C.W.P. No.1294 of 1988 -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
****
C.W.P. No.1294 of 1988
Date of Decision:16.09.2008
Pritam Singh
.....Petitioner
Vs.
Pepsu Road Transport Corporation, Patiala and another
.....Respondents
CORAM:- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARBANS LAL
Present:- Ms. Deepinder Kaur, Advocate for the petitioner.
None for the respondents.
****
HARBANS LAL, J.
This petition has been moved by Pritam Singh under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution of India for quashing the impugned order dated
4.6.1987 (Annexure P.1) passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court,
Patiala and for giving a direction to the Pepsu Road Transport Corporation,
Patiala (for brevity, `the Corporation’) to pay to the petitioner the amount
claimed in the application under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (for short `the Act’).
The brief facts of this case are that the petitioner was employed
with the Corporation as Conductor. He remained under suspension from
1.4.1982 to 27.9.1984. His inquiry was not completed within a period of six
months. The Corporation has no jurisdiction to keep its employees under
suspension beyond six months and that being so, the petitioner is entitled to
claim wages amounting to Rs.7500/- after the said period. The petitioner
moved an application under Section 33-C(2) ibid to the Labour Court,
Patiala claiming the above-mentioned amount. The following issues were
framed:-
C.W.P. No.1294 of 1988 -2-
(i) Whether the application is not maintainable and this
Court has no jurisdiction to try this application?
(ii) To what amount, if any, the workman is entitled?
(iii) Relief.
After hearing the representatives of the parties and examining
the evidence on record, the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Patiala
dismissed the application with no order as to costs. Feeling aggrieved
therewith, the petitioner has filed this petition.
None has put in appearance on behalf of the Corporation to
argue this petition. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner
besides perusing the findings returned by the learned Presiding Officer,
Labour Court, Patiala in the impugned order with due care and
circumspection.
Ms. Deepinder Kaur, Advocate appearing on behalf of the
petitioner urged with a good deal of force that the petitioner was put under
suspension on 1.4.1982 and no inquiry was completed within a period of six
months. Thus, on expiry of this period, he was entitled to wages in
accordance with Rules 24 and 25 of the Pepsu Road Transport Corporation
(Conditions of Appointment and Service Regulations), 1981. The
Corporation has not paid wages to the petitioner and, therefore, the Labour
Court was to compute the amount payable to him. The Labour Court has
gravely erred in not accepting the application of the petitioner. The
Corporation be directed to pay wages to him as claimed in his application.
I am unable to persuade myself to agree with these submissions
for the reasons to be recorded hereinafter. Section 33-C(2) of the Act reads
as under:-
C.W.P. No.1294 of 1988 -3-
“Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer
any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed
in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount
of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should
be computed, then the question may , subject to any rules that
may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court
as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate
Government [within a period not exceeding three months]:
[Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court
considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for
reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such
further period as he may think fit.”
As observed in paragraph No.2 of the impugned order, “the
respondent filed the reply and objected that the application is not
maintainable as the workman has no existing right. It is alleged that he is
not entitled to any amount claimed by him as nothing is due to him.” In re:
M.D., Oswal Hosiery (Regd.) v. D.D.Gupta, 1994 LLR 487 (Delhi), it has
been held that “once there is an admission of the existing right of the
workman by the employer in regard to the benefit, which the former is
entitled to and receive from the latter, Section 33C(2) of the Act would
come into play.” In view of these observations, in an application to succeed
under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, the workman has to prove two things that
the employer has admitted his (workman) existing right and secondly, he
(workman) is entitled to the benefit and receive the same from his employer.
Here, in this case, the Labour Court has observed that “the Labour Court
proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of money. This calculation or
C.W.P. No.1294 of 1988 -4-
computation follows upon an existing right to the money or the benefit in
view of its being previously adjudicated or otherwise duly proceeded for.”
In the instant case, the Corporation did not admit the existing right of the
workman. Furthermore, there is nothing on the record to show that there is
any adjudication in favour of the petitioner. That being so, the impugned
order does not call for interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction under
Articles 226/227 of the Constitutional of India. Sequelly, this petition is
dismissed.
September 16, 2008 ( HARBANS LAL ) renu JUDGE