JUDGMENT
S.J. Hyder, J.
1. Defendant is a tenant of a first floor of the building. The plaintiffs filed a suit for ejectment on the ground of bonafide requirement for personal need. The plaintiff’s contention was accepted by the two Courts below and in the consequence the second appeal has been filed by the defendant.
2. There is no controversy between the parties in regard to the facts of the case. The building in dispute is a double storeyed structure. It originally belonged to the wife of plaintiff who died leaving behind plaintiff No. land a daughter. The suit had been filed by both the heirs of the erstwhile owner of the property. Defendant was a tenant of, the first floor of the building whereas the ground floor was vacant and was in possession of the landlord plaintiff No. 1 who was employed as a professor of Geography in the Magadh University at Bodh Gaya. He retired from the said post on 1.12.1978. The suit was instituted on September 12, 1978 and sometime after the said date the ground floor of the building was let out by the plaintiffs to another tenant.
3. In the plaint it was stated that after his retirement plaintiff No. 1 intended to reside on the first floor of the building and to let out the ground floor in order to supplement his income after retirement. It may be stated that the ground floor of the building was let out by the plaintiffs to the Co-operative Department on a monthly rent of Rs. 800/- per month where defendant appellant was paying only Rs. 150/- for the first floor of the building.
4. The suit was contested by defendant appellant on a number of grounds. They denied that the accommodation was required by plaintiff respondents for their personal need in an ordinary manner. He further stated hat the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction Control) Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) did not apply to the building in suit. It was contended that the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act served on defendant appellant was invalid and was wholly insufficient to terminate his tenancy.
5. The two Courts below have concurrently found that the Act does not apply to the building in question. They also came to the conclusion that the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was valid, ordinarily the findings on the above two questions were sufficient to dispose of the controversy between the parties in the suit. However, the Courts below went into the question on the alleged bonafitte need of the plaintiffs and decided the matter in his favour.
6. Parties are agreed before me that the house in dispute lies in Mohalla Dangra Toli in the City Of Ranchi. There was some conclusion whether the Act applied to the police station under the jurisdiction of which the house is situate. This controversy has been set at rest by a Notification dated April 30, 1980 which specifically provides that the locality in which the house in dispute is situate is the subject-matter of the provisions of the Act. This being so, the question of validity of the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act does not arise. When the Act applies to the building in dispute it was not necessary for plajnliff respondents to serve any notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The only question which therefore, survives for determination is as to whether on the admission of the parties plaintiff-respondent No. 1 has succeeded in proving that the accommodation was required by him bonafids for his personal occupation. The substantial question of law framed for determination in the second appeal is to the same effect. There is a well marked distinction between a desire of a landlord to occupy a building and his personal requirement for such an establishment. A desire to occupy the building is a subjective matter whereas his need for such personal use and occupation must depend on determination of objective of facts. It will be more so in a case where a need for personal occupation is directed by jaw to be a bona fide nature This distinction between a desire to occupy a house for personal requirement and a need for such personal occupation has therefore, to be kept in view. There is one more preliminary aspect which has to be emphasised. It is sometime said that the Rent Control Legislation passed in different states are intended for the benefit of the tenants. The statement thus made is too wide of the mark. The intent in the Rent Control Legislation passed in different states is to strike a balance between the interest of the tenants on the one hand and the landlord on the other. For instance a tenant has not been made a perpetual occupant of a building under the laws. A suit for ejectment can be filed on certain specific grounds one of them being requirement for the occupation of by the landlord of a building for his personal use and occupation. In most of the states, a landlord has to prove that he genuinely needs the disputed building for his personal requirement, If the bona fides are not established, the suit filed by a landlord on this ground must fail.
7. As already stated above, it is the admitted case of the parties that the ground floor of the building was lying vacant at the time of institution of the suit, It was subsequently let out to the Co-operative Department by plaintiff respondents on a monthly rent of Rs. 900. The rent payable in. respect of the ground floor by the Co-operative Department goes to show that it has sufficiently extensive. Ordinarily plaintiff could occupy the said portion after his requirement if he intended to settle down at Ranchi.
8. It is, however, submitted by the learned Counsel appearing for plaintiff respondents that the plaintiff respondent Mo. 1 was a Professor and on his retirement he may receive half of the original salary which was paid to him while he was still in service. It is further argued that a retired professor has to maintain certain standards which was not possible within the meager amount of pension to which plaintiff respondent No. 1 was entitled after his retirement. Submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent at first place appears to be attracted but cannot stand on the test of scrutiny. It may be that the pension payable to plaintiff respondent No. 1 may be one half of the salary which he was getting. Nevertheless, the liability of plaintiff-respondent No. 1 had decreased. It is admitted case of the parties that the building had been acquired by plaintiff-respondent No. 1 in the name of his wife who had died leaving behind only two heirs, namely, plaintiff-respondent No. 1 and plaintiff respondent No. 2. Plaintiff respondent No. 2 is comfortably married to a Deputy Collector who, as it appears from the evidence, was posted at Ranchi when the suit was being fought between the parties. Therefore, it follows that plaintiff-appellant No. 1 had only to maintain himself from the pension payable to him. Moreover, the submission of the learned Counsel which has been accepted by the Courts below does not take into account that plaintiff-respondent No. 1 must have received considerable amount from the University where he was employed as provident fund. The interest payable on the provident fund, if prudently invested could have been sufficient sum which would have enabled plaintiff-respondent No. 1 to live in affluence.
9. Learned Counsel for plaiatiff-respondents has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Mst. Bega Begum and Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khan (dead) by L.R’s. and Ors. (1) for the purpose to augment the income of the landlord it is sufficient to make out a case for personal use and occupation. The instant case related to Rent Control legislation of State of Jammu and Kashmir. The relevant provision in the State Law provides that a landlord had only to establish his need for personal use and occupation. There was nothing in the law in force in that State which requires the need for personal occupation to be bonafide. Be that as it may Smt. Bega Begum’s, case (supra) is distinguishable on another ground. In that case, there was evidence before the Court that the landlord in the case was not able to make the two ends meet within his meagre income. It was, in that context, that the Court observed that to augment the income of landlord it was necessary in order to enable him to make the two ends meet. No such case has been made out in the instant case. In fact, the evidence shows that the only plaintiff-respondent No. 1 had to maintain himself and that he has no other encumbrance.
10. Going through the judgment of the two Courts below I am left with an impression that they have accepted the very ipso dixit of the plaintiff respondent No. 1 without subjecting his statement to a scrutiny. I am also of the view that the Courts below have not balanced the respective needs of the parties in arriving at the conclusion in favour of plaintiff-respondents. According to the Courts below, plaintiff respondent No. 1 is entitled to live in affluence, and comfort where as the appellant is to be thrown out on the street. There is the result of the decrees passed by the two Courts below. I wonder why the Courts below did not bother to compare the respective requirements of the parties before disposing of the matter. The judgments of the Courts below are most unsatisfactory add cannot be sustained.
11. The result is that this second appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The plaintiff-respondent’s suit is dismissed with costs throughout.