ORDER
G.P. Shivaprakash, J.
1. I have heard Sri A. Keshava Bhat, Learned Counsel for the petitioner at great length.
2. The petitioner claims to be the owner of land measuring about 16 guntas in Sy.No. 2/1 of Challaghatta village, Varthur Hobli. The same was proposed for acquisition for the benefit of the 4th respondent-Society. The final notification is dated 21.2.1989, copy of which is marked as Annexure-B.
3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the 4th respondent-Society has been branded by this Court in NARAYANA REDDY v. STATE OF KARNATAKA, AIR 1991(3) Kar. 2248 as a Society consisting of large number of bogus members and is indulging in real estate business. Therefore, the Learned Counsel submitted that though the notification in acquiring certain lands for the benefit of the 4th respondent in the said petition was different from the one which is assailed in this petition, the fact that the activities of the Society have been held to be undesirable it is sufficient to set aside the acquisition made under different notifications for the benefit of the 4th respondent-Society.
4. Against the decision of this Court in Narayana Reddy’s case, the 4th respondent-Society along with other Societies had preferred civil appeals to the Supreme Court of India. The Supreme Court in H.M.T.H.B.C.S. v. SYED KHADER, ILR 1995(3) Kar 1962, dismissed the civil appeals directing that in view of the quashing of the land acquisition proceedings, “the possession of the lands shall be restored to the respective land owners irrespective of the fact whether they had challenged the acquisition of their lands or not.” The Learned Counsel contended that in view of the fact that the Supreme Court has directed restoration of possession of lands to the respective land owners irrespective of the fact whether they had challenged the acquisition of the lands or not, the petitioner in this case pursuant to the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court can seek direction for quashing of the notification assailed in this petition and seek possession of his land.
5. Sri Nanjunda Reddy, Learned Counsel for the 4th respondent-Society, on the other hand submitted that the notification now assailed in this petition is totally different from the one which was assailed in the aforesaid case. He contended that what was quashed by the Supreme Court and the observations made therein are in respect of the lands covered by the notification, quashed in the said case but not in respect of the lands covered by the notification in question.
6. There is no dispute that the notification challenged in the case referred to above was totally different from the one which is now assailed by the petitioner. From a bare reading of the Supreme Court judgment, it is clear that the directions issued by the Supreme Court was only in respect of the lands covered by the notification which was quashed by this Court and confirmed by the Supreme Court.
7. Therefore, the petitioner has to explain in this petition, the inordinate delay on his part in approaching this Court for the relief sought. The prayers in the petition read as hereunder:-
“1. Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction setting aside the impugned order of the 1st respondent, dated 8.3.1995 in LAQ (7) SR 394/85-86 (ANNEXURE ‘E’) and also the final notification dt. 21.2.89 so far it pertains to the schedule land in No. RD. 17 AQB 89 (ANNEXURE ‘B’) as well as the award passed dt. 17.12.90 in General Award No. LAC 905/88-89 (ANNEXURE ‘C’).
(2) Issue a writ of mandamus directing the authorities to re-notify the schedule property from the acquisition proceedings and re-deliver it to the petitioner forthwith.”
8. As noticed above, the final notification is dated 21.2.1989. The petitioner has presented this petition – 7 years after the publication of the final notification. The only explanation given by
the petitioner in the petition to explain the delay is that he is “illiterate, ignorant and a poor villager.” Both the affidavit and the Vakalath are signed by the petitioner in English and the signatures indicate that he has got a steady signature. It is rather difficult to believe that the petitioner is an “illiterate, ignorant and a poor villager”. Assuming it is so, it should not make any difference.
9. In a number of cases, the Supreme Court has emphasised that this Court while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should hesitate to grant reliefs in cases of acquisition of land where there has been inordinate delay on the part of the parties in approaching the Court. See ; and also the unreported decision of a Division Bench of this Court in W.P.Nos. 10570/87 (D.D. 19.1.1988). In MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER BOMBAY v. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT PRIVATE LIMITED 1996 AIR SCW 3871, the Supreme Court has emphasised that this Court should be loathe to exercise the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in granting reliefs to parties owners of lands who approach the Court after long delay, tn a recent decision of the Division Bench rendered in HANUMAKKA AND ORS. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA W.A.Nos. 7122-34/96 dd. 12.9.1996, it is observed as follows:-
“The institution of the judiciary cannot be permitted to be utilised by unscrupulous litigants for the purpose of blackmailing or for extracting money from persons upon whom some benefits are conferred in accordance with the prevalent taw to which the alleged aggrieved persons did not complain and have acquiesced. For the fault or inaction or for being passive party on account of acquiescence, the beneficiaries under law cannot be penalised in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”
10. The Special Leave Petition filed against the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court has been dismissed by the Supreme Court on 9.12.1996 in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 23256-23368/96.
11. The above observations of this Court is more relevant in the context by acquisition of land for the benefit of members of House
Building Co-operative Societies. Assuming that there are bogus members in certain House Building Co-operative Societies, the fact remains that there will be genuine members also in such Co-operative Societies and if any acquisition proceedings were to be set aside after a long delay, the interest of the genuine members who have invested their lives savings would be jeopardised. The ultimate beneficiaries of any acquisition of lands for the House Building Cooperative Societies would be its members the allottees of the sites and, therefore, it is all the more necessary that in cases where the owners of the lands approach this Court after a very long delay, this Court should decline to set aside the acquisition proceedings whatever be the merits of the case.
12. As noticed above, the petitioner has approached this Court seven years after the issue of the final notification.
13. For the foregoing reasons, this petition is dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.