JUDGMENT
Anjani Kumar, J.
1. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, instead of the stay vacation application in the writ petition is itself being heard for admission and disposed of finally.
2. Petitioner-employer filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the award given by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court in Industrial Dispute Case No. 39 of 1993 dated 3.3.1997. published on 17.3.1997/25.3.1997. The labour court arrived at the finding that the termination of the services of respondent-workman w.e.f. 22.4.1988 without complying with the provision of Section 25F of the Act is bad in law and the workman is entitled for reinstatement but so far as the back wages are concerned, the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court has awarded the wages only from the date of reference, i.e., 7.4.1993.
3. It is this part of the award, which is challenged by the employer, inter alia, on the ground that in paragraph 7 of the award, the date of engagement in the second spell, i.e., 23.7.1989, i.e.. date of termination 22.4.1988, is not disputed by either side. The Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court has also referred that it is admitted that between these two dates the total working days come to 275 days. The workman has contended that the labour court came to the conclusion that between two dates namely, the date of engagement and the date of termination, the total working days came to 275 days. The employer has not given the number of days in their written statement. In the written statement filed by the workman, the workman has stated that he has worked 275 days. The witness of the employer Shri S. K. Chandra has stated that the workman has worked 207 days during the aforesaid two dates. This fact has been sought to be corrected belated from the payment vouchers Ext. W-1 to Ext. W-15. Respondent No. 1, the labour court came to the conclusion that even without entering into the disputed fact, on the basis of admitted facts, the management version of 207 days working counted by employer is excluding the Holidays. The respondent No. 1 relied upon the decision in the case of H. P, Singh v. Reserve Bank of India, AIR 1986 SC 132. In which it has been held that the Sunday and other holidays are to be included within the definition of continuous service as defined under Section 25B(2), read with Section 25(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947, therefore, the contention of the employer was rightly rejected by the labour court that the respondent-workman had worked only 207 days thus the finding arrived at by the labour court that the respondent-workman has worked more than 240 days, cannot be assailed and, therefore, is to be accepted.
4. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in view of the decision in Himanshu Kumar Vidyarthi and others v. State of Bihar and Ors. JT 1997
(4) SC 560, since the workmen in the aforestated case were daily wagers, their services stand terminated in terms of contract of employment, thus the ground that they are not covered by the definition of retrenchment as defined after 1984 amendment of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, cannot be accepted. In the case of U. P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. v. Om Prakash Upadhyaya, 2000 LLR, the Apex Court dealing with the dally wagers, opined that once the labour court comes to the conclusion that the workman has worked for more than 240 days in the preceding year and labour court having come to the conclusion that the termination is without complying with the provision of Section 25F or Section 6N of U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, this makes the termination per se illegal, then the workman would be entitled for back wages and re-instalement from the date of termination itself.
5. In the present case, the labour court itself has awarded back wages only from the date of reference, i.e., 7.4.1993. In these circumstances, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court referred to above. I do not find any infirmity, much less error of law in the award passed by the labour court.
6. In this view of the matter, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. The interim order, if any, stands vacated. However, the parties shall bear their own costs.