ORDER
Anil Dev Singh, J.
1. This is a Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated August 18, 2000. The question involved in this appeal is whether a person who has held two terms as a member of the Press Council is ineligible for renomination for a third term. The facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows :-
2. In the year 1982 the second respondent was nominated as a member of the Press Council by the first respondent. The second respondent remained a member of the Press Council for a period of three years from 1982 to 1985. Again the first respondent in the year 1985 renominated the second respondent for a second term. Accordingly, the second respondent remained member of the Press Council till 1988. The appellant by means of a communication dated November 21, 1997 informed the various Presidents of the associations of persons carrying on the business of management of the newspapers including respondent No.1 about the reconstitution of Press Council of India w.e.f. January 25, 1998 and to nominate members as per sub-clause (b) of sub-section (3) of section 5 of the Press Council Act, 1978 (for short ‘the Act’). In response to the aforesaid letter the first respondent nominated the second respondent. The Press Council did not accept the nomination of respondent No.2 but accepted the nomination of his son who was sponsored by the first respondent as a cover candidate on the ground that the second respondent had been a member of the Press Council for two terms and he was ineligible for renomination in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (7) of section 6 of the Act. It needs to be mentioned that much before the letter of the appellant dated November 21, 1997 was addressed to the President of the Associations, the first respondent on May 5, 1997 and August 9, 1997 sought the clarification of the appellant on the question whether there was any prohibition under the provisions of sub-section (7) of section 6 of the Act on renomination of a person who had earlier served as a member of the Press Council for two successive terms after a gap. The Press Council vide its letter dated October 1, 1997 circulated the opinion of the Chairman on the issue according to which sub-section (7) of section 6 of the Act debarred the same person from holding the office as a member of the Press Council for more than two terms during his life time. Notwithstanding the opinion of the Chairman of the Press Council, as already pointed out, the first respondent sponsored the second respondent as its nominee. On November 29, 1997, even before the nomination of the second respondent was rejected by the appellant, the respondents filed the writ petition on the ground that in view of the interpretation placed by the Chairman of the Press Council the nomination of the second respondent would not be accepted. The learned Single Judge by an order dated August 18, 2000 allowed the writ petition and quashed the decision of the Press Council in not accepting the nomination of the second respondent as a member of the Press Council. While deciding thus the learned Single Judge held as follows:-
“…..that sub-section (7) of section 6 of the Act bars only the renomination of a retiring member for more than one term and the provisions does not contain any absolute bar for any person to be nominated for more than two terms.
3. The basic question which arises in this appeal is whether the learned Single Judge was right in rejecting the interpretation placed by the Press Council of India on the provisions of sub-section (7) of section 6 of the Act? It seems to us that the said provision is capable of two interpretations – one which was adopted by the Press Council of India and the other which was perceived by the learned Single Judge.
4. At this stage, it will be appropriate to look at the history of the Act and certain features thereof which have a bearing on the question in issue. On November 26, 1963, Press Council Bill, 1963 (No. xxxviii of 1963) was introduced in the Rajya Sabha. The motion for reference of the bill to a Joint Committee of the House was moved on September 8, 1964 and was adopted by the House on September 15, 1964. The Lok Sabha concurred with the motion of the Rajya Sabha on September 30, 1964. The Joint Committee held various sittings and received memorandum/representation with reference to the bill from different organisations, institutions and individuals. It suggested certain changes in the bill and set out the reasons therefore. Since we are concerned in this appeal with the question of renomination of a retiring member, we will notice the opinion of the Committee in regard to clause 5(7) of the Bill which related to the re-appointment of a retiring member. Before adverting to the opinion of the Committee, in the first instance clause 5(7) of the bill needs to be noticed. This clause reads as follows :-
(7) A retiring member shall be eligible for re-appointment:
Provided that before any retiring member who has served for two full consecutive terms is re-appointed, there shall intervene a period of at least eighteen months between the date of his retirement and the date of his re-appointment.”
5. With regard to the aforesaid clause the committee was of the opinion that a member of the Council should not hold office for more than six years in any case. In this regard, this is what the committee stated in its recommendations dated February 15, 1965:-
“The Committee are of the opinion that a member of the Council should not hold office for more than six years in any case. Sub-clause (7) has been amended suitably to achieve this purpose.”
6. After the receipt of the recommendations of the Committee, the Parliament enacted the Press Council Act, 1965 (No. 34 of 1965). In the said Act, sub-section (7) of section 5 made provision for re-appointment of a retiring member of the Press Council. The provision was as follows:-
(7) A retiring member shall be eligible for re-appointment :
Provided that no member shall hold office for a period exceeding six years in the aggregate and on the expiry of such period he shall cease to be a member.”
7. As is evident, the bill provided for re-appointment of a retiring member, who had served for two full consecutive terms, even for a third term provided there was a gap of eighteen months between the date of his retirement and the date of his re-appointment. The Act, however, provided for re-appointment of a member only if he had not held office for a period exceeding six years in the aggregate. This provision, as is apparent, was not happily worded. But the marked departure in the language of sub-section (7) of section 5 of the Act from clause 5(7) of the Bill reflected the intention of the legislature that a member was not to be re-appointed if he had held office for a period of six years in the aggregate. This was in consonance with the recommendation of the Select Committee. In 1975 the Press Council Act, 1965 was repealed. Thus was during the period of emergency when freedom of press was restricted.
8. The baneful effect of the repeal of the Press Council Act, 1965, was sought to be undone by introducing the Press Council Bill, 1977 (No. xviii-13 of 1977) in the Rajya Sabha on December 23, 1977. The motion of reference of the bill to the Joint Committee of the House was moved in the Rajya Sabha on March 01, 1978 and was adopted by the House on the same day. The Lok Sabha concurred in the motion adopted in the Rajya Sabha at its sitting held on May 15, 1978. The Joint Committee held several meetings. The Committee did not suggest any changes in clause 6(7) of the Bill. thereafter, the Parliament enacted the Press Council Act, 1978 (No. 37 of 1978) which came into effect from March 1, 1979.
9. At this stage, we may look at the preamble of the Act and few provisions thereof.
10 .The preamble of the Act gives insight to the purpose for which it was enacted. Preamble of the instant statute recites that the legislation was enacted to establish a press council for the purpose of preserving freedom of the press and for maintaining and improving the standards of newspapers and news agencies in India. The Council, as per section 5 of the Act, is to consist of a Chairman and twenty-eight other members. Sub-section (3) of section 5 makes provision for nomination of twenty members belonging to and connected with the press. It also makes provision for nomination of three members from different fields, namely, education, science, law, literature and culture, and nomination of five members of Parliament. Sub-section (1) of section 6 provides a three year term for the Chairman and other members. Sub-clauses (2), (3), (4) and (5) of section 6 of deal with the contingencies in which a member ceases to be a member of the Council before the expiry of a period of three years. Sub-section (6) of section 6 deals with the nominations of the members against vacancies arising under sub-sections (2), (3), (4) and (5) thereof. The said sub-section envisages that in the event of a vacancy arising during the period of three years a new member will hold office for the remaining period in which the member in whose place he was nominated would have held office. Sub-section (7) of section 6 which requires our interpretation reads as follows :-
” A retiring member shall be eligible for renomination for not more than one term.”
11. “Member” has been defined in section 2(c) of the Act. According to this section, a member means a member of the Council and includes its Chairman. Therefore, what applies to the re-nomination of a member also applies to the Chairman subject to the exception contained in sub-section (1) of section 6 which provides that the Chairman shall continue to hold office until the Council is reconstituted in accordance with the provisions of section 5 or for a period of six months whichever is earlier.
12. It was submitted by the learned senior counsel appearing for the first and second respondents that sub-section (7) of section 6 refers to a retiring member and not a retired member. According to him, a member who may be retiring after serving for one term can be renominated for not more than one term. He submitted that the bar contained in the said provision applies to a member seeking a third term after having been a member without a gap for two consecutive terms. It is not without significance that the legislature has not used words for creating a prohibition only in respect of those members who had served for two consecutive/successive terms. The expressions like “consecutive” and “successive” have also not been used by the legislature while enacting sub-section (7) of section 6. To say that the bar would have been absolute for a person to be eligible for re-nomination after two terms in case the legislature would have used the word “retired” instead of the word “retiring”, would amount to losing sight of the real intention behind the legislation. It appears to us that the word “retying” has been used to indicate a member who has actually retired. It is only when a member has retired that he can seek re-nomination for a second term. How can a member who has not retired be nominated for a second term. The tense used in a statutory provision may not necessarily have a decisive effect. While construing the provision one must look at the intention of the legislature, the context, the collocation and the object of such words. The fact that the tense of a word may not have a decisive effect is exhibited in Regina v. Leicester Justices, Ex parte Workman, [1964] 1 W.L.R. 707 (Queen ‘s Bench Division) wherein the court was dealing with section 2 of the Dogs Act, 1871, which stated as follows :-
“Any court of summary jurisdiction may take cognizance of a complaint that a dog is dangerous, and not kept under proper control, and if it appears to the court having cognizance of such complaint that such dog is dangerous, the court may make an order in a summary way directing the dog to be kept by the owner under proper control or destroyed, and any person failing to comply with such order shall be liable to a penalty….”
13. The provision came to be applied in the following circumstances:
14. A complaint was made under section 2 of the Dogs Act, 1871, against the owner of an Alsatian dog which showed itself to be dangerous on November 30, 1962 when it was not kept under proper control. During the pendency of the complaint the original owner sold the dog to one Bernard. The complaint was dismissed against the original owner. Subsequently, a complaint was made against Bernard on the ground that he was the owner of a dangerous dog which on November 30, 1962 was not kept under proper control contrary to section 2 of the Dogs Act, 1871. The trial court adjudged the dog to be dangerous and held that it was not kept under proper control on November 30, 1962. Since Bernard was the owner of the said dog the court directed him to keep the same under proper control. Aggrieved by this order, Bernard filed an application for an order for certiorari to quash the decision of the trial court. It was submitted that the applicant, at the time when the dog was dangerous and not kept under proper control, was not the owner. It was also contended that even if the dog remained a dangerous dog yet there was no evidence that in the care of the applicant it was not being kept under proper control and, therefore, there was no power to order him to keep it under proper control. The counsel for the applicant relied strongly on the tense used in section 2 of the Dogs Act, 1871, where a reference inter alia was made to a complaint that a dog “is” dangerous, and not kept under proper control, and again that “if it appears to the court having cognizance of such complaint that such dog is dangerous”. It was urged on behalf of the applicant that by the use of the word “is” what was meant was that before an order could be made the court must be satisfied that not only the dog was dangerous on the date alleged in the past, but remains and is dangerous at the time of the hearing. The submission based on tense used in the statute was rejected by the Queen’s Bench Division.
15. In The Vanguard Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. Madras v. M/s. Fraser and Ross and another, , the Supreme Court was dealing with the interpretation of the word “insurer” occurring in section 2D and section 33 of the Insurance Act, 1938. The court came to the conclusion that persons who had closed their business of insurance also fell within the purview of the word “insurer”. This was held despite the fact that section 2(g) defined the word “insurer” as meaning any body corporate carrying on the business of insurance. Even though the Supreme Court found that the definition of the word “insurer” was exhaustive it held that some of the sections of the Insurance Act using the word “insurer” did not merely mean a person actually carrying on the business of insurance, but included a person who intended to carry on the business of insurance but had not actually started the same and it also included a person who was carrying on the business of insurance but had ceased to do so. Citing the example of section 3(2) and section 9 of that Act, the Supreme Court held as follows :-
“…… thought the ordinary meaning to be given to the word “insurer” is as given in the definition clause [S.2(9)] and refers to a person or body corporate etc. carrying on the business of insurance, the word may also refer in the context of certain provisions of the Act to any intending insurer or quondam insurer. The contention therefore that because the word “insurer” has been used in S. 33 or S. 2D those sections can only apply to insurers who are actually carrying on business cannot necessarily succeed, and we have to see whether in the context of these provisions an insurance will also include a person who was an insurer but has closed his business.”
16. Having regard to the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court, we are of the opinion that much emphasis cannot be attached to a particular word appearing in the section. The court while construing a provision must look to the context in which the word has been used and to the history of the legislation and the various provisions thereof which may have a bearing on the meaning of a particular word occurring therein.
17. As already pointed out, originally when the Press Council Bill 1963 was introduced, it contained a provision for re-appointment of a member who had not served for two consecutive terms and in case he had served for two consecutive terms, his re-appointment for a third term could be made only after a gap of eighteen months between the date of his retirement and date of his re-appointment. Thus, the bill envisaged any number of appointments subject to the satisfaction of the aforesaid condition which provided for a gap of eighteen months between the date of the retirement of the member and the date of his re-appointment. The first Joint Committee recommended that a member of the Council should not hold office for more than six years in any case and sub-clause (7) was recommended to be amended satiably to achieve the purpose. The Parliament while enacting the Press Council Act, 1965, made a provision for a member to be eligible for re-appointment provided he did not hold office for a period exceeding six years in the aggregate. It is no doubt true that provision was not happily worded. In the Press Council Act of 1978, sub-section (7) of section 6 replaced the provisions of sub-section (7) of section 5 of the Press Council Act, 1965. It appears to us that the change brought about by sub-section (7) of section 6 was meant to lend clarity to the provision but it still remains blurred. The intention of the legislature, however, remained the same. The legislature wanted to create a powerful body to preserve the freedom of press and to maintain and improve the standards of newspapers and news agencies in India. More than half of the Press Council is composed of journalists and persons connected with newspapers. The idea appears to be that they would help the Press Council in achieving the purpose for which it was established. Since these members are themselves journalists and connected with the press, they would be interested in preserving and protecting the freedom of the press and improving the standards of newspapers. In the process, the action of an editor or a working journalist would be judged by his peers. It needs to be noted that the offices of the members and the Chairman of the Press Council are not offices of profit. They are meant to subserve the purpose of the Act. Creation of vested interest would be destructive of the objects for which the Press Council was established. The Press Council is required to act as an independent body and is to look into the complaints against newspapers, news agencies, editors and journalists. To permit a person to remain a member of the Press Council for any number of terms is liable to erode independence of the body as the element of vested interest can creep in. The Press Council has also to make various adjudications. Besides, it has to oversee the conduct of newspapers. Newspapers are expected to adhere to neutrality, objectivity and truthfulness in their reporting. Any provision which creates permanent membership of a person will not be conducive to the ideals for which the Press Council was established. It is pointed out by the learned Solicitor General that in the history of the Press Council no person has been nominated as a member beyond two terms. He submitted that the Press Council has consistently taken the view that no person can hold office of a member or Chairman exceeding two terms. This position is controverter by Mr. V.P. Singh, learned senior counsel for the respondents. He submitted that in the past there have been two instances where persons were nominated even beyond two terms. He cited the example of Shri Chandu Lal Chandrakar and Shri Sailen Chatterji. Responding to the allegation, the learned Solicitor General pointed out that Shri Chandu Lal Chandrakar was nominated by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha for the third term in the year 1995 but before the council could take up the issue with the Central Government and the Lok Sabha, Shri Chandu Lal Chandrakar passed away within one week of his nomination. In respect of Shri Sailen Chatterji, it was submitted that he was a member of the erstwhile Press Council of India which was abolished by abrogating Press Council Act, 1965 during the emergency. In the counter-affidavit to the writ petition filed on behalf of the Press Council of India it is categorically denied that Shri Sailen Chatterji was a member of the Council for more than two terms.
18. It seems to us, since two interpretations of the provision are possible, the interpretation placed by the Press Council should not be displaced. In N. Suresh Nathan and another v. Union of india and others, , the Supreme Court held as follows :-
“…..The only question before us is of the construction of the provision and not of the validity thereof and, therefore, we are only required to construe the meaning of the provision. In our opinion, the contention of the appellants Degree-holders that the rules must be construed to mean that the three years’ service in the grade of a Degree-holder for the purpose of R. 11 is three years from the date of obtaining the Degree is quite tenable and commends to us being in conformity with the past practice followed consistently. It has also been so understood by all concerned till the raising of the present controversy recently by the respondents. The Tribunal was, therefore, not justified in taking the contrary view and unsettling the settled practice in the Department.”
19. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion and keeping in view the judgment of the Supreme Court In N. Suresh Nathan and another v. Union of India and others (supra), we are of the opinion that institutional interpretation should not be departed from in case the institution has taken a possible view of the provisions and has been following that view over a long period of time. It we may say so with respect, the learned Single Judge was not right in not accepting the interpretation placed by the Press Council of India on sub-section (7) of section 6 of the Act. In case the interpretation placed by the learned Single judge is accepted, a member could be re-nominated for a third term after a gap which could be of three years, or even after a gap of few days. Such a result would not be desirable. This would defeat the object of sub-section (7) of section 6 of the Act.
20. The learned Single Judge referred to section 5 of the Delhi University Act, 1922 and the 22nd amendment of the US Constitution to hold that like these provisions, in case the legislature wanted to impose an absolute bar on a person from seeking renomination beyond two terms, the legislature would have imposed the bar in clear and categorical terms. We, with respect, do not subscribe to the view. Some times the legislature fails to speak in clear and categorical terms. In such cases the principles of statutory interpretation have to be applied to discern the intention of the legislature. The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Suresh Chand Jain and others v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and others (Civil Writ Petition No. 2010/92, decided on November 14, 1991), on which reliance has been placed by the learned Single Judge, is not of much help for interpreting the provisions of sub-section (7) of section 6 of the Act as the provision which came up for interpretation of the Division Bench was differently worded. The learned Single Judge referred to the observations of Lord Watson in Salomon v. Salomon & Co., [1987] AO 22, 38. But those observations do not alter the time hallowed principle that in construing any statutory enactment regard must be had not only to the words used therein but to the history of the Act, the surrounding circumstances and the reasons which led to its being passed. The intention of the legislature undoubtedly should primarily be gathered from the words which are used, but where the words used are ambiguous and not so clear they would have to be examined and construed in the light of the aforesaid principle. Salomon v. Salomon & Co. (supra) does not make a departure from this rule.
In the result, we hold that respondent No.2-Harbhajan Singh is not entitled to be considered for nomination as a member of the Press Council of India for the remaining term of the Council by the Central Government. Therefore, the appeal succeeds and the order of the learned Single Judge is set aside.