JUDGMENT
I.P. Rao, J.
1. This is a second appeal filed by the tenant against whom a decree for eviction in respect of the ground floor of the house occupied by him as a tenant has been passed.
2. The respondent landlord filed a suit for eviction originally on the grounds of nuisance, arrears of rent and material alteration. By amendment dated 31-7-1979 the landlord added the ground of bond fide requirement on the allegation that his son who is working in Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board has been transferred to Jabalpur. Both the courts have ordered eviction on the grounds of nuisance, bona fide need and material alteration by making unauthorised construction of a wall and converting verandah into a room. The second appeal was admitted by this court on 28-9-1993 on the following substantial questions of law :
(1) whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the decree granted by the Courts below for ejectment under Section 12(1 )(a), (c) and (m) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 is in accordance with law?
(2) whether the children of the son of the landlord can be included in the definition of member of the family as given in Section 2(a) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961?
3. The first question comprises of the three grounds upon which the eviction was ordered by the Courts below. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that under Section 12(l)(m) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred as the Act’) the material alteration will afford a ground for eviction only when it is to the detriment of the landlord’s interest or is likely to diminish its value substantially. The learned Counsel for the Appellant argued that the landlord urged the ground of material alteration on the supposition that the Corporation can penalise him for the unauthorised constructions and the construction affects light and air to the inner portion of the house; that while arriving at the finding the Courts below have not taken into consideration the mandatory requirement under Section 12, clause (10) of the Act; that though the trial Court passed the decree under Section 12(l)(c) of the Act on the ground of nuisance, the lower appellate Court has reversed that finding, that there is no discussion on Issue No. 4 with regard to the nuisance; that therefore, it should be deemed that the ground of nuisance is not made out and the bona fide need of the landlord no longer exists in view of the facts that even after the transfer of the landlord’s son to Jabalpur he did not occupy the first floor of the house; that the grand children of the landlord were taking education wherever his son was working; that the plaintiff alone is residing now in the first floor of the house and as such the ground of bona fide requirement is not substantiated.
4. The first objection raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is answered by the learned counsel for the respondent by submitting that the contention of the tenant that the wall existed even prior to the commencement of the tenancy was not accepted by both the courts below and the concurrent finding of the lower Courts is that the construction of the wall was made on the verandah. The reason given by the tenant for construction of the wall is to prevent flow of water into the verandah. If really the tenant felt any inconvenience by reason of flow of water into the verandah, he should have given notice to the landlord requesting him to stop the flow of water and the landlord should have made arrangements for preventing the flow of water. The tenant in the absence of any written permission is not authorised to make the construction and thereby affect the light and the air to the plaintiff’s inner portion.
5. The learned counsel for the appellant further argued that since the construction made by the respondent is not of permanent nature, there was no necessity to take permission from the Municipal Corporation. But there is no clear evidence that the construction in the verandah made by tenant is only a temporary construction. The deposition of the tenant that he has constructed the wall to prevent flow of water into the verandah is contrary to the contention put forth by him that the verandah existed even prior to the commencement of the tenancy.
6. The requirement under Section 12, clause (10) is required to be followed when the sole ground for eviction is under Section 12(l)(m) of the Act. The other submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant is that there is no finding that the construction made by the tenant is likely to diminish the value substantially. But under Section 12(l)(m) the Court is entitled to grant a decree even when the material alteration is to the detriment of the landlord’s interest.
7. I, therefore, hold that in view of the concurrent finding of fact that the unauthorised construction of wall was made on the verandah by the tenant without the permission of the landlord thereby causing obstruction to the landlord, I hold that the order of ejectment passed under Section 12(l)(m) of the Act is perfectly correct.
8. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the ground of bona fide requirement was not originally taken by the landlords; that even after the transfer of the landlord’s son to Jabalpur he did not occupy the first floor of the house, that on the other hand he occupied the quarter allotted to him by the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board and that at any rate because of the subsequent transfer of the landlord’s son from Jabalpur to Rewa and recently to Shahdol the bona fide need no longer subsists. IA No. 10033/94 is filed on 9-12-1994 for amendment of the written statement. It is not explained in the said application as to when the son of the respondent was transferred to Shahdol. I, therefore, feel that the filing of this application at a belated stage when the second appeal is posted for hearing is only an attempt made by the tenant to prolong the second appeal and thereby enjoy the benefit of stay granted to him during the pendency of the second appeal. In fact, the appeal was posted for early hearing by order dated 15-9-1994 and the conduct of the appellant in filing this application for amendment at a belated stage can be considered as with an oblique motive. Hence the application is rejected.
9. The learned counsel for the appellant tried to rely upon the evidence of the plaintiff’s son in order to attck the finding of the lower appellate Court on the ground of bona fide requirement. As held in Mattulal v. Radhe Lal, AIR 1974 SC 1596, the finding as to bona fide requirement of landlord is a finding of fact and unless the appellate Court has misdirected itself or erroneously placed burden of proof on the tenant, the High Court could not interfere with that finding of fact in the second appeal.
10. Both the courts below have placed reliance upon the decision in Kamalkishore v. Narayandas, 1972 MPLJ 137 which lays down that the Court cannot replace its own opinion in place of. that of the landlord regarding his requirement. It is further observed in that decision that the court has to see that the landlord is not actuated by an ulterior motive. In order to show that the landlord in this case has acted with ulterior motive the learned counsel for the appellant argued that this application for eviction was filed by the landlord being enraged by the fact that the tenant has applied for fixation of standard rent. The learned counsel for the respondent contradicted that comment by bringing to my notice that the standard rent application as evidenced by Ex.P-26 was filed on 26-7-1976 whereas the suit for eviction was filed on 17-7-1974. The oblique motive thus sought to be thrust on the landlord is not established. The Courts below held that the bona fide need of the landlord exists because of the education of the grand children. A Division Bench of this Court held in Purushottam Das Gupta v. Balaram, 1995 MPLJ 458 = 1994 JLJ 752 that the definition of the words ‘member of the family’ extends to any other relation dependent upon the landlord.
11. I, therefore, hold that it is not open to the High Court in the second appeal to interfere with the finding of fact with regard to the bona fide need.
12. The third ground is nuisance. The trial Court held that it has not been proved that the electricity connection was disconnected by the defendant is order to cause annoyance to the plaintiff, and that the pump house is not included in the demised premises and that there is no proof of continuous threats and abuses by the defendant and her sons. The trial Court however held that issuing a false notice by the defendant demanding loan, illegal occupation of pump house by the defendant and illegal construction of room by converting the verandah constitute acts of nuisance. The lower appellate Court in paragraph 10 of its judgment after discussing the evidence held that the following acts by the defendant and her family members constitute acts of nuisance :
(1) Removal of movables belonging to the landlord which were restored only at the intervention of police;
(2) Interference with the pump house room thereby preventing flow of water to the landlord’s upstair portion;
(3) Disconnection of the electricity supply by reason of the defendant not paying the electricity bills.
13. The plaintiff filed Ex. P-14 receipt evidencing payment of electricity charges for purpose of restoring the electricity. It is established that by reason of the electric bills remaining Unpaid by the defendant, the power was disconnected. Ex. P-16 and Ex.P-17 are the letters written by the landlord thanking the police for their intervention and restoring the movables removed by the defendant and her family members. The construction of the room by converting the verandah is without permission of the Municipal Corporation. Section 293 of the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act prohibits erection or re-erection of buildings without permission. Section 434 of the same Act makes such construction punishable. The learned counsel for the appellant tried to argue that no criminal prosecution was launched against the landlord. But by virtue of the illegal construction, made by the defendant without obtaining Municipal sanction, the respondent landlord is exposed for prosecution for the illegal construction made by the tenants.
14. In the light of the finding of the trial Court and appellate Court set out in detail earlier, it cannot be said that there was no discussion by the lower appellate Court on the ground of nuisance and that the ground of nuisance is not made out.
15. Each of the acts mentioned above may not by itself be sufficient to order eviction on the ground of nuisance. But the cumulative effect of all the incidents should be taken into consideration by the Court to assess whether the acts complained of constitute nuisance affording a ground of eviction.
16. It is held in Smt. Tulsabai v. Smt. Kashibai, 1973 MPLJ Note 32, that the word ‘nuisance’ means acts and behaviours which make it extremely inconvenient for the landlord to live in the house. In that case the passage leading to the common latrine was chained from the defendant’s side and the defendant used to keep the door closed and she did not open it for 2 or 3 hours in spite of request made by the plaintiff. Another act of nuisance complained of is that the defendant and her brother-in-law abused and assaulted the plaintiff 2 or 3 times. The learned Judge held that the acts proved by the plaintiff amounted to nuisance. In Kanwarlal v. Badrinarayan, 1980 MPRCJ Note 2, the blocking of the passage and thereby preventing the landlord or his other tenant from the use of the premises is considered as amounting to a nuisance. In R. C. Manchanda v. Smt. Kaushalya, 1980 MPRCJ Note 123 it is held that the word ‘nuisance’ used in Section 12(l)(c) of the Act has not been used in technical sense and that it includes acts of misbehaviour causing nuisance to the landlord. It is held in Beranna v. M. A. Chandra Raju, A.I.R. 1990 Karnataka 121 that the act of nuisance complained of need not be proved to be deliberate. Thus the absence of intention on the part of the tenant is not relevant for the purpose of determining the ground of nuisance. In Narpatchand A. Bhandari v. Shantilal Moolshankar Jani, AIR 1993 SC 1712 the Supreme Court lays down that the tenant putting up textile printing mill on common terrace and running it at night, using water from common overhead tank and removing aerials, and antenna of other tenants constitute clear acts of nuisance or annoyance.
17. Applying the dictum laid down by the above decisions to the fact of this case, the conduct of the tenant in depriving the landlord of electricity by non-payment of bills and preventing the water from going to the upstair portion occupied by the landlord by breaking the pump house situated below the stair case certainly amount to acts which constitute clear acts of nuisance and annoyance to the landlord. It is stated that the age of the landlord at the time of filing of the eviction suit was 68 years and that his present age is 86 years.
18. The decision in Gaurishankar v. Bhikhalal, AIR 1978 Gujarat 72 relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant has no application to the facts of this case because the act of nuisance complained of in that case is quarrels of domestic nature between the wives of the tenants. In the present case the various acts complained of against the tenant cover the period from February 1976 to July 1976 and their cumulative effect certainly amounts to act of nuisance.
19. The comment made by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the lower appellate Court has not discussed the various grounds of nuisance in details. As held by the Supreme Court in Girijanandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain, AIR 1967 SC 1124 in order to arrive at a finding of affirmance detailed reasons need not be given by the appellate court. The expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the Court the decision of which is under appeal would ordinarily suffice.
20. From the above discussion I hold that the decree of eviction passed by the courts below against the appellant tenant is perfectly correct and does not call for interference. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. Two months’ time is granted for vacating the promises, on condition of the appellant giving an undertaking before the trial court within 15 days from today.