REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.656 OF 2007
P.VENUGOPAL ...Petitioner
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA ...Respondent
J U D G M E N T
TARUN CHATTERJEE,J.
1. In this writ application under Article 32
of the Constitution moved at the instance of
Dr.P.Venugopal, a renowned and internationally
famed Cardio Vascular Surgeon, calls in
question the constitutional validity of the
proviso to sub-section (1A) of Section 11 of
the All India Institute of Medical Sciences
(Amendment) Act, 2007.
1
2. The writ petitioner was admittedly the
Director of All India Institute of Medical
Sciences (in short the “AIIMS”) immediately
prior to the commencement of the added
provisions and by virtue of the legislative
command contained in the added provision he had
been made to demit his office as Director of
the said Institute from the date of coming into
force of this added provision.
3. The writ petitioner claims and it does not
appear to be disputed that he was a Gold
Medalist in his batch of MBBS, passed out from
the AIIMS itself and thereafter he acquired
qualification of MS and MCH in cardio vascular
surgery and that he served the Institute for
about three/four decades with honesty and
respect without any blemish. It is also not in
dispute that the writ petitioner was to
complete his five-year term in the Office of
the Director on 2nd of July, 2008, but due to
this added provision in the Act, had to suffer
2
a pre-mature termination and consequent removal
from the office of the Director on 30th of
November, 2007. It is alleged that this adverse
affectation has been brought about directly by
the added provision.
4. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons of
the Amendment Act of 1987 being Act XXX of
1987, as stated herein above, AIIMS and the
Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education
and Research, Chandigarh, are statutory
autonomous bodies wholly financed by the
Government of India. Sub-Section (2) of
Section 3 of the All India Institute of Medical
Sciences Act, 1956, provides for the
incorporation of the Institute and declares
“that the Institute shall be a body corporate
by the name aforesaid having perpetual
succession and a common seal with a power to
acquire, hold and dispose of property, both
moveable and immoveable, and to contract, and
shall by the said name sue and be sued”.
3
Section 5 of the Parent Act declares “that the
Institute shall be an Institute of National
Importance.” Section 4 of the Act deals with
the composition of the Institute and the
Director of the Institute has been made an Ex-
officio Member of the Institute and under sub-
section 2 of Section 6, he is to continue as
such so long as he holds office in virtue of
which, he is such a Member. The Act provides
for Constitution of a Governing Body by the
Institute from amongst its members in such
manner as may be prescribed by the Regulations
to exercise such power and discharge such
functions as the Institute may, by Regulation,
make in this behalf confer or impose upon it.
Under Regulation 25, the Institute is required
to carry out such directions as may be issued
to it from time to time by the Central
Government for the efficient administration
under the Act. Section 26 deals with the
dispute between the Institute and the Central
Government in the matter of exercise of its
4
power and discharge of its function under the
Act and makes the decision of the Central
Government final. Thus the Act designed the
Institute to be an autonomous statutory body of
national importance subject to limited control
in respect of specified matters. Sub-section
(1A) with its proviso added to Section 11 of
the AIIMS (Amendment) Act, 2007 reads as
follows:-
(1A) – The Director shall hold office
for a term of five years from the date
on which he enters upon his office or
until he attains the age of sixty-five
years, whichever is earlier.
Provided that any person holding
office as a Director immediately
before the commencement of the All
India Institute of Medical Sciences
and the Post-Graduate Institute of
Medical Education and Research
(Amendment) Act, 2007, shall in so far
as his appointment is inconsistent
with the provisions of this sub-
section, cease to hold office on such
commencement as such Director and
shall be entitled to claim
compensation not exceeding three
months’ pay and allowances for the
premature termination of his office or
of any contract of service……”
5
5. As noted herein earlier in this writ
petition, the challenge has been confined only
to the proviso of the added sub-section (1A) of
Section 11 of the Act. Mr.Arun Jaitley, learned
senior counsel appearing on behalf of the writ
petitioner submitted at the first instance that
the provisions, no doubt, acquire their
operational significance from the added sub-
section but manifestly, it makes a significant
departure from the substantive part and
proceeds to deal only with the particular
Director holding office immediately prior to
its coming into force and is not concerned with
any other officer or member of the Institute,
nor to any other person who may be coming to
hold the same office of Director in future.
6. We have carefully examined the proviso to
the added sub-section (1A) to Section 11 of the
Act. Reading the proviso in the manner as
aforesaid, the writ petitioner has challenged
its constitutional validity mainly on the
following grounds:
6
(i) The proviso is patently a
single-man legislation and
intended to affect the writ
petitioner only and none else
thus introduces a "naked
discrimination" to deprive
the writ petitioner of the
constitutional protection
under Article 14 of the
Constitution.
(ii) The writ petitioner has been
singled out to be deprived of
the two protective conditions
in respect of curtailment of
his tenure. The benefit of
notice and justifiable
reasons being the two such
conditions will continue to
be available to all future
Directors but the proviso
makes them non-available to
the writ petitioner being the
Director presently in office
and requires him to move out
of the office under the
legislative command.
(iii) In the facts and
circumstances of the case and
in view of the pending
proceedings with different
orders passed therein, such
calculated steps to force the
writ petitioner out of his
office offend the
constitutional scheme
envisaging fair, reasonable
and equal treatment on the
part of the State in its
dealing with the individual
in general and with people in
public employment in
particular.
7
(iv) The writ petitioner claims
the protection of Articles 14
and 16 of the Constitution of
India.
(v) In the factual context of the
case, there has been a
violation of the orders
issued in favour of the writ
petitioner passed by the
learned Single Judge of the
High Court of Delhi in
W.P.No.10687/2006 in
connection with interim
applications CMP
NOs.8169/2006 and 12471/2006
and by the Division Bench in
W.P.)No.8485/2006 and LPA
NOs.2045-46/2006.
7. It is true that in establishments like
AIIMS, there is an age of superannuation
governing the length of service of its officers
and employees. Such age of superannuation may
be suitably altered by way of reducing the age
so as to affect even the serving employees
under appropriate circumstances and no
exception can be taken to such course of
action. Similarly under the Service Rules,
there may be provision for extension of service
after the attainment of the age of
8
superannuation and it is well settled that in
the event of refusal by an employer to grant an
extension, the employee cannot justifiably
claim to be deprived of any right or privilege.
The view taken is that the employer has a
discretion to grant or not to grant such
extension having regard to the interest of the
employer or the establishment. This view is
expressed by this Court in the Case of State
Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur and Ors. vs. Jag
Mohan Lal (AIR 1989 SC 75). In this case, at
para 12, this Court observed as follows :
“The Bank has no obligation to extend
the services of all officers even if
they are found suitable in every
respect. The interest of the Bank is
the primary consideration for giving
extension of service. With due regard
to exigencies of service, the Bank in
one year may give extension to all
suitable retiring officers. In another
year, it may give extension to some
and not to all. In a subsequent year,
it may not give extension to any one
of the officers. The Bank may have a
lot of fresh recruits in one year. The
Bank may not need the services of all
retired persons in another year. The
Bank may have lesser workload in a9
succeeding year. The retiring persons
cannot in any year demand that
“extension to all or none”. If we
concede that right to retiring
persons, then the very purpose of
giving extension in the interest of
the Bank would be defeated. We are,
therefore, of opinion that there is no
scope for complaining arbitrariness in
the matter of giving extension of
service to retiring persons.”
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8. In the instant case, the material facts
and circumstances bring into focus other
consideration. In the case of the writ
petitioner, a Division Bench of the Delhi High
Court by its judgment and order dated 29th of
March, 2007 (Pages 119 to 181 of Volume I of
Writ Petition No.656 of 2007) has considered
the right of the writ petitioner to hold the
office of the Director for five years from the
age of 61 years to 66 years. There can be no
dispute with regard to the contentions raised
by Mr. K. A. Parasaran, learned senior counsel
10
appearing for the respondent, that a person
appointed in Government service acquires a
status and his service conditions will be
determined by the Service Rules or Statutory
Rules and not by the contrary or inconsistent
terms of the contract, and such terms and
conditions of service may be unilaterally
altered by the Government. This view has been
candidly expressed in paragraph 6 of a decision
of this Court, namely, Roshan Lal Tandon vs.
Union of India and Anr. (AIR 1967 SC 1889)
which, in our view, should be required to be
reproduced. Accordingly, we reproduce para 6 of
the aforesaid decision which is as under :
“We pass on to consider the next
contention of the petitioner that
there was a contractual right as
regards the condition of service
applicable to the petitioner at the
time he entered Grade ‘D’ and the
condition of service could not be
altered to his disadvantage afterwards
by the notification issued by the
Railway Board. It was said that the
order of the Railway Board dated
January 25, 1958, Annexure ‘B’, laid
down that promotion to Grade ‘C’ from
Grade ‘D’ was to be based on11
seniority-cum-suitability and this
condition of service was contractual
and could not be altered thereafter to
the prejudice of the petitioner. In
our opinion, there is no warrant for
this argument. It is true that the
origin of Government service is
contractual. There is an offer and
acceptance in every case. But once
appointed to his post or office the
Government servant acquires a status
and his rights and obligations are no
longer determined by consent of both
parties, but by statute or statutory
rules which may be framed and altered
unilaterally by the Government. In
other words, the legal position of a
Government servant is more one of
status than of contract. The hall-mark
of status is the attachment to a legal
relationship of rights and duties
imposed by the public law and not by
mere agreement of the parties. The
emolument of the Government servant
and his terms of service are governed
by statute or statutory rules which
may be unilaterally altered by the
Government without the consent of the
employee. It is true that Art. 311
imposes constitutional restrictions
upon the power of removal granted to
the President and the Governor under
Art. 310. But it is obvious that the
relationship between the Government
and its servant is not like an
ordinary contract of service between a
master and servant. The legal
relationship is something entirely
different, something in the nature of
status. It is much more than a purely
contractual relationship voluntarily12
entered into between the parties. The
duties of status are fixed by the law
and in the enforcement of these duties
society has an interest. In the
language of jurisprudence status is a
condition of membership of a group of
which powers and duties are
exclusively determined by law and not
by agreement between the parties
concerned. The matter is clearly
stated by Salmond and Williams on
Contracts as follow :
“So we may find both contractual and
status-obligations produced by the
same transaction. The one transaction
may result in the creation not only of
obligations defined by the parties and
so pertaining to the sphere of
contract but also and concurrently of
obligations defined by the law itself,
and so pertaining to the sphere of
status. A contract of service between
employer and employee, while for the
most part pertaining exclusively to
the sphere of contract, pertains also
to that of status so far as the law
itself has been fit to attach to this
relation compulsory incidents, such as
liability to pay compensation for
accidents. The extent to which the law
is content to leave matters within the
domain of contract to be determined by
the exercise of the autonomous
authority of the parties themselves,
or thinks fit to bring the matter
within the sphere of status by
authoritatively determining for itself
the contents of the relationship, is a
matter depending on considerations of
13
public policy. In such contracts as
those of service the tendency in
modern times is to withdraw the matter
more and more from the domain of
contract into that of status.”
9. Similarly in N.Lakshmana Rao and Ors vs.
State of Karnataka and Ors. (1976) 2 SCC 502 in
paras 20 and 21, it was observed as follows :-
“As a result of the exercise of
option by the teachers of the local
bodies they became Government
servants. The term that the service
conditions would not be varied to
their disadvantage would mean that
they would be like all other
Government servants subject to Article
310(1) of the Constitution. This could
mean that under the law these teachers
would be entitled to continue in
service up to the age of
superannuation. The exercise of option
does not mean that there was a
contract whereby a limitation was put
on prescribing an age of
superannuation. It has been held by
this Court that prescribing an age of
superannuation does not amount to an
action under Article 311 of the
Constitution. Article 309 confers
legislative power to provide
conditions of service. The Legislature
can regulate conditions of service by14
Law which can impair conditions or
terms of service.
This Court in Roshan Lal Tandon v.
Union of India said that there is no
vested contractual right in regard to
the terms of service. The legal
position of a Government servant is
one of status than of contract. The
duties of status are fixed by law. The
terms of service are governed by
statute or statutory rules which may
be unilaterally altered by the
Government without the consent of the
employee.”
10. A further decision relied upon in this
connection by Mr.Parasaran, learned senior
counsel appearing for the respondent, is the
decision of this Court reported in Union of
India and Anr. vs. Dr.S.Baliar Singh, [(1998) 2
SCC 208], particularly learned senior counsel
has relied on paragraph 12 of the said decision
in support of his contention. Relying on this
decision of this Court, it was contended that
the rules which were in force on the date of
retirement would govern the employee concerned.
15
On this aspect of the matter, there cannot be
any dispute as such aspect is well settled by a
series of decisions of this Court as referred
to herein above. But the problem arises when
the constitutional validity of the statutory
provisions is called in question on the ground
of violation of fundamental rights. A person
entering into a Government service is no doubt
liable to be dealt with by the relevant Act or
the Rules but it ceases to be so in the event
of his success in challenging the
constitutional validity of the same. A
Government servant entering into a Government
service does not forego his fundamental rights.
On the other hand, because of his status as a
person in public employment, he acquires
additional rights constitutionally protected.
The State or other public authorities are not,
therefore, entitled to make and impose laws
governing the service conditions of an employee
which manifestly deprive him of the privileges
of that status. A person in public employment
16
is endowed with a status not merely subjecting
him to liabilities and obligation but also
protecting him against any arbitrary,
unreasonable and unequal treatment. Such a
person is also entitled to constitutional
remedies whether under Article 32 or under
Article 226 of the Constitution. The next
contention on behalf of the respondent is that
the constitutionality of law cannot be judged
on the basis of its peculiar operation in
special or individual cases and it must be
judged on the basis of its ordinary effect and
use of operation. It was pointed out that a few
freak instances of hardship may arise at a time
or at different times but the same cannot
invalidate the order or the policy. In this
connection, Mr.Parasaran, learned senior
counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent,
had placed reliance on a decision of the
Federal Court reported in AIR 1939 Federal
Court P.1 (Central Provinces and Berar Sales
17
of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation
Act,1938.)
11. While examining the legality of Central
Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and
Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938, Justice
Sulaiman, as His Lordship then was, in a
concurring judgment referred to the
observations of Lord Herschell in Attorney
General for Canada vs. Attorney General for
Ontario (1898) A C 700 to the following
effect:-
“The Supreme Legislative power in
relation to any subject matter is
always capable of abuse, but it is not
to be assumed that it will be
improperly used, if it is, the only
remedy is an appeal to those by whom
the Legislature is elected.” (See AIR
1939 PC 1 at page 30.
12. Reliance can also be placed in this
connection on the case of R.S.Joshi, Sales Tax
Officer, Gujarat and Ors. vs. Ajit Mills Ltd.
and Anr. [(1977) 4 SCC 98]. Mr.Parasaran,
18
learned senior counsel had also relied on
another decision reported in Tamilnadu
Education Department Ministerial and General
Subordinate Services Association and Ors. vs.
State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. [(1980)3 SCC 97].
Reliance was also placed by the learned senior
counsel for the respondent on the decision in
the matter of State of Himachal Pradesh and
Anr. vs. Kailash Chand Mahajan and Ors. (1992
Suppl.2 SCC 351) and Virender Singh Hooda and
Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Anr.(2004) 12 SCC
588.
13. On a close examination of the aforesaid
decisions, it appears that the questions
involved in the aforesaid decisions were
significantly different. So far as AIR 1939
(Federal Court page 1) is concerned, the
question of constitutional invalidity, as in
the present case, was not in issue. In
R.S.Joshi’s case, the law in question did not
19
lack in generality in respect of its operation.
But exception was sought to be taken on the
basis of the hardship or injustice in
particular cases. So far as 1980 (3) SCC 197
(Tamilnadu Education Department case) is
concerned, the law was general in its operation
and freak instances of hardship were held not
relevant to determine its validity.
14. So far as the last decision of this Court,
as referred to by Mr. Parasaran, namely, State
of Himachal Pradesh vs. Kailash Chand Mahajan
(1992 Supp.2 SCC 351) is concerned, the
impugned law in the decision being the
Ordinance of 1990 was a law of general
application and it applied not only to the
Chairman-cum-Managing Director of Himachal
Pradesh State Electricity Board, but also to
all members of the Electricity Board. This
Court, accordingly, held that this was not a
one-man legislation and consequently upheld it
on merit. Therefore, the respective contentions
20
are to be examined in the context of the
Constitutional Scheme of India having a written
constitution with guaranteed fundamental
rights. In India, under Article 13(2) of the
Constitution “the State shall not make any law
which takes away or abridges the rights
conferred by this part and any law made in
contravention of this Clause shall, to the
extent of the contravention, be void.” Thus in
India, a law cannot be accepted merely because
it purports to be a law falling within the
legislative field of the maker thereof. Each
such provision of law is required to stand the
test of Article 13(2) of the Constitution and
survive.
15. Mr.Arun Jaitley, learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner laid
stress on the following three judgments of this
Court. The first decision is the case of Ram
Prasad Narayan Sahi and Anr. vs. The State of
Bihar and Ors. (AIR 1953 SC 215). Mr.Jaitley
21
had drawn our attention to a passage of this
judgment rendered by the former Chief Justice
of this Court, Justice Patanjali Sastri, in
which the Chief Justice, after referring to the
facts of the earlier case of Ameerunissa Begum
and Ors. vs. Mahboob Begum and Ors. (AIR 1953
SC 91), in which the Legislature intervened in
a private dispute in respect of succession to
an estate,observed:-
“Legislation based upon
mismanagement or other misconduct as
the differentia and made applicable to
a specified individual or corporate
body is not far removed from the
notorious parliamentary procedure
formerly employed in Britain of
punishing individual delinquents by
passing bills of attainder, and should
not, I think, receive judicial
encouragement.” (See Page 217 of this
decision).
16. Chief Justice Patanjali Sastri further
referred to his own dissenting judgment in
Charanjit Lal Chowdhury vs. Union of India and
Ors. (AIR 1951 SC 41) and observed that similar
view was taken in Ameerunnissa Begum’s case
22
(Supra). The former Chief Justice Patanjali
Sastri, in the same decision proceeded to
observe :
“Whenever, then, a section of the
people in a locality, in assertion of
an adverse claim, disturb a person in
the quiet enjoyment of his property,
the Bihar Government would seem to
think that it is not necessary for the
police to step in to protect him in
his enjoyment until he is evicted in
due course of law, but the Legislature
could intervene by making a “Law” to
oust the person from his possession.
Legislation such as we have now before
us is calculated to draw the vitality
from the Rules of Law which our
Constitution so unmistakably
proclaims, and it is to be hoped that
the democratic process in the country
will not function along these lines.”
17. In Ameerunnissa Begum’s case (Supra), the
former Chief Justice of India, Mr. Justice
Bijon Kumar Mukherjee, as His Lordship then
was, also applied the principles laid down in
the case of Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi’s case
(Supra) and at page 220 observed as follows:-
“What the legislature has done is
to single out these two individuals
and deny them the right which every
Indian citizen possesses to have his23
rights adjudicated upon by a judicial
tribunal in accordance with law which
applied to his case. The meanest of
citizens has a right of access to a
court of law for the redress of his
just grievances and it is from his
right that the appellants have been
deprived, by this Act. It is
impossible to conceive of a worse form
of discrimination than the one which
differentiates a particular individual
from all his fellow subjects and
visits him with a disability which is
not imposed upon anybody else and
against which even the right of
complaint is taken away. The learned
attorney general who placed his case
with his usual fairness and ability,
could not put forward any convincing
or satisfactory reason upon which this
legislation could be justified.” (See
Page 220 of this decision).
18. The observation made by His Lordship in
the aforesaid decision is also material and
therefore we reproduce the same:
“It is true that the presumption
is in favour of the constitutionality
of a legislative enactment and it has
to be presumed that a legislature
understands and correctly appreciates
the needs of its own people. But when
on the face of a statute, there is no
classification at all and no attempt
has been made to select any individual
or group with reference to any24
differentiating attribute peculiar to
that individual or group and not
possessed by others, this presumption
is of little or no assistance to the
State.”
19. Let us now look into the facts of the case
in hand. In the instant case it was submitted
that the impugned proviso was manifestly
designed to apply and was in fact applied only
against the writ petitioner and was not
intended to and could not apply even, in
principle or otherwise, to anybody else because
there was only one AIIMS in the country, there
was only one Director of the AIIMS on the date
of commencement of the Amending Act, and there
could be none else who could conceivably be
effected by its operation. It is claimed that
reference to a similar proviso introduced in
the PGI Chandigarh Act, 1956, is somewhat
misleading as the term of appointment of the
present Director of PGI Chandigarh was only
upto the age of 68 years and accordingly there
was no question under the PGI Chandigarh Act as
25
the proviso is affecting the present incumbent
or his successor.
20. It was further submitted on behalf of the
writ petitioner that the proviso itself
declares that “any person holding office as a
Director immediately before the commencement
of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences
and the Post Graduate Institute of Medial
Education and Research (Amendment) Act of 2007
shall in so far as his appointment is
inconsistent with the provisions of this sub-
section ceases to hold office on such
commencement as such Director and shall be
entitled to claim compensation not exceeding
three months’ pay and allowances for the
premature termination of his office or of any
contract of service.” (Emphasis supplied)
21. This submission, as advanced by
Mr.Jaitley, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the writ petitioner, in our view, has
26
merit that the impugned proviso does not at
all deal with the alteration of the age of
superannuation. On the contrary, it really
modifies the initial appointment on the ground
of alleged inconsistency with a subsequent
enactment and makes him entitled to
compensation for premature termination of his
office. To equate the impugned proviso with the
simple alteration of the age of superannuation
is to ignore the clear language of the proviso
itself. The proviso brings about a premature
termination and provides for compensation. A
superannuation in usual course gives rise to
ordinary retiral benefits and not to any
compensation. Again it is impossible to ignore
the force in the submission of Mr.Jaitley,
learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
the writ petitioner, that a person is being
singled out for premature termination without
any question of his being justifiably treated
as a Member of a separate and distinct class on
any rational basis, any question of
27
intelligible differentia having a nexus to the
object of classification cannot arise. It was
contended by Mr.Jaitley that in reality there
is no legislation in respect of any class but
there is legislation in respect of an
individual, a living human being requiring him
to move out of office. The Delhi High Court in
its judgment dated 29th of March, 2007 has held
that the writ petitioner was entitled to
continue as a Director upto 2nd of July, 2008
and issued a Writ of Mandamus that premature
termination could only be made for justifiable
reasons and in compliance with the principles
of natural justice. By a Writ in the nature of
Prohibition issued by the High Court, the
respondent was prohibited from implementing any
adverse decision against the writ petitioner
without giving him a period of two weeks for
approaching the High Court. It would be
appropriate at this stage to refer to the
Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
Amendment Act of 2007. It declares that with a
28
view to comply with the directions of the High
Court of Delhi in the judgment dated 29th of
March, 2007, the amendments are being
introduced. It is difficult to conceive how the
amendments are in compliance or in consonance
with the directions of the High Court. On
behalf of the writ petitioner, it was contended
and not without reason, that the amendments
were made precisely to frustrate the judgment
of the High Court reducing his search for
justice to an exercise in futility.
22. It appears that the direction No.13 in the
judgment of the Delhi High Court was not
confined or related to the particular case of
the writ petitioner as regards his right to
continue as a Director until he attains the age
of 66 years, i.e., upto 2nd of July, 2008. It
was otherwise and independently upheld in the
same judgment. It is also true that the
impugned proviso does not lay down any policy
or principle at all, but deals only with the
29
case of the writ petitioner and seeks to affect
him in isolation. After the order of the Delhi
High Court dated 29th of November, 2002, in
Health India (Registered) vs. Union of India
and Ors. [102 (2003) Delhi Law Times 19], the
writ petitioner was appointed with the approval
of the ACC as the Director at the age of 61
years on 3rd of July, 2003 for a term of five
years expiring on 2nd of July, 2008, i.e., on
attainment of the age of 66 years. Shri
R.L.Malhotra, Under Secretary to the Government
of India, in fact, by a letter to the Director,
All India Institute of Medical Sciences, Ansari
Nagar, New Delhi, conveyed the approval of the
Appointments Committee of the Cabinet for
appointment of Prof. P.Venugopal as Director,
All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New
Delhi in the pay scale of Rs.26,000/- with
Non- Practicing Allowance for a period of five
years from the date he assumes charge of the
post and until further orders. He will also
continue as Professor in the Department of
30
Cardiovascular and Thoracic Surgery, AIIMS, New
Delhi. The appointment of the Director, PGI,
Chandigarh, was restricted upto the age of
62 years and his appointment does not bear any
comparison with the instant case.
23. The learned Single Judge of the Delhi High
Court in the writ Petition being W.P.[C]
No.10687/2006 on 7th of July, 2006, inter alia,
observed that “the petitioner has not been
given any notice and according to him his
tenure of five years could not be curtailed on
the grounds which are not justifiable…”and then
proceeded to injunct the respondent against
premature termination of the term of the writ
petitioner. The learned Single Judge reiterated
and re-emphasized the prohibition against the
respondent by subsequent order dated 18th of
October, 2006 (See Pages 89-118 of Vol.1)
24. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court
by its judgment dated 29th of March, 2007 has
31
rendered an effective and binding determination
of the right of the writ petitioner to continue
as Director for five years upto 2nd of July,
2008. In the said judgment (at P.127 of Vol.I),
the learned Judge of the High Court has
referred to the AIIMS Regulations and
particularly to Clause 5 thereof which provides
for fixed tenure of five years for the Member
of the Governing Body as the Director being
full fledged Member of the Governing Body and
not an Ex-officio Member and was entitled to
the benefit of his tenure as a Member, and
could not justifiably be deprived of the same.
The writ petitioner is, however, being singled
out and treated differently from other Members
of the Governing Body. In this connection,
reference can be made to Sections 4, 6 and 10
of the AIIMS Act, 1956 which are relevant for
our purpose. Accordingly, we quote relevant
provisions as indicated herein above:-
Section 4 - Composition of the
Institute -
32
The Institute shall consist of the
following members, namely :-
(a) the Vice-Chancellor of the Delhi
University, ex-officio;
(b) the Director General of Health
Services, Government of India, ex
officio;
(c) the Director of the Institute, ex
officio;
(d) two representatives of the
Central Government to be
nominated by that Government, one
from the Ministry of Finance and
one from the Ministry of
Education;
(e) five persons of whom one shall be
a non-medical scientist
representing the Indian Science
Congress Association, to be
nominated by the Central
Government;
(f) four representatives of the
medical faculties of Indian
Universities to be nominated by
the Central Government in the
manner prescribed by rules; and
(g) three members of Parliament of
whom two shall be elected from
33
among themselves by the members
of the House of the People and
one from among themselves by the
members of the Council of States.
Section 6 – Term of office of, and
vacancies among, members –
(1) Save as otherwise provided in the
section, the term of office of a
member shall be five years from
the date of his nomination or
election:
Provided that the term of office of a
member elected under clause (g) of
section 4 shall come to an end as soon
as he [becomes a Minister or Minister
of State or Deputy Minister, or the
Speaker or the Deputy Speaker of the
House of the People, or the Deputy
Chairman of the Council of States or]
ceases to be a member of the House
from which he was elected.
(2) The term of office of an ex
officio member shall continue so
long as he holds the office in
virtue of which he is such a
member.
(3) The term of office of a member
nominated or elected to fill a
casual vacancy shall continue for
34
the remainder of the term of the
member in whose place he is
nominated or elected.
(4) An outgoing member shall, unless
the Central Government otherwise
directs, continue in office until
another person is nominated or
elected as a member in his place.
(5) An outgoing member shall be
eligible for re-nomination or re-
election.
(6) A member may resign his office by
writing under his hand addressed
to the Central Government but he
shall continue in office until
his resignation is accepted by
that Government.
(7) The manner of filing vacancies
among members shall be such as
may be prescribed by rules.
Section 10 – Governing Body and other
Committees of the Institute _
(1) There shall be a Governing Body
of the Institute which shall be
constituted by the Institute from
among its members in such manner
35
as may be prescribed by
regulations.
(2) The Governing Body shall be the
executive committee of the
Institute and shall exercise such
powers and discharge such
functions as the Institute may,
by regulations made in this
behalf, confer or impose upon it.
(3) The President of the Institute
shall be the Chairman of the
Governing Body and as Chairman
thereof shall exercise such
powers and discharge such
functions as may be prescribed by
regulations.
(4) The procedure to be followed in
the exercise of its powers and
discharge of its functions by the
Governing Body, and the term of
office of, and the manner of
filling vacancies among, the
members of the Governing Body
shall be such as may be
prescribed by regulations.
(5) Subject to such control and
restrictions as may be prescribed
by rules, the Institute may
constitute as many standing
committees and as many ad hoc
committees as it thinks fit for
exercising any power or
discharging any function of the
Institute or for inquiring into
36
or reporting or advising upon,
any matter which the Institute
may refer to them.
(6) A standing committee shall
consist exclusively of members of
the Institute; but an ad hoc
committee may include persons who
are not members of the Institute
but the number of such persons
shall not exceed one half of its
total membership.
(7) The Chairman and members of the
Governing body and the Chairman
and members of a standing
committee or an ad hoc committee
shall receive such allowances, if
any, as may be prescribed by
regulations.”
25. Keeping the provisions, as noted herein
above, in our mind, we now proceed to take up
the question in hand. The tenure of the writ
petitioner as a Director to act as a Member of
the Governing Body is for five years which
expires on 2nd of July, 2008 on the basis of
his initial appointment and, therefore, it is
not in dispute that it was a tenure appointment
which could not be otherwise dealt with. It was
37
seriously contended by Mr.Parasaran, learned
senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent, that reliance on the Delhi High
Court’s judgment and orders particularly those
of the learned Single Judge dated 7th of July,
2006 and 18th of October, 2006 and the order
dated 29th of March, 2007 of the Division Bench
was wholly misconceived as the two orders of
the Single Judge were interim orders and the
special leave petition against the orders of
the Division Bench was pending before this
Court. It was also contended by Mr.Parasaran,
learned senior counsel for the respondent that
the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner
in the Delhi High Court is still pending before
the learned Single Judge and therefore, it was
pointed out on behalf of the respondent that in
such view of the matter, no reliance could be
placed upon the decision in Madan Mohan Pathak
and Anr. vs. Union of India and Ors. [(1978) 2
SCC 50] and in the case of A.V.Nachane and
Anr. vs. Union of India and Anr. [(1982)1 SCC
38
205]. It is true that respondent has, no doubt,
raised the plea that the judgment of the
Division Bench is under challenge before this
Court and, therefore, it has not yet attained
the kind of finality which was there in Madan
Mohan Pathak’s case. In Madan Mohan Pathak’s
case (Supra), the question of finality was
taken into consideration only for the purpose
of enforceability of the direction of the
Calcutta High Court in respect of payment of
bonus under the settlement of Class III and
Class IV employees and it was held that
irrespective of the question of
Constitutionality of the Amendment Act, the
Calcutta High Court judgment operating inter
parties and becoming final was enforceable. In
this connection, Para 8 of the decision in
Madan Mohan Pathak’s case is important for the
purpose of the present case. Accordingly, we
reproduce the said paragraph which runs as
under :-
“It is significant to note that there
was no reference to the judgment of
39
the Calcutta High Court in the
Statement of Objects and Reasons, nor
any non-obstante clause referring to a
judgment of a court in Section 3 of
the impugned Act. The attention of
Parliament does not appear to have
been drawn to the fact that the
Calcutta High Court has already issued
a writ of Mandamus commanding the Life
Insurance Corporation to pay the
amount of bonus for the year 1st
April, 1975 to 31st March, 1976. It
appears that unfortunately the
judgment of the Calcutta High Court
remained almost unnoticed and the
impugned Act was passed in ignorance
of that judgment. Section 3 of the
impugned Act provided that the
provisions of the Settlement in so far
as they relate to payment of annual
cash bonus to Class III and Class IV
employees shall not have any force or
effect and shall not be deemed to have
had any force or effect from 1st
April, 1975. But the writ of Mandamus
issued by the Calcutta High Court
directing the Life Insurance
Corporation to pay the amount of bonus
for the year 1st April, 1975 to
31st March, 1976 remained untouched by
the impugned Act. So far as the right
of Class III and Class IV employees to
annual cash bonus for the year 1st
April, 1975 to 31st March, 1976 was
concerned, it became crystallised in
the judgment and thereafter they
became entitled to enforce the writ of
Mandamus granted by the judgment and
not any right to annual cash bonus
under the settlement. This right under
the judgment was not sought to be
40
taken away by the impugned Act. The
judgment continued to subsist and the
Life Insurance Corporation was bound
to pay annual cash bonus to Class III
and Class IV employees for the year
1st April, 1975 to 31st March, 1976 in
obedience to the writ of Mandamus. The
error committed by the Life Insurance
Corporation was that it withdrew the
Letters Patent Appeal and allowed the
judgment of the learned Single Judge
to become final. By the time the
Letters Patent Appeal came up for
hearing, the impugned Act had already
come into force and the Life Insurance
Corporation could, therefore, have
successfully contended in the Letters
Patent Appeal that, since the
Settlement, in as far as it provided
for payment of annual cash bonus, was
annihilated by the impugned Act with
effect from 1st April, 1975, Class III
and Class IV employees were not
entitled to annual cash bonus for the
year 1st April, 1975 to 31st March,
1976 and hence no writ of Mandamus
could issue directing the Life
Insurance Corporation to make payment
of such bonus. If such contention had
been raised, there is little doubt,
subject of course to any
constitutional challenge to the
validity of the impugned Act, that the
judgment of the learned Single Judge
would have been upturned and the Writ
petition dismissed. But on account of
some inexplicable reason, which is
difficult to appreciate, the Life
Insurance Corporation did not press
the Letters Patent Appeal and the
result was that the judgment of the
41
learned Single Judge granting writ of
Mandamus became final and binding on
the parties. It is difficult to see
how in these circumstances the Life
Insurance Corporation could claim to
be absolved from the obligation
imposed by the judgment to carry out
the Writ of Mandamus by relying on the
impugned Act.”
26. Mr. Justice P.N. Bhagwati, former Chief
Justice of India in that decision at Para 8
pointed out that Life Insurance Corporation
(Modification and Settlement) Act, 1976 was
enacted apparently in ignorance of the Calcutta
High Court judgment and the attention of the
Parliament was not drawn to that judgment at
all. It was also pointed out in that decision
at para 8 that there was no reference to the
said judgment in the Statement of Objects and
Reasons nor any non-obstante clause
incorporating in Section 3 of the impugned Act
in that case to override the judgment. This
Court has been moved by the respondent in the
writ application challenging the propriety of
42
certain directions issued by the Delhi High
Court requiring the respondent to take approval
of ACC for any adverse decision against the
writ petitioner and for giving the writ
petitioner two weeks’ time against any such
adverse decision. This Court has, however,
declined to pass any interim order in the SLP
filed by the respondent. Therefore, the
interim order or final order of the Delhi High
Court would remain binding upon the parties for
the time being and they cannot be ignored or
disregarded unless they are modified or leave
is granted to take any step contrary thereto.
It may not be out of place to mention that the
SLP of the respondent indicates that the term
of office of five years of the writ petitioner
as Director was not really in dispute. In the
Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act
introducing the impugned proviso, it is stated
that the same is being introduced with a view
to comply with the direction of the High Court
in the judgment and order dated 29th of March,
43
2007. It, however, appears that the Division
Bench of the Delhi High Court has determined
the question of tenure of the writ petitioner
to be five years and there are writs in the
nature of Mandamus and Prohibition issued by
the Delhi High Court directing the right of the
writ petitioner indicated in the respective
orders. As in Madan Mohan Pathak’s case(para 8),
as quoted herein above, in the instant case
also the Parliament does not seem to have been
apprised about the pendency of the proceedings
before the Delhi High Court and this Court and
declaration made and directions issued by the
Delhi High Court at different stages. In the
impugned amendment, there is no non-obstante
clause. The impugned amendment introducing the
proviso, therefore, cannot be treated to be a
validating Act. This Court in the case of
Dr.L.P.Agarwal vs. Union of India and Ors.
[(1992) 3 SCC 526 (Para 16)] observed as
follows :-
“We have given our thoughtful
consideration to the reasoning and the
44
conclusions reached by the High Court.
We are not inclined to agree with the
same. Under the Recruitment Rules the
post of Director of the AIIMS is a
tenure post. The said rules further
provide the method of direct
recruitment for filling the post.
These service-conditions make the post
of Director a tenure post and as such
the question of superannuating or
prematurely retiring the incumbent of
the said post does not arise. The age
of 62 years provided under Proviso to
Regulation 30(2) of the Regulations
only shows that no employee of the
AIIMS can be given extension beyond
that age. This has obviously been done
for maintaining efficiency in the
Institute-Services. We do not agree
that simply because the appointment
order of the appellant mentions that
“he is appointed for a period of five
years or till he attains the age of 62
years”, the appointment ceases to be
to a tenure-post. Even an outsider
(not an existing employee of the
AIIMS) can be selected and appointed
to the post of Director. Can such
person be retired prematurely
curtailing his tenure of five years?
Obviously not. The appointment of the
appellant was on a Five Years Tenure
but it could be curtailed in the event
of his attaining the age of 62 years
before completing the said tenure. The
High Court failed to appreciate the
simple alphabet of the service
jurisprudence. The High Court’s
reasoning is against the clear and
unambiguous language of the
Recruitment Rules. The said rules
45
provide “Tenure for five years
inclusive of one year probation” and
the post is to be filled “by direct
recruitment”. Tenure means a term
during which an office is held. It is
a condition of holding the office.
Once a person is appointed to a tenure
post, his appointment to the said
office begins when he joins and it
comes to an end on the completion of
the tenure unless curtailed on
justifiable grounds. Such a person
does not superannuate, he only goes
out of the office on completion of his
tenure. The question of prematurely
retiring him does not arise. The
appointment order gave a clear tenure
to the appellant. The High Court fell
into error in reading “the concept of
superannuation” in the said order.
Concept of superannuation which is
well understood in the service
jurisprudence is alien to tenure
appointments which have a fixed life
span. The appellant could not
therefore have been prematurely
retired and that too without being put
on any notice whatsoever. Under what
circumstances can an appointment for a
tenure be cut short is not a matter
which requires our immediate
consideration in this case because the
order impugned before the High Court
concerned itself only with premature
retirement and the High Court also
dealt with that aspect of the matter
only. This court’s judgment in
Dr. Bool Chand v. The Chancellor
Kurukshetra University relied upon by
the High Court is not on the point
involved in this case. In that case
46
the tenure of Dr. Bool Chand was
curtailed as he was found unfit to
continue as Vice-Chancellor having
regard to his antecedents which were
not disclosed by him at the time of
his appointment as Vice-Chancellor.
Similarly the judgment in Dr. D.C.
Saxena v. State of Haryana has no
relevance to the facts of this case”.
27. From the above quotation, as made in para
16 of the said decision of this Court, it is
evident that this Court has laid down that the
term of 5 years for a Director of AIIMS is a
permanent term. Service Conditions make the
post of Director a tenure post and as such the
question of superannuating or prematurely
retiring the incumbent of the said post does
not arise at all. Even an outsider (not an
existing employee of the AIIMS) can be selected
and appointed to the post of Director. The
appointment is for a tenure to which principle
of superannuation does not apply. “Tenure”
means a term during which the office is held.
It is a condition of holding the office. Once a
person is appointed to a tenure post, his
47
appointment to the said post begins when he
joins and it comes to an end on the completion
of tenure unless curtailed on justifiable
grounds. Such a person does not superannuate,
he only goes out of the office on completion of
his tenure. It was in 1958 that AIIMS had
framed its regulations under Section 29 of the
Act. Regulation 30-A was brought into AIIMS
Regulation by an amendment dated 25th of July,
1981 notified in the Gazette on 10th of
October, 1981 coming into force w.e.f. 1st of
August, 1981. The provision of Regulation 30-A
was very much in existence when this court had
decided the case of Dr.L.P.Agarwal on 21st of
July, 1992. It is the same provision of
Regulation 30-A which was brought into force
w.e.f. 1st of August, 1981 in the AIIMS
Regulations and had been re-numbered as
Regulation 31, when the AIIMS 1958 Regulations
had been substituted by AIIMS Regulations,
1999. Therefore, it is incorrect on the part of
the respondent to contend that Regulation 31
48
was introduced in the AIIMS Regulations only
after the judgment of this Court in
Dr. L.P.Agarwal’s case.
28. This question was specifically deliberated
upon by Justice Kuldip Singh, as His Lordship
then was, in Dr.L.P.Agarwal’s case and a
question was formulated on this aspect at page
530 of the said decision. After formulating
the aforesaid question, a submission on behalf
of the respondent was also considered by this
Court in the aforesaid decision at paragraph 13
page 532 of the said decision which is as
follows:-
“The respondent argued before the High
Court that the appellant was retired
by the AIIMS under Regulation 30(3) of
the Regulations in public interest
after he attained the age of 55 years.
It was further contended that
fundamental Rule 56(j) was also
applicable to the AIIMS employees by
virtue of Regulation 35 of the
Regulations. It was argued that even
if Regulation 30(3) was not attracted
the Institute had the power to
prematurely retire the appellant, in
public interest, under fundamental
Rule 56(j) applicable to the Central49
Government employees. It was contended
that despite the fact that the
appellant was on a tenure post there
was no bar to prematurely retire him
by invoking either Regulation 30(3) or
Fundamental Rule 56(j).
29. After formulating the question and after
considering the submission made on behalf of
the parties, this Court in that decision at
para 16 of page 531 concluded in the following
manner:-
“We have given our thoughtful
consideration to the reasoning and the
conclusions reached by the High Court.
We are not inclined to agree with the
same. Under the Recruitment Rules the
post of Director of the AIIMS is a
tenure post. The said rules further
provide the method of direct
recruitment for filling the post.
These service-conditions make the post
of Director a tenure post and as such
the question of superannuating or
prematurely retiring the incumbent of
the said post does not arise. The age
of 62 years provided under Proviso to
Regulation 30(2) of the Regulations
only shows that no employee of the
AIIMS can be given extension beyond
that age. This has obviously been done
for maintaining efficiency in the
Institute-Services. We do not agree
that simply because the appointment
order of the appellant mentions that
50
“he is appointed for a period of five
years or till he attains the age of 62
years”, the appointment ceases to be
to a tenure-post. Even an outsider
(not an existing employee of the
AIIMS) can be selected and appointed
to the post of Director. Can such
person be retired prematurely
curtailing his tenure of five years?
Obviously not. The appointment of the
appellant was on a Five Years Tenure
but it could be curtailed in the event
of his attaining the age of 62 years
before completing the said tenure. The
High Court failed to appreciate the
simple alphabet of the service
jurisprudence. The High Court’s
reasoning is against the clear and
unambiguous language of the
Recruitment Rules. The said rules
provide “Tenure for five years
inclusive of one year probation” and
the post is to be filled “by direct
recruitment”. Tenure means a term
during which an office is held. It is
a condition of holding the office.
Once a person is appointed to a tenure
post, his appointment to the said
office begins when he joins and it
comes to an end on the completion of
the tenure unless curtailed on
justifiable grounds. Such a person
does not superannuate, he only goes
out of the office on completion of his
tenure. The question of prematurely
retiring him does not arise. The
appointment order gave a clear tenure
to the appellant. The High Court fell
into error in reading “the concept of
superannuation” in the said order.
Concept of superannuation which is
51
well understood in the service
jurisprudence is alien to tenure
appointments which have a fixed life
span. The appellant could not
therefore have been prematurely
retired and that too without being put
on any notice whatsoever. Under what
circumstances can an appointment for a
tenure be cut short is not a matter
which requires our immediate
consideration in this case because the
order impugned before the High Court
concerned itself only with premature
retirement and the High Court also
dealt with that aspect of the matter
only. This court’s judgment in Dr.
Bool Chand v. The Chancellor
Kurukshetra University relied upon by
the High Court is not on the point
involved in this case. In that case
the tenure of Dr. Bool Chand was
curtailed as he was found unfit to
continue as Vice-Chancellor having
regard to his antecedents which were
not disclosed by him at the time of
his appointment as Vice-Chancellor.
Similarly the judgment in Dr. D.C.
Saxena v. State of Haryana has no
relevance to the facts of this case”.
30. From the aforesaid discussion, the
principle of law stipulated by this Court that
curtailment of the term of five years can only
be made for justifiable reasons and compliance
with principles of natural justice for
52
premature termination of the term of a Director
of AIIMS – squarely applied also to the case
of the writ petitioner as well and will also
apply to any future Director of AIIMS. Thus
there was never any permissibility for any
artificial and impermissible classification
between the writ petitioner on the one hand and
any future Director of AIIMS on the other when
it relates to the premature termination of the
term of office of the Director. Such an
impermissible over classification through a one
man legislation clearly falls foul of Article
14 of the Constitution being an apparent case
of “naked discrimination” in our democratic
civilized society governed by Rule of Law and
renders the impugned proviso as void, ab initio
and unconstitutional.
31. Such being our discussion and conclusion,
on the constitutionality of the proviso to
Section 11A, we must, therefore, come to this
conclusion without any hesitation in mind, that
53
the instant case is squarely covered by the
principles of law laid down by this Court in
the various pronouncements as noted herein
above including in the case of D.S.Reddy vs.
Chancellor, Osmania University and Ors.
[1967 (2) SCR 214). In the case of D.S.Reddy
(supra), the facts of that case are somewhat
similar to that of the writ petitioner. In that
decision, D.S.Reddy was already a Vice-
Chancellor for the past seven years and had not
challenged the fixation of term from five years
to three years. He was aggrieved by the second
amendment in the University Act whereby Section
13A was introduced to make the provision of
Section 12(2) providing for inquiry by an Hon.
Judge of High Court/Supreme Court and hearing
before premature termination of the term of the
Vice-Chancellor inapplicable to the incumbent
to the office of the Vice-Chancellor on the
commencement of the 2nd Amendment. The core
contention of D.S.Reddy was that this amendment
was only for his removal and therefore was a
54
case of “naked discrimination” as it also
deprived the protection of Section 12(2) to him
when Section 12(2) was applicable to all other
Vice-Chancellors and there being no distinction
in this regard between the Vice-Chancellor in
office and the Vice-Chancellors to be
appointed. In that situation, the plea of the
respondent-Government was that the provision
similar to Section 13A was also incorporated in
two other enactments relating to Andhra
University and Shri Venkateswara and was,
therefore, not a one man legislation. It was
further contended by the State that it was
always open and permissible to the State
Legislature to treat the Vice-Chancellor in
office as a class in itself and make provisions
in that regard. All the contentions on behalf
of the State Government were rejected by the
Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in
the case of D.S.Reddy (supra) and it was held
that it was a clear case of “naked
discrimination” for removal of one man and by
55
depriving him of the protection under Section
12(2) of the Act without there being any
rationality of creating a classification
between the Vice-Chancellor in office and the
Vice-Chancellor to be appointed in future. It
was further held in the case of D.S.Reddy that
such a classification was not founded on an
intelligible differentia and was held to be
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India. Accordingly, the provision of Section
13A was held to be ultra vires and
unconstitutional and hit by Article 14 of the
Constitution. Similarly in the present case,
the impugned proviso to Section 11(1A) itself
states that it is carrying out premature
termination of the tenure of the writ
petitioner. It is also admitted that such a
premature termination is without following the
safeguards of justifiable reasons and notice.
It is thus a case similar to the case of
D.S.Reddy and other decisions cited above that
the impugned legislation is hit by Article 14
56
as it creates an unreasonable classification
between the writ petitioner and the future
Directors and deprives the writ petitioner of
the principles of natural justice without there
being any intelligible differentia.
32. In view of our discussion made hereinabove
and for the reasons aforesaid, we are of the
view that this writ petition is covered by the
decisions of this Court in the case of
D.S.Reddy and L.P.Agarwal and the impugned
proviso to Section 11A of the AIIMS Act is,
therefore, hit by Article 14 of the
Constitution. Accordingly, we hold that the
proviso is ultra vires and unconstitutional and
accordingly it is struck down. The writ
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution
is allowed. In view of our order passed in the
writ petition, the writ petitioner shall serve
the nation for some more period, i.e., upto
2nd of July, 2008. We direct the AIIMS
Authorities to restore the writ petitioner in
57
his office as Director of AIIMS till his period
comes to an end on 2nd of July, 2008. The writ
petitioner is also entitled to his pay and
other emoluments as he was getting before
premature termination of his office from the
date of his order of termination. Considering
the facts and circumstances of the present
case, there will be no order as to costs.
…………………………………………J.
[TARUN CHATTERJEE]
New Delhi: …………………………………………J.
May 8, 2008 [HARJIT SINGH BEDI]
58
59