Delhi High Court High Court

Process Syndicate vs Central Board Of Trustee, Through … on 8 August, 2002

Delhi High Court
Process Syndicate vs Central Board Of Trustee, Through … on 8 August, 2002
Equivalent citations: 99 (2002) DLT 625, 2002 (95) FLR 981, (2002) IIILLJ 856 Del
Author: V Jain
Bench: V Jain


JUDGMENT

Vijender Jain, J.

1. The short question involves in this writ petition ia that as to whether the impugned order is a speaking order for the purpose of assessing damages under Section 14B of The Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as “Act”) by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner.

2. Mr. D.N. Vohra has contended that the impugned order, inter alia, states that the end of justice would be met if damages are levied in terms of the enclosed statement. That order cannot be termed as a speaking order for assessing damages as no basis for agreeing to the rates as levied and mentioned in the statement has been given by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner. To support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner has cited Organo Chemical Industries and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. 1979 Lab I.C. 1261. Mr. Vohra has further contended that as per the Scheme mentioned in Section 32-A of the Act rate of damages and percentage thereof has been provided although from the statement which has been taken into consideration by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, no basis has been adverted to and, therefore, the order becomes non-speaking, arbitrary and without basis.

3. On the other hand, Mr. R.C. Chawla, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, has contended that the impugned order is a speaking order as would be evident from the order if read as a whole. He has further contended that levy of damages could be 100% of the amount of default in terms of Section 14B of the Act. He has contended that this question is no more res integra in view of the authority of the Supreme Court as well of this Court and he has cited M/s Birla Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors. 2nd (1984) II Delhi 60.

4. I have given my careful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for both the parties. The provisions of Act as well as of the Scheme have been indicated for the benefit of the workers and it must bear a beneficial construction. In Birla Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd.’s case (supra) the Division Bench of this Court held that :

“…..It is correct that in imposing damages broadly the slab given in the table have been made the basis. But there is no mechanicality about it. Mind has been applied to each case. In many cases though proposed damages were indicated 100 per cent of arrears but after the hearing the same have been reduced to 25 per cent. . . . . ”

 5. Quoting    from      Associated  Journals    Ltd.       v. the RPFC. CWP  362/1978  Their  Lordships  of  the  Division  Bench further  observed  that   :-  
  "No doubt in some other cases the proposed damages and the ultimate damages imposed are the same. But from this it does not follow that there has been no application, of mind. Simply because the broad parameters have been laid down for the imposition of damages does not mean that this is an inflexible rule....."  
 

 6. Although    this  observation  was  with  regard  to  the Circular       issued       by     the         Central       Provident       Fund Commissioner.        It     also  holds  good  in  the  case   in     hand. The    Regional     Provident     Fund  Commissioner     decided     the matter,     applied  his  mind  and  that  is  why  he had  observed that     it  would  be  too  harsh  to  levy  damages  equal  to    the amount    in  arrears  as  provided  under  Section  14B  of    the Act    and  after  seeing  the  statement  agreed  with  the     levy of  rates  and  the  percentage  which  has  been   imposed  by  the Provident  Fund  authorities.     I   have  perused  the  Scheme  as provided     in    paragraph  32A  of  the  Scheme.     The     highest percentage   is  37%  though  rate  of  damages  for  a  default  of more     than  6  months  and  above  whereas  rate  of     percentage for     six     months    and    above     in    the    present    case     the authorities     have  fixed  55%  but  after  perusing   the  table it     is     clear   that  though  the  Provident  Fund     authorities could     have  imposed  rate  of  17%  for  a  period  of   less  than two    months,  yet  in  the  instant  case  they  have  imposed  2% for     the     said    period.     Taking  all     these     factors     into consideration     the     impugned  order   cannot  be  termed  as     a non-speaking    order     or  order  passed  mechanically.     I     do not    see  any  fault  with  the  impugned  order.     The  case    of   Organo Chemical Industries and Anr. (supra)     cited    by Mr. Vohra  does  not  support  the  case  of  the  petitioner.  

 

 7. I do not see any infirmity with the impugned order. Writ petition, therefore, stands dismissed with no order as to costs.