JUDGMENT
Anil Kumar, J.
1. The petitioner has challenged in this writ petition the termination of his agreement by letter dated 11th July, 2006. An agreement was arrived at between the petitioner and the respondents for providing private security personnel on 19th January, 2005 for a period of 11 months which was effective from 1st February, 2005. Though the agreement stipulated that it is for a period of 11 months, it also stipulated that the guidelines of Directorate General Resettlement, Ministry of Defense, D.G.R., shall be part and parcel of the agreement. The guideline of Directorate General of Resettlement contemplates re-sponsorship. Under the guidelines, any agency is initially sponsored to the principal employer for a period of two years and on the recommendations of the principal employer, the same agency can be re-sponsored for another period of two years provided the employer gives a ‘satisfactory performance report’ along with a request for re-sponsorship and the agency fulfillls the conditions of the quota of guards and age limit. The petitioner has filed Annexure P-8 detailing his achievements after the period of agreement was extended up to 31st March, 2006.
2. The petitioner has filed another writ petition being WP(c) 3859 of 2006 for direction to respondents to extend the period for providing security services by executing a supplementary agreement or otherwise seeking extension of period of contract for providing security services up to 31st January, 2007. In the earlier writ petition on an interim application of the petitioner the following interim order was passed:
The facts of the case are that although the contract in question is stated to have become effective from 1.2.2005 for a period of eleven months, the next clause itself makes a reference to the Guidelines for functioning of security agencies. These Guidelines envisage that an agency, such as the Petitioner, would be sponsored to the principal employer for a minimum period of two years, but exceeding four years. This is also how the Government of India, Ministry of defense has viewed the position as is evident from their letter dated 30th September, 2005. The contract of the Petitioner has been extended up to 31.3.2006, i.e., for a total period of fifteen months only. Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the Petitioner has expended large sums of money on the training uniform and other paraphernalia of its employees/security personnel and it had understood that the contract would be subject to the Guidelines. Mr. Gupta states that the Guidelines are not binding on the Respondent and pertain only to sponsorship.
Mr. Gupta further draws reliance on Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner, Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation and in particular to paragraph 10 thereof. That paragraph in fact militates against the Respondents inasmuch as it underscores that there should be no arbitrariness even at the stage of entering into the contract. He also relies on State of West Bengal v. Niranjan Singha (2001) 2 Supreme Court Cases 326. Specific reliance has been made on the following observation that ?….The Doctrine of ?legitimate expectation? is only an aspect of Article 14 of the Constitution in dealing with the citizens in a non-arbitrary manner and thus, by itself, does not give rise to an enforceable right but in testing the action taken by the government authority whether arbitrary or otherwise it would be relevant. The decision in Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries does not lay down any principle which detracts from what we have stated now. In a case where the agency is granted for collection of toll or taxes, as in the present case, it can be easily discerned that the claim of the respondent for extension of the period of the agency would not come in the way of the Government if it is economically more beneficial to have a fresh agreement by enhancing the consideration payable to the Government. In such an event, it cannot be said that the action of the Government inviting fresh bids is arbitrary. Moreover, the respondent can also participate in the tender process and get his bid considered. Hence, we do not think that the view taken by the High Court can be justified.? The extension order for a period of three months rather than one year does not amplify or elucidate the reasons for a departure from the Guidelines. This distinguishes the case from the quoted precedent. If reasons are spelt out, and they are not arbitrary in the Wednesbury sense, this Court would be loathe to interfere with the decision.
The approach which commends itself in this case is to look into the terms of engagement between the parties. If there was no reference to the Guidelines the complexion of the dispute would have completely changed. As has already been seen the Guidelines contemplate that the contract would run for a period of two years and up to a maximum of four years. The contention of the counsel for the Petitioner is that it was with that understanding that the contract was executed. The matter, therefore, requires consideration in greater detail.
Learned Counsel for the Respondent further submits that the contract has been re-tendered and that the Petitioner has participated therein. Counsel for the Petitioner states that she has no such instructions. Be that as it may, I do not propose to interdict the tender process which has already been initiated.
Notice be issued to Respondents to show cause as to why rule nisi be not issued, returnable on 27th July, 2006.
Mr. Mukul Gupta, Advocate accepts notice on behalf of the Respondents.
Till the next date of hearing, the subject contract shall continue to operate.
3. Against the said interim order, an LPA No. 555/2006 was filed by the respondents wherein by the order dated 3rd April, 2005, the order of the learned Single Judge dated 13th March, 2006 directing the respondents to continue to operate the agreement between the parties was stayed. The order passed in LPA is as under:
C.M. No. 4992/2006
Allowed subject to all just exceptions.
LPA 555/06
Admit.
C.M. No. 4991/2006
Till further orders, directions in the impugned order dated 13.03.2006 passed by the Ld. Single Judge i.e. the said contract shall continue to operate, shall remain stayed.
4. Thereafter by letter dated 11th July, 2006, it has been communicated to the petitioner that the contract dated 19th January, 2005 which was extended by letter dated 14th February, 2006 which was continuing pursuant to the order dated 13th March, 2006, for providing security agency has been terminated and a new contract has been awarded to a new incumbents and, therefore, the petitioner was requested to wind up his services with effect from 7.00 AM of 11th August, 2006 on which time and date the new incumbent had to take over. It was also communicated that the communication dated 11th July, 2006 be also treated as one month notice to terminate the contract as per Clause 30 of the agreement.
5. Aggrieved by the communication dated 11th July, 2006, the petitioner first filed an application being CM No 8979 of 2006 on 20th July,2006 in W.P.(C) No. 3859/2006 seeking stay and quashing of communication dated 11th July, 2006. On the said application of the petitioner no interim order was passed and notice was issued on the said application on 27th July,2006 for 6th December, 2006. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition seeking quashing and cancellation of letter dated 11th July, 2006. He has also filed yet another application being C.M. No. 9621/2006 in W.P.(C) No. 3859 of 2006 again seeking quashing and cancellation of communication dated 11th July, 2006. The petitioner has impugned the order dated 11th July, 2006 on the ground that the contract which was extended for three months should had been extended for not less than one year and the statement made on behalf of respondent in W.P.(C) No. 3859/2006 when the order dated 13th March, 2006 was passed that the petitioner had participated in tender process for the subsequent period, is a fraud played by the respondent on the petitioner. Mr. Kirti Uppal, learned Counsel for the petitioner gave great emphasis to reference to order dated 13th March, 2006 in communication dated 11th July, 2006 when the said order dated 13th March, 2006 had also been stayed by order dated 3rd April, 2006.
6. The termination of agreement has also been challenged on the ground that one month notice as contemplated under Clause 30 of the Agreement has not been given. The communication dated 11th July, 2006 has also been impugned on the ground that it has been issued by a Store Officer whereas the initial agreement dated 19th January, 2005 was executed by the Director of the Institute.
7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied on , Smt. Rajesh Kumari v. Delhi Development Authority; , K.C Sharma v. Delhi Stock exchange and ors; , C.S.I.R and Ors. v. Dr. Ajay Kumar Jain and , Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd and Ors v. Union of India and Ors. and AIR 1990 SC 1033 in support of his contention that the writ petition shall be maintainable against the alleged termination of his agreement as the same is malafide and the court must interfere.
8. The Apex Court in K.C.Sharma (supra) considering the bad blood between the parties, employer and employee had held that the reinstatement would not be proper irrespective of the facts that loss of confidence had not been pleaded and proved. It was decided that compensation in lieu of reinstatement was a better option and molded the relief according to what the parties had agreed. In C.S.I.R (supra) it was held that though the maximum period of appointment as scientists under the quick and fire scheme was three years, it could not be said that the contract could not be terminated before the expiry of that period. Rather the scheme clearly provided that the contract could be terminated by giving notice of three months from either side. It was held that extension of contract for a further period of six months did not mean that the applicants had exercised their option to terminate the contract by giving three months notice.
It was held that extension of contract for six months cannot be equated with the notice of termination of contract as provided in the letter of appointment. In Smt. Rajesh Kumari (supra) it was held that for enforcement of a contract though a writ jurisdiction is not an appropriate remedy, but there is no express bar whereby such remedies cannot be granted.
9. Considering the present facts and circumstances it is apparent that the judgments relied on by the petitioner are distinguishable. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. It is well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision. The Supreme Court in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd and Anr. v. N.R. Vairamani and Anr. AIR 2004 SC 778 had observed:
Court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes.
The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus:
Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and Anr. is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of Anr. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to Anr. case is not at all decisive.
Suffice it will be to say that the precedents relied on by the petitioner are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case and the relief prayed by the petitioner can not be granted on the basis of same.
10. The learned Counsel for the respondent has produced the record regarding re?tendering for appointment of private security agencies at AIIMS on rate contract basis. Perusal of the record reflects that five firms, namely, M/s. Skylark Cagers International; M/s. SDB CISCO (India) Limited; Keshav Security Services Pvt. Ltd.; VNA Security Services Private Limited and M/s. Prahari Secuirty and Detective Services Pvt. Ltd. had participated in the tender. The financial bids of these tenderers were considered and the decision was taken and approved by the Director. The copy of the original agreement dated 19th January, 2005 has also been produced to show that the agreement was signed by Financial Officer and Store Officer. Therefore the plea of the petitioner that letter dated 11th July,2006 signed by the store officer does not and can not terminate the agreement is not made out. The decision was taken and approved by the Director and has been communicated to the petitioner by store officer. The plea of the petitioner that the agreement could not be terminated by the letter of store officer dated 11th July,2006 is therefore, not acceptable.
11. If the decision has been approved by the Director of the Institute to re-tender and the existence of the successful tenders can not be doubted; the objection of the petitioner that the agreement ought to have been renewed for a period of one year and it could not be renewed for a period of three months, and such an action to re-tender is arbitrary can not be accepted and it will not entail to any relief to the petitioner. The initial agreement was for a period of 11 months which was extended for a period of three months. The guidelines of DGCR are applicable, however, for re-sponsorship there should be a satisfactory performance report along with the request for re-sponsorship and fulfilllment of conditions by the agency. Learned Counsel for respondents has produced number of complaints regarding functioning of the petitioner. The petitioner, therefore, cannot claim as a matter of right that there should be re-sponsorship of the petitioner for a period of one year more and not for a period of less than one year as had been done.
12. The extension of agreement or renewal is granted on the expiry of period of existing agreement but this cannot be claimed as a matter of right. The renewal or re?sponsorship can be on the same terms and conditions or on different terms. If the respondents had found that it would be more proper considering the facts and circumstances to re-tender for appointment of the security agencies, the action of the respondents cannot be termed arbitrary and will not affect the alleged legitimate expectation of the respondent though the plea of legitimate expectation has not been raised by the petitioner.
13. The Apex Court in the case of State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Niranjan Singha (2001) 2 SCC 326, had held that denial of extension of period of agency by Government inviting fresh bids does not amount to arbitrariness. The relevant observations of the Court are as under:
We may notice that the distinction sought to be made by the High Court that this is not a case involving grant of a fresh agency but extension of the existing one does not make much sense. An extension of an agreement or renewal is granted on the expiry of the period of the existing agreement. Either the extension or the renewal of the existing agreement may be on the same terms or on different terms. If it is a case of extension of the existing agreement on the same terms and conditions and such consideration gives rise to a question of legitimate expectation being a part of the agreement concerned, economic consideration of getting higher bid for the same period would be a relevant consideration. If the governmental authorities had found that it would be feasible to have the agency, as in the present case, on fresh terms by enhancing the amount payable to the Government, it would be a relevant factor and in such a case it cannot be said that the legitimate expectation of the respondent had been affected because the public interest would outweigh the extension of the period of the agreement. The doctrine of ?legitimate expectation? is only an aspect of Article 14 of the Constitution in dealing with the citizens in a non- arbitrary manner and thus, by itself, does not give rise to an enforceable right but in testing the action taken by the government authority whether arbitrary or otherwise it would be relevant. The decision in Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries does not lay down any principle which detracts from what we have stated now. In a case where the agency is granted for collection of toll or taxes, as in the present case, it can be easily discerned that the claim of the respondent for extension of the period of the agency would not come in the way of the Government if it is economically more beneficial to have a fresh agreement by enhancing the consideration payable to the Government. In such an event, it cannot be said that the action of the Government inviting fresh bids is arbitrary. Moreover, the respondent can also participate in the tender process and get his bid considered. Hence, we do not think that the view taken by the High Court can be justified.
14. The emphasis of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the order dated 3rd April, 2006 staying the order dated 13th March, 2006 has not been disclosed in letter dated 11th July, 2006 is also without much significance and cannot entail any benefit to the petitioner. Regarding the alleged false statement made in the W.P.(C) No. 3859 of 2006 that the petitioner had already participated in the re-tendering process, it was contended by the Learned Counsel for the respondents that another firm with a similar name had participated in the tendering process, namely, Prahery Security and Detective Services Pvt. Ltd. and the similarity of the name with the name of the petitioner led to a wrong statement that the petitioner had participated in the re-tendering process.
15. Contracts in prescribed or standard forms or which embody a set of rules as part of the contract are entered into by the party with superior bargaining power with a large number of persons who have far less bargaining power or no bargaining power at all. Such contracts which affect a large number of persons or a group or groups of persons, if they are unconscionable, unfair and unreasonable, are injurious to the public interest. In order that such a contract should be void, it must fall under one of the relevant sections of the Indian Contract Act. The only relevant provision in the Indian Contract Act which can apply is Section 23 which contemplated that the consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless the court regards it as opposed to public policy. The impact of every State action is also on public interest. This factor alone is sufficient to import at least the minimal requirements of public law obligations and impress with this character the contracts made by the State or its instrumentality. It is a different matter that the scope of judicial review in respect of disputes falling within the domain of contractual obligations may be more limited and in doubtful cases the parties may be relegated to adjudication of their rights by resort to remedies provided for adjudication of purely contractual disputes. The agreement with the petitioner and its determination does not seem to be contrary to public policy.
16. Even if the agreement of the petitioner was not determinable before the expiry of two years as has been alleged by the petitioner, perusal of Sections 14 and 41 of Specific Relief Act reflect that a contract cannot be specifically enforced which in its nature is determinable and injunctions are not to be granted on breach of contract, nonperformance of which could not be specifically enforced and/or when a party has an equally efficacious remedy available to him. Under Section 14(1)(a) of the Specific Relief Act, the specific performance of an agreement can not be granted, breach of which can be compensated by money. The petitioner has impugned the action of the respondents in terminating the contract before the expiry of the period of another year, though the period of eleven months for which the contract was entered had expired. The petitioner has impugned the notice of termination dated 11th July, 2006 contending that it is not the notice for termination but the intimation of termination and this could not be construed as the prior notice. The right of the petitioner for extension of agreement is subject to various factors which include the satisfaction of the respondents. The learned Counsel for the respondents produced a number of letters regarding dis-satisfaction with the functioning of the petitioner. Thus it can not be inferred that the right of the petitioner was absolute and ought to have been granted by the respondents. Therefore, apparently the inference drawn is that the agreement between the petitioner and respondents was determinable and has been determined by the respondents. Even if the inference is that the agreement between the parties was not terminated validly and could not be terminated, then the petitioner shall only be entitled for damages and the petitioner will not be entitled for specific performance of his agreement. Section 14(1)(c) of the Specific Relief Act also prohibits specific performance of an agreement which by its nature is determinable. Even injunction can not be granted under Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act to prevent the breach of contract performance of which cannot be specifically enforced, and therefore to extend the agreement by an interim order in a writ petition will not at all be justifiable.
17. Rather on account of re-tendering for appointment of security agency, in which the petitioner could take part again, no arbitrariness can be culled, in the facts and circumstances, nor the procedure adopted reflects any procedural unreasonableness so as to entitle petitioner for invoking the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
18. The petitioner is also not entitled for any relief as first an application was filed in the earlier writ petition No. 3859/2006 seeking stay and quashing of the communication dated 11th July, 2006 where no interim order was passed and the matter was adjourned. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed the present petition seeking similar relief. The petitioner has also filed yet another application in the earlier writ petition Nos. 3859/2006 seeking similar relief. The petitioner could not file three application/petition seeking almost the same relief. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that the cause of action for the present writ petition is different. Once an application was filed seeking quashing of letter dated 11th July,2006 with an interim relief, on failure to get any interim relief, the petitioner is not entitled to file present writ petition and yet another application seeking similar relief in the earlier writ petition.
19. In the entirety of facts, it is perceptible that the cause of action of the present writ petition and the application No. 9621/2006 filed in writ petition No. 3859/2006 is the same. Minor changes in pleading the facts do not change the cause of action. The cause of action are those essential facts which would entitle the petitioner for the relief. In the application in the writ petition No. 3859/2006 relief claimed is quashing the communication dated 11th July, 2006 whereas the same relief has been prayed in the present writ petition after the relief was declined to the petitioner in an earlier application. In the circumstances, the writ petition seeking similar relief is nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court.
20. In the totality of facts and circumstances, I do not find any ground to interfere and the writ petition is, therefore, dismissed.