JUDGMENT
A.N. Divecha, J.
1. The order passed by the Assistant Collector at Dhrangadhra (the first authority for convenience) on 27th May, 1981 in Ceiling Case No. 253 of 1977 as affirmed in revision by the decision rendered by die Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad (‘the Tribunal’ for convenience) on 11th August, 1982 in Revision Application No. TEN. B.A. 558 of 1981 is under challenge in this petition under ArticleS 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. By his impugned order, the first authority rejected the present petitioner’s application under Section 8(2) of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960 (‘the Act’ for brief) for declaration that the transfer of his three parcels of land bearing survey Nos. 363 admeasuring 4 acres 12 gunthas on 26th June, 1973, survey No. 321 admeasuring 16 acres 7 gunthas on 15th June, 1972 and survey No. 417 admeasuring 5 acres 8 gunthas on 5th May 1974 was not made with a view to defeating the object of the Act in any manner.
2. The facts giving rise to the petition move in a narrow compass. The original petitioner (the deceased for convenience) transferred some three parcels of land to certain persons between the period from 24th January, 1971 to 31st March, 1976. The details in that regard may be summarised thus. The land bearing survey No. 363 admeasuring 4 acres 12 gunthas situated in village Patdi was transferred in favour of Shambhuprasad Somabhai on 26th June, 1973 for Rs. 1,750, the land bearing survey No. 321 admeasuring 16 acres 7 gunthas situated in the same village was transferred in favour of Prabhubhai Somabhai and Narsibhai Parsottambhai on 15th June, 1972 for Rs. 20,000 and the land bearing survey No. 417 situated in village Savlas admeasuring 5 acres 8 gunthas was transferred in favour of Naranbhai Rambhai on 15th May, 1974 for Rs. 3,500. As aforesaid, since the transfers were made between 24th January, 1971 and 31st March, 1976, a presumption would arise that they were made in order to defeat the object of the Act. It appears that the holding of the deceased at the relevant time was in excess of the ceiling area. There is, however, nodiing on record to come to that conclusion at this stage. In order to rebut the prersumption arsing under Section 8(1) of the Act, the deceased made one application in the prescribed form under Section 8(2) thereof on 26th July 1976. It appears to have been assigned to the first authority for hearing and disposal. It came to be registered as Ceiling Case No. 253 of 1977. After recording evidence and hearing the parties, by his order passed on 27th May, 1981 in Ceiling Case No. 253 of 1977, the first authority rejected the application under Section 8(2) of the Act made by the deceased. Its copy is at Annexure-A to this petition. The aggrieved deceased carried the matter in revision before the Tribunal by means of his Revision Application No. TEN. B.A. 558 of 1981. By its decision rendered on 11th August, 1982 in the aforesaid revisional application, the Tribunal rejected it. Its copy is at Annexure-B to this petition. The aggrieved deceased thereupon moved this Court by means of this petition under ArticleS 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for questioning the correctness of the impugned order at Annexure-A to this petition as affirmed in revision by the impugned decision at Annexure-B to this petition. During the pendency of this petition before this Court, the deceased breathed his last leaving behind him the present petitioners as his heirs and legal representatives.
3. Shri Zaveri for the petitioners has urged that the entire approach of the first authority as well as the Tribunal in appreciating the evidence on record was in question were made with a view to defeating the object of the Act. The grievance voiced by Shri Zaveri for the petitioners is that the approach of the first authority as well as the Tribunal was as if the deceased was required to establish his bona fides and genuineness behind the transfers in question beyond any reasonable doubt as the prosecution has to do in a criminal proceeding. According to Shri Zaveri for the petitioners, the deceased examined all the transferees in support of his case and also certain other witnesses who un-equivocally stated before the concerned authority that the transfers were bona fide and genuine for meeting the deceased petitioner’s need for collecting funds to the tune of something like Rs. 25,000 for creating a boring in the fields which he wanted to retain in his holding. Shri Zaveri for the petitioners has made a further grievance that the first authority as well as the Tribunal has not considered one major piece of evidence to the effect that the land bearing survey No. 417 at Savlas admeasuring 5 acres 8 gunthas was required to be sold also on the ground that it was at a considerable distance from his village Patdi and he was facing nuisance from wild animals. As against this, Smt. Shaikh for the respondent has urged that both the first authority and the Tribunal have carefully appreciated the evidence on record and have concurrently come to the conclusion that the transfers in question were with a view to defeating the object of the Act, and as such this Court cannot and need not interfere with that conclusion of fact reached by the first authority and the Tribunal in exercise of its limited powers under ArticleS 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
4. Ordinarily, Smt. Shaikh’s submission to the effect that neither Article 226 nor Article 227 can be pressed into service for interfering with any finding of fact recorded or any conclusion of fact reached by the authorities below has to be accepted. It, however, cannot be gainsaid that this normal rule would be applicable provided the finding or conclusion of fact is not perverse. A finding or conclusion can be said to be perverse inter alia if it is such as no prudent or reasonable person on appreciation of the material on record would record or reach it. The grievance of Shri Zavari for the petitioners is that the conclusion reached by the first authority as well as the Tribunal is such as could not be reached by a prudent or reasonable person. In order to appreciate this submission urged before me by Shri Zaveri for the petitioners, it would be necessary to look at the impugned order at Annexure-A to this petition and the impugned decision at Annexure-B to this petition in detail.
5. It clearly transpires from the impugned order at Annexure-A to this petition that the deceased contended before the first authority that he needed funds for creating a boring in his lands bearing survey Nos. 751/1 and 751/4 situated in village Patdi. In support of his case, he examined all his transferees. They unequivocally stated that the deceased needed funds for the purpose and sold the land in question to raise such funds. He also produced serveral bills and vouchers to show that he in fact created a boring in his aforesaid fields. He even examined the Contractor who did the job and passed the receipt in that regard. I think this evidence would certainly go to show that the transfers in question were bona fide and genuine and certainly not with a view to defeating the object of the Act. Any contrary conclusion would be an outcome of a perverse mind. A case of such nature has not to be decided as if it is a criminal trial and the applicant has to prove his case beyond any reasonable dobt. A proceeding under Section 8(2) of the Act would be in the nature of a civil proceeding though in fact it would be a quasi judicial proceeding not to be governed by strict rules of evidence. If a civil proceeding is required to be decided on the basis of preponderance of probabilities, a quasi-judicial proceeding has to be decided all the more so as rule of evidence stricto sensu would not be applicable to such proceeding. The reasoning given by the first authority and the Tribunal for not accepting the case of die deceased was that the funds were collected sometime in 1972 and the boring was created sometime in 1974 about two years later. It transpires from the record that no explanation was sought from the deceased why there was delay in creation of the boring after collection of the funds. There could be thousand and one reasons for such delay. If the deceased was given an opportunity, he could and would have certainly explained the delay in that regard. In absence of any opportunity afforded to him to give explanation for such delay, it would not be justifiable to jump to the conclusion that the transfers in question effected by the deceased were with a view to defeating the object of the Act.
6. Neither the first authority nor the Tribunal has considered the case of the deceased that the transfer of the land bearing survey No. 417 situated in village Savlas was also on account of the distance between his village Patdi and the land in question and the nuisance created by wild animals in maintaining it. There is no word or discussion either in the impugned order at Annexure-A to this petition or in the impugned decision at Annexure-B to this petition in that regard. It appears that the deceased was not subjected to any cross-examination in this regard. If that be so, there was no reason not to accept his case as set up by him in support of his transfer of the land bearing survey No. 417 situated in village Savlas.
7. So is the case with the land bearing survey No. 363 admeasuring 4 acres 12 gunthas transferred by the deceased in favour of his cousin Shambhuprasad Somabhai. It was the case of the deceased that the land was originally purchased for Shambhuprasad Somabhai and since the latter had not enough funds and since the former was required to pay some amount to his cousin for die purpose of purchasing the said land, it was purchased in the joint names of the deceased and his cousin presumably with a view to securing the amount of loan advanced to his cousin. This aspect of the case has not been considered by the first authority as well as the Tribunal. There was no reason not to accept this case set up by die deceased more particularly when his cousin named Shambhuprasad Somabhai was examined in die proceeding conducted before the first authority.
8. It transpires from me order at Annexure-A to this petition that the deceased also purchased some land in the name of his minor son on 20th April, 1971. If the deceased was inclined to defeat me object of the Act, he would not have purchased mat parcel of land in me name of his minor son during the period between 24di January, 1971 and 31st March, 1976. The first authority in his impugned order at Annexure-A to this petition has not considered this aspect of die case at all. The Tribunal in its impugned decision at Annexure-B to this petition has merely brushed it aside by observing that die holding of die minor son will be separately counted after the Amending Act. It is surprising as to on what basis the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the minor’s holding would be separately counted after the Amending Act when there is on die statute book Section 6(2) of the Act. It appears that the Tribunal has treated that son of the deceased to be a major at the relevant time. It appears from the record that the deceased had purchased the land in the name of his minor son and shown himself as his guardian. Without looking into the correct factual position, with respect, the Tribunal ought not to have jumped to such conclusion.
9. At this stage, it would be quite proper to look at the binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Brijendra Singh v. State of U.P. . That was a case under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holding Act, 1961 as amended by U.P. Act 18 of 1973. The relevant provisions were found in Section 5(6) thereof. The relevant part thereof as reproduced in para 12 of the aforesaid ruling is quite relevant. It reads:
(6) In determining the ceiling area applicable to a tenure-holder, any transfer of land made after the twenty-fourth day of January, 1971, which but for the transfer would have been declared surplus land under this Act, shall be ignored and not taken into account:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to-
(a)…. ….
(b) a transfer proved to the satisfaction of the prescribed authority to be in good faith and for adequate consideration and under the irrevocable instrument not being a benami transaction or for immediate or deferred benefit of the tenureholder or other members of his family,
Explanation I …. ….
Explanation II- The burden of proving that a case falls within Clause (b) of the proviso shall rest with the party claiming its benefit.
In that context the Supreme Court has held:
The expression ‘good faith’ has not been defined in the Ceiling Act. Although the meaning of “good faith” may vary in the context of different statutes, subjects and situations, honest intent free from taint of fraud or fraudulent design, is a constant element of its connotation. Even so, the quality and quantity of the honesty requisite for constituting “good faith” is conditioned by the context and object of the statute in which this term is employed. It is a cardinal canon of construction that an expression which has no uniform precisely fixed meaning, takes its colour, light and content from the context.
Where a tenure-holder who was holding a post of Brigadier in Army sold part of his land in August 1971 as he required money for building his own house in Delhi, the transfer could not be ignored on ground that it was not for a pressing need.
Compared to the aforesaid provision in the U.P. Legislation, Section 8(2) of the Act is comparatively not so stringent. It reads:
8(2). Any person affected by the provision of Sub-section (1) may, within the prescribed period and in the prescribed form, make an application to the Collector for a declaration that the transfer or partition was not made in anticipation in order to defeat the object of this Act, or as the case may be, of the Amending Act of 1972.
What is required to be seen is that the transfer should not be with a view to defeating the object of the Act. Such transfer could be in any form not necessarily in the form prescribed in the aforesaid provision of the U.P. Legislation on the subject. In that view of the matter, by analogy, the aforesid binding ruling of the Supreme Court would all the more be applicable in the present proceeding under Section 8(2) of the Act. Even at the cost of repetition, I may reiterate that the evidence on record as reflected in the impugned order at Annexure-A and in the decision at Annexure-B to this petition would unequivocally suggest that the transfers in question were bona fide and genuine and certainly not with a view to defeating the object of the Act. The contrary conclusion reached by the first authority as well as the Tribunal cannot be sustained in law.
10. In view of my aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that the impugned order at Annexure-A to this petition as affirmed in revision by the impugned decision at Annexure-B to this petition cannot be sustained in law. They will have to be quashed and set aside. The matter will have to be remanded to the first authority for restoration of Ceiling Case No. 253 of 1977 to file and for deciding it afresh in the light of this judgment of mine.
11. In the result, this petition is accepted. The impugned order passed by the Assistant Collector at Dhrangadhra on 27th May, 1981 in Ceiling Case No. 253 of 1977 Annexure-A to this petition as affirmed in revision by the decision rendered by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad on 11th August, 1982 in Revision Application No. TEN. B.A. 558 of 1981 at Annexure-B to this petition is quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded to the Assistant Collector at Dhrangadhra for restoration of Ceiling Case No. 253 of 1977 to file and for his fresh decision according to law in the light of this judgment of mine. Rule is accordingly made absolute to the aforesaid extent.