JUDGMENT
Y.K. Sabharwal, J.
(1) This litigation has a chequered history but for the purposes of this petition it is not necessary to give the details of all the litigation except to briefly state few facts. The premises in dispute were let out by the petitioner to the respondent under Section 21 of the Delhi Rent The Control Act (hereinafter called ‘Act’) for the first time in the year 1968 for a period of three years and after the expiry of said period, there were also subsequent lettings each time under Section 21 of the Act. The respondent remained in continuous possession. However, in the year 1977 the petitioner moved execution petition before the Rent Controller seeking possession of the premises. This Court directed that the petitioner be put into possession. The Supreme Court by its celebrated judgment reported in 15(1979) Dlt (SC) 30 S-B. Noronah v.Prem Kumari Khanna, set aside the order passed by this Court. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Additional Rent Controller, Delhi, and directed the Controller to go into the question of the validity of sanction under Section 21 of the Act and such other objections as may be available to the tenant in the light of observations made by the Supreme Court in its judgment. The Additional Rent Controller, after remand, dismissed the application for execution and upheld the objections filed by the tenant- respondent and held that the permission granted under Section 21 of the Act was invalid. The first appeal filed by(r)tbe petitioner was dismissed by the learned Rent Control Tribunal and order of Additional Rent Controller was upheld,
(2) Aggrieved from the order of Additional Rent Controller and Rent Control Tribunal, the petitioner filed a second appeal in this court (S.A.O. 306 of 1985). This appeal was disposed of by order made by this court on 19th February 1987.
(3) The petitioner, in this contempt petition, alleges the breach of undertaking given by the respondent and recorded in the order made on 19th February 1987. The said order reads as under :- “THIS appeal by the landlady is directed against the order dated 29th August 1985 passed by the Rent Control Tribunal whereby her appeal against the upholding the objections of the tenant was also dismissed. During the course of arguments, Mr. Hardev Singh, learned counsel for the respondent-tenant has made the statement that he has the instructions to say that the respondent will increase the rent with immediate effect to Rs. 10,OCO.00 per month and would make earnest effort to find alternate accommodation and as such if the alternate accommodation is available, the respondent will vacate the premises also. In view of this statement Mr. Kohli, the learned counsel for the appellant, who is accompanied by the appellant craves leave to withdraw his execution application under Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Consequently, the execution itself stands dismissed as withdrawn. In view of that, the objections filed by the tenant obviously do not survive. The appeal is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.”
(4) It is not the case of the petitioner that the respondent is not paying rent at the rate of Rs. 10,000.00 per month. The respondent has filed an affidavit staling that as per the statement recorded in the order dated 19th February 1987 she is continuing to pay enhanced rent of Rs. 10,000.00 per month. The monthly rent was enhanced from Rs. 5.000.00 to Rs. 10,000.00 .
(5) Mr. Kohli, learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, laid great stress on the part of the order which states that the respondent would make earnest effort to find alternate accommodation and as soon as the alternate accommodation is available the respondent will vacate the premises. Counsel submits that this amounts to an undertaking by the respondent. He says that for the purposes of this contempt petition two undertakings given by the respondent are relevant, namely, (i) the petitioner earnest would make effort to find alternate accommodation and (ii) as soon as alternate accommodation is available the respondent will vacate the premises. According to the contention of the learned counsel the respondent has committed willful breach of both these undertakings.
(6) Undoubtedly, if a person commits willful breach of an undertaking given to a Court he commits ‘civil contempt’ and is liable to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The main question in this petition is whether an undertaking was given by the respondent to the Court. In case answer to this question is in affirmative then alone further question about the breach and its being willful or not would arise. It would not be necessary to go into any other aspect of the matter if the aforesaid main question is answered against the petitioner.
(7) From the narration of facts given above, it is apparent that learned Additional Rent Controller held the permission under Section 21 of the Act to be invalid. The said finding was upheld in first appeal by learned Rent Control Tribunal and at this stage the second appeal (S.A.O. 306 of 1985) was filed in this Court. The concurrent findings of both the Courts below were not set aside by this court while disposing of the second appeal. In view of the statement of Mr. Hardev Singh, learned counsel for the respondent, the appellant was granted leave to withdraw the execution application under Section 21 of the Act. In view of withdrawal of execution application the objections filed by the tenant obviously did not survive and so also the appeal which was disposed of accordingly. It is also important to note that no time frame up to which the respondent was required to vacate has been mentioned in the order dated i9ih February 1987. I have never seen such statement being treated as an undertaking to the Court. If an undertaking is given to a Court specifying time up to which a person would vacate but instead of the word ‘undertaking’ the word ‘statement’ is used in the order, it may be possible to contend that in fact an undertaking has been given to the court although the word used is ‘statement’. But that is not the case here. It was only a general and a vague statement made by the learned counsel that effort will be made to find alternate accommodation and as soon as it is available the respondent will vacate the premises. No undertaking can be inferred from the said statement or from the order reproduced above. In the absence of an undertaking there is question of the respondent committing breach let alone willful breach. Accordingly, it is not necessary to go into the question as to what efforts were made by the respondent for finding alternate accommodation. It is also not necessary to go into the question whether the respondent has acquired or not any other accommodation. The only worth noticing averment made in the contempt petition is that ‘she inspite of the assurance and undertaking given to this Hon’ble Court has not made any earnest effort and/or vacated the premises . . . ‘. The petitioner does not even make an averment about willful breach by the respondent or her having acquired any alternative accommodation. I find on the record an affidavit of the petitioner dated 19th April 1988 stating that the respondent has acquired another residence at 33, Prithvi Raj Road, New Delhi. In the contempt petition there is no such averment. This affidavit dated 19th April 1988 was filed the respondent bad filed her reply to the contempt petition. I do not know how such affidavit was placed on record without any order or direction from the court. Mr. Hardev Singh points out that a copy of this affidavit has not been given to the respondent or her counsel. As such I have not called upon the respondent to answer the affidavit of the petitioner dated 19th April 1988 and also because of the view I have taken above that no undertaking was given by the respondent to the Court.
(8) It is well settled that contempt jurisdiction should be used sparingly and only when a clear case of a willful breach of an undertaking is made out and not on the basis of vague and general statements and equally vague pleadings without even alleging willful breach. The contempt proceedings cannot be permitted to be used by one party for twisting the arm of the other party.
(9) For the above reasons the petition for contempt is dismissed and the show cause notice issued to the respondent is discharged.