High Court Kerala High Court

Pulikkal Beerankutty @ Cheth … vs The State Of Kerala on 11 September, 2007

Kerala High Court
Pulikkal Beerankutty @ Cheth … vs The State Of Kerala on 11 September, 2007
       

  

  

 
 
  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

CRL A No. 1108 of 2004(C)


1. PULIKKAL BEERANKUTTY @ CHETH FAIZAL @
                      ...  Petitioner
2. PANGADAN ABDUL RAZAK, S/O.KUNHIKAMMU,
3. KRISHNADAS @ UNNI NAIR,
4. EDAYADAN SAIDALAVI, S/O. MUHAMMED,
5. CHAKKACHANPARAMBATH FAIZAL,
6. AREEKKAN FAZALUL RAHMAN,

                        Vs



1. THE STATE OF KERALA,
                       ...       Respondent

                For Petitioner  :SRI.BABU S. NAIR

                For Respondent  : No Appearance

The Hon'ble MR. Justice K.THANKAPPAN

 Dated :11/09/2007

 O R D E R
                                  K. Thankappan, J.
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                           Crl. A. No. 1108 of 2004
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                 Dated this the 11th day of September, 2007

                                     JUDGMENT

Accused in S.C. No. 477/2001 on the file of the Court of the Addl.

Sessions Judge Fast Track Court No.I (Adhoc), Manjeri are the appellants.

They faced trial for offence punishable under section 395 IPC. The

prosecution allegation against the appellants is that at about 9.15 p.m. all the

accused in furtherance of their common intention to commit decoity chased

the de-facto complainant in a jeep No.KL.10J.6147 and blocked scooter

bearing No.KLG 7327 driven by the defacto complainant and caught hold

the defacto complainant and manhandled him and accused 2 and 3 took

away MO1 bag containing Rs.50,000/- kept in the scooter and all the

accused assisted them in perpetrating the crime and therefore they

committed the offence. Before committal proceedings, the 2nd accused in the

original crime was declared absence and his case was split up and the

present appellants were faced trial as accused Nos.1 to 6 in the above case.

To prove the charge against the appellant, PWs.1 to 12 were examined and

Exts.P1 to P16 and Mos. I and II were marked. After closing the

Crl.A.1108/04 2

evidence on the prosecution side, the appellants were questioned under

section 313 of Cr.P.C. They denied the allegation. On the side of the

defence, DWs.1 and 2 were examined. After considering the evidence, the

trial court found the appellants guilty of the offence punishable under

section 395 IPC and they were convicted thereunder and sentenced to

undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years each and to pay fine of

Rs.15,000/- each and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for three

years. The trial court also directed that if the fine amount was realized that

should be paid to the victim. The conviction and sentence awarded against

the appellant are assailed in this appeal.

2. Heard.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant has raised the following

contentions to challenge the impugned judgment:- Firstly, it is contended

that the trial court had committed serious error in believing the evidence of

the prosecution to find the appellants guilty under section 395 IPC.

Secondly, it is contended that there was no proper identification of the

accused. Thirdly, it is contended that the trial court has committed serious

error in finding the appellant guilty under section 395 IPC on the basis of

the confession statement alleged to have been given by the 1st accused to

PW11 Sub Inspector of Police.

Crl.A.1108/04 3

4. The trial court had considered the evidence of PW1 and came to

the conclusion that PW1 had properly identified the 1st accused. In this

context, it is relevant to note that in Ext.P1 he stated that while he was

riding his scooter, his scooter was blocked by a jeep. He stopped the scooter

due to the blockage and at that moment 4 travellers in the said jeep

suddenly jumped out and two of them caught hold of his neck and he was

manhandled for few minutes. He fell down in the tarred road . The said two

persons continued manhandling him by kicking his chest and dragging him

through the tarred road. The other two robbers snatched the bag containing

money. Due to the unexpected manhandling, he could not come his voice

for a short while. Thereafter he lost his presence of mind and he remained

there for few minutes. When he regained his presence of mind, he made

loud cry and on hearing his cry, local people reached there. In chief

examination he stated that he identified the 1st accused. When he was

cross-examined, he stated that he had identified the 1st accused at the police

station. When he was further cross-examined he stated that ”

driver  5             " .

This witness also stated that "A1                              police

            " In this context, the evidence of

Crl.A.1108/04                         4

PW10 would show that he had previous occasion to see the 1st accused

visiting the house of one Saidalavi and the said Saidalavi has got criminal

antecedents concerning theft of vehicles and he knew that Saidalavi was

involved in similar cases. He also stated that once PW10 had noticed the

arrival of the 1st accused to the house of the said Saidalavi in an omni van.

He further stated that on the relevant night he had seen the 1st accused at

Parambil Peedika, just one hour prior to the incident and on suspicion he

enquired with one Musthafa and came to know his name as Cheth Faisal.

The evidence of PW10 is only hear say evidence. Hence, the evidence of

PW10 cannot be considered as a corroborative piece of evidence. Evidence

of PWs.1 and 2 would not show the identity of the persons as the accused

who jumped out of the jeep, caught hold of him and robbed his bag as

alleged by the prosecution. In this context the learned counsel for the

appellant brought to the notice of a decision of the Supreme Court reported

in Budhsen and another V. State of U.P. (AIR 1970 SC 1321). In the above

decision the Apex Court held that as a general rule, the substantive

evidence of a witness was a statement made in court. The evidence of mere

identification of the accused persons at the trial for the first time was from

its very nature inherently of a weak character. The Apex Court also held

that it was accordingly considered a safe rule of prudence to generally look

Crl.A.1108/04 5

for corroboration of the sworn testimony of witnesses in court as to the

identify of the accused who are strangers to them, in the form of earlier

identification proceeding. The learned counsel for the appellant submits

that the prosecution had not conducted any identification parade to identity

the accused as the persons who committed the alleged offence. In this

context, it is also to be noted that PW1 was questioned by the police more

than six times and all these times PW1 could not have given any evidence

regarding the identity of the accused who involved in the commission of the

offence. The trial court found that the first information statement do not

contained any clue regarding the identity of the accused. PW11

investigating officer has no case before the court that PW1 had identified

the accused. If that be so, the trial court had committed serious error in

finding that PW1 identified the accused.

5. The next question to be considered is with regard to the

confession statement given by the 1st accused to PW11. Admittedly, there is

no recovery under section 27 of the Evidence Act. If that be so, the trial

court is not correct in placing reliance on PW11 regarding the alleged

confession statement given by the 1st accused. With regard to the

acceptance of confession statement made by the 1st accused, as per

sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act confession made by an accused to a

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police officer is not admissible in evidence. If that be so, the trial court has

committed serious error in placing reliance on the confession statement

alleged to have been given by the 1st accused. There was no evidence to

show that Mos.1 and 2 were recovered on the basis of the alleged

confession statement given by the accused to PW11. If that be so, the

confession statement alleged to have been given by the 1st accused cannot

be used against the accused. In this context, the learned counsel for the

appellant brought to the notice of this court a decision reported in

Kalpanath Rai V. State (through CBI) (AIR 1998 SC 201). In the above

decision the Apex Court held that under sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence

Act no confession made by an accused to a police officer, or to any person

while he was in police custody could be admitted in evidence and under

section 162 of the Cr.P.C. no statement made by any person during

investigation to a police office could be used in a trial except for the

purpose of contradiction and for the purpose of section 27 of the Evidence

Act.

6. Another point to be considered is with regard to the production of

Mos.1 and 2. There is no evidence given either by PW11 or any other

witness regarding the recovery or seizure of MOs.1 and 2. Though in re-

examination PW1 identified MO1, description of MO1 bag was not given .

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Even if MOs.1 and 2 were recovered and produced on any confession

statement recorded by investigating officer, it should be proved properly by

adducing evidence. In this context, the trial court committed serious error in

accepting the evidence of PW1. PWs.3, 4 and 5 had given evidence before

the court that they saw PW11 Sub Inspecator of Police seizing certain

amount from accused Nos.3, 4 and 5. The seizure is also not properly

proved before court and the material objects were not properly identified

by PW1 or PW11 and the recoveries of MOs.1 and 2 are not under section

27 of the Evidence Act.

7. In the above circumstances, this Court is of the view that the

finding of the trial court is not based on any acceptable evidence. Hence,

the convictions and sentence ordered against the appellants are hereby set

aside and the appellants are acquitted. Fine amount, if any, deposited by

the appellants, it shall be refunded to them as per law. Bail bond executed

by the appellants shall stand cancelled.

The appeal is allowed as above.

K. Thankappan,
Judge.

mn

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                      K. Thankappan,J.
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                    Crl.A. No. 266 of 2006
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                            Judgment
                            11-7-2007