JUDGMENT
E. Padmanabhan, J.
1. The above appeal has been preferred challenging the order of the Commissioner of Workmen’s Compensation and Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Pondicherry, dated July 23, 2001 made in W.C. No. 21 of 1997.
2. Heard Mr.R.Sivakumar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. A. Senthilnarayanan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. The respondents instituted W.C.No.21 of 1997 on the file of the Additional Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation, Pondicherry claiming a compensation under Section 10(1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 against the appellants herein for the death of their son employed by the first appellant herein in respect of the accident arising out of and in the course of employment as a cleaner under the first appellant. The claim has been made by the dependents of the deceased employee. The respondents claimed Rs. 3 lakhs as compensation while alleging that the vehicle belonging to the first appellant herein was insured with the second appellant and they are liable to pay compensation for the personal injuries sustained by the deceased Elumalai who died due to the accident on August 4, 1996 arising out of and in the course of employment as a cleaner in the vehicle PY-01 A 7353. The deceased was just 20 years at the time of accident and he was earning Rs. 3,000 per month according to the respondents. 2
3. The second appellant herein denied the terms of employment and conditions of employment as well as the entire claim including the very accident itself and sustaining of injuries in the course of employment by the deceased Ezhumalai and his succumbing to injuries. The Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation framed the following three points for consideration:
(i) Whether the applicant is a workman as per the definition in the Act and was working under the first opposite party at the time of accident?
(ii) Whether the accident took place out of and in the course of employment and the injury sustained is due to accident?
(iii) Who is liable to pay compensation and what is the quantum of compensation?
4. On the first issue, the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation recorded a finding that the deceased was a workman as defined in the Act. On the second issue, the Commissioner recorded a finding that the deceased-employee Ezhumalai sustained personal injuries and died on the spot consequent to the accident that occurred on August 4, 1996 which incident as arose out of and in the course of employment. On the third issue, the Commissioner held that owner of the vehicle is liable to pay and the insurer with whom the vehicle was insured is liable to indemnify.
5. As regards the quantum of compensation the Commissioner recorded a finding that the deceased employee was earning Rs. 3,000 per month at the time of accident, he was aged 20 years and awarded a compensation of Rs. 3,36,000 in all in terms of Schedule IV of the Act read with the Workmen’s Compensation (Amendment) Act, 1984. In the result, the Commissioner awarded Rs. 3,36,000 with interest at 12% per annum from the date of accident till date of deposit/realisation by order dated July 23, 2001.
6. Challenging the said order, the owner of the vehicle and the insurer of the vehicle have jointly preferred the present appeal. The counsel for the appellants mainly contended that even assuming the wages drawn by the deceased at the time of accident was Rs. 3,000 per month, in terms of Section 4(1)(b) Explanation II, the monthly wages has to be reckoned at Rs. 2,000 and the total compensation should have been arrived at Rs. 2,24,000 and award of any amount in excess of Rs.2,24,000 is illegal.
7. In this appeal, notice of motion was ordered by this Court on February 20, 2002. The respondents have been served and they have entered appearance. The following substantial questions of law were advanced:
“(A) Whether the learned Additional Commissioner is correct in not fixing the wages of the deceased at Rs. 2,000 as per Section 4(1), Clause (b), Explanation II of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923?
(B) Whether the learned Additional Commissioner is correct in not taking the date of accident and fixing the wages of the deceased?”
8. The counsel for the appellants did not challenge the other findings, namely about the status of the deceased workman, his employment, the employment injury sustained and the consequential death of the deceased. Instead the appellants challenged the quantum of compensation. The entire arguments were advanced on the premise that the deceased was drawing Rs. 3,000 per month as salary. However, it is contended that in term of the provision which existed on the date of accident the maximum salary has to be taken as Rs. 2,000 for assessing the compensation and compensation has to be worked out accordingly.
9. The learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the pronouncement of Gauhati High Court in Sandhya Gosami and Ors. v. Bani Choudhary and Anr., 2000-II-LLJ-585 (DB) and also the Division Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court in Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Asokan, 1997-II-LLJ- 546 in support of his contention that the amendment which came into force, after the date of accident, but the date of determination of compensation has to be applied and Rs. 3,000 has to be taken as the monthly salary and on that basis the compensation has to be worked out.
10. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, no interference is called for with the order of the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation. Let us examine the -respective contention. Section 4(1) of The Workmen’s Compensation Act, reads thus:
“4. Amount of Compensation: (i) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the amount of compensation shall be as follows, namely:
(a) Where death results from the injury an amount equal to fifty percent of the monthly wages to the deceased workman multiplied by the relevant factor; or an amount of fifty thousand rupees whichever is more;
(b) Where permanent total disablement results from the injury an amount equal to sixty percent of the monthly wages of the injured workman multiplied by the relevant factor; or an amount of sixty thousand rupees, whichever is more;
Explanation I: For the purposes of Clauses (a) and (b), “relevant factor” in relation to a workman means the factor specified in the second column of Schedule IV against the entry in the first column of that Schedule specifying the number of years which are the same as the completed years of the age of the workman of his last birthday immediately preceding the date on which the compensation fell due.
Explanation II: Where the monthly wages of workman exceeds two thousand rupees, this monthly wages for the purposes of Clauses (a) and (b) shall be deemed to be two thousand rupees only”.
11. We are not concerned with the remaining sub-sections. In this case we have to examine the effect of amendment to Explanation II to Sub-section (1) of Section 4. Explanation II was amended by Central Act, 30 of 1995 with effect from September 15, 1995. According to the amended provision as introduced by the Central Act 30 of 1995, where the monthly wage of the workman exceeds Rs. 2000, the monthly wages for the purpose of Clauses (a) and (b) shall be deemed to be Rs. 2,000 only. We hasten to add that we are not persuaded to follow the view taken by the said two pronouncements of Kerala and Gauhati High Courts as in our view the date of accident is crucial and the amendment has no application at all.
12. In the present case, the accident took place on August 4, 1996 which is the crucial date to assess the amount of compensation payable in terms of Section 4(1)(b) read with Schedule IV as on the date of the accident, in terms of Explanation II, irrespective of the amount of wages drawn by a workmen and even if it exceeds Rs. 2,000 the monthly wages for the purpose of Clauses (a) and (b) shall be deemed to be Rs. 2,000 only. The word Two Thousand Rupees has been subsequently amended and by later enactment with effect from August 8, 2000 by the Central Act 46 of 2000. The date of accident being August 4, 1996 it is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that Rs. 2000 alone shall be taken as wages in terms of Explanation II to Sub-section (1) of Section 4 and only on that basis compensations payable in terms of Schedule IV has to be assessed.
13. Per contra, the counsel for the respondents contended that on the date when the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation assessed the claim namely on July 23, 2001, the amendment has been introduced by the Central Act, 46 of 2000, which means that the wages drawn has to be taken or deemed as Rs. 3,000. The question whether the provision is retrospective or whether the Amending Act 46 of 2000 is retrospective? or whether the crucial date is the date of accident? or date of determination? are the points required to be considered.
14. Though the Division Benches of Kerala and Gauhati High Courts taken the view that the amendment introduced by the Central Act 46 of 2000 which is a beneficial provision 2 is retrospective in operation and the determination of compensation has to be made on the date on which the order is being passed and the date of accident is not the crucial date for assessing the compensation, and the provision which states “as on the date of accident” has no bearing.
15. In our considered view, the point is no longer res Integra and it has been decided by the Supreme Court in Kerala State Electricity Board and Anr. v. ValsalaK. and Anr., . The Full Bench of the Supreme Court laid down that the relevant date for determination of the rate of compensation is the date of the accident and not the date of adjudication of the claim.
16. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in this respect in the said pronouncement held thus 1999-II-LLJ-1112 at p. 1113.
“3. A four Judge Bench of this Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata, speaking through shINGHAL, J. has held that an employer becomes liable to pay compensation as soon as the personal injury is caused to the workman by the accident which arose out of and in the course of employment. Thus, the relevant date of determination of the rate of compensation is the date of the accident and not the date of adjudication of the claim.
4. A two Judge Bench of this Court in New Indict Assurance Company Limited v. K. Neelakandan, C.A. Nos. 16904-091 of 1996 dated November 6, 1996 however, took the view that the Workmen’s Compensation Act being a special legislation for the benefit of the workmen, the benefit as available on the date of adjudication should be extended to the workmen and not the compensation which was payable on the date of the accident. The two-Judge Bench in Neelakandan case however, did not take notice of the judgment of the larger Bench in Pratap Narain Singh Deo case as it presumably was not brought to the notice of their Lordships. Be that as it may, in view of the categorical law laid down by the larger Bench in Pratap Singh Deo’s case, the view expressed by the two Judge Bench in Neelakandan case is not correct.
5. Our attention has also been drawn to a judgment of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in United India Insurance Company Limited v. Alavi 1998-II-LLJ-896 wherein the Full Bench precisely considered the same question and examined both the abovenoted judgments. It took the view that the injured workman becomes entitled to get compensation the moment he suffers personal injuries of the types contemplated by the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and it is the amount of compensation payable on the date of the accident and not the amount of compensation payable on account of the amendment made in 1995, which is relevant. The decision of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court, to the extent it is in accord with the judgment of the larger Bench of this Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata, lays down the correct law and we approve it”.
17. In view of the above Full Bench pronouncement of the Supreme Court, we hold that the relevant date for determination of the rate of compensation is the date of accident and not the date of adjudication of the claim. On the same reasoning, we also hold that on the date of accident in the present case, in terms of the provisions that existed namely Central Act, 30 of 1995, for the purpose of Wages, Explanation II to Section 4(1) has to be taken only as Rs. 2,000 which is the maximum for the purpose of Clauses (a) and (b) and on that basis the compensation has to be determined in terms of Schedule IV.
18. If we assess the compensation in terms of the provision, namely Explanation II as it existed on the date of accident, then the compensation works out to Rs. 2,24,000. This would mean that we have to reduce the compensation awarded by the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation from Rs. 3,36,000 to Rs. 2,24,000. Both the questions of law were answered in favour of the appellants and against the respondents in the light of the above discussions while following the pronouncement of the Supreme Court. We also hasten to add that suffice to state that the earlier Division Bench judgment of the two High Courts need not be examined as our view is supported by the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court.
19. C.M.A. is allowed to the extent indicated above holding that respondents are entitled to payment of Rs. 2,24,000 with usual interest. Consequently, connected C.M.P. is closed. No cost.