JUDGMENT
V.S. Dave, J.
1. An application purported to be one under Section 12 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971, has been filed with a prayer that the contempt proceedings be initiated and suitable punishment should be awarded to the non-petitioners one of whom is Secretary to the Government, Department of Cooperative Societies, Rajasthan, for not implementing the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court presided over by Hon’ble M.C. Jain, the then Chief Justice of this Court and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Farooq Hasan, in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3340/1987, in letter and spirit and thereby showed deliberate disrespect towards the order of this Court. In view of the fact that learned brother Hon’ble M.C. Jain had since been transferred from this Court to Delhi High Court as Chief Justice, this case was marked to this bench by Hon’ble the Chief Justice.
2. Though none has appeared for the petitioner still we have perused the entire record and the relevant law, as the matter of contempt is between the Court and the Contemners.
3. The contempt alleged is against the order which was an agreed order and which runs as under:
Accordingly, in view of the above agreement the directions given by the Tribunal are further modified and the respondents No. 2 & 3 are directed to redetermine the seniority of the petitioners and private respondents in these writ petition after arriving at the finding of their dates of substantive appointment. The re-determination shall be made within a period of two months. The observations made by the Tribunal would not come in the way of the Government and further as a result of redetermination of seniority. Consequence would automatically followed and the consequential orders may be passed within a period of further two months. These writ petitions are disposed of with the above observations and directions.
4. The petitioner’s grievance is that despite aforesaid directions respondents did not re-determine the seniority and inspite of his representations. He submitted that a seniority list was published on 30th July, 1990, but the name of the petitioner has not been placed at proper number and this was done malafide. His grievance is that Rule 15(1) of the Absorption of Surplus Personnel Rules, 1969, has not been properly read and followed which was to be done, it being the spirit of the order passed by this Court.
5. On these allegations, the contempt application was admitted and notice was issued on 28th April, 1992. Detailed reply has been filed to the petition on behalf of the respondents denying the facts mentioned in the contempt petition. It is stated in reply that the petitioner has not been denied any right and the judgment dated 17th January, 1990, has been implemented in the right perspective and in accordance with the provisions of law. It has been submitted that the respondents have issued the seniority list as was directed on 30th July, 1990, and the copy of which was given to the petitioner through Jaipur Central Cooperative Bank, Jaipur, where he was working on deputation. It is submitted that if he has any grievance he can afresh challenge the order but cannot move a contempt application as there is no dis-obedience of the order of this Court. Contemners have also tendered apology and have submitted that they have utmost respect of the order of the Court.
6. We have heard the learned Counsel for the contemners and perused the record made available to us. A compromise order was passed by this Court on 17th January, 1990, and in terms of the agreement, the re-determination of seniority was ordered to be done within two months. The re-determination was delayed and for that the respondents had tendered their un-conditional apology. They submitted that in following the procedure, time was consumed because number of formalities had to be completed.
7. Their submission is that moment order of this Court was conveyed to them, they started the exercise and looked into relevant laws applicable to petitioner’s case and using their best judgment, they have issued fresh list in full compliance of the order of this Court. It is submitted that law has been applied as is done in each case and if the interpretation is not correct a fresh cause of action accrues which can be challenged in separate proceedings.
8. A serious question have come-up for consideration in this case as to whether the proceedings for contempt of Court should be initiated for getting enforcement of an order passed by this Court when dispute is raised about the manner and the method applied for implementation of the order and whether rowing and fishing enquiries are called for unless there are allegations of malafide or deliberate dis-obedience or disrespect and specifically made in contempt application and further whether proceedings can be initiated without foundation having been led in the petition specifically and whether any illegality done in re-determination of a seniority as per honest interpretation of the Rules, can it be adjudicated in the contempt application.
9. Contempt of Court in common parlance is associated with the conduct of a person which tends to bring the authority of Court and administration of law into dis-respect or disregard or attempts to interfere with proceedings or pressurize the parties to give particular statements or their witnesses during litigation or in any manner lowers the dignity of the Court or the majesty of law. There are two types of contempt; one is ‘Criminal Contempt’ and the other is ‘Civil Contempt’. ‘Civil Contempt’ with which we are concerned in this case has been defined as under:
Civil Contempt : means willful disobedience to any judgment, decree direction, order writ or other process of a Court or willful breach of an undertaking given to a Court.
Thus, willful disobedience is the gravemen of a charge for contempt, say it a ‘Civil Contempt’. The necessary corollary to this is that if dis-obedience is neither calculated to undermine the authority of the Court nor is wilful it is not a civil contempt. The expression wilful connotes purposeful and intentional flouting of any order. In other words, mensria is an essential ingredient of the offence of contempt wherever disobedience of the order is alleged in order to see as to whether the contemner is guilty of contempt or not. It is, therefore, to be seen as to whether his intention in deliberately doing of an act or forbidding to do an act ordered by the Court is willful? In doing so, even if he has done in ignorance of law something country to the order of the Court, in some circumstances, he may be said to be guilty of contempt but if he has carried-out the order with the best intention in manner he has understood the order and if (here is an accidental error in doing so, there is no contempt. It is, therefore, the nature of the order passed by the Court and the action done in pursuance of the order has to be looked into carefully. Legal position in this respect has been considered time and again by various Courts.
10. In the case of Bukhtiarpur Bihar Light Rly. Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar , the Court considered the question of implementation of an order passed in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court observed that a flagrant and willful disobedience of an order alone can call for the exercise of Jurisdiction in contempt and that too when there is no alternative legal remedy available to the aggrieved party which was not less convenient, beneficial and effectual. It was held that contempt jurisdiction should be reserved for what essentially brings the administration of justice into contempt or unduly weakens it as distinguished from a wrong that might be inflicted on a private party, by infringing a decretal order of Court.
11. In the case of Chinnabha Chetty v. Changalrava Chetty . It was held that where the matter is one of infringement of a decree or a decretal order embodying rights, as between parties, it is clearly not expedient that contempt jurisdiction should not be invoked and exercised in each instance, as a mode of executing that decree, or merely because other remedies may take time or any more circumlocutory in character. The same principle was accepted by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of A Ramalingam v. V.V. Mahalingamma Nadar , wherein the Court held that essentially, contempt of court is a matter which concerns the administration of justice and the dignity and authority of judicial tribunals; to enable the Court to take such action as it deems expedient to adopt, a party can bring to its notice, facts constituting what may appear to amount to contempt of Court. Essentially, however, it is not a right of a parry, to be invoked for the redressal of his grievances. It is not also a made by which the rights of a party, adjudicated upon by a tribunal can be enforced against, another party, only when the facts on the record, ex-facie, support a proceeding in contempt, that it would be in the interest of Justice to exercise contempt jurisdiction or to commence to do so. Any detailed enquiry must be left to the Court which had passed the order and which presumably is fully acquainted with the subject matter of its own decree. When the matter relates to infringement of a decree or decretal order embodying rights abate as between parties, it is clearly in expendient to invoke and exercise contempt jurisdiction. In essence as a mode of executing that decree or merely because other remedies may take time or are more circumlocutory in character. In yet another judgment, in the case Abul Razak Sahib v. Mrs. Azizunntsa Begum and Ors. the Court held that while it is difficult to rigidly define contempt in a general way contempt of Court may be said to be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of law into dis-respect or dis-regard or interfere with or prejudice parties to the action or their witnesses during litigation. For an act to amount to contempt punishable under the summary Jurisdiction of the High Court, it must fall within the principles of these cases in which power to punish has been decided to exist, the unfailing criteria being whether or not there has been an interference or a tendency to interfere with the administration of justice. Contempt jurisdiction is reserved and exercise for what essentially brings the administration of Justice into contempt or unduly weakens it, as distinguished from a wrong that might be inflicted on a private party by infringing a decretal order of the Court. The Court relied on its previous decision and held that mere failure in depositing the amount claimed by the opposite part and ordered to be deposited cannot amount to contempt of Court. Case where the alleged contemner has drawn an order in pursuance of the order of this Court in the best exercise of his own discretion and according to the honest interpretation in accordance with the Rules, which he interprets if otherwise the intention is not borne-out from the order then in such cases, even if there is a dis-obedience, it cannot be said to be a willful dis-obedience. As there is nothing indicative of the fact that there is either dis-respect shown to the order of the Court or there was an intentional act to flout the order of the Court. In the case of K. Ramdas Shenov v. The Chief Officer, Town Municipal Council, Udipi and Ors. AIR 1976 S.C. 944. Where a petition for revoking licence to exhibit films was decided by Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the District Magistrate, refused to act on photostat copy of the judgment, unless a certified copy was produced and also in the case of Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Ors. .
12. In this view of the matter, we are clearly of the opinion that there must be a willful dis-obedience of the order of this Court. In the instant case, it is clearly brone-out that when the fresh order was passed; reference was given to the order of this Court and the fresh order was also exhibited and the re-determination was also done in accordance with the Rule 31 of the Raj as than Co-operative Subordinate Service Rules, 1955 and Rule 15(1) of the Rajasthan Civil Services Absorption of Surplus Personnel Rules, 1969. In case, the rules have not been properly followed or there is any factual wrong in the list, the petitioner had the remedy to get it corrected by going into by the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur, or initating fresh proceedings in accordance with the law but the order cannot be said to be a wilful dis-obedience of the order of this Court dated 17th January, 1990. There is no allegation of malafide or otherwise in the said order and no factual foundation has also been read in this respect. In this view of the matter, the contempt petition is dismissed. Rule Is discharged.