JUDGMENT
Tarun Agarwala, J.
1. The petitioner claims to be the owner of plot No. 25/1 and plot No. 22 measuring 43 decimal and 20,5 decimal respectively situate at village Habibpura, Pargana Dehat Amanat. Tehsil and District Varanasi. The petitioner alleged that the plot originally belonged to one Gajadhar and upon his death the property was partitioned between his two sons, namely, Lakshmi Narain and Shiv Shanker. After the death of Lakshmi Narain his share devolved upon his widow Smt. Bhutani. The petitioner contended that he became the owner of the plot by virtue of the registered sale deed dated 24.1.1971 executed by Smt. Bhutani in his favour. It was further stated that after purchasing the aforesaid property the petitioner moved an application for mutation in his name. The co-sharer, Ram Kishore, son of Shiv Shanker filed an objection and the matter is still pending in the Revenue Court as well as in the Civil Court, on account of which the petitioner’s name could not be mutated in the revenue records. The petitioner contended that on 24.3.2000 the staff and the employees of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 started measuring the disputed land. The petitioner made inquiries from the office of the District Magistrate and Varanasi Development Authority, Varanasi and then came to know that the notification under Section 4 dated 19.11.1981 and the notification under Section 6, dated 30.11.1981 had been issued under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to the ‘Act’) for acquiring the land for a public purpose.
2. The petitioner contended that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 failed to make the public announcement by beat of drum or by affixing a public notice in the locality after the issuance of the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, and therefore, the petitioner was unaware of the land acquisition proceedings. It was contended that the non-compliance of the public announcement invalidated the notification under Section 4 of the Act. The petitioner further contended that the notification under Sections 4 and 6 had lapsed and the plot is liable to be reverted back to the petitioner in view of Section 11A of the Act since the award was not made within two years from the date of the publication of the declaration. It was asserted that after issuance of the notification under Section 17(1) of the Act, the Collector failed to take possession of the acquired land nor any proceedings were initiated under Sections 8, 9 and 11 of the Act and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings are deemed to have been lapsed in view of Section 11A of the Act. The petitioner further submitted that other plot owners whose land had also been acquired under the aforesaid notifications had challenged the said notifications by means of various writ petitions, which were finally, decided in the year 1995 and even after the said decision the Collector took no steps to start the proceedings under Sections 8, 9 and 11 of the Act, nor took possession of the land within two years from the date of the dismissal of the writ petitions and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings had lapsed in view of Section 11A of the Act. In view of the assertions made by the petitioner, the petitioner in the present petition prayed that a mandamus be issued to respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 directing them not to measure the land or prepare the map or take possession of the plot of the petitioner.
3. The Sate of Uttar Pradesh and the District Magistrate, Varanasi have filed a counter-affidavit. In paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit it has been contended that the name of Smt. Bhutani does not figure in the revenue records nor her husband’s name was ever recorded in the revenue records and only the name of one Kishore had been recorded as Bhumidhar of Plot No. 25/1. In paragraph 9 of the counter-affidavit it has been submitted that the notification under Section 4(1) and (6) of the Act, was duly published in the gazette and public notice of substance was given at convenient places in the locality, as envisaged under the aforesaid section. It was also submitted that the notice under Section 9 was also given to the recorded tenure holders of the area as early as on 16.12.1982 after demarcation and survey of the land was made by the competent authority under Section 8 of the Act. It was further submitted that some of the tenure holders, who received the notice under Section 9 of the Act, had filed objections before the Collector, Varanasi. In paragraph 10 of the counter-affidavit, the respondents contended that several tenure holders filed writ petitions before this Hon’ble Court challenging the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, which were decided on various dates namely, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14885 of 1982, Atma Ram Dhaniya v. State of U.P. and Ors., decided on 10.9.1990; Writ Petition No. 15173 of 1982, Tuliya v. State, decided on 25.11.1997; Writ Petition No. 15175 of 1982. Bhagwan Das v. State of U.P.. decided on 25.11.1997; Writ
Petition No. 1769 of 1982, Chandra Shekhar Pandey v. State of U.P., decided on 18.11.1997, Writ Petition No. 66 of 1983. Ram Kishore v. State of U.P., decided on 30.10.1995, which relates to the impugned plot in question. The respondents contended that in all the aforesaid writ petitions interim orders were passed by this Hon’ble Court restraining dispossession of the writ petitioners and, therefore, the possession of the land could not be taken inspite of the issuance of notice under Section 9(1) of the Act. It was further stated that the respondents came to now about the dismissal of the aforesaid writ petitions vide letter dated 8.5.2000 of the Law Officer of Varanasi Development Authority and thereafter steps were initiated for taking possession of the land on 9.5.2000 and the possession was handed over to the Varanasi Development Authority on 10.5.2000. The aforesaid paragraph Nos. 4, 9 an 10 of the counter-affidavit have not been specifically denied by the petitioner in his rejoinder-affidavit. In paragraph 5 of the rejoinder-affidavit, the petitioner admits that the revenue authorities failed to enter the name of the petitioner in the revenue records inspite of the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and the Naib Tehsildar, Varanasi on account of litigation with the co-sharer. The petitioner in paragraph 10 of the rejoinder-affidavit has not denied that after issuance of notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, public notice was not made at convenient places in the locality nor has he denied that the notice under Section 9 was not given to the recorded tenure holders. The petitioner has also not denied that the respondents have taken possession of the land on 10.5.2000. The petitioner in paragraph 11 of the rejoinder-affidavit has not denied that various writ petitions were filed by other tenure holders including the co-sharer challenging the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, which were dismissed on various dates by this High Court nor has denied that the State Government came to know about the dismissal of the writ petition vide letter dated 8.5.2000 of the Law Officer of Varanasi Development Authority.
4. We have heard Sri S.O.P. Agarwal, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Shrish Chand Khare, the learned standing counsel appearing for the State of U.P. and District Magistrate, Varanasi respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and Sri Satish Chaturvedi, learned counsel appearing for Varanasi Development Authority, respondent No. 3.
5. The sheet anchor of the petitioner’s plea is that the land acquisition proceedings have lapsed in view of Section 11A of the Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that since the award was not made within a period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration, the entire proceedings in the acquisition of the land lapsed and the said land was liable to be reverted back to the petitioner. It was further contended that the interim order of the Court came to an end, when the writ petitions of other tenure holders were finally decided in the year 1995 and even then no steps were taken by the respondents to complete the proceedings under Sections 8, 9 and 11 of the Act nor possession was taken within a period of two years from 1995. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the following decisions, namely. Ram Jiyawan v. State of U.P. and Ors., AIR 1994 All 38; Yusuf Bhai Noor Mohmmad Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat and Ors., AIR 1991 SC 2153 and Abdul Majeed Sahib and Anr. v. District Collector and Ors., AIR 1997 SC 2130. In the aforesaid decisions it has been held that if the award is not made within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act, the acquisition proceedings will lapse.
6. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner has no force and is liable to be rejected. The decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner are totally distinguishable and are not applicable to the present case. In the aforesaid cases (supra), the provision of Section 17(1) of the Act was not invoked and it became obligatory on the authority to make an award within two years from the date of the publication of the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act.
7. In the present case, the notification dated 30.11.1981 was issued under Section 6 read with Section 17(1) of the Act, authorising the Collector to take possession of the land after issuance of notice under Section 9(1) even though the award under Section 11 had not been made. Pursuant to the said notification, notices under Section 9 were issued to the recorded tenure holders, but the possession could not be taken on account of the interim orders passed in various writ petitions. The proceedings for taking possession of the land were again initiated after the disposal of the writ petitions, when the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 received information on 8.5.2000, whereupon, the possession was taken and handed over to the Varanasi Development Authority on 10.5.2000.
8. In Satendra Prasad Jain and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors., (1993) 4 SCC 369 at 374, the Supreme Court held :
“When Section 17(1) is applied by reason of urgency, Government takes possession of the land prior to the making of the award under Section 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of the title to the land which is vested in the Government. Section 17(1) states so in unmistakable terms. Clearly Section 11A, can have no application to cases of acquisition under Section 17 because the land has already vested in the Government and there is no provision in the said Act by which land statutory vested in the Government can revert to the owner.”
9. The same view was again reiterated by the Supreme Court in Awadh Bihari Yadav and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors., (1995) 6 SCC 31 at 37 wherein, it was held :
“In this case, the Government had taken possession of the land in question under Section 17(1) of the Act. It is not open to the Government to withdraw from the acquisition (Section 48 of the Act). In such a case. Section 11A of the Act is not attracted and the acquisition proceedings would not lapse, even if it is assumed that no award was made within the period prescribed by Section 11A of the Act.”
10. In view of the clear dictum laid down by the Supreme Court, we hold that since the possession of the land was taken by the Government after invoking Section 17(1) of the Act, the provisions of Section 11A is not attracted and the acquisition proceeding in the instant case did not lapse, even though, it is assumed that no award was made within the prescribed period, as envisaged under Section 11A of the Act. We further hold that since the Government took the possession of the land, the land vests absolutely with the Government free from all encumbrances, as contemplated under Section 17(1) and cannot be reverted back to the petitioner.
11. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that after the dismissal of the writ petition, the respondents did not take possession nor made the award within two years and, therefore, the provision of Section 11A is attracted. The petitioner since urged that the possession of the land was not taken, nor the award was made within two years, the entire acquisition proceedings lapsed under Section 11A of the Act.
12. According to the petitioner the last of the writ petition was dismissed on 25.11.1997 and excluding the period of stay, the limitation to make an award or take possession stood extended till 25.11.1999. Neither possession was taken nor award was made till 25.11.1999 and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings lapsed by operation of law as contemplated under Section 11A of the Act. In support of his contention, the petitioner has placed reliance of a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Sushil Kumar and Ors. v. Sate of U.P. and Ors., 1999 (1) AWC 764 : 1999 (35) ALR 285, in which it was held that since the possession of the land was not taken under Section 17(1) of the Act before the expiry of two years, the provision of Section 11A is attracted and the acquisition proceedings lapsed by operation of law.
13. We are unable to agree with the aforesaid submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The dismissal of the writ petition on 25.11.1997 was brought to the knowledge of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 only on 8.5.2000 whereupon possession of the land was taken and handed over to Varanasi Development Authority on 10.5.2000. The fact that the respondents came to know about the dismissal of the writ petition only on 8.5.2000 has not been denied by the petitioner in his rejoinder-affidavit. Therefore, in our view, the period to be excluded under the Explanation to Section 11A would be upto 8.5.2001, i.e., till the date of knowledge of the dismissal of the writ petition. Admittedly, the possession of the land was taken on 10.5.2000. The decision in Sushil Kumar’s case (supra), is, therefore, not applicable inasmuch as in the present case the possession of the land had already been taken within the stipulated period of two years. Therefore, we hold that since the possession of the land was taken by the respondents within the stipulated period, the acquisition proceedings did not lapse under Section 11A of the Act.
14. At this stage we may look into another aspect of the matter. The provisions of Section 11A was arrested in the Act to benefit the land owner and ensure that the award was made within a period of two years from the date of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The Supreme Court in Yusuf Bhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat and Anr., (1991) 4 SCC 531 at 535 held :
“On the other hand, it appears to us that the Explanation is intended to confer a benefit on a landholder whose land is acquired after the declaration under Section 6 is made in cases covered by the Explanation. The benefit is that the award must be made within a period of two years of the declaration, falling which the acquisition proceedings would lapse and the land would revert to the landholder. In order to get the benefit of the said provision what is required, is that the landholder who seeks the benefit must not have obtained any order from a Court restraining any action or proceedings in pursuance of the declaration under Section 6 of the said Act so that the Explanation covers only the cases of those landholders who do not obtain any order from a Court which would delay or prevent the making of the award or taking possession of the land acquired.”
15. The principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision (supra), is that the owner of the land or a person who is interested in the land and wants to take advantage of Section 11A of the Act, must not have obtained an interim order.
16. In the present case, the tenure holders including the co-sharer of the petitioner had filed various writ petitions before this Hon’ble Court challenging the acquisition proceedings thereby stalling the acquisition proceedings on account of interim orders granted by this Court. The tenure holders themselves contributed to the delay and did not allow the respondents from taking possession of the land. Therefore, assuming that the possession of the land was not taken within the stipulated period, we are not inclined to quash the acquisition proceedings in exercise of the discretionary powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Similar view was taken by another Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Kamla Pandey v. Collector, Agra, 1989 ALJ 622 at 625, wherein their Lordship opined :
“We think where the land owner himself contributes to the delay, in making the award, the acquisition proceeding ought not to be quashed in the exercise of the discretionary powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The
acquisition is undoubtedly for a laudable public purpose, namely, construction of a housing colony. The urgency of providing housing accommodation in urban areas can scarcely be over-emphasized. In the present case, in pursuance of the scheme conceived by the Agra Development Authority, houses/flats have already been constructed and thereafter sold or allotted to various individuals. It is not disputed that over the petitioner’s land also in implementation of the housing scheme buildings have been constructed. This finds corroboration from the petitioner’s applications referred to above in which she had specifically asked for the removal of the malwa existing over her land. Further the scheme is an integrated one and, therefore, It will be inappropriate to quash the acquisition proceedings on the ground that in respect of the petitioner’s plot the Special Land Acquisition Officer omitted to determine the amount of compensation. The omission was not a fraud on the statute but was clearly bona fide based on the consideration that there was a move afoot for the release of the land from acquisition. Moreover, the persons who would be hit by the quashing of the acquisition proceedings are not before us. To quash the proceedings at this stage of things would not, in our considered view, be appropriate. It would defeat the larger public interest if we were to quash the proceedings on the technicality, assuming that the omission to make an award in respect of the petitioners’ land within time produced the effect of vitiating the entire acquisition proceedings.”
17. Thus, we hold that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in exercise of the discretionary powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
18. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that no notice under Section 9 was given to the petitioner and non-compliance of this provision invalidates the notifications issued under Section 4(1) and 6 of the Act. We are unable to agree with the aforesaid submission. Section 9(1) of the Act imposes a legal duty on the Collector to cause service of a general notice to be given at convenient places and the Collector is under a legal obligation to serve notice on the occupier and interested persons under Section 9(3) of the Act. In para 9 of the counter-affidavit of respondent Nos. 1 and 2, it has been specifically averred that notice of substance was given at convenient places in the locality and notices under Section 9(3) were also given to the recorded tenure holders after demarcation and survey of the land made under Section 8 of the Act. Some of the tenure holders also filed objections. Proof of the notices sent to the recorded tenure holders and their objections have been annexed to the counter-affidavit as Annexure-C.A. 3, 3A, 3B, 3C, 4 and 5.
19. These averments have not been denied by the petitioner in his rejoinder-affidavit. It is admitted by the petitioner that his name was not recorded or mutated in the revenue record. Since the petitioners’ name was not recorded in the revenue record, he was not entitled to a notice under Section 9 of the Act. However, the co-sharer was given notice, who then filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 66 of 1983 with regard to the same plot. The said writ petition was eventually dismissed on 30.10.1995. Even otherwise, the mere fact that notices under Section 9 were not served on the petitioner the same could not invalidate or render nugatory the land acquisition proceedings upto the stage of notices under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act.
20. Before parting, we would like to add that there has been an inordinate delay in challenging the acquisition proceedings. The notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act were issued on 19.11.1981 and 30.11.1981. The present writ petition was filed in the year 2000 after more than 18 years. The petitioner in para 14 of the writ petition has alleged, that he came to know about these proceedings on 24.3.2000, when the respondents started measuring his land. This paragraph has been sworn on the basis of “perusal of records”. Such an averment cannot be sworn on the basis of perusal of records and can only be sworn on personal knowledge. Even otherwise, the notification under Sections 4 and 6 was duly published and public notice of substance was given at convenient places in the locality. The petitioner has been litigating with his co-sharer, who had filed a writ petition. Other tenure holders had also filed writ petitions. It is, therefore, impossible to believe that the petitioner had no knowledge of the acquisition proceedings.
21. The Supreme Court in Larsen and Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, (1998) 4 SCC 387 at page 401 held as follows :
“This Court has repeatedly held that writ petition challenging the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches if challenge is not made within a reasonable time. This Court has said that the petitioner cannot sit on the fence and allow the State to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis that notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 were valid and then to attack the notifications on the grounds which were available to him at the time when these were published as otherwise it would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics.”
22. The Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. (P.) Ltd., held as follows :
“It is thus well settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226.”
23. The same view was again reiterated by the Supreme Court in Northern India Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh and Ors., 2003 (1) SCCD 248 : (2003) 1 SCC 335, where the land owner approached the High Court after a period of 17 years after finalisation of the acquisition proceedings.
24. In view of the aforesaid, we hold that the petitioner is guilty of laches and the writ petition is also liable to be dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay.
25. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition has no merit and is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
