JUDGMENT
L. Narasimha Reddy, J.
1. One Mr. Krishna, the husband of the first appellant, father of appellants 2 and 3 and son of respondents 3 and 4, is an agricultural labourer of Kallakal Village, Medak District. On 1-4-1996 at 7.30 p.m. he was crossing the road, by the side of National Highway No. 7, with a bag of rice on his head. A jeep bearing No. API 6475, owned by the first respondent and insured with the second respondent herein, dashed against him and he died on account of the injuries. The appellants and respondents 3 and 4 herein filed O.P. No. 375 of 1996 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-cum-District Judge, Medak at Sangareddy, claiming a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- as compensation, under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short ‘the Act’) and O.P. No. 376 of 1996, for a sum of Rs. 50,000/- as compensation, towards no fault liability, under Section 140 of the Act.
2. Through a common order, dated 30-10-1998, the Tribunal dismissed O.P. No. 376 of 1996 and awarded a sum of Rs. 1,20,000/- as compensation in O.P. No. 375 of 1996. However it held that the appellants are entitled to be paid half of the awarded amount, on the ground that the deceased was equally liable for the accident. Since compensation was awarded under Section 166 of the Act, it dismissed the O.P. filed under Section 140 of the Act. The appellants seek enhancement of the compensation.
3. Sri A. Sudershan Reddy, the learned Counsel for the appellants submits that the Tribunal was not justified in treating the income of the deceased at Rs. 500/- per month and applying the multiplier ’15’, particularly when the Parliament itself had supplied the parameters in Schedule-II to the Act. He further contends that it was neither pleaded nor established by respondents 1 and 2 that there was any contributory negligence on the part of the deceased. The first respondent remained ex parte before the Tribunal and therefore, he is treated as not necessary in this civil miscellaneous appeal.
4. On behalf of the second respondent-Insurance Company, Sri D. Vijaya Shankar, the learned Counsel, submits that the circumstances, under which the accident occurred, clearly disclose that the deceased was unmindful of the traffic on a National Highway and had contributed substantially for the accident. He further submits that the Tribunal had applied the correct and relevant parameters in computing the compensation and that the same does not warrant interference.
5. The occurrence of the accident and the death of the deceased, on account of the same, are matters of record. On the issue relating to the liability for the accident, the Tribunal took into account the evidence of P.W. 2, who was standing in the Bus Stand, at the time of accident. He deposed that the deceased was crossing the road with a rice bag on his head and in the meanwhile, the said Jeep came and hit him. The Tribunal proceeded mostly on the basis that the deceased was negligent in crossing the road. It needs to be noted that Ex. A.1 -First Information Report and Ex.A.2-Charge-sheet were issued against the driver of the Jeep, alleging that he alone was responsible for the accident. Apart from that, just as it is incumbent upon and necessary for the claimants to prove the negligence on the part of the driver of the vehicle, it is equally incumbent upon the owner and insurer of the vehicle, to plead and prove the contributory negligence on the part of the deceased or the injured, as the case may be. In the absence of any such plea and evidence, the Tribunal would not be justified in drawing inferences. In the instant case, though a plea was raised, alleging that the deceased was also guilty of contributory negligence, no evidence was adduced by respondents 1 and 2.
6. No Law prohibits the use of road by pedestrians. Crossing the road is not an offence. Even where an individual is found to be walking on the road or crossing it, unmindful of the traffic, the responsibility of a driver of a motor vehicle increases, to ensure that no untoward incident occurs. A driver of the vehicle cannot plead justification for the accident, on the ground that the pedestrian or the individual was unmindful of the traffic rules.
7. There may be cases, where in spite of all precautions taken by the driver of the vehicle, an accident may have occurred, on account of the negligence, exclusive or part, of a pedestrian. The extent of liability, in such cases, must be pleaded and proved by cogent evidence. Therefore, this Court is not in agreement with the finding recorded by the Tribunal that the deceased was also equally responsible for the accident.
8. The deceased was an agricultural labourer. Obviously, there does not exist any record to speak about the extent of his income. It is to meet such contingencies, that the Parliament introduced Schedule-II to the Act. Clause (6) thereof provides that where no evidence exists, at to the income of an individual, who died in an accident, it has to be treated notionally at Rs. 15,000/-per annum and one-third of it has to be deducted towards personal expenditure of the individual. Thereby, the minimum loss of contribution, on account of death of the individual, would be Rs. 10,000/- per annum. Schedule II to the Act had also indicated the multipliers to be applied, depending on the age of concerned individuals. The deceased was aged 25 years. The multiplier stipulated for such age is ’18’. Schedule-II to the Act also provides for payment of a sum of Rs. 5,000/- towards consortium, Rs. 2,500/- towards loss of estate and Rs. 2,000/- towards funeral expenses. Thus the total compensation would come to Rs. 1,89,500/-. The appellants have filed the O.P. No. 375 of 1996, claiming a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- and they did not file any application for amendment of the O.P. either before the Tribunal or before this Court. Hence, the compensation has to be restricted to Rs. 1,50,000/-.
9. Therefore, the civil miscellaneous appeal is allowed, enhancing the amount of compensation from Rs. 1,20,000/- to Rs. 1,50,000/-. The enhanced amount of compensation shall carry interest at the rate of 7.5% and it shall be distributed among appellants 1 to 3 and respondents 3 and 4, in the same proportion, as directed by the Tribunal in its order. There shall be no order as to costs.