JUDGMENT
B.L. Yadav, J.
1. By the instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the prayer is that a writ, Order or direction be issued quashing the reference made by the State of U.P. under Section 4-K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act (the Act for short), as the same was made without applying the mind and the said reference has been made presupposing the status of respondent No. 2, the workman, as Upper Division Clerk, whereas in fact it was a disputed question. It was stated in the writ petition that the reference to the following effect was bad:
“KYA SEWAYOJAKON DWARA APNE SHRAMIK SHREE ANUP BEHARILAL SRI-VASTAVA PUTRA SRI VISHWANATH BEHARI LAL SRIVASTAVA UPPER DIVISION CLERK KEE SEWAIN DECEMBER 26, 1990 SESAMAAPT KIYAJANA UCHIT TATHA/ATHWA WAIDHANIK HAI.”
2. The portrayal of the essential facts are that earlier a writ petition (Writ Petition No. 1754 of 1991 Anup Behari Lal Srivastava v. Director, North Central Zone Cultural Centre, 14 C.S.P. Singh Marg, Allahabad) was filed by respondent No. 2 but in that petition an objection was taken by the present petitioner (the respondent) that the writ petition was not maintainable as the North Central Zone Cultural Centre was not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and the present respondent No. 2, the workman, has an alternative remedy by way of filing an application before the conciliation Officer and also seeking a reference under Section 4-K of the Act. On these objections earlier petition was consequently dismissed. Thereafter, the reference to the aforesaid effect was made by the State of Uttar Pradesh under Section 4-K of the Act. Now the present petition has been filed primarily taking the ground that the Reference has been made without application of mind and presupposing that the respondent No. 2, the workman, was Upper Division Clerk and that he has left the services on account of his own volition. Hence, there was no justification for the reference.
3. The aforesaid averments in the writ petition have been denied by respondent No. 2 by filing a counter affidavit. The affidavits have been exchanged and it was suggested by the learned counsel for the parties that the petition itself be decided on merits. This is how I proceed to decide the petition on merits.
4. It was urged by Mr. Navin Sinhu, learned counsel for petitioner, that the reference was bad in law, inasmuch as the real dispute between the parties was whether respondent No. 2 was a Class III employee and not whether his services have been correctly terminated and on his behalf no application was made before making the reference. Reliance was placed on a Full Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in India Tourism Development Corporation, New Delhi v. Delhi Administration, Delhi and Ors., (1982 Lab. IC. 1309) and Chiranji Lal Shrilal Goenka v. Jasjit Singh and Ors., 1993 (2) SCC.507.
5. Shri R.P. Misra, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, on the other hand, urged that for making a reference under Section 4-K of the Act paramount consideration is whether an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and in case there was existence of the industrial dispute or the same was apprehended, the State Government gets jurisdiction to make the reference and the present reference has been made consistent with the statutory provisions contained in Section 4-K of the Act. When the earlier writ petition was filed an objection was taken on behalf of the present petitioner that the petition was not maintainable, as the workman has got an effective and efficacious remedy by seeking a reference under Section 4-K of the Act and that the North Central Zone Cultural Centre was not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. In the present petition, a totally contradictory stand has been taken that the North Central Zone cultural Centre was a state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and an objection was taken before the Labour Court that as the workman was not a Class III employee, hence the reference was bad and was made without application of mind. Such dilatory tactics was adopted on behalf of the employer/management by raising preliminary question with a view to create obstruction in the early disposal of the industrial dispute. Such preliminary objections on the part of the employer have been deprecated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration and Ors. (1983-II-LLJ-425). Consequently, the objection if any can be taken provided the same is maintainable before the Labour Court or the Tribunal and the present petition has been filed with a view to frustrate the aims and object of the Act, so that the workman may not get justice on account of unbecoming device adopted by the employer. It was urged that no ground has been made for interference.
6. Having scrutinised the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, the moot question for determination is as to whether the petitioner can be permitted to take the preliminary objection to the maintainability of the reference and if so taken, can the Labour Court decide it as a preliminary issue or decide the same alongwith other issues involved in the case. Suffice it to say that in the earlier petition filed by the respondent No. 2, the objection taken by the present petitioner was that the said petition was not maintainable, as the North Central Zone Cultural Centre was not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, whereas a contradictory stand has been taken as is obvious from a perusal of para 23 of the petition where it has been stated that even though the North Central Zone Culture Centre is a society and is registered under the Societies Registration Act, its activities are carried on under the guidance of the Central Government and its corpus has been formed substantially out of the finances given by the Central Government.
7. When the reference was made, an objection was taken about the maintainability of the reference not on the ground that there existed no industrial dispute or the same was not apprehended but on the ground as to whether the workman was Class III employee whereas the objection taken was also that the workman himself left the services. In my considered opinion, the consideration by the State Government before making the reference was as to whether any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and in case the same was there, the reference could be made irrespective of the fact whether the workman was Class III employee or otherwise. The same could be decided by the Labour Court or the Tribunal. Consequently, the reference made by the State Government under Section 4-K of the Act was consistent with the provisions of Section 4-K of the Act.
8. The object of the Act is to maintain the industrial peace to augment the production and for the speedy and amicable settlement of Industrial Disputes with a view to prevent strike and lock- out. What has to be kept in mind is the nature of the legislation. The provisions of the Act are of predominant social nature and the approach of the court has to be made in that light. The judges must take a broad view of the back ground and policy of the statute in question – See – Brown v. Brash and Ambrose, (1967 10B.42.
9. In the matter of social legislation the purposive approach is to be made by the court in interpretation of provisions With a view to ascertain social ends envisaged in the Act (See 1991(2) Suppl. SCC 228). The Act also contains benevolent provisions. In such a case, the policy underlined is to be scrutinized. (See Othereth Lakshmi Amma and Anr. V. Netta Chinkuniyil Govindan Neiyer, JT (1990) 3.SCC.230.
10. The matter can be considered with another aspect as well since the Constitution envisages the justice-social, economic and political. The administration of justice, in my opinion, need not be just a protector of legal rights, rather it must be dispenser of social justice. Benthems’
theory pertaining to greatest happiness of greatest number is to be kept in mind while administering the justice, particularly the provision pertaining to social justice. It is better to shift from the fine-spun technicalities and we must consider human beings as human beings, and human needs as human needs (See Sadhu Ram Bansal v. P.B. Sarcar. (1984) 3.SCC 410.
11. The submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner about non-maintainability of the reference under Section 4-K of the Act have to be scrutinised, keeping in view these salutory principles of interpretations was of the provision of Section 4-K of the Act, is made on the line suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In case submissions and interpretations of Section 4-K of the Act, which is predominantly of social nature, and other relevant provisions are accepted, in that event, relevant provisions of the Act would be converted into a veritable rogue’s charter. (See Davis and Sons Ltd. v. Atkins, 1977.ACC.931), per Lord Diplock.
12. In this back ground, in my opinion the conduct of the petitioner and the employer in raising the objections in the earlier petition and similar other objections in the present petition about the maintainability of the reference appears to be with a deliberate design to avoid decision of the industrial disputes in question on merit, as the time has passed, it has become fashion to raise as much preliminary objections as possible so that reference of industrial dispute may remain pending for decades so that the workman may be exhausted.
13. In D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration (supra), His lordship Hon’ble Mr. Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy ruled that in such situation the employers do adopt unbecoming devices to avoid decision of industrial disputes on merit. It is better to extract the relevant observations: (P 426):
“It was just the other day that we were bemoaning the unbecoming devices adopted by certain employers to avoid decision of industrial disputes on merits. We noticed how they would raise various preliminary objections, invite decision on those objections in the first instance, carry the matter to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and delay a decision of the real dispute for years, sometimes for over a decade. Industrial peace, one presumes, hangs in the balance in the meanwhile. We have now before us a case where a dispute originating in 1969 and referred for adjudication by the Government to the Labour Court in 1970 is still at the stage of decision on a preliminary objection. There was a time when it was thought prudent and wise policy to decide preliminary issues first. But the time appears to have arrived for a reversal of that policy: We think it is better that tribunals, particularly those entrusted with the task of adjudicating labour disputes where delay may lead to misery and jeopardise industrial peace, should decide all issues in dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues. Nor should High Courts in exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution stop proceedings before a Tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them. Neither the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution nor the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 may be allowed to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill afford to wait by dragging the latter from Court to Court for adjudication of peripheral issues, avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. Article 226 and Article 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workman in this fashion. Tribunals and Courts who are requested to decide preliminary questions must therefore ask themselves whether such threshold part-adjudication is really necessary and whether it will not lead to other woeful consequences. After all, tribunals like Industrial Tribunal are constituted to decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes and their jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stifled by all manner of preliminary objections and journeyings up and down.”
14. The aforesaid observations have to be kept in mind. In my humble opinion, it is just an unbecoming device on the part of the employer to avoid the decision of the industrial disputes on merit. The court need not encourage such unbecoming devices.
15. Reverting to the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Indian Tourism Development Corporation, New Delhi v. Delhi Administration, Delhi and Ors., (supra) was a case prior to the aforesaid dictum laid down by His Lordship in D.P. Maheshwari’s case. Consequently, even though I have profound regards to the views taken by the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court, but the observation made therein appears to be not relevant.
16. In Chiranji Lal Shrilal Goenka v. Jasjit Singh and Ors., (supra) was a case where the matter for consideration was as to whether decree passed without jurisdiction would be invalid and non est. The question of its invalidity can be raised even at the execution stage. With profound regards to the observations made and the principle indicated by the Apex Court, but in all humility, I have to say that it is not relevant and is clearly distinguishable.
17. In view of the discussion made hereinbefore and applying the principles of Aristotalian and Baconian reasoning, the petition lacks merits consequently, the same is dismissed summarily. Interim stay dated July 7, 1992 is hereby vacated.
18. A certified copy of this judgment be issued to the learned counsel for the parties within a week after making proper application to that effect.
