ORDER
J. Narain, J.
1. As prayed for Criminal Miscellaneous Nos. 2457 and 3292 of 1974 have been heard together. Parmjit Singh Bedi, Inspector, Railway Protection Force. Jamalpur Workshop is the petitioner in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 2457 whereas Union of India is the petitioner in the other case. Dhaneshwar Sah is the apposite party in both the cases.
2. At about 2.30 p.m. on the 26th of February, 1973 Inspector Parmjit Singh Bedi received an information that some criminals were engaged in removing properties from the railway workshop. Accordingly, he along with other members of the Railway Protection Force went to the spot and noticed 4 or 5 persons coming out from the yard with gunny bags on their heads. When they were chased and challenged the miscreants dropped the gunny bags and fled away. Members of the Railway Protection Force proceeded further and noticed a truck on which opposite party Dhaneshwar Sah was sitting and 7 or 8 persons were engaged in loading the gunny bags on the truck. When they saw the members of the Railway Protection Force the truck with the opposite party fled away. The members of the Force could seize some gunny bags which contained railway properties. On these allegations a case under Section 8 of the Railway Properties (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966 was started and its investigation was endorsed to Sub-Inspector Kala Charan Mukherjee. On the 11th of March, 1974 the opposite party filed a petition of complaint against Parmjit Singh Bedi speaking about the aforesaid case No. 3 (2)/74 and alleging that at the time of occurrence he was in Monghyr Jail and that he had no information about the case. It was further alleged that at 6 p. m. on the 5th of March, 1974 Parmjit Singh Bedi came to his place and entered into his godown and began to make a search. He could not find any railway property and inquired who Dhaneshwar Sah was. The opposite party replied that it was he. Upon this Parmjit Singh Bedi caught hold of him and hurling abuses and giving him slaps took him to the police station Jamalpur and put him in the police lock-up. After making inquiry from the Monghyr Jail the opposite party was released. On the above complaint the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate took cognizance of the case for offences under Sections 323, 341, 342 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code.
3. Parmjit Singh Bedi filed a criminal revision before the Sessions Judge. Monghyr against the above order. The learned Sessions Judge took the view that members of the Railway Protection Force under the Act were authorised to act and take action within the railway premises only and they could not go beyond the railway premises and make arrest. This was the scheme of the Act and, accordingly, repelled the argument based on absence of notice as contemplated by Section 20(3) of the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957.
4. Of the two petitions filed before this Court one is by Parmjit Singh Bedi for quashing the criminal prosecution started against him and the other is by the Union of India to expunge certain observations made by the Sessions Judge wherein he dealt with the powers and privileges of the Railway Protection Force.
5. A preliminary objection was raised by Mr. Debendra Narain Sinha appearing on behalf of the opposite party Dhaneshwar Sah challenging the maintainability of these criminal miscellaneous cases. He, on the basis of Section 399(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1978. submitted that once a revision petition had been dismissed by the Sessions Judge the order was final and no second revision petition could be entertained by the High Court. It will be noticed that the two criminal miscellaneous cases are not by way of revision of the order taking cognizance and which prayer has been rejected by the learned Sessions Judge, The Union of India seeks to get certain observations occurring in the order dated the 13th of August, 1974 passed by the learned Sessions Judge expunged and, manifestly, therefore, the petition filed by the Union of India is not hit by the provisions of Section 399(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
6. Now so far as the other miscellaneous case is concerned, that also, in my opinion, is not hit by the provisions of Section 399(3). The reason is that it is not revision petition. It invokes the inherent jurisdiction of the Court under Section 482 of the New Code of Criminal Procedure and seeks to get the entire criminal proceeding quashed. The decision of the learned Sessions Judge is different, namely, that cognizance taken cannot be quashed. Even if the order taking cognizance is quashed criminal prosecution can subsist and, therefore, a petition for quashing the entire criminal prosecution cannot be deemed to be a further proceeding by way of revision of the same order. For the above reasons the preliminary objection raised on the basis of provisions of Section 399(3) of the Code must be rejected,
7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the criminal prosecution is liable to be quashed and the order of the learned Sessions Judge set aside on the ground that no notice under Section 20(3) of the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957 was served on the petitioner, that whatever was done was done under the powers conferred by that Act and that the scheme of the Act of 1957 is not as has been held by the learned Sessions Judge.
8. It has been argued for the opposite party that by reason of Case No. 3(2)/74 being under Section 3 of the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1988 provisions of Section 20(3) of the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957 cannot be availed of. Section 20(3) says that a criminal proceeding which may lawfully toe brought against any superior officer or member of the Force for anything done or intended to be done under the powers conferred by, or in pursuance of any provisions of this Act or the rules thereunder shall commence within three months after the act complained of shall have been committed and not otherwise; and notice in writing of such proceeding and of the cause thereof shall be given to the persons concerned and his superior officer at least one month before the commencement of such proceeding. Such a provision does not exist in the Railway Properity (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966. It has been vehemently argued that while an investigation is being conducted under the Act of 1966 provisions of the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957 Cannot be invoked. I am not impressed with this argument. For the better protection and security of the railway properties. Act of 1957 was brought on the Statute Book and it provided for the constitution and regulation of Force called the Railway Protection Force. The Act of 1966, on the other hand, consolidated and amended the law in relation to any unlawful possession of railway property. In other words, the Act of 1966 was, in no way, intended to limit or extinguish the provisions of the Act of 1957. The above argument cannot avail the opposite party for yet another reason. The learned Counsel is not quite correct when he submits that the arrest of the opposite party on the 5th of March was under the Act of 1966. The power of arrest was available to the petitioner even under Section. 12 of the Act of 1957 since it empowers any superior officer or member of the Force to arrest any person who has been concerned in an offence relating to railway property or against whom a reasonable suspicion exists of his having been so concerned
9. Learned Counsel could not point out any provision in the Act of 1957 to lend assurance to the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge that the members of Force had no jurisdiction outside the railway premises. It will be noticed that the power of arrest as provided under Section 12 of the Act does not impose any such limitation. The relevant words are “an officer may arrest any person who has been concerned in an offence relating to railway property” or “against whom a reasonable suspicion exists of his having been so concerned”. A reasonable inter-pretation that can be put to these words is that the jurisdiction of the members of the Force extends to arresting such a person wherever he may be. This also accords with commonsense. Suppose a man having stolen a railway property is trying to make good his escape and is being followed by a member of the Force. It is inconceivable that the member of the Force will have to cry halt as soon as the miscreants goes a step beyond the boundary of the railway premises. The preamble of the Act of 1957 also does not circumscribe the power of arrest as has been held by the learned Sessions Judge, Therefore, in my opinion, the view that the power to arrest is confined to the railway premises only is not in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1957.
10. It was next argued that even if Act of 1957 applies in this case, bar under Section 20(3) of the Act cannot operate since offences, for which cognizance has been taken were not “for anything done or intended to be done under the powers conferred by, or in pursuance of any provisions of this Act or the rules thereunder” occurring in Section 20(3). It was argued that in no view of the matter offences under Sections 323 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code can be said to be done or intended to be done under the powers conferred by the Act. In support of this contention the counsel referred to State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Venugopal and Pukhraj v. State of Rajasthan . Facts of the case of N. Venugopal and others are clearly distinguishable. What had happened there was that after taking Arige Ramanna into custody police party returned and less than three days later he was found lying dead. The prosecution case was that the injuries on the deceased had been caused by N. Venugopal and other ‘police officers’ for the purpose of extorting from him information which led to the detection of an offence and restoration of stolen property. Further prosecution case was that the police party wrongfully confined him and it was there when he was thus confined that the injuries were caused. It was in such a circumstance that the Supreme Court has observed that
by no stretch of imagination can it be said that the provisions of this section authorises the officer examining a person to beat him or to confine him for the purpose of inducing him to make a particular statement.
So far as the case of Pukhraj is concerned, it has quoted with approval Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari and it is on this decision that the case of the petitioner Bedi is rested. The prosecution in Matajog Dobey’s case was that the Income-tax authorities forcibly broke open the entrance door of the premises. The Darwan challenged them and requested them to desist but they paid no heed to the Darwan. They broke open the door, went inside and interfered with some boxes and drawers of tables. They tied him with a rope and assaulted him causing injuries. The question arose whether sanction was necessary under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was held by the Supreme Court that
where a power is conferred or a duty imposed by statute or otherwise, and there is nothing said expressly inhibiting the exercise of the power or the performance of the duty by any limitations or restrictions, it is reasonable to hold that it carries with it the power of doing all such acts or employing such means as are reasonably necessary for such execution.
If in the exercise of the power or the performance of the official duty, improper or unlawful obstruction or resistance is encountered there must be the right to use reasonable means to remove the obstruction or overcome the resistance. This accords with commonsense and does not seem contrary to any principle of law.” Bearing this principle of law in mind let us now see what is the case of the opposite party. A reading of the complaint petition and the solemn affirmation gives an unmistakable impression that the intention was never to assault or defame the opposite party. The impression that I get is that some force might have been applied when the opposite party resisted in being taken to the police station and the story of “Gali-Galoj” is just an embellishment or too vague to be of any significance. The opposite party has not filed any injury report nor has he said the kind of abuses that were hurled on him. Even if the abuses were there they were so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm (vide Section 95 of the Indian Penal Code). For the above reasons in ray opinion, ratio of Matajog’s case will govern the present case and as such prosecution for offences under Sections 323 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be allowed to continue.
11. Power to arrest without warrant is conferred on a member of the Force or its superior officers under Section 12 of the Railway Protection Force Act 1957. Therefore, the fact that investigation had been entrusted by the petitioner Bedi to an officer subordinate to him is of no consequence and prosecution for offences under Sections 341 and 342 of the Indian Penal Code is also bad.
12. In the result the two criminal miscellaneous petitions are allowed and the criminal prosecution started against the petitioner is quashed.