JUDGMENT
Jawahar Lal Gupta, J.
1. The wife’s appeal against the judgment and decree of the matrimonial Court annulling her marriage with the respondent having been dismissed by the learned single Judge, she has filed the present Letters Patent Appeal.
2. A few facts may be noticed.
3. Jagrup Singh, the present respondent, filed a petition under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act for dissolution of the marriage. He alleged that the marriage was solemnised between the parties on Nov. 15, 1987, at Village Joremajra according to Hindu rites. After the marriage, the parties cohabited and stayed together and a female child was born. Sometime later, he came to know that Smt. Pritpal Kaur, present appellant was already married and that she had contracted a second marriage by concealing this fact. She had not divorced her earlier husband Karnail Singh. It was alleged that the second marriage was void and deserved to be annulled by a decree.
4. The wife filed a written statement admitting the averment that the marriage had been performed on November 15, 1987. The fact that she was married to Karnail Singh was admitted. However, it was further averred that a writing had been, executed by which she had divorced Karnail Singh. The parties led evidence. The trial Court found that the parties were married on November 15, 1987. The wife had relied upon Exhibit R-1, an affidavit according to which she had divorced Karnail Singh. This affidavit was executed on Dec, 29, 1987. Thus the marriage between the two was subsisting on Nov. 15, 1987, when the appellant was married to Jagrup Singh. On this basis, the petition under Section 11 was accepted. These findings have been confirmed by the learned single Judge.
5. Mr. Denesh Goyal, learned counsel for the appellant, has contended that an application under Order 6, Rule 17 had been filed in April. 1992, during the pendency of the appeal before this Court. In this application, her prayer was for withdrawing the admission made in paragraph 1
of her written statement made. In view of the factual position, the learned single Judge should have allowed the application and permitted the appellant to withdraw the admission. Since the application was not specifically decided by the learned single Judge, the decision is vitiated and the case should be remanded for fresh decision. The claim made on behalf of the appellant has been controverted by the learned counsel for the respondent.
6. The primary question that arises for consideration is that — when was the appellant married to the respondent? The appellant had appeared as DW 1. Her statement was recorded by the learned Additional District Judge, Sangrur, on June 23, 1990. In her statement, she had admitted that she was married to the respondent about 2 years back. A daughter was born out of the wedlock in the month of September, 1988. She had further stated that “a writing of divorce was made in respect of divorce with my previous husband about one and a half years ago.” When this statement is read along with the written statement, it is clear that the position as initially taken by her was correct. Thus, the factual position appears to be that the appellant was married to the respondent on November 15, 1987. A daughter was born in September, 1988. The divorce had taken place about six months after the appellant’s marriage to Jagrup Singh. However, the affidavit is shown to have been executed on December 29, 1987. In any event, it is clearly established that the appellant was married to Karnail Singh and that this marriage was never annulled in accordance with law. Thus, the second marriage was performed while the first was still subsisting. Consequently, it was annulled.
7. In view of the above, the mere fact that the appellant had filed an application under Order 6, Rule 17 for the purpose of withdrawing the admission and that this application was not formally decided has not prejudiced her interest in any manner whatsoever. In fact, it appears that the application was a device only to distort facts. Otherwise, the factual position has been admitted by her in her statement in the Court. The mere fact that the learned single Judge had not formally disposed of the application did not prejudice the appellant’s interest. Still further, it has been stated by the learned counsel for the respondent husband that the appellant had actually filed a
review application before the learned single Judge which was dismissed.
8. No other point has been raised.
9. In view of the above, there is no ground to interfere with the concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below. The letters patent appeal is wholly lacking in merit. It is consequently dismissed. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs.