JUDGMENT
Ranjana Desai, J.
1. The petitioner is the complainant in R.C.C. No. 34 of 2000 pending on the file of Chief Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Solapur. The charge therein is under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code. Respondent 1 and 2 are accused 1 and 2 respectively.
2. The case of the petitioner in the complaint is that respondent 1 is a Finance Corporation and respondent 2 is a partner thereof. The petitioner had obtained a loan of Rs. 80,000/- with interest at the rate of 3.5% per annum for purchase of a tempo truck. It is the petitioner’s case that the said amount was paid by him.
3. According to the petitioner, in June, 1999, there was again some discussion between him and respondents 1 and 2 and respondents 1 and 2 agreed to give him another loan of Rs. 1 lac. The petitioner agreed to mortgage the said truck with respondents 1 and 2 for the said loan and as a security, certain cheques were also obtained by respondents 1 and 2 from the petitioner. On 15/10/1999, the petitioner took an amount of Rs. 1 lac by way of loan from respondents 1 and 2. He mortgaged his tempo truck bearing No. MH.13/A 4688 with respondents 1 and 2 as security for the said loan. A charge has been created in that behalf in the R.C. Book. According to the petitioner, from time to time, he has paid some amount towards repayment of the said loan. There was some dispute between the petitioner and respondents 1 and 2 over the exact outstanding amount of the said loan. Therefore, on 31/3/2000, when the petitioner’s driver was taking the said tempo truck to Solapur, the respondents with the help of the agent – Ramesh forcibly took custody of the said tempo truck from the petitioner’s driver and hence respondents 1 and 2 committed an offence punishable under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code. On these allegations, the complaint was filed by the petitioner on 24/3/2000.
4. On the same day, the petitioner made an application under Section 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code (for short, “the Code”) praying for search warrant and seizure of the said tempo truck.
5. On 27/3/2000, the petitioner filed an application under Section 461 of the Code praying for return of the said tempo truck to him. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Belapur, by his order dated 27/3/2000, directed the Vijapur Naka Police Station to release the tempo truck to the petitioner on his executing a bond. The learned Magistrate directed that the petitioner should pay two instalments on or before 29/4/2000 and thereafter every month he shall pay two instalments instead of one instalment.
6. This order was challenged by respondent 1 and 2 in Criminal Revision Application No. 105 of 2000 in the court of Additional Sessions Judge, Solapur. The learned Sessions Judge set aside the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. He relied on the decision of this court in B.C.L. Financial Services Ltd., Nagpur v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., 1999 (3) Mh.L.J. 173. The learned Sessions Judge held that the petitioner, who is the borrower, has not paid the amount to the financial institution in time. He observed that there was a clause in the agreement in favour of the financial institution to take possession of the vehicle and, therefore, the order of the learned Magistrate releasing the vehicle, in question, on bond cannot be stated to be legal, proper or correct. He referred to the decision of this court in Virendra Kumar J. Handa v. Dilawar Khan, wherein it is held that the order releasing the vehicle on bond is an interlocutory order. The learned Sessions Judge, however, observed that in B.C.L. Financial Services Ltd.’s case (supra), this court has taken a different view. The judgment in B.C.L. Financial Services Limited’s case (supra) is a later judgment and, therefore, it should be followed. In view of this, while setting aside the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Solapur, he directed the petitioner to produce the said tempo truck before the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 8/6/2000 pursuant to the bond given by him in the Court, for giving custody of the said vehicle to the respondents. This order is challenged before me.
7. On 28/11/2000, Rule has been issued on this petition and interim order in terms of prayer Clause (c), which had been earlier passed has been ordered to continue. By reason of the interim order, the impugned order was stayed. I am informed that the truck is with the petitioner. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. He contended that the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate dated 27/3/2000 was an interlocutory order being an order passed under Section 451 of the Code and, therefore, in view of the decision of this court in Virendra Kumar J. Handa’s case (supra), it being an interlocutory order, no revision is maintainable against it. The learned Sessions Judge, therefore, could not have set aside the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate in his revisional jurisdiction. The learned counsel submitted that the decision of this Court in B.C.L. Financial Services’ case (supra) is not applicable to the facts of this case because it does not deal with the question whether order passed under Section 451 of the Code is interlocutory or not. He also drew my attention to yet another judgment of this court in Liyakat Hussain v. Rajendra and Ors., 1996 (2) Crimes 549 wherein it is held that the orders passed under Section 451 of the Code do not decide the rights of the parties and, therefore, are interlocutory orders and hence, no revision is maintainable against such orders. The learned counsel therefor submitted that the impugned order be set aside.
8. I have heard the learned A.P.P. He has drawn my attention to the judgment in Kachru s/o. Jairam Jadhav and Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra, the learned single judge of this court has considered Section 451 and 457 of the Code and has observed that the orders passed under Section 451 of the Code are interlocutory orders.
9. In my opinion, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Solapur, erred in relying upon B.C.L. Financial services Limited’s case (supra). The judgment does not directly deal with the question whether the orders passed under Section 451 are interlocutory orders or not. The order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Belapur, dated 27/3/2000 merely directs the petitioner to execute a bond. It also directs him to pay instalments of the loan as per the schedule worked out by him. This order does not decide the rights of the parties finally. As stated by this Court in Liyakat Hussain’s case (supra), whether the order is under Section 451 or under Section 457 of the Code is not material at all. When an order does not decide the rights of the parties in any manner, it would become an interlocutory order.
10. In Amar Nath and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors., , the Supreme Court has observed that there could be an intermediate category of orders which are not final and yet could not be considered as merely interlocutory as they decide issues of moment and determine or seriously affect the rights of the parties. The order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, dated 27/3/2000 does not fall in that category also. In my opinion, it is purely an interlocutory order and a revision against that order is not maintainable. In the circumstances, the impugned order will have to be set aside. I am informed by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has paid the entire loan amount. It is not possible for this court to state whether the entire amount is paid or not because though respondents 1 and 2 have been served they have not cared to appear in this court. If the loan amount is not paid, the trial court will pass appropriate orders if an application is made in that behalf. Hence, the following order:
11. The impugned order dated 27/5/2000 passed by the IInd Additional District and Sessions Court, Solapur in Criminal Revision Application No. 105 of 2000 is set aside. R.C.C. No. 88 of 2000 pending on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Solapur is expedited. Writ of this court to go the trial court immediately.
12. Petition is disposed of in the aforestated terms.