JUDGMENT
Anil Kumar Sinha, J.
1. Heard the learned Counsel for both the sides.
2. The instant revision application has been directed against the order dated 2.5.2000, whereby the learned Munsif atChaibasa, stated the further proceedings in Title Eviction suit No. 8 of 1997 till the disposal of F.A. No. 57 of 1997 (R), pending before this Court under Section 151 read with Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
3. The admitted facts are that the Title Suit No. 39 of 1982 was filed by the opposite party against Prof. Jagannath Poddar for specific performance of contract, which was partly decreed in his favour by the Sub-Judge, against which F.A. No. 57 of 1997 (R) was referred and the same is pending before this Court. The petitioner filed Title Eviction Suit No. 8 of 1997 for eviction of the opposite parties. A prayer was made on behalf of the defendant-opposite parties in the said Title Eviction suit that the proceedings in the suit may be stayed till the disposal of the F.A. No. 57 of 1997 (R) pending before this Court.
4. The learned Court below after hearing both the sides was of the view that although the parties and the subject-matter of the suit are the same but issue were different, but in order to avoid multiplicity of the suit, stayed the further proceedings in Title Eviction Suit No. 8 of 1997 in exercise of its power under Section 151 read with Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
5. In view of the fact that the issued in Title Suit No. 39 of 1982 and Eviction Suit No. 8 of 1997 are different, the further proceeding in the subsequent suit cannot be stayed under Section 151 read with Section 10 of the C.P.C. So far exercising the powers under Section 151 read with Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure for staying the further proceedings in the Eviction Suit No. 8 of 1997 is concerned, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Dr. N.P. Tripathi v. Smt Dayamanti Devi and Anr. 1987 PLJR 724, wherein it was held as hereunder:
By resosting to the inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code, the petitioner will be frustrating the very object and purpose of a bilateral munificent piece or legislation such as the Control Act of 1982 setting at naught the legislative mandate thereby rendering nugatory the provisions of Section 14 of the Act. I can say with all the vehemence at my command that to take recourse to such a procedure would not only be not subservient to the ends of justice but would be overriding the special procedure mandated by a self-contained Code as the Control Act. It would indeed, be an abuse of the process of the Court by trying to induce the Court to render Section 14 of the Control Act as otiose and redundant. Therefore, ultimately, I am constrained to hold that invoking the inherent powers of the Court under Section 151 of the Code would, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, amount to an abuse of the process of the Court and there can be no manner of doubt that such a recourse cannot be said to sub-serve the ends of justice, rather would be inducing the Court to resort to a procedure which will do complete injustice to the parties as contrary to ex debite justitiae.
6. In view of the aforesaid decision, the learned Counsel submitted that the aforesaid decision squarely applies in the facts and the circumstances of the instant case, inasmuch, as the pasties in both the litigations are same, subject-matter of the suit was also the same and point of law is also common, inasmuch as it has to be considered in the instant application that whether in both the suits, the order passed for staying the further proceedings in the Eviction Suit in exercise of its power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure will apply.
7. On the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing for the opposite party submitted that the facts in the case of Dr. N.P. Tripathi (supra) are not similar to the facts of the instant case, since in the present case the plaintiff-petitioner waited for a long period of about 15 years for the disposal of the suit filed for specific performance of contract and after the disposal of that suit, the Eviction Suit was filed by the petitioner-plaintiff, whereas in the case before His Lordship (as quoted above) the facts were that the suit for the specific performance of contract and the suit for eviction were filed simultaneously. Therefore, the decision cited on behalf of the plaintiff-petitioner is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the instant case.
8. Having heard the rival contentions of both the sides and relying upon the decision as referred to above, I am of the view that suit filed under the Rent Control Act is governed by the special procedure mandated by a self-contained Code and the provisions of the Act cannot be otherwise rendered nugatory. In the decision cited above, the same view was taken and it was held that invoking the inherent powers of the Court under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court and such a recourse cannot be said to sub-serve the ends of justice, rather, would be inducing the Court to resort to a procedure which will do complete injustice to the parties as contrary to ex-debito justitiae. Therefore, relying on the aforesaid decision, I am of the view that the Court below was not justified in staying the proceedings in Eviction Suit No. 8 of 1997 in exercise of its power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As such, the impugned order is set aside and the Court below is directed to proceed in the matter in accordance with law.
9. This Civil revision application is, accordingly, allowed.
