JUDGMENT
P.C. Misra, J.
1. The liability of the appellant under the award passed by the Second Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has been challenged by him in this appeal.
2. The facts leading to the limited controversy of the parties are as follows: The present respondent Nos. 1 to 8 filed an application under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, being the parents, widow and children of deceased Kalu Sahu for awarding compensation due to his death occurred in an automobile accident. The vehicle was insured with the National Insurance Co. Ltd. The original owner of the vehicle was the present appellant. It is alleged that he transferred the vehicle to the present respondent No. 9 on 20.2.1983. The accident having taken place on 16.7.1983, the Accidents Claims Tribunal while assessing compensation at Rs. 90,000/- felt that the present respondent No. 9 being the owner of the vehicle is liable to pay the compensation. In proof of the transfer of ownership the present appellant had filed a receipt executed by respondent No. 9 stating that he has received the vehicle bearing registration No. ORU 2728 from Purusottam Mishra, appellant, on payment of Rs. 40,000, the agreed cost. Respondent No. 9 preferred M.A. No. 301 of 1986 in this court. During hearing of the appeal it was urged on behalf of respondent No. 9 that he could not participate in the hearing of the case before the Accidents Claims Tribunal for want of proper opportunity and the default committed was beyond his control. This court on a consideration of the circumstances relevant to the aforesaid contention came to a conclusion that the liability of present respondent No. 9 would depend upon several factors like policy of insurance, if any, effective transfer of the vehicle by the present appellant to respondent No. 9, etc. Being of the opinion that no sufficient evidence in this regard has been placed for reaching a definite conclusion, the case was remanded to the Tribunal for readjudication after affording opportunity to all concerned to place materials before the Tribunal. So far as the receipt dated 20.2.1983 is concerned, which has been marked as Exh. A, this court in the said appeal had the occasion to consider the said document and by the time it was placed before the court, the date had been changed from 20.2.1983 to 20.8.1983. This court observed that the change was very much apparent from a bare look of Exh. A itself because the figure ‘8’ on the date given below the signature ‘P. Parida’ (present respondent No. 9) is in an ink different from that used in the scribe of the document itself. This court directed an enquiry to be made as to under what circumstances the interpolation was possible and by whom and further wanted necessary action in the matter. On receipt of the case on remand, the Accidents Claims Tribunal considered the case afresh and refixed the compensation at Rs. 90,000/-. Though the insurance company was noticed in the matter, the particulars of insurance policy were not disclosed by any of the parties for which reason the Tribunal could not fix the liability with the insurance company. The Tribunal, however, considered that since the present appellant was the owner of the vehicle and his name continued in the registration certificate until it was changed to the name of the present respondent No. 9 with effect from 27.9.1983 the present appellant should be considered as the owner of the vehicle till that date and the accident having taken place prior to such change of ownership in the registration certificate, the liability to pay the compensation on account of the accident should also be saddled against him. The Tribunal after examining some persons in charge of handling the record could not fix the responsibility as regards the interpolation in the date of execution of the receipt, Exh. A.
3. The dispute in this appeal filed by the present appellant is limited to the extent as to whether the present respondent No. 9 was the owner of the vehicle on the date of the accident and whether it was he whose liability is to pay the compensation. The primary question of fact relevant for the aforesaid purpose is as to whether the ownership resided with the appellant till the date of change of ownership recorded by the registering authority. The effect of receipt, Exh. A, naturally becomes relevant to be considered in this connection. So far as Exh. A is concerned, the finding of this court on the earlier occasion in M.A. No. 301 of 1986 is that there has been interpolation in the date given in the receipt. The interpolation was that the figure ‘2’ representing the month has been changed to figure ‘8’ which means that the date of transfer has been changed from 20.2.1983 to 20.8.1983. If the transfer was effected on 20.2.1983 respondent No. 9 may be considered as the owner subject to the legal question as to whether the change of ownership would depend upon the change effected in the registration certificate. But it has to be ascertained actually as to whether or not the vehicle was sold to respondent No. 9 by the present appellant on 20.2.1983. It is true as already held that respondent No. 9 for want of due opportunity was unable to contest the case before the Tribunal at the first instance and after remand he was given due opportunity and he contested the case by adducing evidence. The appellant as it appears did not cross-examine the witnesses examined after remand and was satisfied with the evidence that was led by him earlier. Curiously though respondent No. 9 stated before the Tribunal in his evidence that the transfer was effected on 14.9.1983 he did not make any reference to Exh. A in this context nor did he deny that the date appearing therein not to be in his handwriting. He said that he had granted a receipt for Rs. 40,000/- out of Rs. 45,000/- on 14.9.1983 and the receipt was granted by him on 14.9.1983. Copy of such receipt has not been produced by him nor has he called for the same from the present appellant. He evidently did not dispute the contents of genuineness of Exh. A which shows that he received the vehicle bearing No. ORU 2728 from the present appellant on payment of Rs. 40,000/- which was the agreed cost. The xerox copy of Exh. A has been produced and marked as Exh. C which shows that it is dated 20.2.1983 though the date apparently appears faintly in the xerox copy and is clearly readable by a magnifying glass. From the aforesaid circumstances and the evidence on record, specially Exhs. A and C, the conclusion is irresistible that the whole of the document including the date was in the hand of respondent No. 9 and he had taken possession of the vehicle on the date of transfer, i.e., 20.2.1983 on payment of an agreed consideration of Rs. 40,000/-.
4. The next question that requires consideration is as to whether the ownership stands transferred in favour of the transferee on execution of receipt on payment of consideration and taking over possession of the vehicle or would await till the ownership is transferred by the registering authority in the registration certificate. This question has been considered by several decisions including two of our own High Court. In the decision in P.K. Panda v. Premalata Chaudhury 1980 ACJ 213 (Orissa), this court held that there is no provision of law that the registration of a motor vehicle with the registering authority is a sine qua non for transfer of ownership or that transfer without registration would be void or ineffective. The court also expressed the view that the provisions of the Act regarding registration of vehicles have nothing to do with ownership. They only provide for regulation of the use of the motor vehicles in public places. The certificate of registration issued under Section 24(2) of the Act is not a document of title, but it is a piece of evidence to show the owner of the vehicle who is liable to pay taxes and to perform duties and obligations under the Act. There is nothing in the Act to indicate that it is the registered owner who shall be liable to pay compensation. The decision relied upon by the learned counsel for respondent No. 9 in this appeal is Orissa Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd. v. Bhagaban Sahu 1971 ACJ 49 (Orissa). It was considered in the said case and was not valid in view of the latter decision of this court in South India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Puma Chandra Misra 1973 ACJ 46 (Orissa). The same view was re-enforced by a Division Bench of this court in the case of Mihir Kumar Rath v. Rabinarayan Prusty 1993 ACJ 733 (Orissa), where their Lordships explained the matter in issue with the following words:
In certain circumstances, a person registered as the owner of the vehicle need not be held to be the real owner. The contractual transfer of ownership of a vehicle has to precede the application for transfer of ownership. As between the transferor and the transferee, the sale gets completed before the transfer of registration certificate. The failure to report the transfer may involve penal consequences. But that does not interdict the passing of property. It is relevant to indicate that the registration book is not a document of title. However, a presumption can be drawn that the person named in the certificate of registration is the owner of the vehicle in the absence of the material. It is nevertheless open to reach a conclusion on consideration of the materials available as to who is the real owner of a vehicle when there is a dispute regarding ownership.
In the present case the very change of ownership in the registration certificate at a later date would not defer the passing of title in the goods delivered at the time of sale. I should, therefore, hold that the present appellant was not the owner with effect from 20.2.1983 when he delivered the possession of the motor vehicle on payment of consideration to respondent No. 9 on which date the sale transaction was complete. Thus it is respondent No. 9 who is liable to pay the compensation to the claimant and not the present appellant.
5. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the award passed by the Accidents Claims Tribunal is set aside. The amount deposited by the appellant at the time of admission of the appeal may, therefore, be returned to him. Respondent No. 9 to pay the awarded amount within a period of two months from today failing which the consequence as envisaged in law would follow.