JUDGMENT
Swatanter Kumar, J.
1. The main contention raised on behalf of the appellant in the present appeal is that the learned courts below have erred in dismissing the suit as one being barred by time. In order to save the suit being hit by the provisions of Limitation Act, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the order of termination dated 28.10.1981 was never served or tendered to the appellant, as such, limitation would start from the date of his retirement, which is alleged to be 15.11.1986. This contention is seriously controverted by the learned counsel for the respondents on facts and law.
3. In order to determine the merits or otherwise of this contention reference to necessary facts would be inevitable.
4. The plaintiff (appellant herein) filed a suit for declaration that the order of termination dated 28.10.1981 is illegal, wrong, arbitrary, mala fides ultra vires and is in contravention of the terms and conditions of service agreement and the principles of natural justice. The ancillary prayer in the suit was, with regard to consequential benefits for the period 5.4.1981 to 31.12.1985 and thereafter terminal benefits. The appellant joined the service of the respondents herein (defendants in the suit) on 25.5.1960 as supervisor at Moga. The plaintiff worked in different units and offices of the defendants, which in the beginning was proprietory concern and then it was converted into partnership and finally into a private limited company. The plaintiff claimed that he was not treated well by the respondents and therefore, the plaintiff accepted a job of equal status in better salary with other concern at Bathinda, but thereafter he was again taken back into service by the defendants. According to the plaintiff, he was appointed in terms of the letter dated 1.1.1979. Because of his sincere work and efforts he earned profits for the concern. It was averred that the plaintiff was not paid any salary since 5.4.1981, as a result of which an application under Section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, was filed on 25.5.1982 and thereafter one more application was filed but relief to the appellant was declined by the Authority under that Act vide its order dated 8.10.1985 on the ground of jurisdiction. According to the appellant on 4.9.1986 during the course of proceedings the defendants gave copy of letter of termination dated 28.10.1981, which has been assailed in the suit with consequential reliefs. The plaintiff claimed total nearly Rs. 3,00,000/- on various accounts, the details of which have been given in the plaint, with interest.
4. The suit of the plaintiff was contested by the defendants who took preliminary objections with regard to maintainability of the suit, misjoinder of necessary parties and valuation of the suit for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction. The main contest was that the suit was barred by time. The stand of the defendants in the suit was that the plaintiff joined service on 25.5.1960 was supervisor where he worked. Thereafter, he had left the service and fresh letter of appointment was issued on 1.1.1979 to the plaintiff. Services of the appellant were terminated on 5.4.1981. Termination order was served upon the appellant and even brought to his notice during the proceedings before the Sub Divisional Officer (Civil) Moga in the petition filed by him at the very first instance. It was maintained that the order of termination dated 28.10.1981 was valid, proper, not liable to be set aside and prayed for dismissal of the suit.
5. Learned trial Court keeping in view the aforestated pleadings framed the following issues :-
1. Whether the impugned order dated 28.10.1981 is illegal, wrongful, arbitrary, mala fide, ultra vires, in contravention of service agreement and principles of natural justice and consequently is null and void? OPD.
2. Whether this suit is bad for misjoinder of parties? If so, to what effect? OPD.
3. Whether this suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD.
4. Whether the suit has been properly valued for the purposes of Court fee and jurisdiction if not what is its correct valuation? OPP.
5. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try this suit? OPD.
6. Whether the suit is not within time? OPD.
7. Relief.
6. Learned trial Court decided the issues in terms of onus against the plaintiff and the learned trial Court held that the suit was not maintainable as the plaintiff could only bring the suit for damages, further held that civil court has no jurisdiction as the plaintiff has already availed the remedy available to him under the payment of Wages Act and the present suit was an abuse of process of law and finally it was held that the suit of the plaintiff was barred by time. Consequently, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff vide judgment and decree dated 30.1.1993 which was unsuccessfully assailed in appeal by the appellant before the learned Ist Appellate Court. Learned Appellate Court affirmed the findings of the learned trial Court and dismissed the appeal vide judgment and decree dated 4.11.1996 giving rise to this regular second appeal.
7. As already noticed the thrust of the argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is on the question of limitation. There is not much dispute with regard to the facts. However, relevant facts for determination of the main issue, the finding on which is vehemently assailed before this court are that the appellant joined the service on 25.5.1960, left the service in 1977 and was given fresh appointment on 1.1.1979 vide Ex. P.1. The terms and conditions of Ex. P-1 specifically postulated that the appellant would retire at the age of 55 years. It is further admitted case of the parties that services of the appellant were terminated vide order dated 28.10.1981 (Ex. D1). The dispute is with regard to the point of time when this order of termination was brought to the knowledge of the appellant. In this regard it must be noticed that both the Courts below have come to concurrent findings of fact based upon proper appreciation of evidence adduced on record that the suit was barred by time. Condition No. 16 of Ex. P-1 clearly stipulated that the appellant would retire at the age of 55 years and there can be no second thought to the facts and position of law that the terms and conditions of employment of the appellant would be governed by Ex. P-1 as it is private concern. Any amendment in government service rules, ipso facto would have no effect on the terms of the employment of the appellant. The contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the plaintiff would superannuate only at the age of 58 years is totally ill-founded and misconceived. There is no material whatsoever on record to substantiate this submission. Thus, this submission needs to be rejected. It has been correctly held by the learned courts below that the appellant would retire at the age of 55 years and not at the age of 58 years as argued.
8. It is pleaded by the respondents that the order of termination dated 28.10.1981 Ex. Dl was duly given to the appellant and in any case was brought to his notice during the pendency of the proceedings before the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act which were admittedly filed by the appellant. The findings of the Authority under Payment of Wages Act firstly would not be binding on the Civil Court and secondly the Authority itself came to the conclusion that it has no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the petition. Once, the Authority or the Court comes to the conclusion that it has no inherent jurisdiction to entertain and decide the petition, the question of giving findings on merit does not arise. In any case, if such findings are recorded, they would be ineffective in law as the authority or court itself came to the conclusion that it had no jurisdiction to record any finding. Thus, the observations, if any, made by the Authority concerned under the payment of Wages Act would be of no consequence. It is admitted by the appellant that he had filed proceedings in the year 1982 itself and other side had appeared before the Authority concerned in 1982. Thus, the order of termination dated 28.10.1981 was brought to the notice of the appellant. Limitation of three years would commence from 28.10.1981 and in any case from August, 1982. The suit was admittedly filed for the first time on 15.11.1986. On the face of it, the suit was barred by time.
9. At this stage reference to the observations of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of State of Punjab and Ors. v. Gurdev Singh and Anr., A.I.R. 1991 Supreme Court 2219, would be appropriate which reads as under:-
“There are not the only cases in which the Punjab and Haryana High Court has taken the view that there is no limitation for instituting the suit for declaration by a dismissed or discharged employee on the ground that the dismissal or discharge was void or inoperative…………………………………….
First of all, to say that the suit is not governed by the law of limitation runs afoul of our limitation Act. The Statute of limitation was intended to provide a time limit for all suits conceivable……….
The residuary article is applicable to every variety of suits not otherwise provided for. Article 113 (corresponding to Article 120 of the Act of 1908) is a residuary article for cases not covered by any other provisions in the Act. It prescribes a period of three years when the right to sue accrues. Under Article 120, it was six years which has been reduced to three years under Article 113. According to the third column in Article 113, time commences to run when the right to sue accrues. The words ‘right to sue’ ordinarily mean the right to seek relief by means of legal proceedings. Generally, the right to sue accrues only when the cause of action arises, that is, the right to prosecute to obtain relief by legal means. The suit must be instituted when the right asserted in the suit is infringed or when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. (See. (i) Mt. Bole v. Mt. Koklam, A.I.R. 1930 P.C. 270 and (ii) Gannon Dunkerly and Co. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1433)”.
10. In view of the aforestated settled position of law and proper appreciation of evidence. I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the aforestated arguments raised on behalf of the appellant had no merit and are liable to be rejected.
11. Further more all the matters stand fully concluded as they are based upon appreciation of evidence, in this regard. Once the learned courts below have returned the findings of fact in favour of the respondents, jurisdiction of this Court to interfere in such concurrent findings of fact is very limited one. Approach of the learned courts below is neither perverse nor appear to be pulpably wrong. Mere fact that there could be possible of taking another view than what has been taken by the learned courts below, would be no ground for this Court to interfere in the regular second appeal. In this regard reference can be made to the case of Ms. Kanta Jagasia v. C.K Rao, 1997(9) J.T. 556, and Ramanuja Naidu v. Kaniah Naidu, J.T. 1996(3) S.C. 164.
12. For the reasons aforestated, I find no merit in this regular second appeal which is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.