JUDGMENT
Swatanter Kumar, J.
1. This is a petition filed under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the order of the District Development and Panchayat Officer-cum-Collector, Hoshiarpur dated 24.3.1982 and that of the Appellate Authority-Joint Director, Panchayat, Punjab dated 25.11.1982.
2. No body appears on behalf of the respondents. Keeping in view the pendency of this petition for a considerable number of years. I see no reason to defer hearing.
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at some length.
4. Gram Panchayat, Salehrian Kalan, Tehsil Dasuya, District Hoshiarpur, had filed an application through its Sarpanch under Section 11 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1981, for declaration that the land in dispute has vested and is owned by the Gram Panchayat of the village and Punjab Wakf Board has no title or interest in the land which is shamlat deh.
5. Notice was issued on which the Wakf Board has filed the reply. Parties led evidence and vide order dated 24.3.1982, the learned District Development and Panchayat Officer-cum-Collector held as under:-
“…. I have gone through the record and heard the arguments of the learned counsel for both the parties.
It has been urged by the learned counsel for the respondents that the property in dispute is Wakf property as there is described to be a Masjid and Qabristan in the land in dispute according to the entries in the jamabandi placed on the file and that it has been properly described as such in the records of the Punjab Wakf Board according to the Central Government Wakf Act, 1954. The learned counsel for the appellants has on the other hand urged that there is no Masjid at site and there is no grave of any Muselemman in the land in dispute. There are on the other hand 60 valuable Mango trees in the land which the Wakf Board is trying to illegally utilise for their purpose. There is no doubt that in the jamabandi the property is described as gair mumkin Qabristan, but it has been proved by the evidence of the applicants witnesses consistently that there is no grave yard in existence at the site now and there is no mosque either. It has also been proved that there are mango trees in it and the land is more a mango garden. It is an admitted fact that there is no Muslim living in the village since partition. A half hearted attempt made by the respondent’s witnesses to show that there were some Gujjar Mussalmans in the village does not carry conviction because they have not been able to name any such, Musalman residing there. It is, therefore, fully proved on the file that the land in dispute, which might have been a Qabristan at some time before partition is no more used as Qabristan, and there is no graveyard or mosque in it.
Under these circumstances, this application must succeed and it is hereby declared that 10 kanals and 15 marlas of land described above vests in and belongs to the Gram Panchayat Salehrian Kalan”.
6. This order was assailed in appeal before the Joint Director, Panchayats, who affirmed the findings arrived at by the lower authority and sustained the order. Aggrieved there from, the present petition has been filed.
7. Mr. Palli, learned counsel for the petitioner while relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Syed Mohd State Salie Labbai (Dead) by LRs and Ors. v. Mohd Haneefa (Dead) by LRs and Ors., A.I.R. 1976 Supreme Court 1569, contended that once a disputed land was shown as qabristan, then it would continue to be qabristan and consequently, is the property of the Wakf Board. Findings to the contrary recorded by the authorities are thus vitiated in law.
8. Secondly, it is contended that the issue ought to have been decided by the authorities whether the land had vested in the Gram Panchayat or not and placing onus of the issue upon the applicant before the authorities and it was for the authorities to decide issue of treating that as if onus was upon the respondent/petitioner herein.
9. A bare reading of the above recorded finding indicates that in the jamabandi, it was recorded that the land in dispute was a qabristan. It is a settled principle of law that entries made in the revenue record have presumption of truth and such presumption is rebuttable. Once presumption is rebutted by leading documentary and cogent evidence in support thereof, presumption of correctness is normally displaced. In the present case, it has been decided that the land at one time was being used as a qabristan, however, for a considerable period, land has not been used as a qabristan and in fact, there is no muslim resident in the village. This is a finding of fact arrived at by both the authorities. Finding of fact concurrently arrived at by the authorities can hardly be interfered by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, unless such finding was so perverse to defeat the statutory or other principle of law. I certainly do not find that the finding recorded by both the authorities fall in that class of cases. Once there is no Muslim in the village and the land in question is a mango garden, I am unable to trace any fault in the finding recorded by the authorities concerned. In the case of Syed Mohd State Salie Labbat relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, there facts were different and in that case, it had been proved that the land in question was a public grave yard and constitutes a Wakf. In that case, ground of non-user, could not divest the Wakf Board from ownership of the land in question. In the present case, finding recorded in fact, totally alters the stand taken by the respondent (petitioner herein). It may be noticed that in the jamabandi recorded for the year 1952-53 in the column of ownership, shamlat deh has been recorded and in the column of cultivation, word “Ahl-i-Islam” has been mentioned. Thus, even the jamabandi does not reflect positively that the land was being used as a qabristan. A shamlat deh would commonly be termed as a land under user and control of the villagers. The Wakf Board was claiming the ownership of the land when it was never so recorded even in the revenue record.
10. In view of the above discussion, the other contention raised on behalf of the petitioner has no merit. The parties had led evidence and finding arrived at is based upon proper appreciation of evidence. At least, there is nothing on the file of this Court, which could persuade the Court to arrive at a finding contrary to the one already arrived at above by the authorities concerned.
11. For the reasons recorded. I find no merit on this petition and the same is hereby
dismissed with no order as to costs.