1. This case comes on before me under Sections 429 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The question on which the learned judges who first heard the case, differed is, whether the accused complied with the provisions of Section 3 of Act XXV of 1.867. That section provides that “every book or paper printed within British India shall have printed legibly on it the name of the printer and the place of printing and (if the book or paper be published) of the publisher, and the place of publication.” The words with which the accused published the Newspaper called Kerala Nandini are, “Printed and published at Cochin for the Malabar Economic Company at the said Company’s Goshree Vilasam Press.” They only mention the place of publication and of the press in which the paper was printed and state that it was on account or for the benefit of an unregistered association called Economic Society. But they do not name the printer as required by the Act and to this extent there is a departure from its provisions. The intention was to inform the public who the responsible printer was, and to convey that information on the face of the paper, and I cannot say that words which contain no such information amount to a sufficient compliance with the requirements of Section 3. It is urged that the object was to provide to the public facilities towards the discovery of the responsible printer and that any person might easily discover, who the printer was on reference to the Economic Society. The intention was not simply to provide some facility or other but to provide a specific facility on the face of the paper. It is possible that a person may not be able without considerable inconvenience to discover who the members of the Economic Society are, and that some member may refuse to give or evade giving information regarding the responsible printer.
2. We are not at liberty, I think, to speculate as to the object of the legislature and to substitute a mode of discovering the responsible printer for that prescribed by the legislature as most conducive to public convenience and protection.
3. I agree, therefore, with the learned Chief Justice that we must decline to interfere with the conviction and the sentence.