IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE
DATED THIS THE 17" DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2008
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAwAD
CR£_.R.P. NO. 1617 OF 2006 .__f
BETWEEN: I -
1 PYARIJAN S/O MOHAMED HUSSAIN_
AGED 29 YEARS, DRIVERI , i ,
R/O CHOWLAHIRIYUR " -_ .
KADURTALUK, CHIKMAGALOR DISTRICT.' ,
~ " P'E'TfTIONER
(BY MR S.G.BHAGAvAN',Yv.ADv.) =
1 THE STATE BY SOBAAINSRECTOR
TRAFFIC,PO1.ICE,_STATION,
SHIMQGA ' I
V RESPONDENT
,,.,{§RI RAIA MANYA B HAT, HCG P)
THIS PE"FI«T.I.QN IS FILED U/S.397 R/w 401 CR.P.C BY
A THE ADVO~CATE FOR THE PETITIONER PRAYING THAT THIS
g,HO,N'EBLEvI:OORT MAY BE PLEASED TO SET ASIDE THE
J..UD'GM'E,NT,"'&-=' ORDER DTD. 19.8.04 PASSED BY THE II
"ADDL.,A*--"IjjC,§'., (JR.DN.) & 3MFc., SHIMOGA, IN
C:«.C.N__O.'1,7352/01 AND THE JUDGMENT & ORDER DTD.
29.6.06 PASSED BY P0,, FTC-I, SHIFVEOGA, IN
, <;RL.A_.NO.42/04, ETC.,
THIS. PETITION IS COMING ON FOR FINAL HEARING
"";rHIS DAY THIS COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:~
ORDER
Convicted accused is in revision under Section 397
Cr.P.C. against the judgement in Crl. A. No. 42/ZQO4 dated
29–O6–2006 on the file of the learned Judge,v..i%a.§t~i.jrack
Court, Shimoga confirming the conviction
for the offence punishable under g_Sect_io’n'”2:73’V”an’d,V
IPC, by the judgement in C.C. lxlo. offs ”
the learned 11 Addl. Civil Judge (Jr’.”DV:vP..)’ at3ivig’rc.,.t,s3himo–g:a,
dated 19–08–2004. L’ J i J
2. Heard V _ “.leaaj_mued–_’gg.:s’e.nior counsel Mr.
S.G.:vB’h’ag’avan f:’p.etitione’r’V’— accused and learned
Gover–nrnaent Subramanya Bhat appearing
for .r_esponde_’nt .+’.’StAate}'”‘
2 Thieimaterial accusation on the basis of which
thep:etViAtiori»er_:..was arraigned, tried and ultimately convicted
‘AEJ34:/’V%the. judgement are:
i is VVVThe petitioner — accused is admittedly a professional
:7-:d”ri’ver of a passenger bus and was employed by
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under Section 304–A IPC was confirmed. Against both these
concurrent finding the convicted accused is in revision.
7. The learned senior counsel Sri S.G….Vv_iBiha.gavan
took me through the evidence, which accord_i_h_gn’to5_’hg~iii~f; i-isftoo
feeble to establish the charge ofmnegIig.e’n’cei:tVo
accused for the offence punishable underésectijon’3C4′–f:,r_IAPC.””
In this regard it was urged that
are cited by the prosecuyt:i_ori’..:_a–s__» eye «–VV:wi’tAnVesses to the
accident, in unequivocal_teV_rm.s:Vfa’d’rri’iAt:’atone point or other
during Cl’0SS-W”/)V(§|’]’1i1n’Ei”L’l:fi)r;lV’ ‘could saw what
Qicczurreclji.”‘i§iy”‘a’ttention was drawn to
certain –arisw’e~r’s:-..:gi~1>e’ii.i:l3*’;r’these witnesses, which in itself
shows «that they the place of occurrence and on
heariyng huelnfcrv, they rescued the victim. It is urged
.’ that .tAhAree:V’pe__rsons, PW1 to PW3 cited as eye witnesses by
ct’r.E,Vroéecuttion had not witnessed the actual occurrence.
” The learned counsel would further contend that
place of occurrence, topography of the area and other
__places show that driver could not have driven bus at high or
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uncontroliable speed or in reckless manner. Therefore, the
burden on the prosecution was more to establish that the
accused was driving the vehicle in a rash and___neg|igent
manner and such rashness and negligencey,:is.l_V*’gross
negligence’ to bring home the guilt.
9. A distinction was drawn .4_culr;labVle
negligence and actionable negfigence in’-civiyl i.|aw~.._.lAl”l–:The ” J
learned counsel for petitioVrie:r”=sough’t citatiov-na’i.._:s’u’pp’ort frorn
the following decisions: _
(1) SARWAR ..ig(“FylA|\£-‘_ v§;,’STAfE’E, or ANDHRA
PRADESH, reported’ina.AIFf; 1_96.E5f’»lA’P–290;
(2) _1iA’G.o~V:s’H »g’ci{ANoE’R vs STATE or DELHI,
Vrieportedy iii:_+’XIR«..19.?3–~ SC 2127; and
_ _ (3)°J.A_COBi-.MAA.TH’EnW vs STATE OF PUNJAB AND
Ai\lOTi~’iE..RA reported in AIR 2005 SC 3180.
;,f,{O._””=.__Firstly, it was urged that in similar case there
basil alficlonsistent view of Apex Court foliowed by the
High .-__Court,S that when the charge is under Section 304–A
..IFfC,*=the prosecution cannot be contend with only
“”._Vva’c–c:usation, it had to discharge the burden by placing
clinching evidence of gross negligence on the part of the
accused.
11. In the first decision cited supra in_,vth,e«._,lcase of
SARVAR KHAN, the Apex Court took note of,i–Ehe’p’7biservetio.n
of the trial court, which reads as_,fo.ll,ows:_-“ll”
“A person driving a motor’:.car’_”is’iunder ,3 du.r§3,-._’*1:,’
to control that car; he is prima facie.5′.g.ui’i’ty of ”
negligence if the car’*~.,leave’s the ‘roa«d”*v–ia.nd
dashes headlong into”a._tree an’d._it*is for the
person driving the,_.__.c’a.r ‘=.._1;o e”xp.|,ain,’ the
circumstances ‘_u~n,_der«’i w_hich the car came to
leave the road.” iTho’s_e1-ci.rcumst’a–n_ces may be
beyond control, and mayiex«cui’p~ate.’–~him, but in
the absenyce oi””stir)’h ‘ci.rt’cumsta,nv’ces the fact
that ;thet..,.Car “left ‘the* ,r’o–ad.__..iS evidence of
cello n rt .’ofV’the d river.
From, thi.sVob-serv_a’tion the learned Magistrate
inferred that ‘t_hei..b”urden of proof had shifted to
the ‘petitioner to prove under what
_circumst”ance.svthe car that he was driving left
road, and then dashed against the tree. It
. gwiillfbe’ seen that in this case the petitioner did
if tiry.-‘to explain the circumstances, which
cui!fnin’ated in the accident, but simply denied
,.,_ih’aVi–ng committed the offence. Therefore, the
.. learned Magistrate though that the burden of
“proof has not been discharged by the
appellant. This observation is not such as to
wholiy absoive the prosecution from proving its
case. The accused may refuse to enter any
plea. He may refuse to give an explanation,
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and he may refuse to examine any witnesses
on his behalf. But still none of these facts can
be taken into consideration to assess the guilt
of the accused. The burden of proof never
shifts, and it is for the prosecution to provewits
case. Explanation of an accused, or the,ple_a’i._V
entered by him, or the evidence adduced,”‘b.\f_”v..
him, may succeed in making the cas_e;””of–«t’h–e_” _
prosecution somewhat doubtful, and1ftonthat’V”
extent the plea, or the explanati~on–,..’1for”-they
evidence may be taken :i’rito’~acc’our}tpby the}
Court. But, beyond that it-His? ri.otl..for”the\
accused to set up and prove his own ‘case, in ‘
manner the prosecution__is bound to do.’ ‘._In__thi_s
Darticular case, .. .. V ‘ –
12. On thisvbasis u”rged in the instant
case, PW1 to 3 have,’i%n_’th’e-inocu.l:ar”_stVatement had spoken
to about t.h«e,;injuriies,’s,.ufferedg._uby}the victim and his
conseciulent..i,5d_Veat3h. a close scrutiny of their evidence
reveals that thyeyhave:bolt”spoken to about the actual act of
negliygence the Ad.riVv’ing of the vehicle. The evidence of
A ig~ain–s_impVorta’nce, as he was the Complainant and the
setthe law in motion. Even he claims to be at a
Ad.i,stan.ce:o*f’iOO ft. away. He says that the accused drove the
vehi’c.le*at a speed of 30 to 40 KM. According to the learned
it ‘vCOl5’nsel it cannot be termed as a high speed or speed
Héuncontrollable.
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13. He further point out that witnesses in their
examination~in~chief stated and further admitted in cross-
examination that Mahadeva was crossing the road”‘wghen he
was hit by the bus. Simiiar statements wereV..m4ad:e4e:4by”9W2
and PW3 in their deposition. But none of””these~..witn’e’sses,_
have identified the driver to sayv”he”was ‘d_rivinflg’e_n.d’ange’rEngT,__
human life and was grossly ne:gV!.ig’en.t. ;lfr11e’refore;:’.A’i’tVVwas
urged that prosecution no” except
evidence of PW1 to. Thins};VVaccuse’d§Vc’anVnot be called
upon to prove anything’ViuV’rt’hfer_.-.i_n’vAA_’ifi.i.s_’_’_.favo:.£r. Had the
prosecution; ‘placed ::__any–:.~~’addiiti-ona._|__V:f’materiai which was
incori’si%stent}v_Vwith4VV’ perhaps the accused
necessa ri!-y ‘o.t~i”ierwise.
14…_ “It was’.furtTher urged that the burden to prove
charge’ withiniacceyptable evidence is not on the accused, but
» ionVth.e’pra,Sec_ution.
second decision relied on by the learned
coiunseal is in the case of JAGADISH supra, where the Apex
it it Courtflideaiing with similar case and on concurrent finding
“I 0
recorded by the courts held investigation should be on
scientific lines and reveal culpability of the accused.
16. This decision was pressed into service..__to point
out that apart from lack of direct accusation”–~,ifn._’ocuIar
testimony of witnesses, even the documents by
the prosecution prepared duringwthye invevsti’gIati.on’.’_foo”._,not
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reveal anything directly incriminating”‘agai.nv§t:”,th.e:Eaccu*sed.
The learned counsel pointe-a:i:v,:”‘o_ut to” sceneof
occurrence, which ac.cordinAg—–to..”,hirn-.accr’u”es-to..t§he favour of
the accused. He vih,ad.,the driver bus at
speed which situs would have
shown t’-pike marks were noticed by the
Investigating O’ffi’ce’.r»’a:’n_d therefore, as noticed by the Apex
C,_urt>in t’r’ie.fldecision cited supra, it reduces the
.’ effect of ocular testimony of the witnesses.
‘isfurther urged that strict view should be taken
as” sketch prepared by the Investigating Officer was
“ina_drn’issible, as being hit by the provision of Section 162
gfif
17. In support of such contention, it was urged that
the evidence of Investigating Officer shows in the sketch
was not on the basis of his observation. He submits that the
sketch was prepared on the basis of the stat..eme–.nt of
witnesses. Thus, it is inadmissible. Such a_.st–ate:ment,:’is–, hit
by Sec. 162 Cr.P.C. and is inad_m.i.s.si4b|e;’.Con’s.gqtj’en_tiy;-the.
sketch prepared on the statement the witnesses:V’f_wiiI7fa.lso
be inadmissible. _V V _V _ 1
18. I have bestowed””.,my_ concern to} this iegai
proposition and scrut’§4.ni,seAd”._the.evi.den’ce of PW7′–Basavaraj,
the Investigating OffiVcer,:._wVhoV—i,s:».,th’e”~a£}’t.h’or of the sketch. It
is seen –. Officer was deposed “he
visited the scenetef ogzeurrence and then prepared the
sketch. in tI§e=_prese~nce of witnesses.” The evidence of
:Pvii7-_£»§a.sa.va~r.aj, Investigating Officer is not that the sketch
~.is.~o.n the statement of witnesses. What he says
is,4″‘sketch”‘.is prepared in the presence of panch witnesses.
V “T=h.i,_s has to be distinguished. The sketch is recorded of what
‘AA’-he-‘Aobserved at the place of occurrence. What is recorded,
it “therefore, is as observed and not merely drawing of the
sketch on the basis of hear say or statement given by the
witnesses. I am therefore, not inclined to accept that the
said sketch is hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C.
19. Besides, PW1 has also in his e.v~id.enc_e”.j’stated
that after lodging of the report, PW7–Ba_sa_v..araj:’~inspecteidd,
the place and prepared panchar1jama,’vvhi_ch’he,
his signature is at Ex.P2V(.a)a. l_il<ge-llwise,
other witnesses is he hadllsefiein investigatjivonludone bv the
Investigating Officer.:"i?.!3ereifnolisé;'paparationiotvthe sketch is
after the visit of the and it is recorded
as what is sleeitgat the place of yoc-c'urr.e§nce.
may, the sketch is actually of no
avail to"-1;'hle,VaVcc,u'sed' it only covers the position of the
vehic|e~ and Vscene____of the accident. Undoubtedly, it is record
» idof,wh:a't_was.found after the accident. How the accident has
. r occurred'_'»i.s'to'sbe noticed for the ocular evidence only.
The thrust of arguments is it may show
2 it negéligwence but not gross negligence to indict him for the
"'offence punishable under Section 304–A IPC. The accused is
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answerable only to the charge for actionable negligence,
which would give rise to cause of action under civil law. In
support of this contention, reliance has been placed on the
three decisions referred to supra.
22. Before I advert to the pro_n.o.:._.I,.n’cen*i-lent ”
Apex Court as to what constitutes giross: rs.egl.ig’ence,___iVt
be necessary to refer to the.,,facts”‘aJnd circu’rns.t:a_nce”s.’ofthe
case which had come up for’iconsidVerati’o–n_.: isjnoticed that
the case before the Mathew, referred to
supra, relates to VA’f~:fp,ro’fessional medical
negligence,i_corj:ge’gu.e*nt ‘pat’i~e~nt died. The facts are:
Siiarrna, lodged a report at the
jurisdictio-nal ‘p.olitfleV.a’t–~.budiiiana alleging that on 15-02-1995
heghad taélkeiif |”iiVs.v”fat’ner”:Jiwan Lal Sharma and admitted as a
,p’at:i’en’tl in”a privatemward of CMC Hospital, Ludhiana. On 22-
“‘o.2’;19ff9s:,’i’%iiat,:f_iabout 11–OOPM he developed difficulty in
his elder brother Vijaya Sharma contacted the
A duty/ft Wdrse, who informed the duty doctor. No doctor turned
V.”VV-.,’~upr.–‘for about 20 to 25 minutes and thereafter Dr. Jacob
sf”
Mathew, the appellant and Dr. Allen Joseph visited the
patient and contacted him. Oxygen cylinder was brought
and connected to the mouth of the patient,_..___but the
breathing problem increased further. Later it wa’sV:’fo7un’d.,,that
oxygen cylinder was empty. By the time -anotheital’cyl.’i_’iid”er
was brought, the Jiwan Lal Svharma d-lied;’.’lvie.x’attribt.itecij«
negligence to the doctor (appel|;aht)7..’_an’d
On his complaint the Inyes:tl”g_atinlg ._C_)ffi.;er_:’ Jacob
Mathew for the offence pun,isha.b:le”u-.ndehr Section 304–A IPC.
23. the Apex Court
held that theiiyal-lega:tllo’ns:’V,::of.:Vlneglipgyergce made against the
doctor didV’n”ot’=-_,c’onstwr,u’e._ gross negligence nor it can be
construed*rec’l:le’ssraes’s or failure in performance of
i3,r.Ci’«fessionalxditlty. The Apex Court took note of the following
. “c.irctimsta.nces as mitigating circumstances, which calls for
of the Medical Officer. The Apex Court
0lbSer’*t?:ed’ Pa ra–49 thus:
“Negligence is the breach of a duty caused by
omission to do something which a reasonable
man guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs would do, or doing something which a
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prudent and reasonable man would not do.
The definition of negligence as given in Law of
Torts, Ratanlal & Dhirajlal (edited by Justwice
G.P.Singh), referred to hereinabove, _h0l.d«S_*g
good. Negligence, becomes actiona.b!e».o’n’V;~fl.
account of injury resulting from th_e:..act”–ofr..l
omission amounting to negligence att’ri_butVa’bie T
to the person sued. The es.sential_–‘corriponents. V
of negligence are three:; ‘duty’, *’.brea–c_h’–.a.nd”V
‘resulting damage’. ‘
24. With these obselrvations th’epA’pe5< found fit
to apply the distincti'on.g_ to _<dea'i a«:il_/:\',iil;fiI"%Il".1C'l"I€ medical profession
and observed thus:
“Neg.!i’gen’;ce–_’_ in 1-the.._«* context of medical
proIfessi’on’ r:–ecés’isariiy,–calls” for a treatment
V_w_igth”‘=._a’ *d:i_ffere’i:ce’. ” .._..To_.% infer rashness or
nge’ligenceijo’n_the partwof a professional, i_n
*__particular”–.a*doctor. ‘additional considerations
‘apply. A”ca~s_e’v.of«occupational negligence is
differentlfrom oneof professional negligence. A
simp’le_’lac.k– of. care, an error of judgement or
an accident, is not proof of negligence on the
” ilpartgtof a rnedical professional. So long as a
_doctor. follows a practice acceptable to the
_”medi’cal”jprofession of that day, he cannot be
“l*ié’lvd__ ‘liable for negligence merely because a
batten’ alternative course or method of
“treatment was also available or simply because
” almore skilled doctor would not have chosen to
follow or resort to that practice or procedure
which the accused followed. When it comes to
the failure of taking precautions what has to be
seen is whether those precautions were taken
which the ordinary experience of men has
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found to be sufficient; a failure to use special
or extraordinary precautions which might have
prevented the particular happening cannot be
the standard for judging the alleged
negligence. So also, the standard of car_e,g
while assessing the practice as adopted’,’~V._i”s
judged in the light of knowledge avai:i’a’oieg.ait5_.__
the time of the incident, and not at the “date ”
trial.”
25. With these observat,ion$,fhe”Apex
the issue and held thus:
“The word ‘gross’ has ‘n.ot’i»been use’dir’i Section
304–A of IPC, yet it igssetti-etc: that-i.n_ criminal
law negligence” ‘or recklessness-,.,to be so held,
must be of such a high degrees as–..to be ‘gross’.
The expression “l-rash” or .–~nég[/l’Qe’nt act’ as
occurring in SeCtion.:’304.–_A_of th.e”IPC has to be
read as “o;u,,a|ifie_d by’–wthe’aw’o–r.’d~ 7.G.Fbss|y’.
%VIt seen that while considering the
accusatioéln’ to s.u’p;:>o’rtVthe charge, it was noted by the Apex
A Q’:p.urt.”cthatéallegations was too feeble to establish the doctor
.(aaVCcu:segd’)V%’h_a’s done something which a professional man
Ac.o__uld_,r~.ot,;.~ or he does something which a professional man
A coul’d.,__Anot have done. The Apex Court has also noted the
that in the provisions of Section 304–A IPC what is
incorporated is the expression rash or negligent act as
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qualified by the word grossly. However, the Apex Court
noted that in order to bring out the guilt of the accused for
the offence punishable under Section 304–A, theydegree of
proof of negligence must be high. Thus, the has
been render in different fact situation.
27. Keeping in mind the»ldl»ctum’_4t Cvoutrt.
we have to examine this case a§.i,r,0 wh’ethei* this :arse.¢5.a, be
treated as comes under 304__–A_iPC”:b’a’sed’: on the
– Charge of Section 27.9 IPC_,—–tThei’–efore,t”nvo.w,./Ewe have to
consider whether in Ha’ltcasel._VE§»f:ivthiisinature, the concept of
gross neg|igen’cve_ V-Iflfivtould refer to the
pro\/lsions the Motor Vehicle Act, which
is actua”l~!y_ a vgu’icle’iine,t’o. consider rash and negligent driving
ofgthesl.vehicl’e.»._.t:Vt Vllhen the charge is under Section 304–A
a’svt.,o~bVser_ved by the Apex Court, certainly apart from
H~.pitovitng”_”_a_ctip’nable negligence it is necessary in law, the
proseciutiotn must necessarily establish the culpable
“negligence. There is no distinction in IPC as to what
t7-‘constitutes actionable negligence or culpable negligence.
28. Provisions of Section 184 of the MV. Act is one
of such provision in which this aspect could be noticed and
what constitutes actionable negligence. Therefore, while
dealing with provisions of Section 279 IPC
against a person driving a motor vehicle
the provisions of Section 184 haste-be
29. The provisionssof Secti_on lélct
reads thus: if V l V ‘
“DRIVING DAN’eE;Ro’LJsri;r;.-‘*–wnce,ver drives a
motor vehicle at a-lspefed :or_.-i.n”ajjma.nner which
is dangerous tQ”ti”ue.:publi_c,_ haVving”.v”regard to all
the ciuc-;i.nifstari_ces ..o’f ‘th”e{j’cas_ef’ including the
nature, c’on.dit,ion_ and __u3je. ofgthe place where
the veh”icIe”i*s .drix;-egn’ and the amount of traffic
which actually”i.s”‘at..–~the time or which might
reasoinably ‘b,e»~e”x.pected to be in the place,
shali bVeVp’uni’s;.ha”ble for the first offence with
ifmprisonment for a term which may extend to
igsix«months””o’r with fine which may extend to
, _one_th,ousand rupees, and for any second or
_”s.ubse»qu1ent offence if committed within three
“yea–rs’go’f the commission of a previous similar
offence with imprisonment for a term which
“–may extend to two years, or with fine which
” ,may extend to two thousand rupees, or with
both.’
30. From the above referred provision it is seen a
person could be found guiity if he is driving.,i’s.,_t’.=1ot in
conformity with Section 184 of the M.V.
provisions of Section 184 of the__M…,\,/_._ ‘i’t’Vci’eai*,.Vi;h’eJ..
in order to ensue the driver does,noteridaiinger:”hum’an.”iife or
property, the driver is e:%Vp’e.r;ted ditto”:dri_ve.,”‘iij”;.the ‘,1,/r1ar,,4er
stated in Section 184 be careful.
Whereas the provisions.oi”.,.$sggtti’4o’n’,’:.3é{)4fVA IPC comes into
service when by. This becomes
very re|ev.ar~i.t4″;Se’ction 184 of the Motor
Vehicie__VAVg:t..Vi:$ for a period up
to results in death it can be taken as
gross
3.1.. instant case, the facts undisputed are
.A :a.c:cid_ent spot__is near bus stop. Someshwara bus driven by
1″~.tf;–e;a’ccu_~s_ed;,.”was approaching the stop, which was at a
di”s’tan’–cae. “of 100 ft. Accused was expected to slow down the
‘sp.eed,”‘ but before reaching bus stop the accused hit victim
‘A’v–!M’a’hadesh. Thus, bus was moving at a high speed.
R 517/’
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32. Further, he was reasonably expected to know
that there would be movement of the persons at that spot
which he was approaching bus. Undoubtediy, he was
expected to be cautious as the passengers wiil rusbttoywards
bus to board the bus. We have to take judi§:i’a’i«’..n’o’t_e5the
fact that due to lack of proper conveya.nc.é4.:’:i’VnVrti:os_t
area the peopie are much depen4den’t.._uponvthe’,pu’b|ic’—._if
transport and to board such’ veh’ir;ie” the,_;xf.»,;,.sib,’t
may mess it. In such ttcirtcnumystances:’thetfidrivers are
expected to be speed of the
bus when the bus such incidents.
Vln: case, the bus is operated by
private tran,_spor’t-‘er;’v. It is to be noticed that it is in the
e§.:i_de,.i1ce”i–a’nd notdisputed by the accused that road at the
sp’ot4Vba_d’_;.. It was the place, where accident occurred,
vehicu.iart,raffic was heavy. More over the accident occurred
righ”t._i_r31 front of Transport Office. Therefore, as required
Section 184 of the M.V. Act he was required to notice
__5the nature, condition and use of the place where the vehicle
if
ta
is driven. In this context that we expect explanation from
the accused as to how the accident has occurred.
34. For these reasons, I am satisfied that t’hegfinding
recorded by the trial court that the prosecutgionfj_A»hia’s”V;p:ro.ved
the charge of negligent driving by the
under Section 279 IPC and
died and was charged under Slectironf 304:fA.tIvPC,wfasalso
proved and need no interference. it court on
reappraisal of the.§vigdenc§:’W.asu,TI’ig.ht ‘inxconfirming the
finding recorded by judgement of the
appellate cou’.*t..gsuffe.rs gfrorn”no’ ~1i’i*avfi.rrr}ity legal or otherwise
calling forVlinterferelncefi—.. ‘I3 am therefore, constrained to
confirm”-.t_he_ finding of both the courts and I
fougnldilno reasonvto interfere with such conclusion.
trial court has imposed sentence for a
._ ‘pl’e_riAo”c]:”(;vfV___o’ri;’e”‘year for the offence punishable under Section
3″O4–A’: .’.[PC; and the First Appellate Court has confirmed the
* :§.a4_meV;”.while deleting the punishment imposed for the
7:’offence punishable under Section 279 IPC. In this regard
the learned counsel Sri S.G. Bhagwan, relying on the
decision of the Apex Court referred to above seeksgreduction
of period of imprisonment on the plea has
faced the agony of trial for more than Bggyéairsv
this belated stage sentencing::’the”accused–l.:_’:to.u.unduer:«go.___
imprisonment would lead to several. hardships “an’d”it twill
cause injustice to the accusedfl»
36. After heanrig. thefi’lAea”rnge.c£sV”Government Pleader
and the lear’y7*e’d.__Cou:ns’e’l~f9t”‘D,él_i,€ioV:ncfllllllhalso feel that the
reasons in sentencing the
period of imprisonment
to the –.p’eriVo’d.jialreaciyi””undergone during trial, would be
reasonable. the fine has to be quantified
considering xtheivperiod of imprisonment already undergone
llccordingly, the petition is allowed in part.
W4fsil.e””V:co’n’firming the finding of guilt recorded against the
“accused, the sentence of imprisonment is set aside.
‘A’-}’\lccused is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.i5,000/~, which on
X :
J).
u
recovery be paid to the wife of the victim. That shall be the
only modification in the impugned judgement. In default of
payment of the fine amount the accused shailftingder go
simple imprisonment for a period of threefhe
accused is granted four weeks time to pa_y:”t.he:.ff’in.e be«l’oVre~__
the trial cou rt. Out of the said
the Daid as compensationto ieglalrheirs l’victirnV’a’r2d
Rs.25o/- shall be the fine $taté;.V_Tfi’he3-Itrilalucolurt Sm
ascertain the legal heirs and then pay it to
the wife or eldest su
…. “l’1::;i.~. 2 S d/_
VK