PETITIONER:
PRABHAKARAN NAIR, ETC.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT03/09/1987
BENCH:
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)
BENCH:
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)
NATRAJAN, S. (J)
CITATION:
1987 AIR 2117 1988 SCR (1) 1
1987 SCC (4) 238 JT 1987 (3) 492
1987 SCALE (2)469
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1988 SC 485 (6)
ACT:
Landlord-Tenant matter-Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and
Rent Control) Act, 1960-Sections 14(1)(b), 16(2) and 30(ii)-
Vires of-Challenged.
HEADNOTE:
There was 'much ado about nothing' about these Writ
Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution. The
petitions sought to challenge the Vires of sections
14(1)(b), 16(2) and, incidentally, sec. 30(ii) of the Tamil
Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 on the
ground of being arbitrary, discriminatory and unreasonable.
The different petitions had different facts, and it was
considered appropriate to deal with the facts of the writ
petition filed by Prabhakaran Nair (Writ Petition No. 506 of
1986) as a typical case to appreciate the points in issue.
In that case, the respondents-landlords, after
purchasing the premises in dispute from the erstwhile owner,
filed an application for the eviction of the petitioner from
the said premises on the grounds of non-payment of rent
under section 10(2)(1), unlawful sub-letting under section
10(2)(ii)(a), causing damages to the premises under section
10(2)(iii) and demolition and reconstruction of the premises
under section 14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Rent Act. The Trial
Court ordered eviction only under section 14(1)(b) of the
Act for demolition and reconstruction, rejecting the other
grounds. The appellate court dismissed the appeal of the
petitioner. The High Court also dismissed the civil revision
petition of the petitioner. The petitioner then filed a
petition for Special Leave in this Court against the
judgment and order of the High Court. In the meanwhile, the
City Civil Court, on January 29, 1983, granted interim
injunction, restraining the respondents-landlords from
demolishing the building till the disposal of an application
filed by the petitioner in the suit, against the erstwhile
owner and the present landlords for specific performance of
an agreement to sell the premises to the petitioner. The
injunction was stated to have been confirmed and was still
continuing as the said application for specific performance
was still pending in the City Civil Court.
2
This Court dismissed the petition for special leave,
observing that the petitioner would be at liberty to file,
if so advised, a writ petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution, challenging the validity of section 14(1)(b)
of the Act. The petitioner filed this writ petition,
challenging the validity of sections 14(1)(b) and 16(2) of
the Tamil Nadu Rent Act as being arbitrary, discriminatory,
unreasonable and unconstitutional, and contending
consequently that the eviction order passed against him
under section 14(1)(b) was illegal. Several of the other
writ petitions were on this issue.
Dismissing the Writ Petitions, the Court,
^
HELD: In this case, the Court was not concerned with
clause (ii) of section 30 of the Tamil Nadu Act, a challenge
to the validity of which had been accepted by the Court in
Rattan Arya and others v. State of Tamil Nadu and another,
[1986] 3 S.C.C. 385 and the section 30(ii) had been struck
down as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. [10E]
Under section 14(1)(b) of the Act, a landlord could
make an application to the Rent Controller for possession of
a building, and the Rent Controller, if satisfied that the
building was bona fide required by the landlord for the
immediate purpose of demolition and such demolition was for
the purpose of erecting a new building on the site of the
building sought to be demolished, might pass an order,
directing the tenant to deliver possession of the building
to the landlord before a specified date. Under the
provisions of the Act, the landlord has to commence the work
of demolition not later than one month and the entire
demolition work shall be completed before the expiry of
three months from the date he recovers possession of the
entire building, and in the case of massive buildings,
demolition can take six months or even a year, in which
case, for reasons to be recorded in writing, the controller
may allow further period. During that period a tenant was
bound to have found some other suitable alternative
accommodation. In the case of a building vacated for repairs
under section 14(1)(a) of the Act, a tenant may arrange for
a temporary accommodation for a few months and then return
to the building. It was not practicable and would be
anomalous to expect a landlord to take back a tenant for a
re-constructed building after a long lapse of time during
which the tenant must necessarily have found some other
suitable accommodation. This was the true purpose behind
section 14(1)(b) read with section 14(2)(b). In that view of
the matter, the Court was unable to accept the submission
that in providing for the re-induction of the tenant in the
case of repairs and not in the
3
case of re-construction, there was any unreasonable and
irrational classification without any basis. The absence of
the provision for reinduction does not ipso facto make the
provisions of the Act unfair or make the Act self-defeating.
[11G, 12A-C,D-G, 18E]
As regards the submission that in most of the Rent
Acts, there was a provision for re-induction of the tenant
after re-construction, but in the case of the Tamil Nadu
Act, there was no such provision and this was violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution, Article 14 of the
Constitution does not authorise the striking down of a law
of one State on the ground that in contrast with a law of
another State on the same subjects, its provisions are
discriminatory, and nor does it contemplate a law of the
centre or of the State dealing with similar subjects being
held to be unconstitutional by a process of comparative
study of the provisions of two enactments; the source of
authority for the two statutes being different, Article 14
could have no application, as observed by a Constitution
Bench of this Court in the State of Madhya Pradesh v. G.C.
Mandawar, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 599. [12G, 13A-C]
The Act sought to restore the balance in the scale
which is otherwise weighted in favour of the stronger party
which had larger bargaining power. The Act balances the
scales and regulates the rights of the parties fairly and
cannot be construed only in favour of the tenant. The main
provision of section 14(1)(b) enables a landlord to make an
application to the rent controller for possession of the
building for demolition for re-construction of a new
building in its place. If the Rent Controller is satisfied
with the bona fide need of the landlord, he may pass an
order, directing the tenant to deliver possession of the
building to the landlord before a specified date. There must
be a bona fide need of the landlord. It could not be said
that section 14(1)(b) was arbitrary and that excessive
powers had been given to the landlords. [16G-H, 17D-E]
The provisions of the Act imposed restrictions on the
landlord's right under the common law or the Transfer of
Property Act to evict the tenant after the termination of
his tenancy. The nature, the form and the extent of the
restrictions to be imposed on the landlord's right and
consequent extent of the protection to be given to the
tenants is a matter of legislative policy and judgment. It
is inevitably bound to vary from one State to another
according to the local, peculiar conditions prevailing in
each State. When the Courts are confronted with the problem
of a legislation being violative of Article 14, the Courts
are not concerned with the unwisdom of the legislation. "In
short, unconstitutionality and not unwisdom of a legislation
is the narrow area of judicial review"
4
observations of Krishna Iyer, J. in Murthy Match Works,
etc., v. Asstt. Collector of Central Excise, etc., [1974]3
S.C.R. 121, may be seen in this connection. [18F-H,19G]
The purpose underlying section 14(1)(b) read with
section 16(2) of the Act is to remove or mitigate the
disinclination on the part of the landlords to expend moneys
for demolition of the dilapidated buildings and reconstruct
new buildings in their places. It is a matter of which
judicial notice can be taken that the return from the old
and dilapidated buildings is very meagre, and in several
cases, such buildings prove uneconomic for the landlords,
resulting in the deterioration of the condition of the
buildings, and there are even collapses of such buildings.
It is for this purpose that the landlord is given by section
14(1)(b), read with section 16, an incentive in the form of
exemption from the provisions of the Act for five years in
respect of the reconstructed building. The principle
underlying such exemption is not discriminatory against the
tenants, nor is it against the policy of the Act. It only
serves as an incentive to the landlord for creation of
additional accommodation to meet the growing housing needs.
These provisions providing for exemption of the new
buildings from the provisions of the Rent Act for a period
of five years or ten years were upheld vide the decision of
this Court in Punjab Tin Supply Co., Chandigarh and Ors. v.
The Central Govt. & Ors., [1984] 1 S.C.C. 206 at 216, 217.
[20C-G]
The Court was unable to accept the submission that the
absence of the right of induction of the tenants in the
reconstructed premises was either arbitrary or unreasonable.
The Act must be so construed that it harmonises the rights
of the landlords and at the same time protects the tenants
and also serves best the purpose of the Act, and one of the
purposes of the Act is to solve the acute shortage of
accommodation by making rational basis for eviction and
encouraging building and re-building which is at the root of
all causes of shortage of accommodation. [23D;24E-F]
OBITER: There is an acute shortage of housing. The laws
relating to letting and landlord and tenant in the different
States have from different States' angles tried to grapple
with the problem. Yet, in view of the magnitude of the
problem, the problem has become insoluble and the
litigations abound and people suffer. More houses,
therefore, must be built and more accommodation must be made
available for the people to live in. The laws of the
landlord and tenant must be made rational, humane, certain
and capable of being quickly implemented. The landlords
having premises in their control should be induced and
5
encouraged to part with the available accommodation on
certain safe-guards which will strictly ensure their
recovery when wanted. Men with money should be given proper
and meaningful incentives, as in some European countries, to
build houses. Tax holidays for new houses can be encouraged.
The tenants should also be given protection and security and
certain amount of reasonableness in the rent. Escalation of
prices in the urban properties, land, materials and houses
must be rationably checked. The country very vitally and
urgently requires a National Housing Policy if we want to
prevent a major breakdown of law and gradual disillusionment
of the people. After all shelter is one of our fundamental
rights. The New National Housing Policy must attract new
buildings, rationalise the rent structure and the rent
provisions and bring certain amount of uniformity, leaving
scope for sufficient flexibility amongst the States to
adjust such legislation according to their needs. This Court
and the High Courts should also be relieved of the heavy
burden of the rent litigations. Tier of appeals should be
curtailed. Laws must be simple, rational and clear.
Litigation must come to an end quickly. Such New Housing
Policy must comprehend the present and anticipate the
future. The idea of a National Rent Tribunal on an All India
basis should be examined. This has become an urgent
imperative of today's revolution. A fast changing society
cannot operate with unchanging law and preconceived judicial
attitude. [25B-H]
Rattan Arya and others v. State of Tamil Nadu and
another, [1986] 3 SCC 385; State of Madhya Pradesh v. G.C.
Mandawar, [1955] 1 SCR 599; S. Kannappa Pillai and another
v. B. Venkatarathnam, 78 Law Weekly 363; P.J. Irani v. State
of Madras, [1962] 2 SCR 169; S. Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State
of Tamil Nadu and another, [1985] 2 SCR 398; Raval & Co. v.
K.C. Ramachandran & Ors., [1974] 2 SCR 629; Murlidhar
Agarwal and another v. State of U.P. and others, [1975] 1
SCR 575; Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory
v. Subbash Chandra Yograj Sinha, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 159;
Metalware & Co., etc. v. Bansilal Sharma and Ors., etc.,
[1979] 3 S.C.R. 1107; Meta Ram v. Jiwan Lal, [1962] Suppl.
2.S.C.R. 623; Murthy Match Works, etc. etc. v. Asstt.
Collector of Central Excise, etc., [1974] 3 S.C.R. 121; In
re: The Special Courts Bill, 1978, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 476;
Punjab Tin Supply Co. Chandigarh & Ors. v. The Central Govt.
JUDGMENT:
State of Haryana and Anr., [1985] 4 SCC 221 at 226, 227;
Mehsin Bhai v. Hale and Company G. T. Madras, [1964] 2
Madras Law Journal 147; Metalware Co. etc. v. Bansilal
Sharma and others, etc., [1979] 3 S.C.R. 1107 at 1117, 1118
Punjab Tin Supply Co., Chandigarh etc. etc. v. The Central
Govt. and Ors., [1984] 1 SCR 428; Motor General Traders and
Anr. etc. etc. v.
6
State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. etc. etc., [1984] 1 SCR 594
at 605; Atam Prakash v. State of Haryana and Ors., [1986] 2
S.C.R. 249; Panchamal Narayan Shenoy v. Basthi Venkatesha
Shenoy, [1970] 3 SCR 734; Jiwanlal & Co. and Ors. v. Manot
and Co., Ltd., 64 Calcutta Weekly Notes, 932 at 937 and M/s.
Patel Road-ways Private Limited, Madras v. State of Tamil
Nadu and Ors., A.I.R. 1985 Madras 115, referred to.
&
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 506 of 1986
etc.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
J. Ramamurthi, V. Shanker, B. Parthasarthi, Raju
Ramachandran, S. Srinivasan, M.C. Verma, C.S. Vaidyanathan,
K.R.R. Pillai, E.C. Aggarwala, V. Balachandran, N.K. Sharma,
M.N. Krishnamani, Diwan Balakram, A.T.M. Sampath, Mukul
Mudgal, V. Balachandran, V. Shekhar, K. Parasaran, Attorney
General, Soli J. Sorabjee, Shanti Bhushan, A.K. Verma, D.N.
Mishra, A.V. Rangam, P.N. Ramalingam and M. Raghuraman, for
appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. There is ‘much ado about
nothing’ about these cases. These petitions seek to
challenge the vires of section 14(1)(b) and section 16(2) as
well as incidentally section 30(ii) of the Tamil Nadu
Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter
called ‘the Tamil Nadu Rent Act’) on the ground of being
arbitrary, discriminatory and unreasonable. Different
petitions deal with different facts. It is not necessary to
set these out exhaustively but it would be appropriate to
deal with the facts of Writ Petition No. 506 of 1986 as a
typical one in order to appreciate the points in issue. In
Writ Petition No. 506 of 1986, the respondent-landlord on or
about 21st of March, 1978 after purchasing the premises
No.95, Thyagaraja Road, T. Nagar, Madras from the erstwhile
owner, filed an eviction petition in the court of Small
Causes, Madras for eviction of the petitioner herein from
the premises where the petitioner had been carrying on a
hotel business serving meals etc. for four decades. The
grounds in the eviction petition were non-payment of rent
under sec-
7
tion 10(2)(1) of the Tamil Nadu Rent Act, unlawful sub-
letting under section 10(2)(ii)(a), causing damages to the
premises under section 10(2)(iii) and also for the purposes
of demolition and reconstruction under section 14(1)(b).
The learned Judge of the trial court ordered eviction
under section 14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Rent Act only for
demolition and reconstruction and dismissed the other
grounds, and that is the only ground with which we are
concerned in this appeal. On 25th of February, 1981 the
Appellate Court dismissed the petitioner’s appeal by saying
that the landlords were rich people and capable of
demolition and reconstruction in order to put the premises
to a more profitable use by putting up their own showroom.
On September 30, 1982 the High Court dismissed the civil
revision petition of the petitioner and granted time till
31st of January, 1983 for the petitioner to vacate the
premises in question. The petitioner thereafter filed a
special leave petition against the judgment and order of the
High Court in this Court. This Court initially ordered show
cause notice and also granted ad interim ex-parte stay of
dispossession. On 29th January, 1983 the City Civil Court,
Madras granted interim injunction restraining the
respondents from demolishing the building till the disposal
of the application in the suit filed by the petitioner
against the erstwhile owner and the present landlords for
specific performance of an agreement to sell the premises to
the petitioner. According to the petitioner the injunction
was confirmed and was still continuing and the said suit for
specific performance was also pending in the City Civil
Court, Madras.
On 17th of February, 1986 this Court dismissed the
special leave petition after notice but directed that the
decree for eviction would not be executed till 17.11.86. It
was observed by this Court that the petitioner would be at
liberty to file a writ petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution, if so advised, challenging the validity of
section 14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Rent Act as mentioned on
behalf of the petitioner. The petitioner filed this writ
petition challenging the validity of section 14(1)(b) and
section 16(2) of the Tamil Nadu Rent Act on the ground that
these were arbitrary, discriminatory, unreasonable and
unconstitutional. The petitioner contends in this writ
petition that consequently the eviction order passed under
section 14(1)(b) and confirmed in appeal is also illegal.
The aforesaid several of the writ petitions are on this
issue.
The main ground of attack on this aspect seems to be
that while
8
other Rent Acts in case of eviction for demolition permit
and direct that after reconstruction the tenant should be
inducted as tenant or given the opportunity to have the same
space in the reconstructed building, in the instant Act no
such option is given and no such obligation imposed upon the
landlord and as such the impugned provision is illegal as
being discriminatory against the tenant. In order to examine
the various aspects on this contention, it will be necessary
to examine in detail the relevant provisions of the Act. It
should be borne in mind, however, that this was an Act
passed to amend and consolidate the law relating to the
regulation of the letting of residential and non-residential
buildings and the control of rents of such buildings and the
prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants in the State
of Tamil Nadu. Section 14 of the Tamil Nadu Rent Act states
as follows:-
” 14. Recovery of possession by landlord for
repairs or for reconstruction.-(1) Notwithstanding
anything contained in this Act, but subject to the
provisions of sections 12 and 13, on an
application made by a landlord, the Controller
shall, if he is satisfied-
(a) that the building is bona fide required
by the landlord for carrying out repairs which
cannot be carried out without the building being
vacated; or
(b) that the building is bona fide required
by the landlord for the immediate purpose of
demolishing it and such demolition is to be made
for the purpose of erecting a new building on the
site of the building sought to be demolished, pass
an order directing the tenant to deliver
possession of the building to the landlord before
a specified date.
(2) No order directing the tenant to deliver
possession of the building under this section
shall be passed-
(a) on the ground specified in clause (a) of
subsection (1), unless the landlord gives an
undertaking that the building shall, on completion
of the repairs, be offered to the tenant, who
delivered possession in pursuance of an order
under sub-section (1) for his re-occupation before
the expiry of three months from the date of
recovery of possession by the landlord, or before
the expiry of such further period as the
Controller may, for reasons to be recorded in
writing, allow; or
9
(b) on the ground specified in clause (b) of
subsection (1), unless the landlord gives an
undertaking that the work of demolishing any
material portion of the building shall be
substantially commenced by him not later than one
month and shall be completed before the expiry of
three months from the date he recovers possession
of the entire building or before the expiry of
such further period as the Controller may, for
reasons to be recorded in writing, allow.
(3) Nothing contained in this section shall
entitle the landlord who has recovered possession
of the building for repairs to convert a
residential building into a non-residential
building or a non-residential building into a
residential building unless such conversion is
permitted by the Controller at the time of passing
an order under subsection (1).
(4) Notwithstanding an order passed by the
Controller under clause (a) of sub-section (1)
directing the tenant to deliver possession of the
building, such tenant shall be deemed to continue
to be the tenant, but the landlord shall not be
entitled to any rent for the period commencing on
the date of delivery of possession of the building
by the tenant to the landlord and ending with the
date on which the building is offered to the
tenant by the landlord in pursuance of the
undertaking under clause (a) of subsection (2).
(5) Nothing in this section shall entitle any
landlord of a building in respect of which the
Government shall be deemed to be the tenant to
make any application under this section”.
Section 15 empowers the tenant to re-occupy after
repairs. There is no such provision in case of eviction on
the ground of bona fide need for demolition and
reconstruction. This is one of the grounds of challenge.
Section 16 deals with the right of the tenant to occupy
the building if it is not demolished. Sub-section (2) which
was amended and introduced by Act 23 of 1973 dealing with
the reconstructed building reads as follows:
10
“16(2) Where in pursuance of an order passed by
the Controller under clause (b) of sub-section (1)
of section 14, any building is totally demolished
and a new building is erected in its place, all
the provisions of this Act shall cease to apply to
such new building for a period of five years from
the date on which the construction of such new
building is completed and notified to the local
authority concerned.”
In this connection section 30 which exempts certain
buildings may be referred to and sub-section (i) is
important. It reads as follows:
“30. Exemption in the case of certain buildings-
Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to-
(i) any building for a period of five years
from the date on which the construction is
completed and notified to local authority
concerned; or
(ii) any residential building or part thereof
occupied by any one tenant if the monthly rent
paid by him in respect of that building or part
exceeds (four hundred rupees).”
In this appeal we are not concerned with clause (ii) of
section 30 the challenge to whose validity has been accepted
by this Court in Rattan Arya and others v. State of Tamil
Nadu and another, [1986] 3 S.C.C. 385. Section 30(ii) of the
Tamil Nadu Rent Act has been struck down as violative of
Article 14.
Various submissions were urged in support of the
several writ petitions. Sree Raju Ramachandran contended
that in most of the Indian statutes dealing with eviction of
tenants, there are provisions of re-induction of the tenant
where the eviction is obtained on the ground of
reconstruction after the premises in question is
reconstructed. It was submitted that in those statutes,
there is obligation on the landlord to reconstruct within a
certain period and the corresponding right on the tenant
evicted to be re-inducted at the market rate to be fixed by
the Rent Controller or by such authority as the Court may
direct.
Our attention was drawn to several statutes, namely,
Maharashtra, Karnataka, Kerala, West Bengal and numerous
others where there are provisions for re-induction of other
tenants in the premises after reconstruction. Most of the
provisions of other statutes provide for such induction
while the Tamil Nadu Rent Act does not. On this
11
ground it was submitted, that firstly, that this is
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was further
submitted that section 16(2) of the Tamil Nadu Rent Act says
that where in pursuance of an order of eviction passed by
the Rent Controller under section 14(1)(b) any building is
totally demolished and a new building is erected in its
place, all the provisions of the Act shall cease to apply to
such new building for a period of five years. It was
submitted that neither the old tenant nor any new tenant was
thus entitled to protection of the Rent Control Act after
reconstruction. The old tenant cannot also get into the new
building as of right. This discrimination against the
tenants in Tamil Nadu is invidious and violates Article 14
of the Constitution. Secondly, it was submitted that if in
case of repairs which also dislodges the tenants for limited
period, the tenants have a right to get into the premises
after repairs under the Tamil Nadu Rent Act, it is
unreasonable that tenants should not have the same right in
case of reconstruction. It was urged that once the building
is ready for occupation it should make no difference whether
the readiness is after repairs or after construction. It was
urged that in both cases the tenants go out during the
period of building work, and they should equally come back
into the building after repairs or reconstruction. It was
submitted on this ground also that not enjoining re-
induction of the evicted tenant after reconstruction is
discriminatory and unconstitutional. The classification of
buildings reconstructed differently from the buildings
repaired is not valid, as it has no relation to the object
or purpose of the Act. Furthermore, that all the tenants
belong to one class and they could not be treated
differently. On this aspect it was further submitted that
the provisions of re-induction in most of the Rent Acts re-
presented the standard of reasonableness in the landlord and
the tenant law and the philosophy of Rent Control
Legislation. It re-presented the national consensus of
reasonable standard. Therefore, any provision which
according to learned counsel appearing for the different
parties in the writ petitions, was in variance with that
standard was unreasonable and as such violative of Article
14 of the Constitution. In aid of this submission various
contentions were urged. We are, however, unable to accept
this submission.
Learned Attorney General appearing for the respondents
submitted before us that the main provision of section
14(1)(b) enables a landlord to make an application to the
Rent Controller and the Rent Controller, if he was satisfied
that the building was bona fide required by the landlord for
the immediate purpose of demolishing it for the purpose of
erecting a new building on the site of the building sought
to be demolished might pass an order directing the tenant to
deliver
12
possession of the building to the landlord before a
specified date. In the case of an application under section
14(1)(a) of the Tamil Nadu Rent Act namely bona fide
requirement for carrying out repairs it cannot be carried
out without the building being vacated and it has to be done
within three months to enable the tenant to re-occupy the
building. It has further to be borne in mind that in the
case of demolition and re-construction, the landlord has to
undertake that the work of demolishing any material portion
of the building shall be substantially commenced by him not
later than one month and the entire demolition work shall be
completed before the expiry of three months from the date he
recovers possession of the entire building. See in this
connection the provisions of section 16 of the said Act. The
demolition has therefore to be completed within three
months. In the case of massive buildings demolition can
overtake six months or even a year and hence the provision
that for reasons to be recorded in writing, the Controller
may allow such further period.
It has further to be borne in mind that after such
demolition the re-construction of a new building on the same
site is bound to take time and such time depends upon the
nature of the building to be erected and it might take years
it was argued. During that period a tenant was bound to have
found some other suitable alternative accommodation; on the
other hand in the case of a building for repairs, a tenant
may arrange for temporary accommodation for a few months and
return back to the building. Therefore provision for
reinduction in the case of repairs and absence of such a
provision in the case of demolition and reconstruction is
quite understandable and rational.
It has to be borne in mind that it is not practicable
and would be anamolous to expect a landlord to take back a
tenant after a long lapse of time during which time the
tenant must necessarily have found some suitable
accommodation elsewhere. This is the true purpose behind
section 14(1)(b) read with section 14(2)(b). In the
aforesaid view of the matter, we are unable to accept the
submission that in providing for re-induction of the tenant
in case of repairs and not providing for such re-induction
in case of reconstruction, there is any unreasonable and
irrational classification without any basis.
The other submission as noted above was that in most of
the Rent Acts, there was provision for re-induction of the
tenants but there was no such provision in case of
reconstruction in the Tamil Nadu Rent Act. In The State of
Madhya Pradesh v. G.C. Mandawar, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 599, a
Constitution Bench of this Court observed that
13
Article 14 of the Constitution does not authorise the
striking down of a law of one State on the ground that in
contrast with a law of another State on the same subject its
provisions are discriminatory. Nor does it contemplate a law
of the Centre or of the State dealing with similar subjects
being held to be unconstitutional by a process of
comparative study of the provisions of two enactments. The
source of authority for the two statutes being different,
Article 14 can have no application’ it was observed.
It is necessary now to deal with the submission that
the section is unreasonable. For this, one has to bear in
mind the public purpose behind the legislation. The Tamil
Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 was passed
in 1960. A similar enactment which was in operation from
1949 to 1960 did not contain any provision like sections 14
to 16 providing for eviction of the tenant on the ground of
demolition and reconstruction.
In 1949, however, the enactment contained a provision
empowering the Government to exempt any building or class of
buildings from all or any of the provisions of the Act. When
the landlords desired to evict tenants on the ground of
demolition and re-construction, they resorted to the remedy
of moving the Government by an application for exemption
under section 13 of the 1949 Act. The Government by
notification used to exempt any building or class of
buildings from all or any of the provisions of the Act. In
this connection reference may be made to the decision in S.
Kannappa Pillai and another v. B. Venkatarathnam, (78 Law
Weekly 363). The Government in that case when passing the
order of exemption used to impose condition that the
landlord should complete the re-construction within four
months from the date on which the premises were vacated by
the tenants and that he should take back the old tenants
into the reconstructed building at the rate demanded by the
landlord subject to the fixation of fair rent. However, in
view of the tenants’ conduct in resorting to writ
proceedings challenging the order of exemption and in filing
suits and having delayed the process of demolition and
reconstruction, the Court in the exercise of discretion
refused to extend the benefit of the condition as to re-
induction in favour of the tenants. The further remedy was
by writ proceedings before the High Court by the landlord or
the tenant who felt aggrieved as the case may be.
It was submitted on behalf of the respondents by the
learned Attorney General that the Legislature in view of the
experience gained from 1949 to 1960 enacted sections 14 to
16 of the Act and which were introduced in the Act of 1960.
14
It was urged that the 1960 Act had improved the
position. It had provided as a ground of eviction of the
tenant the requirement of the landlord for demolition and
re-construction of the building leaving it to a judicial
authority viz. Rent Controller to decide the matter with one
statutory right of appeal and a further right of revision to
the District Court or the High Court as the case may be. It
was on this ground urged that leaving the matter to judicial
adjudication as to the ground for eviction, it cannot be
held to be arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust. This point has
to be judged keeping in view the main purpose of the Act in
question and the relevant submissions on this aspect.
It may be borne in mind that historically the
constitutionality of section 13 of the Act of 1949 was
upheld on the touchstone of Article 14 both by the Madras
High Court and on appeal by this Court in P.J. Irani v. The
State of Madras, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 169. It was held that
section 13 of the Act did not violate Article 14 and was not
unconstitutional. Enough guidance, according to the judgment
of the majority of learned judges, was afforded by the
preamble and the operative provisions of the Act for the
exercise of the discretionary power vested in the
government. It was observed that the power under section 13
of the Act was to be exercised in cases where the protection
given by the Act caused great hardship to the landlord or
was the subject of abuse by the tenants. It was held by
Sinha, C.J., Ayyangar and Mudholkar, JJ. that section 13 was
ultra vires and void. An order made under section 13 was
subject to judicial review on the grounds that (a) it was
discriminatory, (b) it was made on grounds which were not
germane or relevant to the policy and purpose of the Act,
and (c) it was made on grounds which were mala fide. While
S.K. Das and A.K. Sarkar, JJ. emphasised that the order
passed by the government under section 13 was a competent
and legal order. All that the court had to see was whether
the power had been used for any extraneous purpose, i.e. not
for achieving the object for which the power was granted.
The Act of 1960 contains a corresponding provision for
exemption in section 29 of the Act which corresponds to
section 13 of the Act of 1949 was also upheld by this Court
in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of Tamil Nadu and
another, [1985] 2 SCR 398. Dealing with section 29 of the
Act this Court observed that the rationale behind the
conferral of such power to grant exemptions or to make
exceptions was that an inflexible application of the
provisions of the Act might under some circumstances result
in unnecessary hardship entirely disproportionate to the
good which will result from a literal enforcement of the Act
and also the practical impossibility of anticipating in
advance
15
such hardship to such exceptional cases. In the matter of
beneficial legislations also there were bound to be cases in
which an inflexible application of the provisions of the
enactment might result in unnecessary and undue hardship not
contemplated by the legislature. The power to grant
exemption under section 29 of the Act, therefore, has been
conferred not for making any discrimination between tenants
and tenants but to avoid undue hardship or abuse of the
beneficial provisions that might result from uniform
application of such provisions to cases which deserve
different treatment. The decision reiterated that the Tamil
Nadu Rent Act was a piece of beneficial legislation intended
to remedy the two evils of rackrenting (exaction of
exorbitant rents) and unreasonable eviction generated by a
large scale of influx of population to big cities and urban
areas in the post Second World War period creating acute
shortage of accommodation in such areas and the enactment
avowedly protects the rights of tenants in occupation of
buildings in such areas from being charged unreasonable
rents and from being unreasonably evicted therefrom. In that
view of the matter it had made a rational classification of
buildings belonging to government and buildings belonging to
religious, charitable, educational and other public
institutions and the different treatment accorded to such
buildings under section 10(3)(b) of the Act.
The scope of this Act was discussed by this Court in
Raval and Co. v. K.C. Ramachandran & Ors., [1974] 2 S.C.R.
629, where the majority of the court at pages 635 to 636
observed:-
“All these show that the Madras Legislature had
applied its mind to the problem of housing and
control of rents and provided a scheme of its own.
It did not proceed on the basis that the
legislation regarding rent control was only for
the benefit of the tenants. It wanted it to be
fair both to the landlord as well as the tenant.
Apparently it realised that the pegging of the
rents at the 1940 rates had discouraged building
construction activity which ultimately is likely
to affect every body and therefore in order to
encourage new constructions exempted them
altogether from the provisions of the Act. It did
not proceed on the basis that all tenants belonged
to the weaker section of the community and needed
protection and that all landlords belonged to the
better off classes. It confined the protection of
the Act to the weaker section paying rents below
Rs.250. It is clear, therefore, that the Madras
Legislature deliberately proceeded on the basis
that fair rent was to be fixed which was
16
to be fair both to the landlords as well as to the
tenants and that only the poorer classes of
tenants needed protection. The facile assumption
on the basis of which an argument was advanced
before this Court that all Rent Acts are intended
for the protection of tenants and, therefore, this
Act also should be held to be intended only for
the protection of tenants breaks down when the
provisions of the Act are examined in detail. The
provision that both the tenant as well as the
landlord can apply for fixation of a fair rent
would become meaningless if fixation of fair rent
can only be downwards from the contracted rent and
the contract rent was not to be increased. Of
course, it has happened over the last few years
that rents have increased enormously and that is
why it is argued on behalf of the tenants that the
contract rents should not be changed. If we could
contemplate a situation where rents and prices are
coming down this argument will break down. It is a
realisation of the fact that prices and rents have
enormously increased and therefore if the rents
are pegged at 1940 rates there would be no new
construction and the community as a whole would
suffer that led the Madras Legislature to exempt
new buildings from the scope of the Act. It
realised apparently how dangerous was the feeling
that only “fools build houses for wise men to live
in”. At the time the 1960 Act was passed the
Madras Legislature had before it the precedent of
the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair
Rent) Act, 1956. That Act provides for fixation of
fair rent. It also provides that the contract
rent, if lower, will be payable during the
contract period. Even if the contract rent is
higher only the fair rent will be payable. After
the contract period is over only the fair rent is
payable. The Madras Legislature having this Act in
mind still made only the fair rent payable and not
the contract rent if it happens to be lower. It is
clear, therefore, that the fair rent under the
present Act is payable during the contract period
as well as after the expiry of the contract
period.”
The Act sought to restore the balance in the scale
which is otherwise weighted in favour of the stronger party
which had larger bargaining power. The Act balances the
scales and regulates the rights of the parties fairly and
cannot be construed only in favour of the tenant.
17
In Murlidhar Agarwal and another v. State of U.P. and
others, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 575 this Court had occasion to deal
with this matter. In that case, powers of High Court to
interfere with revisional orders passed by State Government
under section 7F of U.P. Temporary Control of Rent and
Eviction Act, 1947 were challenged. The Court was of the
view that if a provision was enacted for the benefit of a
person or class of persons, there was nothing which
precluded him or them from contracting to waive the benefit,
provided that no question of public policy was involved. In
doing so, the question arose what was the ‘public policy’
involved in the said Rent Act. There can be no doubt about
the policy of the law, namely, the protection of a weaker
class in the community from harassment of frivolous suits.
But the question is, is there a public policy behind it
which precludes a tenant from waiving it? Mathew, J.
reiterated that public policy does not remain static in any
given community. It may vary from generation to generation
and even in the same generation. Public policy would be
almost useless if it were to remain in fixed moulds for all
time. The Rent Act, however, balances both the sides, the
landlord and the tenant.
The main provision of Section 14(1)(b) enables a
landlord to make an application to the Rent Controller and
the Rent Controller, if he is satisfied that the building is
bonafide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose
of demolishing it for the purpose of erecting a new building
on the site of the building sought to be demolished may pass
an order directing the tenant to deliver possession of the
building to the landlord before a specified date.
Section 16 provides for the tenant to occupy the
building if it is not demolished in certain contingencies.
The scheme of the section was very carefully analysed in
Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v.
Subbash Chandra Yograj Sinha, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 159.
In Metalware and Co. etc. v. Bansilal Sharma and Ors.
etc., [1979] 3 S.C.R. 1107 this Court emphasised that the
phrase used in section 14(1)(b) of the Act was “the building
was bona fide required by the landlord” for the immediate
purpose of demolition and reconstruction and the same
clearly referred to the bona fide requirement of the
landlord. This Court emphasised that the requirement in
terms was not that the building should need immediate
demolition and reconstruction. The state or condition of the
building and the extent to which it could stand without
immediate demolition and reconstruction in
18
future would not be a totally irrelevant factor while
determining “the bona fide requirement of the landlord.”
This Court emphasised that if the Rent Controller had to be
satisfied about the bona fide requirement of the landlord
which meant genuineness of his claim in that behalf the Rent
Controller would have to take into account all the
surrounding circumstances including not merely the factors
of the landlord being possessed of sufficient means or funds
to undertake the project and steps taken by him in that
regard but also the existing condition of the building, its
age and situation and possibility or otherwise of its being
put to a more profitable use after reconstruction. All these
factors being relevant must enter the verdict of the Rent
Controller on the question of the bona fide requirement of
the landlord under section 14(1)(b). The fact that a
landlord being possessed of sufficient means to undertake
the project of demolition and reconstruction by itself might
not be sufficient to establish his bona fide requirement if
the building happened to be a very recent construction in a
perfectly sound condition and its situation might prevent
its being put to a more profitable use after reconstruction.
The Rent Controller has thus to take into account the
totality of the circumstances and the factors referred to in
the judgment by lesser or greater significance depending
upon whether in the scheme of the concerned enactment there
is or there is not a provision for re-induction of the
evicted tenant into the new construction. Reference was made
to the decision of this Court in Neta Ram v. Jiwan Lal,
[1962] Suppl. 2 S.C.R. 623. There must be bona fide need of
the landlord on all the conditions required to be fulfilled.
That being the scheme of the section, it cannot be said, in
our opinion, that the section was arbitrary and excessive
powers were given to the landlords. Absence of provision for
re-induction does not ipso facto make the provisions of the
Act unfair or make the Act self defeating.
It has been borne in mind that the provisions of the
Act imposed restrictions on the landlord’s right under the
common law or the Transfer of Property Act to evict the
tenant after termination of his tenancy. The rationale of
these restrictions on the landlord’s rights is the acute
shortage of accommodation and the consequent need to give
protection to the tenants against unrestricted eviction. The
nature, the form and the extent of the restrictions to be
imposed on the landlord’s right and the consequent extent of
protection to be given to the tenants is a matter of
legislative policy and judgment. It is inevitably bound to
vary from one State to another depending on local and
peculiar conditions prevailing in the State and the
individual State’s appreciation of the needs and problems of
its people. When we are confronted with
19
the problem of a legislation being violative of Article 14,
we are not concerned with the wisdom or lack of legislative
enactment but we are concerned with the illegality of the
legislation. There may be more than one view about the
appropriateness or effectiveness or extent of the
restrictions. There may be also more than one view about the
relaxation of the restrictions on the landlord’s right of
eviction. This fact is reflected in the different provisions
made in different Acts about the grounds for eviction. For
example, in case of Assam, Meghalaya, Andhra Pradesh, Delhi,
Haryana, Orissa, Tripura, East Punjab, Madhya Pradesh, Tamil
Nadu, Kerala, Mysore, Himachal Pradesh and Pondicherry, no
particular duration for arrears of rent is prescribed, which
would entitle a landlord to maintain an action for ejectment
of his tenant. However, in other cases a certain period is
prescribed. For instance, two months in Bihar, West Bengal
and Jammu and Kashmir, three months in Goa and Tripura, four
months in Uttar Pradesh, six months in Bombay and Rajasthan.
Again some Rent Acts require that before an action for
ejectment on the ground of arrears is instituted, a notice
demanding rent should be served on the tenant-for example-
Bombay, Delhi, Kerala, Tripura, Jammu and Kashmir, Madhya
Pradesh and U.P. Rent Acts. In such cases the tenant is
given one chance to pay up the arrears. Again different Rent
Acts provide different facts and circumstances on the basis
of which premises could be recovered on the ground of bona
fide personal requirement. Generally the bona fide
requirement extends both to residential as well as
commercial premises. However, the Delhi Rent Control Act
restricts the right on account of the bona fide need of the
landlord’s right to premises let for residential use only.
Further, Bihar, Bombay, Goa, Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka,
Tamil Nadu, U.P. and West Bengal Rent Acts provide for
partial eviction. But there is no such provision in the
other Acts. It is obvious from the above that there can be
no fixed and inflexible criteria or grounds governing
imposition of restrictions on the landlord’s right or for
relaxation of those restrictions in certain cases.
Ultimately it is a matter of legislative policy and
judgment.
Courts are not concerned with the unwisdom of
legislation. “In short, unconstitutionality and not unwisdom
of a legislation is the narrow area of judicial review.”.
See in this connection the observations of Krishna Iyer, J.
in Murthy Match Works, etc. etc. v. The Asstt. Collector of
Central Excise, etc., [1974] 3 S.C.R. 121. This Court
approved the above passage from the American Jurisprudence
and emphasised that in a classification for governmental
purposes there cannot be an exact exclusion or inclusion of
persons and things. It is
20
important to bear in mind the constitutional command for a
state to afford equal protection of the law sets a goal not
attainable by the invention and application of a precise
formula. Therefore, a large latitude is allowed to the
States for classification upon any reasonable basis. See
also in this connection the observations of this Court in Re
The Special Courts Bill, 1978, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 476 where
Chandrachud, C.J.speaking for the Court at pages 534to537 of
the report laid down the propositions guiding Article 14 and
emphasised that the classification need not be constituted
by an exact or scientific exclusion nor insist on delusive
exactness or apply doctrinaire tests for determining the
validity of classification in any given case. Classification
therefore, is justified if it is not palpably arbitrary. We
also in view of the different provisions we have discussed
bear in mind the fact that there is no such consensus among
the different States about the right of re-induction of
tenant in case of eviction required for demolition. It will
depend on the particular State and, appreciation of the need
and problem at a particular point of time by that State
concerned. The purpose underlying section 14(1)(b) read with
section 16(2) of the Tamil Nadu Rent Act is to remove or
mitigate the disinclination on the part of landlords to
expend moneys for demolition of dilapidated buildings and
reconstruct new buildings in their places. It is a matter of
which judicial notice can be taken that the return from old
and dilapidated buildings is very meagre and in several
cases such buildings prove uneconomic for the landlords with
the result that the condition of the building deteriorates
and there are even collapses of such buildings. It is for
this purpose that the landlord is given by section 14(1)(b)
read with section 16 an incentive in the form of exemption
from the provisions of the Rent Act in respect of
reconstructed building for the limited and short duration of
five years. The policy under section 14(1)(b) read with
section 16 is not in essence different from the policy
adopted by different States of giving exemption for a
limited duration to newly constructed buildings. These
provisions, namely, exemption of new buildings from the
provisions of the Rent Act for a period of five years or ten
years has been upheld as constitutional. See in this
connection the observations of this Court in the case of
Punjab Tin Supply Co., Chandigarh & Ors. v. The Central
Govt. & Ors., [1984] 1 SCC 206 at pages 216 and 217 and
Mohinder Kumar v. State of Haryana and Anr, [1985] 4 S.C.C.
221 at pages 226-227. There the Court emphasised that it is
entirely for the Legislature to decide whether any measures,
and if so, what measures are to be adopted for remedying the
situation and for ameliorating the hardship of tenants. The
Legislature may very well come to a conclusion that it is
the shortage of buildings which has resulted in scarcity of
accommodation
21
and has created a situation where the demand for
accommodation is far in excess of the requisite supply, and,
it is because of such acute scarcity of accommodation the
landlords are in a position to exploit the situation to the
serious detriment of the tenants. The Court observed at
pages 226to227 of the report as under:
“The Legislature in its wisdom may properly
consider that in effecting an improvement of the
situation and for mitigating the hardship of the
tenanted class caused mainly due to shortage of
buildings, it will be proper to encourage
construction of new buildings, as construction of
new buildings will provide more accommodation,
easing the situation to a large extent, and will
ultimately result in benefiting the tenants. As in
view of the rigours of Rent Control Legislation,
persons with means may not be inclined to invest
in construction of new houses, the Legislature to
attract investment in construction of new houses
may consider it reasonable to provide for adequate
incentives so that new constructions may come up.
It is an elementary law of economics that anybody
who wants to invest his money in any venture will
expect a fair return on the investment made. As
acute scarcity of accommodation is to an extent
responsible for the landlord and tenant problem, a
measure adopted by the Legislature for seeking to
meet the situation by encouraging the construction
of new buildings for the purpose of mitigating the
hardship of tenants must be considered to be a
step in the right direction. The provision for
exemption from the operation of the Rent Control
Legislation by way of incentive to persons with
means to construct new houses has been made in
Section 1(3) of the Act by the Legislature in the
legitimate hope that construction of new buildings
will ultimately result in mitigation of the
hardship of the tenants. Such incentive has a
clear nexus with the object to be achieved and
cannot be considered to be unreasonable or
arbitrary. Any such incentive offered for the
purpose of construction of new buildings with the
object of easing the situation of scarcity of
accommodation for ameliorating the conditions of
the tenants, cannot be said to be unreasonable,
provided the nature and character of the incentive
and the measure of exemption allowed are not
otherwise unreasonable and arbitrary. The
exemption to be allowed must be for a reasonable
and a definite period. An exemption for an
indefinite period or a
22
period which in the facts and circumstances of any
particular case may be considered to be unduly
long, may be held to be arbitrary. The exemption
must necessarily be effective from a particular
date and must be with the object of promoting new
constructions. With the commencement of the Act,
the provisions of the Rent Act with all the
restrictions and rigours become effective.
Buildings which have been constructed before the
commencement of the Act were already there and the
question of any kind of impetus or incentive to
such buildings does not arise. The Legislature,
therefore, very appropriately allowed the benefit
of the exemption to the buildings, the
construction of which commenced or was completed
on or after the commencement of the Act. This
exemption in respect of buildings coming up or to
come up on or after the date of commencement of
the Act is likely to serve the purpose of
encouraging new buildings to be constructed. There
is therefore nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in
fixing the date of commencement of the Act from
which the exemption is to be operative.”
Section 14(1)(b) has sufficient inbuilt guidelines. The
requirements to be satisfied before initiating action under
this provision have been judicially laid down by the Madras
High Court by Anantanarayanan, J. as he then was, in Mehsin
Bhai v. Hale and company, G. T. Madras, [1964] 2 Madras Law
Journal 147. Anantanarayanan, J. observed at page 147 as
follows:
” What the section really required is that the
landlord must satisfy the Court that the building
was bona fide required by him, for the immediate
purpose of demolition. I am totally unable to see
how the present state of the building, and the
extent to which it could stand without immediate
demolition and reconstruction, in the future, are
not relevant considerations in assessing the bona
fides of the landlord. On the one hand, landlords
may bona fide require such buildings, particularly
old buildings, in their own interest, for
demolition and reconstruction. On the other hand,
it is equally possible that the mere fact that the
building is old, is taken advantage of by the
landlord to put forward such pretext his real
object being ulterior, and not bona fide for the
purpose of reconstruction. The Courts have to
apply several criteria, and to judge upon the
totality
23
of the facts. But the Courts cannot exclude the
possibility that the ancient or relatively old
character of the building which may nevertheless
be in quite a good and sound condition, is being
taken advantage of by a landlord in order to make
such an application with an ulterior purpose,
which purpose might be, for instance, to obtain
far more advantageous terms of rent in the future.
What the section really contemplates is a bona
fide requirement; that necessarily implied that it
is in the interests of the landlord to demolish
and reconstruct the building, and that the fact
that the building is old is not merely a pretext
for advancing the application, with the object of
evicting the tenant, and of obtaining higher
rentals.”
This Court also emphasised this aspect in the decision
of Metalware & Co. etc. v. Bansilal Sharma and others etc.,
[1979] 3 S.C.R. 1107 at pages 1117-1118.
We are therefore unable to accept the submission that
absence of the right of induction of tenants in
reconstructed premises is either arbitrary or unreasonable.
The submission that section 16(2) which provides that when a
building is totally demolished and on which a new building
is erected shall be exempt from all the provisions of the
Act for a period of five years is bad is also unsustainable.
See in this connection the observations of this Court in
M/s. Punjab Tin Supply Co., Chandigarh etc. etc. v. The
Central Government and others, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 428 and Motor
General Traders and another etc. etc. v. State of Andhra
Pradesh and others etc. etc., [1984] 1 S.C.R. 594 at page
605. It was submitted that the fact that in these cases
exemption was after the first construction of the building
and not after demolition and re-construction but that would
not make any difference to the principle applicable. The
principle underlying such exemption for a period of five
years is not discriminatory against tenants, nor is it
against the policy of the Act. It only serves as an
incentive to the landlord for creation of additional housing
accommodation to meet the growing needs of persons who have
no accommodation to reside or to carry on business. It does
not create a class of landlords who will forever be kept
outside the scope of the Act as the provision balances the
interests of the landlords on the one hand and the tenants
on the other in a reasonable way. This Court in Atam Prakash
v. State of Haryana and others, [1986] 2 S.C.C. 249 also
judged the rules of classification in dealing with the
Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913.
24
This Court emphasised in Panchamal Narayan Shenoy v.
Basthi Venkatesha Shenoy, [1970] 3 S.C.R. 734 that in
considering the reasonable and bona fide requirements of the
landlord under this clause, the desire of the landlord to
put the property to a more profitable use after demolition
and reconstruction is also a factor that may be taken into
account in favour of the landlord. It was also emphasised
that it was not necessary that the landlord should go
further and establish under this clause that the condition
of the building is such that it requires immediate
demolition.
Our attention was drawn to certain observations of
Chatterjee, J. of the Calcutta High Court in Jiwanlal & Co.
and others v. Manot and Co., Ltd., (64 Calcutta Weekly Notes
932 at page 937) that where the landlord had established a
case of building and rebuilding the tenants undoubtedly
would suffer on ejectment. The learned Judge was of the view
that though the landlords required the premises for the
purpose of building and rebuilding, it was not desirable
that the tenants should be ejected. The learned Judge
emphasised that the purpose of the Act was to protect the
tenants as long as possible and to eject them only when it
was not otherwise possible. The landlords did not require it
for their own use and occupation. They wanted it for the
advantage of increased accommodation. The learned Judge was
of the view that if the tenants were ejected, then for the
time being, far from the problem being solved, it would
create difficulties for the public as well as for
themselves. We are, however, unable to accept this
principle. It is true that the Act must be so construed that
it harmonises the rights of the landlords and at the same
time protects the tenants and also serves best the purpose
of the Act and one of the purposes of the Act is to solve
the acute shortage of accommodation by making a rational
basis for eviction and to encourage building and rebuilding
which is at the root of all causes of shortage of
accommodation.
It was held by a learned single Judge of the Madras
High Court (one of us-Natarajan J.) in M/s. Patel Roadways
Private Limited, Madras v. State of Tamil Nadu and others,
(A.I.R. 1985 Madras 119) that the provisions of the Tamil
Nadu Act were not violative of Article 14 and Article
19(1)(f) of the Act. But that was in a slightly different
context.
Post war migration of human beings en bloc place to
place, the partition of the country and uprooting of the
people from their hearth and home, explosion of population,
are the various vital factors leading to the present acute
shortage of housing. It has to be borne in mind
25
that the urge for land and yearning for hearth and home are
as perennial emotions as hunger and sex are, as Poet
Rabindranath would say meaning thereby, it is not wealth-I
seek, it is not fame that I want, I crave for a home
expressing the eternal yearning of all living beings for
habitat.
It is common knowledge that there is acute shortage of
housing, various factors have led to this problem. The laws
relating to letting and of landlord and tenant in different
States have from different States’ angles tried to grapple
the problem. Yet in view of the magnitude of the problem,
the problem has become insoluble and the litigations abound
and the people suffer. More houses must, therefore, be
built, more accommodation and more spaces made available for
the people to live in. The laws of landlord and tenant must
be made rational, humane, certain and capable of being
quickly implemented. Those landlords who are having premises
in their control should be induced and encouraged to part
with available accommodation for limited periods on certain
safeguards which will strictly ensure their recovery when
wanted. Men with money should be given proper and meaningful
incentives as in some European countries to build houses,
tax holidays for new houses can be encouraged. The tenants
should also be given protection and security and certain
amount of reasonableness in the rent. Escalation of prices
in the urban properties, land, materials and houses must be
rationally checked. This country very vitally and very
urgently requires a National Housing Policy if we want to
prevent a major breakdown of law and order and gradual
disillusionment of people. After all shelter is one of our
fundamental rights. New rational housing policy must attract
new buildings, encourage new buildings, make available new
spaces, rationalise the rent structure and rationalise the
rent provisions and bring certain amount of uniformity
though leaving scope for sufficient flexibility among the
States to adjust such legislation according to its needs.
This Court and the High Court should also be relieved of the
heavy burdens of this rent litigations. Tier of appeals
should be curtailed. Laws must be simple, rational and
clear. Tenants are in all cases not the weaker sections.
There are those who are weak both among the landlords as
well as the tenants. Litigations must come to end quickly.
Such new Housing Policy must comprehend the present and
anticipate the future. The idea of a National Rent Tribunal
on an All India basis with quicker procedure should be
examined. This has become an urgent imperative of today’s
revolution. A fast changing society cannot operate with
unchanging law and preconceived judicial attitude.
26
For the reasons aforesaid the contentions urged in writ
petitions fail and are accordingly dismissed. In the facts
and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to
costs. Interim orders if any are vacated.
S.L. Petition dismissed.
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