PETITIONER: PAPAIAH Vs. RESPONDENT: STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 23/08/1996 BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. G.B. PATTANAIK (J) ACT: HEADNOTE: JUDGMENT:
O R D E R
Leave granted.
We have heard learned counsel on both sides.
This appeal by special leave arises from the order of
the High Court of Karnataka dated 19.9.1990 made in WA
No.494/90. The admitted facts are that the respondents 4 and
5, by name Doddaramaiah and Chikkaramaiah, sons of late
Gurappa of Bangalore were granted five acres of agricultural
land under Rule 43 (8) of the Mysore Land Revenue Code on
February 13, 1940 for use and enjoyment of the Government
land. Rule 43 (8) reads as under:
“Occupancies granted to applicants
belonging to Depressed Classes
under Rule 43(5) above and those
granted by Government free of upset
price or reduced upset price to
poor and landless people of other
communities or to religious
charitable institutions, shall not
be alienated and the grantees shall
execute Mutchalikas in the form
prescribed by Government. This
shall not, however, prevent lands
granted to Depressed classes under
Rule 43(5) being accepted as
security for any loan which they
may wish to obtain from Government
of from a Co-operative society for
the bonafide purposes of improving
the land.:
A reading of the said rule would indicate that with a
view to augment the economic conditions of the Scheduled
Castes, Scheduled Castes and other weaker sections of the
society, Government may assigned the land to them or to
cooperative societies composed of them. It is not in dispute
that the appellant had purchased the land from the assignees
under a registered sale deed on December 19, 1958. The
Karnataka Legislature enacted Karnataka Scheduled Castes &
Schedules Tribes (prohibition of transfer of certain lands)
Act, 1978 [for short, the “Act”] declaring alienation by the
assignee-Schedules Castes and Schedules Tribes, as void and
inoperative. Procedure has been prescribed for restoration
of the lands the assignees or if they not available, the
land resumed be assigned to eligible persons from those
classes. In furtherance thereof, thee respondents 4 & 5
filed an application under Section 4 & 5 of the Act before
the competent authority on April 22, 1985 for restoration of
the land. The competent authority allowed the application
which was confirmed on appeal and, therefore, the writ
petitions came to be dismissed. Thus this appeal by special
leave.
Sri P.R.Ramasesh, learned counsel for the appellant
contended that there was no prohibition as against the
appellant, since he obtained the title after the expiry of
ten years from the date of the assignment by the Government.
The appellant had perfected title by adverse possession.
Therefore, the Act is inapplicable to such a situation. In
support of his contention, he sought to place reliance on
the judgment of this Court in K.T. Huchegowda Vs. Deputy
Commissioner & Ors. [1994 (3) SCC 536].
Sri Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel appearing for
the respondents, contended that the appellant had not
pleaded adverse possession ass against the State. He came
into possession by virtue of a title obtained from
respondents 4 and 5. The sale is void and against the public
policy. His contention of adverse possession against
respondents, though was raised before the primary authority
and the appellate authority and was negatived the same, was
not canvassed before the High Court. The only contention
raised before the High Court was as to the estoppel which
was rightly negatived. Under those circumstances, the ratio
of Hochegowdh case [supra] has no application. In support of
his contention, he placed reliance on other judgment of this
Court on the case of R. Chandevarappa etc. Vs. State of
Karnataka & Ors. etc. etc. [1995 (5) SCALE 620].
In view of the rival contention raised on both sides, the
questions that arise for consideration are: whether the
respondents 5 and 6 who have alienated the land to the
appellant are estopped to challenge the sale and whether the
sale is valid and also whether appellant perfected his title
by adverse possession as against the State?
It is seen that Article 46 of the Constitution, in terms of
its Preamble, enjoins upon the State to provide economic
justice to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other
weaker sections of the society and to prevent their
exploitation. Under Article 39 (b) of the Constitution, the
State is enjoined to distribute its largess, land, to sub-
serve the public good. The right to economic justice to the
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other weaker is a
fundamental right to secure equality of status, opportunity
and liberty. Economic justice is a facet of liberty without
which equality of status and dignity of person are teasing
illusions. In rural India, land provides economic status to
the owner. The State, therefore, is under constitutional
obligation to ensure to them opportunity giving its largess
to the poor to augment their economic position. Assignment
of land having been made in furtherance thereof, any
alienation, in its contravention, would be not only in
violation of the constitutional policy but also opposed to
public policy under Section 23 of the Contract Act. Thereby,
any alienation made in violation thereof is void and the
purchaser does not get any valid right, title or interest
thereunder. It is seen that Rule 43 (a) specifically
prohibits alienation of assigned land. It does not prescribe
any limitation of time as such. However, it is contended
that the appellant has obtained land by way of sale in 1958
long before the Act came into force and thereby he perfected
his title by adverse possession. We find no force in
contention. This Court had considered this question in
similar circumstances R. Chandevarappa’s case and had held
thus:
“The question then is whether the
appellant has perfected his title
by adverse possession. It is seen
that a contention was raised before
the Assistant Commissioner that the
appellant having remained in
possessions from 1968, he perfected
his title by adverse possession.
But thee crucial facts to
constitute adverse possession have
not been pleaded. Admittedly the
appellant came into possession by a
derivative title from the original
grantee. It is seen that the
original grantee has no right to
alienate the land. Therefore,
having come into possession under
colour of title from original
grantee, if the appellant intends
to plead adverse possession as
against the State, he must disclaim
his title and plead his hostile
claim to the knowledge of the State
and that the within the State had
not taken any action thereon within
the prescribed period. Thereby, the
appellant’s possession would become
adverse. The counsel in fairness,
despite his research, is unable to
bring to our notice any such plea
having been taken by the
appellant.”
The ratio thereof squarely applies to the facts in this
case.
In K.T. Huchegowda’s case [supra] neither this question
was considered nor the validity of the Rule has been gone
into. Therein, this Court had gone into the question of
adverse possession as against the purchaser but not as
against the State. Unless the purchaser derives valid title,
the question of title does not arise. If he remained to be
in possession in his own right de hors the title,
necessarily he has to plead and prove the date from which he
disclaimed his title and asserted possessory title as
against the State and perfected his possession to the
knowledge of the real owner, viz., the State, in this case.
Such a plea was neither taken nor argued nor was any
evidence adduced in this behalf. The plea of adverse
possession as against the State does not arise even
otherwise as the proceedings were laid before the expiry of
a period of 30 years. The question of estoppel against the
respondent does not arise as the Act voids the sale and
thus there would be no estoppel against the Statute.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.