ORDER
P.S. Narayana, J.
1. W.P. No. 14031 of 2006 is filed praying for a writ of quo-warranto declaring the inaction of the 1st respondent in not declaring the 4th respondent of being MPTC member of the Naidupet Mandal as void as per the provisions of Section 156 read with Section 18 of the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 as illegal, void, inoperative and accordingly, set aside the same and pass such other suitable orders.
2. W.P. No. 14052 of 2006 is filed praying for a writ of quo-warranto declaring the inaction of the 1st respondent in not declaring the 4th respondent of being MPTC member of the Naidupet Mandal as void as per the provisions of Section 156 read with Section 18 of the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 as illegal, void, inoperative and accordingly, set aside the same and pass such other suitable orders.
3. The ground raised in both the writ petitions is that the 4th respondent is a member of the Agricultural Market Committee, Naidupet Mandal and it is clear disqualification.
4. Sri S. Chakrapani, the learned Counsel representing the petitioners in both the writ petitions would contend that the disqualification is attracted from the material placed before this Court and hence, a writ of quo-warranto can be maintained despite the fact that an alternative remedy by way of an election petition is available. He would further contend that though the appeals were preferred, the appellate authority had not considered and dispose of the appeals and in such circumstances, the petitioners are left with no other option except to approach this Court.
5. It is needless to say that the petitioners are at liberty to pursue their appellate remedies and it is made clear that this order, which is being made by this Court, would not come in the way of the appellate authority in considering the appeals in accordance with law. It may be, that the petitioners challenge in regard to certain disqualifications as specified by the statutory provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1994. In Bhairulal Chunilal v. State of Bombay , a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, while dealing with a similar question, held as hereunder:
If, therefore, the property and rights of the Municipality did not vest in Government under Section 4 and the term of office of the outgoing councilors was extended, the Collector had every authority under the rales to fix a date for election which he did by his order dated 26-12-1952. In fact Mr. Kotwal does not challenge the order issued by the Collector. He does not dispute that the Collector was within his rights in ordering a general election to be held. His whole grievance is that in the course of the election illegalities were practised which vitiated the whole election and which made it liable to be set aside. If the term of office of the outgoing councilors was extended, there was nothing to prevent these councilors functioning as the Municipality for the purposes of the election proceedings and the only irregularity or illegality we have to consider is the fact that there was not a properly elected President who could perform the function assigned to him under the rules.
The Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act provides a machinery for challenging elections and that machinery is to be found in Section 15 of the Act. It lays down the grounds on which an election can be challenged, the Tribunal that has to decide it and the procedure that has got to be followed, and it is important to note that under Section 15(5) an election cannot be set aside merely on the ground of an irregularity or informality not corruptly caused. Mr. Kotwal concedes that if he was challenging the election of a councilor, he would not succeed by reason of this provision of the law but his contention is that the election that took place was not an election at all, it was a sham election, and the Court can give him relief by issuing a writ of ‘quo warranto’. It is well settled that where you have statutory provisions dealing with the conduct of an election, the writ of ‘quo warranto’ is displaced. An election then can only be challenged in the manner laid down by the statute. What Mr. Kotwal is doing by this petition is in effect challenging the election of all the councilors. He could undoubtedly have presented petitions for challenging the election of all the councilors under Section 15, and if he had done so, he would have failed because he would have failed to establish what Section 15 requires in order mat he should succeed. Could it then be said that although a party would not succeed if he filed an election petition under Section 15, he could still get a writ of ‘quo warranto’ from this Court merely because he does not choose to challenge the election of an individual councilor but challenges the election of all the councilors as a body ?
In our opinion the grievance made by the petitioner with regard to the conduct of the election is at best nothing more than an irregularity. The President who was in charge of the election under the rules was a person who was elected by the councilors and in whom the councilors had confidence. If he was not the ‘de jure’ President, he was certainly the ‘de facto’ President. There is not even a suggestion that in acting as the President under the rules he did anything which is contrary to the rules. It is not suggested that if any one else had been in charge of the election he would have done any better than this ‘de facto1 President. Therefore, putting it at the highest, the grievance of the petitioner amounts to this that a person who was elected by the councilors as President discharged the functions under the rules when he was not in law authorized to do so because his election by the councilors was not a proper and valid election.
Now, the writ of ‘quo warranto’ is not issued as a matter of right. It is a discretionary relief and the Court has always to ask itself whether under the circumstances of each case the petitioner should be given the relief in the nature of ‘quo warranto’ which he seeks. In this particular case every factor which can be taken into consideration weighs against the petitioner being entitled to this relief. The public notice, as already pointed out, was issued by the Municipality on 20-1-1953. Therefore, the petitioner had knowledge that the elections were going to take place under that notification and that the ‘de facto’ President was going to act as the President of the Municipality under the Election Rules. He takes no action whatever till after the elections are held, which is on 2-3-1953. He allows voters to go and cast their votes, elect their representatives, incur expenditure, and then comes to this Court and challenges the election on a pure technicality. It is not suggested that the result of the election has in any way been affected by what took place in the course of the election. The Courts must always be reluctant to interfere with elections except on the clearest and strongest of grounds. An election is a luxury which a democracy cannot be expected to indulge in too frequently, and once the people have recorded their votes and expressed their confidence in their representatives, the Court should be loath to interfere with the decision of the people merely because some technicality has not been observed or some irregularity has been committed. The matter would be entirely different if the irregularity has resulted in the people not being able to express their views properly, or if there was any corrupt practice which has materially affected the result of 1he election. It might have also been different if the election itself was held without any authority of law. But once it is conceded that the Collector had the authority to fix the dates of the general election and the general election took place according to law, any irregularity committed in the course of the election cannot be a ground for the issue of a writ of ‘quo warranto’.
6. Apart from this aspect of the matter, the issuance of a writ of quo-warranto is a discretionary remedy. In the light of the decision of the Division Bench referred to supra, this Court being in entire agreement with the learned Judges of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, is of the considered opinion that inasmuch as the petitioners are having an effective alternative remedy by way of an election petition, this Court cannot entertain these writ petitions.
7. Accordingly, both the writ petitions shall stand dismissed at the stage of admission. No order as to costs.