JUDGMENT
Mohd. Shamim, J.
(1) This is a petition under Sections 14, 17 and 29 of the Arbitration Act for issue of a direction to the Arbitrator to file the award and to make the same a rule of the Court.
(2) Brieffactswhichgavcrisetothepresentpetition areas under: thatcertain disputes and differences arose in between the petitioner and respondent No. I in connection with the construction of Central Stores with Railway siding facilities at G.T. Kamal Road in Phase Ii SH: CC/o Cement Codowns in Part I and Part Ii in agreement No. 52/EE/HDIII/DDA/81-
82.Consequently, the petitioner approached the Engineer Member, Delhi Development Authority, to appoint an Arbitrator in terms of the arbitration agreement as a corollary whereof the respondent No. 2 was nominated as an Arbitrator vide letter dated August 26,1985. The said Arbitrator entered the reference and gave and published his award on October 16,1987.
(3) Notices were issued to both the parties with regard to the filing of the award. The petitioner did not choose to prefer any objection against the said award. However, the respondent i.e. the Delhi Development Authority filed the objections.
(4) The respondent through the said objections challenged the findings of the arbitrator with regard to claims Nos. 1, 3, 4, 6 & 10.
(5) Learned Counsel for the objector has contended that the learned Arbitrator has not given outreasons for arriving at his conclusions though he was required to do so underclause 25 of the arbitration agreement inasmuch as the amount awarded by the learned Arbitrator in the instant case is more than Rs. 50,000.00 . Thus, the impugned award is not a reasoned award and, as such, it is liable to be set aside. The next limb of the argument of the learned Counsel is that the learned Arbitrator has awarded a sum of Rs. 87,163.84 on account of the increase in the wages of the labour. According to the learned Counsel, he could not have done so in view of Clause 10C of the arbitration agreement, The learned Counsel thus wants that the impugned award is liable to be set aside as far as the amount awarded underclaims Nos. 1, 3, 4 & 6 is concerned. The findings of the learned Arbitrator are thus liable to be set aside.
(6) Learned Counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, has submitted that the learned Arbitrator has given very cogent reasons for arriving at his conclusions. This Court docs not sit in appeal on the findings given by the learned Arbitrator and cannot interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by an Arbitrator. The Court can interfere with an award only in those discerning few cases which fall within the domain of Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, (a) where the Arbitrator has misconducted himself or the proceedings, (b) that an award has been made after the issue of an order by the Court superseding the Arbitrator or after Arbitration proceedings have become invalid under Section 35, and (e) that an award has been improperly procured or is otherwise invalid.
(7) The learned Counsel has thus contended that the impugned award is liable to be made a rule of the Court. The following issues were framed:-
1. Whether the award is liable to be set aside on the grounds mentioned in I.A.No. 2291/89? 2. Relief. Claims Nos. 1, 4 & 6.
(8) Learned Counsel for the respondent has contended that the findings of the learned Arbitratoron the above claims are not supported by cogent reasons. Thelearned Arbitrator under Clause 25 of the arbitration agreement was under an obligation to give a reasoned award inasmuch as he has awarded a claim of Rs. 2,13.054.44 in favor of the petitioner. The learned Counsel has in this connection led me through Clause 25 of the agreement which can be adverted to with profit:
“IN all cases where the amount of the claim in dispute is Rs. 50,000.00 (Rupees fifty thousand) and above, the Arbitrator will give reason for the award”. Seeking inspiration from the above clause, the learned Counsel Mrs. Salwan has thus vehemently argued that the Arbitrator has not given any cogent reasons for arriving at his conclusions. I am sorry. I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned Counsel. A close scrutiny of the findings of the Arbitrator given on claims Nos. 1, 4 and 6 reveal that he has given quite detailed reasons for arriving at his findings. It is a well settled principle of law that an Arbitrator is under no obligation to write a detailed judgment. It is sufficient if we can decipher from his findings his bent of mind. The under lying idea behind the Arbitration Act is to quicken the pace of disposal. Thus, if an arbitrator is required to give out detailed and elaborate reasons the very purpose of the enactment of the Arbitration Act is likely to be defeated. The above view was given vent to by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as , Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Indian Carbon Ltd. “Where reasons for giving the award are stated in the award and no error or law could be pointed out in those reasons; there was no error of fact and the view taken by the arbitrator was a possible view to take and the arbitrator has made his mind known on the basis of which he has acted; that is sufficient to meet the requirements even if it be reasons should be stated in the award. The award could not therefore be set aside on the ground that it was not a reasoned award. It is one thing to say that reasons should be stated and another thing to state that a detailed judgment be given in support of an award. Even if it be held that it is obligatory to state the reasons, it is not obligatory to give a detailed judgment. Arbitration procedure should be quick and that quickness of the decision can always be ensured by insisting that short intelligible indications of the grounds should be available to find of it the mind of the Arbitrator for his action”. To the same effect are the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court as , Goa, Daman b Diu Housing Board v. Ramakant V.P. Daruotkar.
(9) I have very carefully examined and scrutinised the impugned award, yet I find that the learned Arbitrator has given out very cogent and precise reasons for arriving at his conclusions. Thus, the impugned award cannot be faulted on the said score.
(10) Claim No. 3. Learned Counsel for the objector has contended that the arbitrator in the instant case took into consideration the increase in the labour rates which were made on February 23,1982. According to the learned Counsel, the Arbitrator could not have done so in view of the provisions of Clause 10C of the Arbitration agreement. It would be just and proper to examine the provisions of the said clause before proceeding further in the matter. It is in the following words:-
“IF during the progress of the works, the pricen of any material incorporated in the works, (not being a material supplied from the Engineer-in-Charge’s stores in accordance with Clause 10 hereof) and/or wages of labour increases as a direct result of the coming into force of any fresh law, or statutory rule or order (but not due to any changes insales tax) and such increases exceed ten percent of the price and/or wages prevailing at the time of receipt of the tender for the work, and contractor thereupon necessarily and properly pays in respect of the material (incorporated in the work) such increased wages, then the amount of the contract shall accordingly be varied.”
(11) Seeking assistance from the wording of the said clause Mrs. Salwan has vehemently argued that the tender in the instant case was submitted on December 4,1981 and the same was accepted on March 15,1982, whereas the date of commencement ofworkisfromMarch25,1982onwards.According to the learned Counsel, the labour rates were increased on February 23,1982. The contention of the learned Counsel thus proceeds further that since the tender was accepted on March 15,1982 and labour rates were increased prior to that, as such, the contractor was not entitled to any amount on the said score. The learned Counsel has laid much emphasis on the word that the increase in the wages to be given benefit to the contractor must be during the progress of the works. Admittedly, there was no increase in the labour rates during the progress of the work. The increase, if any, was after the submission of the tender and before the acceptance of the tender. Hence, it could not have been taken into consideration by the arbitrator. The next limb of the argument of the learned Counsel is that since the tender was accepted on March 15,1982 i.e. much prior to the increase in the labour rates, hence the same was taken into consideration at the time of the grant of the contract. Consequently, no amount could have been granted on the score of the said increase as the same had already been taken due note of by the respondent.
(12) The learned Counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, has contended that the learned Counsel for the objector has construed amiss the provisions of Clause IOC. According to the learned Counsel, Clause 10C is to be read as a whole and not in a piecemeal fashion in order to give a correct interpretation to the said clause. Thus it becomes crystal clear that the contractor is very much entitled to an amount on account of the increase in the labour wages if the increase in the labour wages was at the time of the receipt of the tender for the work. The labour rates were admittedly in the instant case made applicable w.e.f. February 23,1982 i.e. the labour rates which were increased after the receipt of the tender i.e. December4,1981. The tender was accepted on March 15,1982. Thus, the learned Counsel contends that the contractor was very much entitled to an amount in the increase of the labour wages and the learned Arbitrator was perfectly justified in awarding a sum of Rs. 87,163.84 on the said score. I find myself in perfect agreement with the learned Counsel for the petitioner. I am tempted here to cite a few lines from the findings of the arbitratorgiven on this point”….It has also been urged by the respondents that as per Clause 10C the increase in the labour and materials is payable when the increase takes place during the progress of work. The increase in this case in labour rates took place before acceptance of tender. Due to these reasons they have opposed the claim for payment due to increased wages. The above arguments of the respondents are not considered valid by me since the claimant informed on 18.2.82, that increases were anticipated due to coming budget etc. and the consequent increase in the cost of materials etc. He also did not commit that he will not be claiming due to increase in labour and materials that he was entitled under 10C. The Clause Ioc was not amended by the parties. Further a close reading of Ioc shows that the increase has to be considered in price of labour and materials compared to that which were prevailing at the time of the receipt of the tender for the work and not after the award of the work”
(13) In the circumstances stated above, I do not see any justification to interfere with the learned Arbitrator on this point.
(14) This brings me to claim No. 10. The Arbitrator has awarded pendentelite and future interest at the rate of 10% per annum. There is no dispute in view of the recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court that the Arbitrator is competent to do so.
(15) In the circumstances stated above, the petition under sections 14,17 and 29 of the Arbitration Act is hereby allowed. The objections are hereby dismissed with costs. The award Ex. Yz is hereby made a rule of the Court. Let adecree be passed in favor of the petitioner against the respondent in terms of the award. The award Ex.YZ shall form a part of the decree. The petitioner shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of the decree till the realisation of the decretal amount.