promissory note was in these terms:
Six months after demand I promise to pay to Mrs. M. Chapman the sum of £300 for value received together with 6 per cent, interest per annum.
J.H. Smethurst’s Laundry and Dye works, Ltd.
J.H. Smethurst Managing Director.
7. Joyce, J., observed:
The only thing that raises a doubt in my mind is the use in the body of the note of the singular personal pronoun T instead of the plural ‘we’ or ‘We, J. H. Smethurst’s Laundry and Dye works Limited’, which perhaps would have been better English: but this is not in my opinion sufficient to alter the prima facie effect of the affixing of the name of the company as it was affixed,
8. Vaughan williams, L.J., observed:
It is true that in the present case the promissory note does not profess to be signed ‘for’ or ‘on account of the company, but we have that which is equally strong to show that the company intended to be bound by the note, that is, the stamped signature of the company at the foot of the note and placed over the written signature of the defendant.
9. In the present case we have got the words ‘ on account of P.V. Govindan ‘. The words ‘ Ahammad Kutty in his own capacity ‘ were also added to indicate that his personal liability was also not excluded; otherwise he would not be personally liable. The words in the body of the note, ‘ I, Thorappa Thenu’s son Ahammad Kutty ‘ mean ‘ I, Ahmmad Kutty, in my own capacity and on behalf of P.V. Govindan ‘. There is nothing to preclude an agent from signing for himself and also on behalf of his principal. The cases in Mare v. Charles (1856) 119 E.R. 745 and Jackson v. Hudson (1810) 170 E.R. 1213 : 2 Camp. 447 – relied on by Mr. Variar do not help him. They only proceed on the principle that if a bill be drawn upon one man it cannot be accepted by two. Therefore, I overrule the contention of Mr. Variar on this point.
10. But I am inclined to think that the second contention of Mr. Variar must prevail. The alleged endorsement or assignment relied on in the body of the note is ” Received, the amount from T. K. Narayanan.
(Sd.) K. Anandan,
Proprietor, Ananda Narayana brothers .
11. These words do not constitute an endorsement within the meaning of Section 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Act because there is no direction to pay the amount of the instrument to a specified person, nor does it consist only of the signature of the endorser’s name, and it is not seriously contended that it is. Nor do the words in my opinion constitute an assignment. There are no words of assignment, nor do they convey an expression of intention to transfer. Mr. Nambiar very strongly relied upon the observations of Lord McNaughten in William Brandt’s Sons and Co. v. Dunlop Rubber Co. (1905) A.C. 454 , which indicate that the form of the assignment is immaterial provided the intention to transfer is clear. But that intention must be gathered from the words used and not from evidence aliunde. From the language of the words used in this case one cannot infer such an intention. This case is exactly covered by a Bench decision of this High Court in Chandu v. Ramunni (1920) 39 M.L.J. 273 where exactly similar language was used and their Lordships Spencer and Odgers, JJ., declined to infer therefrom either an endorsement or an assignment. Following the said decision I reverse the decree of the lower appellate Court and dismiss the suit, but in the circumstances I direct each party to bear his own cost throughout. (Leave refused).