High Court Jharkhand High Court

Prabhunath Singh vs State Of Jharkhand on 5 September, 2009

Jharkhand High Court
Prabhunath Singh vs State Of Jharkhand on 5 September, 2009
            In the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi

                  Cr. M. P. No.143 of 2004

            Prabhunath Singh ................................ .Petitioner

                  VERSUS

            State of Jharkhand and another....Opposite Parties

            CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.R.PRASAD

            For the Petitioner : M/s.Abhoy Kumar Singh and Nilesh Kumar
            For the State       :A.P.P
            For the Opposite party no.2: Mr.K.P.Choudhary

Reserved on 22.5.2009                                Pronounced on 5 .9.2009

28.   5.9.09

. This application was initially filed for quashing the charge

sheet no.83 of 1996 dated 21.6.1996 submitted in connection with

Mashrakh P.S. case no.110 of 1991, corresponding to

supplementary U.T.No.62 of 1998, pending before the Chief

Judicial Magistrate, Hazaribagh whereby the petitioner was sent up

for trial for offences under section 364, 302, 201 and 120B of the

Indian penal Code. Subsequently, by way of amendment petition,

entire criminal proceeding of Mashrakh P.S. case no.110 of 1991

has been sought to be quashed.

The facts giving rise this application are that on 23.6.1991

the informant Awadh Kumar Singh proceeded to village Dhanauti

along with Manokamana Singh (the deceased) to bring one Jai

Prakash, the servant of Ashok Singh. When they met with Jai

Prakash, they asked him to go on his bi-cycle whereas the

informant Awadh Kumar Singh along with Manokamana Singh (the

deceased) proceeded on a motor cycle. When they reached near

Dhanauti bridge, they came across with the accused Dina Singh,

Nageshwar Singh, Pankaj Singh, Ajay Singh @ Engineer and Om

Prakash Singh who had come over there on their motor cycles and

some of them were having rifles with them. The accused persons

having over powered them made Manokamana Singh to sit forcibly
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in the motor cycle of Dina Singh and then they proceeded towards

Mashrakh. In the way some members of a Barat party saw accused

persons taking Manokamana Singh. Thereafter Awadh Kumar

Singh lodged a case which was instituted as Mashrakh P.S. case

no.110 of 1991 under sections 363 and 364 of the Indian Penal

Code. Subsequently when Manokamana Singh was found dead,

section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was added in the first

information report. Thereafter the case was taken up for

investigation. The Investigating Officer submitted first charge

sheet no.71 of 1991 on 20.9.1991 against Om Prakash Singh only

and the investigation was kept open for rest of the accused

persons. After some time second charge sheet, bearing no.8 of

1992 was submitted on 7.9.1992 against the accused Dina Nath

Singh and Nageshwar Singh. Subsequently, investigation of the

case was taken over by the CID, who submitted charge sheet,

bearing no.83 of 1996 on 21.5.1996 against the petitioner and one

Ajay Singh under sections 302, 201 and 120(B) of the Indian Penal

Code. Thereafter under the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court,

the case was transferred from Bihar to Jharkhand at Hazaribagh,

which was registered as T.R.No.509 of 2003 and when the case

was committed to the court of sessions, it was registered as

Sessions Trial No.22 of 2004 but as the petitioner was shown

absconder, his case was separated and was numbered as

T.R.No.381 of 2004 and warrant of arrest was issued.

However, when the charge sheet was submitted against this

petitioner, the petitioner moved this Court for quashing of the

charge sheet.

Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that

the case was registered in the year 1991 against the named

accused persons against whom charge sheets were submitted in
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two phases but the name of the petitioner never figured in those

charge sheets. However, when the investigation was taken over by

the CID, charge sheet was submitted under the influence of the

ruling party against the petitioner, who at the relevant point of time

was a member of legislative assembly, though there was absolutely

no material showing legal evidence of the involvement of the

petitioner in the alleged offence.

Learned counsel in this respect further submitted that the

only material which was collected by the investigating agency is

that the car which was used in the commission of the alleged

offence belonged to the petitioner and that the motor cycle used

was having registration number as that of the motor cycle

belonging to the petitioner and that when one of the witnesses

came to the house of the petitioner, he saw the accused persons

present over there and saw blood mark over the shirt of one of the

co-accused. Only on these materials which were never sufficient to

show the culpability of the petitioner, charge sheet was submitted.

Therefore, under this circumstance, the entire criminal proceeding

is fit to be quashed so far the petitioner is concerned.

Learned counsel further submitted that subsequent to filing

of this application, a development having much bearing on this

case, took place whereby all the four named accused persons, who

had been put on trial in Sessions Trial No.22 of 2004 have been

acquitted by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Hazaribagh and as

such, the petitioner who has been sought to be tried with the aid of

section 120(B) cannot be held guilty for the alleged offence.

Learned counsel in support of his submission has referred to

a decision rendered in a case of Yogesh alias Sachin Jagdish

Joshi vs. State of Maharashtra[(2008) 10 SCC 394].
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In the aforesaid circumstances, it was submitted that when

there has been no sufficient material showing involvement of the

petitioner in the alleged offence nor the petitioner could be found

guilty for the offence of conspiracy, in view of the fact that other

accused persons have already been acquitted, there would be

abuse of the process of law, if the petitioner is relegated to face

the trial and hence, the entire criminal proceeding is fit to be set

aside.

As against this, learned counsel appearing for the informant

submitted that in course of investigation, motor cycle as well as car

used in the commission of crime has been found to have belonged

to this petitioner, in whose house the other accused, who was

related to the petitioner was found present just after the

occurrence and hence, the petitioner’s involvement of hatching

conspiracy in the commission of offence cannot be ruled out and

under this circumstance, the court would be very loath in quashing

the entire criminal proceeding so far this petitioner is concerned.

Having heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and

on perusal of the record, I do find that admittedly there has been

no whisper about the involvement of the petitioner in the first

information report and that after the investigation, when two

charge sheets were placed before the court against the named

accused persons, petitioner’s name never figured in those charge

sheets. However, when the investigation was taken over by the

CID, it submitted charge sheet against the petitioner and one other

accused person under sections 302, 201 and 120(B) of the Indian

Penal Code after lapse of five years from the date of occurrence for

the reason that in course of investigation, it transpired that the

motor cycle as well as car used in the commission of the crime,

belonged to this petitioner and that when one of the witnesses
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came to the house of this petitioner just after the occurrence, she

found that the accused persons present over there and one of the

accused was having blood mark on his shirt.

I am afraid in absence of any other circumstances

whatsoever whether these materials would be sufficient to hold the

petitioner guilty. At this stage, it would be apt to refer to a case of

R.P.Kapur vs. State of Punjab (AIR 1960 SC 866) whereby

the Hon’ble Supreme Court summarized some categories of cases

which are fit to be quashed by the High Court in exercise of its

inherent power. They are as follows:

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal
bar against the institution or continuance e.g, want of
sanction;

(ii) where the allegations in the first information
report or complaint taken at its face value and
accepted in their entirely do not constitute the
offence alleged;

(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but
there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence
adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the
charge.

The circumstances, which are sought to be used against

the petitioner even if are taken to be true, it would hardly prove

the charge particularly when other named accused persons with

whom the petitioner is said to have hatched criminal conspiracy for

committing the offence of murder has been acquitted.

At this stage, one needs to take notice of the essential

features of the offence of conspiracy as enshrined under section

120 A of the Indian Penal Code reads as follows:

“120-A Definition of criminal conspiracy – When two
or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done –
(1) an illegal act, or
(2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such
an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy:
Provided that no agreement except an agreement to
commit an offence shall amount to a criminal
conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is
done by one or more parties to such agreement in
pursuance thereof.

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Explanation – It is immaterial whether the illegal act
is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely
incidental to that object”

Thus, it is manifest that the meeting of minds of two or

more persons for doing an illegal act or an act by illegal means is

sine qua non of criminal conspiracy.

Since other named accused persons with whom the

petitioner is said to have hatched conspiracy for committing offence

has already been acquitted, sufficient ground be hardly there to

proceed against the petitioner with an aid of section 120B of the

Indian Penal Code. Therefore, any continuance of the proceeding

would amount to abuse of the process of law.

Having come to such conclusion still the question would be

as to whether the court in exercise of jurisdiction under section 482

of the Code of Criminal Procedure would go into the matter of

sufficiency or insufficiency of the materials or to relegate to the

petitioner to stage where he can plead for his discharge on account

of insufficiency of the material. This question has been answered

by the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in a case of Ashok

Chaturvedi and others vs. Shitul H. Chanchani and another

[(1998) 7 SCC 698] holding therein that merely because the

accused has right to plead at the time of framing of charges that

there is no material for framing of charges he is not debarred from

invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the court at the earliest point

of time when the Magistrate has taken cognizance.

Earlier also the Hon’ble Supreme Court had expressed the

same view in a case of State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy

and others [(1977) 2 SCC 699].

Thus, in the facts and circumstances as stated above, when

no sufficient ground is there to proceed against the petitioner,

there would be abuse of the process of law, if the petitioner is
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allowed to face rigour of the trial and hence, the entire criminal

proceeding of Mashrakh P.S. case no.110 of 1991, corresponding to

supplementary U.T no.62 of 1998, pending in the court of Chief

Judicial Magistrate, Hazaribagh is hereby quashed.

In the result, this application is allowed.

( R. R. Prasad, J. )

ND/