PETITIONER:
PARASRAMKA COMMERCIAL COMPANY
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
29/08/1969
BENCH:
HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ)
BENCH:
HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ)
RAY, A.N.
CITATION:
1970 AIR 1654 1970 SCR (2) 136
1969 SCC (2) 694
CITATOR INFO :
E 1972 SC1507 (15)
ACT:
Arbitration Act (10 of 1940), s. 14(1)-'Notice in
writing' of the making and signing of the award-Copy of
signed award sent to parties-If operates as such notice.
HEADNOTE:
The disputes between the appellant and the respondent,
arising out of a contract between them, were referred to.
arbitration under the arbitration clause in the contract.
The award was made and signed on April 26, 1950. The
arbitrator did not send any notice of the making and signing
of the award but sent a copy of the signed award to the
appellant. The appellant acknowledged receipt of the copy by
two letters dated May 5, 1950 May 16, 1950. On March 30,
1951, the appellant filed an application in the Subordinate
Judge's Court for passing a decree in terms of the award.
On the question whether the application was out of time,
because, under Art. 178 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908,
the application had to be filed within 90 days of the date.
of service of the notice of the making of the award,
HELD: Under s. 14(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, when
the arbitrators have given their award, they shall sign it
and shall give notice in writing to the. parties of the
making and signing thereof and of the amount of fees and
charges payable in respect of the arbirtation and the award.
The notice need not be in the form of a separate letter. It
is sufficient, if it is in writing and intimates clearly
that the award has been made and signed. The non-mention of
the amount of the fees and charges payable in respect of the
arbitration and award will not affect the notice as it is
not an essential part of it for the purpose of limitation.
In the present case, since the appellant had sufficient
notice that the award had been made and signed when a copy
of the award signed by the arbitrator was sent to the
appellant, the application for passing a decree in terms of
the award was out of time. [138 B, F-G; 139' A, C-D]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2532 of 1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated August 8, 1963 of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench
at Delhi in Civil Revision No. 330-D of 1954.
B.P. Maheshwari and S.M. Jain, for the appellant.
V.A. Seyid Muhammad and S.P. Nayar, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hidayatullah, C.J. This is an appeal against a judgment
and order of the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court at
Delhi
137
(Single Judge) in a matter arising under the Arbitration
Act. By ,m agreement dated April 28, 1948 the appellant
company entered into a contract with the Chief Director of
Purchase (Food) acting on behalf of the Government of India.
It is not necessary to give the details of this contract,
because the matter was referred to arbitration under an
arbitration clause included in the agreement between the
parties. The award was made and signed on April 26, 1950.
The Arbitrator awarded Rs. 17,080-2-9 with costs in favour
of the company. The Arbitrator, however, did not send a
notice as such of the making and signing of the award but
sent a copy of the award signed by him to the company. The
company acknowledged the receipt of this copy by two letters
which are dated May 5 and May 16, 1950. It appears that in
the original which was retained in the office of the
Arbitrator, it was stated that there was a covering letter
giving notice of the making of the award, but the company
denied that any such letter had been sent. However, nothing
much turns on it as we shall show presently.
After the copy of the award was received by the company,
it filed an application under s. 14(1) of the Arbitration
Act in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Delhi on March
30, 1951 for making the award ruIe of the court. It may be
mentioned that on July 3, 1951, the Arbitrator sent the
original award to the court also. Before the Subordinate
Judge objection was taken by the Union of India that the
application of the company to the court was delayed since
such an application under s. 14(1) of the Arbitration Act
under Art. 178 of the Indian Limitation Act had to be made
within 90 days of the receipt of the notice intimating that
the award had been made and signed. This objection
prevailed with the Subordinate Judge who rejected the
application. A revision application was unsuccessfully made
before the High Court and it is the order on the revision
application which is the subject of appeal before us.
Originally the revision application went before a
learned Single Judge of the High Court. He referred the
matter to a Division Bench which in its turn referred the
case for decision to a Full’ Bench. The Full Bench gave its
opinion on November 17, 1961. Although the Full Bench
discussed the matter it did not reach any conclusion in the
case, because it felt that whether the application under s.
14(1) of the Arbitration Act had been made within 90 days or
not, was a question of fact which has to be decided by the
learned Single Judge, and as the learned Single Judge had
not gone into that question, the matter had to go back to
him. When the case came before the learned Single Judge, he
took some evidence and examined the question in detail. We
upheld the
Sup CI /70–1o
138
decision of the Subordinate Judge and dismissed the
revision application.
It has been argued before us by Mr. B.P. Maheshwari that
the judgment under appeal is erroneous, because s. 14(1) of
the Arbitration Act requires that there should be a notice
in writing and that notice had to be something besides the
award of which a copy had been sent. He has cited a number
of rulings in support of his contention that a notice in
writing is incumbent before limitation under Art. 178 of
the Limitation Act which applies to Art. 14(1) petitions can
start. In chief, he relies upon Ratnawa v. Gurishiddappa
Gurushantappa Magavi & Ors. ( 1 ), Puppalla Ramulu v.
Nagidi Appelaslwami & Ors.(2), Jagdish v. Sunder(3), Ganga
Ram v. Radha Kishan(4), Badaria Ramakrishnarnma & Ors. v.
Vattikonda Lakshmibayamma & Ors.(5).
It is not necessary to go into the reasoning which made
the learned Judges in these cases to lay down that there
must be a proper notice in writing of the making of the
award. That follows in fact from the words of s. 14(1) of
the Arbitration Act. That section says that when the
arbitrators or umpire have given their award, they shall
sign it and shall give notice in writing to the parties of
the making and signing thereof and of the amount of fees and
charges payable in respect of the arbitration and award.
What will be considered a sufficient notice in writing of
the making and signing of the award is a question of fact.
In the cited cases emphasis sometimes has been laid upon the
latter part of the sub-section which speaks of the amount of
fees and charges payable in respect of the arbitration and
award. Sometimes emphasis has been placed upon the opening
words namely that there should be a notice in writing.
Reading the word ‘notice’ as we generally do, it denotes
merely an intimation to the party concerned of a particular
fact. It seems to us that we cannot limit the words “notice
in writing” to only a letter. Notice may take several
forms. It must, to be sufficient, be in writing and must
intimate quite clearly that the award has been made and
signed. In the present case, a copy of the award signed by
the arbitrator was sent to the company. It appears to us
that the company had sufficient notice that the award had
been made and signed. In fact the two letters of May 5 and
May 16 to which we have referred quite clearly show that the
company knew full well that the arbitrator had given the
award, made it and signed it. In these circumstances to
insist upon a letter which perhaps was also cent (though
there is some doubt about it) is to refine the law
(1) A.I.R. 1962 Mysore 135. (2) A.I.R. 1957 A.P.
11.
(3) I.L.R. 27 Pat. 86. (4) I.L.R. [1955]
Punj. 402.
(5) I.L.R. [1958] A.P. 166.
139
beyond the legitimate requirements. The only omission was
that there was no notice of the amount of the fees and
charges payable in respect of arbitration and award. But
that was not an essential part of the notice for the purpose
of limitation. To emphasise the latter part as being the
essential part of the notice is to make the first part
depend upon the determination of the fees and charges and
their inclusion in the notice. A written notice clearly
intimating the parties concerned that the award had been
made and signed, in our opinion certainly starts limitation.
In this view of the matter we are in agreement with the
decision of the learned Single Judge who has endorsed the
opinion of the Subordinate Judge that limitation began to
run from the receipt of the copy of the award which was
signed by the Arbitrator and which gave due notice to the
party concerned that the award had been made and signed.
That is how the party itself understood when it acknowledged
the copy sent to it. Therefore, the application must be
treated as being out of time and the decision of the High
Court to so treat it was correct in all the circumstances of
the case.
We, therefore, do not see any reason to interfere in
this appeal and it is dismissed. But we make it clear that
the other part of the case, namely what is to happen to the
award sent by the Arbitrator himself to the court has yet to
be determined and what we say here will not affect the
determination of that question. Obviously enough that
matter arises under the second subsection of s. 14 and will
have to be considered quite apart from the application made
by the company to have the award made into rule of Court.
It was represented to us by Dr. Syed Mohammad that
objections had been taken to the validity of the award and
they remain still for decision. Those of course must fall
to the ground with the application which we have found to be
out of time. As to whether similar objections can be raised
in answer to the award filed at the instance of the
arbitrator is a question which we cannot go into in the
present appeal and no expression of opinion must be
attributed to us on that point. In the circumstances of the
case we leave the parties to bear their own costs.
V.P.S. Appeal dismissed.
140