PETITIONER: R.C. SOOD Vs. RESPONDENT: HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT RAJASTHAN AND ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/05/1998 BENCH: A.S. ANAND, S.P. BHARUCHA, B.N. KIRPAL ACT: HEADNOTE: JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
KIRPAL,J.
The petitioner who was a member of the Rajasthan Higher
Judicial Service, has by this petition under Article 32 of
the Constitution of India, assailed the disciplinary
proceedings which have been initiated against him pursuant
to the resolution dated 5th May, 1995 of the Full Court of
the Rajasthan High Court.
The petitioner had joined the Rajasthan Higher Judicial
Service as a District and Sessions Judge on 31st July, 1976.
He had been posted and had discharged duties at various
places and in different capacities including that as an
Additional Registrar, Rajasthan High Court and Registrar
(Vigilance), Rajasthan High Court. With effect from 1st
July, 1989 to 1st February, 1994 the petitioner was posted
as Registrar of the Rajasthan High Court. After he was
posted as District and Sessions Judge, Jodhpur on 2nd
February, 1994 and then was transferred as District and
Sessions Judge, Jaipur with effect from 6th June, 1994 but
before his superannuation on attaining the age of 58 years,
departmental enquiries were initiated against him on two
occasions. The first departmental enquiry was initiated by a
resolution of Full Court dated 21st October, 1994, which was
challenged by the petitioner by filling a writ petition in
this Court. By order dated 22nd November, 1994 in the
judgment reported as R.C. Sood Vs. High Court of Rajasthan,
1994 (Suppl) 3 SCC 711, this Court quashed the said
disciplinary proceedings and the Full Court’s resolution in
respect thereto. The second disciplinary proceeding, which
has been challenged in this writ petition, has been
initiated by the High Court vide its resolution dated 5/6th
January, 1995. Rule nisi was issued by this Court limited to
the question of legality of the initiation of disciplinary
proceedings against the petitioner and not on the question
of his retirement on his attaining the age of 58 years.
There are two sets of facts leading to the passing of
the aforesaid two resolutions by the High Court whereby it
sought to initiate departmental proceedings against the
petitioner. Even though the resolution dated 21st October,
1994, when the first departmental proceeding was initiated,
has been quashed by this Court vide judgment dated 22nd
November, 1994, in order, however, to deal with the
contentions arising in this petition, it is necessary to
first refer to the set of facts pertaining to the issuance
of the first disciplinary proceedings as that has every
material bearing in the present case.
First Disciplinary Proceedings:
When the petitioner was working as the Registrar of the
Rajasthan High Court the Full Court on 29th September, 1993
decided to invite applications to fill up the vacancies in
the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service by way of direct
recruitment. A draft advertisement was finalised in the
Registry of the Rajasthan High Court both in Hindi and in
English, mentioning therein the conditions of eligibility of
the candidates. According to the advertisement which was
published the age limit of the candidates was shown as the
minimum of 35 years and maximum of 45 years on 1st January,
1995. As the last date for receipt of the application was
18th March, 1994 and 20th March, 1994 the relevant cut off
date should have been 1st January, 1994. There being an
error in the publication of the advertisement in mentioning
the relevant date as 1st January, 1995 instead of 1st
January, 1994, a Committee of two Judges was required to go
into the matter. The Committee in its report suggested that
fresh applications be called for and the matter should be
placed before the Chief Justice for taking suitable action
against the officer who was responsible for issuing the
incorrect notification. The Chief Justice directed that this
report should be put up before the Full Court by
circulation. On 20th October, 1994 the Full Court
constituted a committee of two other Judges to look into the
record leading to the issuance of the notification. This
committee submitted a report dated 21st October, 1994 and
noted that in the draft for publication the date was
correctly mentioned as 1st January, 1994 but before the
matter was sent to press for publication interpolations were
made changing the year from `1994′ to `1995′. The committee
further observed that it was their tentative view that the
petitioner was responsible for the “forgery committed in the
record”. It recommended that a regular enquiry be made in
accordance with the rules and that the petitioner should be
placed under suspension in contemplation of the enquiry.
On 21st October, 1994 the date of the report of the two
Judge Committee, the Full Court met at 2 p.m. and resolved
that departmental inquiry be initiated against the
petitioner and he should be placed under suspension. This
action was challenged by a Writ Petition (C) No, 680 of 1994
being fled by the petitioner in this Court. By judgment
dated 22nd November, 1994, in the case reported as R.C. Sood
Vs. State of Rajasthan (supra), this Court quashed the
proposed disciplinary proceedings as well as order placing
the petitioner under suspension. While allowing the writ
petition it was held that it was difficult to appreciate how
the Two Judge Committee could come to the conclusion that
there was a forgery in the record and/or that any person had
benefited from the said error or that the petitioner was
responsible for the same.
The aforesaid decision and direction of this Court did
not result in an end to the petitioner’s troubles. On the
contrary the facts, to which we will currently refer, show
how the further prospects of the petitioner in the judicial
career were successfully thwarted and the disciplinary
proceedings have been sought to be foisted on him, which is
the subject matter of challenge in these proceedings.
Impugned Disciplinary Proceedings :
We will now refer, in some detail, to the second set of
facts culminating in the passing of the impugned resolution
of the Full Court on 5/6th January, 1995 instituting a
regular departmental enquiry under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan
Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules
1958. The story in this connection starts from September,
1993 when one Vijay Singh describing himself as Chairman of
the Rajasthan Judicial Liberation Front, Bar Room, Beni
Park, Jaipur circulated a complaint, though described as a
`PIL – a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution’,
addressed to the Judges of the Rajasthan High Court and
other functionaries. It appears that a copy of the same was
also sent to the State’s Law Secretary. Vide his letter
dated 15th September, 1993, the Law Secretary forwarded that
complaint to the Registrar of the Rajasthan High Court. On
17th September, 1993 the Chief Justice directed the
Additional Registrar (Vigilance) to submit an early report
in the matter. On 15th September, 1993 the Additional
Registrar (Vigilance) recorded statement of one Vijay Singh
Poonia, Advocate, President of the District Court, Beni
Park, Jaipur who stated that there was no organisation by
the name of Rajasthan Judicial Liberation Front in Beni
Park, Jaipur and that he had not heard the name of such an
organisation. He further stated that the signatures on the
complaint were not his and that he had made no complaint
against any judicial officer. The Additional Registrar had
also called for the comments of the petitioner on the
complaint. After receiving the reply Additional Registrar
(Vigilance) recorded further statements of other persons
including members of the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service
and thereupon submitted his report dated 11th January, 1994
to the Chief Justice stating therein that the complaint
against the petitioner was false and fabricated. On the
receipt of the report the Chief Justice passed the following
order on 31st January, 1994.
“I have gone through the report
submitted by the Addl. Registrar,
Vigilance, Shri Behari Lal Gupta,
in the matter of complaint filed
against the Registrar, Shri R.C.
Sood. The report submitted by Shri
Gupta appears to be clear, cogent
and categorical. He has dealt with
all the charges that have been
levelled in the complaint against
Shri Sood. All the witnesses have
testified to the good conduct,
integrity and rightness of Shri
Sood. There is no gain of truth in
the allegations levelled against
Shri Sood. It appears that this
complaint is filed against Shri
Sood out of malice. I put it down
as the handiwork of some mischief
mongers. Thus the complaint is fled
and no action needs be taken
against Shri Sood.”
The matter thus stood closed as far as the complaint of
Vijay Singh against the petitioner was concerned.
After the petitioner had ceased to be the Registrar of
the High Court the Chief Justice issued an office note
relating to complaints against the judicial officers. This
note dated 12th May, 1994 which was addressed to Registrar
(Vigilance) and Additional Registrar (Vigilance) read as
follows :
“A large number of complaints are
being received against the Judicial
Officers. It has been noticed that
after Preliminary Enquiry, most of
the complaints, i.e., more than 95%
are found false. Sometime P.E’s
consume a lot of time and Judicial
Officers are put to embarrassment.
Therefore, before initiating the
P.E. against any Judicial Officer
complainant may be asked to support
his complaint with an affidavit.
If the complainant does not file
the requisite affidavit no action
should be taken on that complaint.”
The trouble for the petitioner revived after he had, on
24th October, 1994, filed the earlier writ petition in this
Court challenging his suspension and initiation of
disciplinary proceedings by the court’s resolution dated
21st October, 1994. From the perusal of those original
records which had been placed before this Court at the time
of hearing by the learned counsel for the respondents it is
seen that a hand written letter dated 27th October, 1994 was
written to the Chief Justice then in officer by Mr. Justice
Kokje which reads as follows :
“I am enclosing a copy of PIL
petition received by me some time
back. As it was addressed to the
Chief Justice, I did not forward it
then to you. However, when in the
last full court meeting the matter
of Sh. R.C, Sood, Distt. Judge,
came up I found no reference to the
serious charges made against him in
the petition by any one. As the
allegations are serious they
deserve to be investigated
thoroughly. I would therefore
request you to kindly order an
inquiry in the allegations made
against Sh. R.C. Sood in the
petition especially when he has
been proceeded against on certain
other charges.”
On this letter itself the then Chief Justice on that
very day, i.e. 27th October, 1994, made the following
endorsement :
“Put up this matter in next F.C. In
the meantime find out if previous
C.J. has received such copy and
orders passed on.”
The enclosure to the letter of Justice Kokje was a
cyclostyled copy of the same PIL/complaint of Vijay Singh
which had been dealt with by the earlier Chief Justice vide
order dated 31st January, 1994. After the judgment of this
Court on 22nd November, 1994, whereby the writ petition of
RC Sood was allowed with costs, the storm against the
petitioner gathered momentum. On 30th November, 1994 the
Full Court took up the letter of 27th October, 1994 of
Justice Kokje for discussion under Agenda Item No. 3. Copy
of the minutes of the said meeting pertaining to Item No.3
has been placed before us by the learned counsel for the
respondents and the same reads as under :
“On being informed that the
complaint of which a copy was
appended to the letter dated
27.10.94 of Hon’ble Justice Shri
Kokje had been received earlier by
the High Court a Preliminary
Enquiry into the allegations made
therein had also been held, the
record of Preliminary Enquiry was
called and perused by the Full
Court. It was noted that such a
serious matter was never brought
before the Full Court. It was also
noted that the Preliminary Enquiry
against Shri R.C. Sood then posted
as Registrar was conducted by
Additional Registrar (Vig) an
officer subordinate to him.
Proceedings of the Preliminary
Enquiry show that statements of
persons who were alleged to have
benefitted Shri Sood were recorded
and in place of Shri Vijay Singh
the complainant, Shri Vijay Singh
Poonia, President, Bar Association
was examined. Statements of
selected judicial officers and
lawyers certifying Shri Sood to be
a person of integrity were also
recorded and relying on such a
material serious charges of
corruption were dropped. Some of
the Hon’ble Judges have also
received fresh complaints against
Shri R.C. Sood making serious
charges of corruption. Considering
all these circumstances and the
serious nature of the charges it is
resolved as follows :
“RESOLVED that the order passed by
the then Hon’ble Chief Justice on
the report of Preliminary Enquiry
against Shri R.C.Sood conducted by
the Additional Registrar (Vig) be
and is hereby revoked.”
FURTHER RESOLVED that Preliminary
Enquiry in the matter be made
afresh by a Committee of Hon’ble
Judge consisting of Hon’ble Mr.
Justice B.R. Arora, Hon’ble Justice
Shri V.S. Kokje and Hon’ble Justice
Shri B.J. Sethana. The Committee
shall also eqnuire into various
complaints forwarded to them by
Hon’ble Judges against Shri R.C.
Sood. It is hoped that the report
of the Committee will be placed
before Full Court on or before
6.1.1995.
FURTHER RESOLVED that facts and
circumstances leading to a pendency
of the Preliminary Enquiry be
communicated to His Excellency the
President of India and Hon’ble the
Chief Justice of India in view of
the fact that looking to the
seniority of Shri R.C. Sood his
name is likely to be under
consideration for elevation as a
Judge of the High Court. Hon’ble
the Chief Justice be and is hereby
requested to do so.”
The said Three Judge Committee submitted its report on
4th January, 1995. After formulating the points for
consideration and discussing the material placed before it,
it came to the following conclusion :
“The Committee, though had a short
time at its disposal, has been able
to collect only a part of the
materials, but on the basis of the
part of the materials too, as
discussed above, we are of the view
that prima facie Shri R.C. Sood has
falled to maintain absolute
integrity and to maintain devotion
to the duty and dignity of his
office. The Committee is, also, of
the opinion that a regular enquiry
under rule 16 of the Rajasthan
Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958,
may be held against Shri R.C.
Sood.”
Submissions :
Two main contentions were urged on behalf of the
petitioner. Firstly, it was contended that with the passing
of the order dated 31st January, 1994 by Chief Justice K.C.
Aggarwal the complaint of Vijay Sing stood disposed off.
This complaint, it was submitted, could not br reopened by
the Full Court or the then Chief Justice specially when
there were no attenuating circumstances by way of fresh
evidence or material which would warrant a fresh look in the
matter – and there was no such material.
Secondly it was submitted that the initiation of the
impugned disciplinary proceedings by issuing a charge-sheet
levelling charges which were state and on materials gathered
as an after thought was an action tainted with malice and
such proceedings were liable to be quashed as being mala
fide and malicious in law.
First submission :
The complaint of Vijay Singh had been enquired into by
the Additional Registrar (Vigilance), on being directed to
do so by the Chief Justice. During the course of enquiry
witnesses were examined and report was received whereupon
the Chief Justice on 21st January, 1994 passed the above
mentioned order. Subsequently on 12th May, 1994, the Chief
Justice had directed that no complaint should be entertained
which is not supported by an affidavit. In the resolution of
30th November, 1994 reference is made to a preliminary
enquiry which had been made earlier and it was noted that
such a serious matter had never been brought before the Full
Court. It was also stated that statements of persons who
were alleged to have been benefited by the petitioner had
been recorded and in place of the complainant Vijay Singh it
is one Vijay Singh Poonia, President Bar Association, who
was examined. It is because of this resolution that the
earlier order of the Chief Justice and the report of the
preliminary enquiry were revoked.
The question which arises for consideration is whether
the Full Court could or was justified in revoking a decision
which was taken by the then Chief Justice on 31st January,
1994. Chapter III of the Rules of the High Court of
Judicature for Rajasthan, 1952, deals with the conduct of
the administrative business of the court. For the purpose of
this case the relevant rules are Rule 14, 15 and 32 which
are as follows :
14. Administrative business
relating to control over
subordinate courts and to
superintendance over courts and
tribunals : – All administrative
business in the Court relating to
the control over subordinate courts
vested in the Court under Article
235 of the Constitution or
otherwise and to the
superintendance over the courts and
tribunals vested in the Court under
Article 227 of the Constitution or
otherwise shall be disposed of as
provided hereinafter.
15. Matters on which all Judges
shall be consulted – On the
following matters all the Judges of
the Court shall be consulted,
namely :-
(a) proposals as to legislation or
changes in the law ;
(b) proposals as to changes in or
the issue of new Rules of Court;
(c) proposals as to changes in or
the issue of new rules for the
guidance of subordinate courts;
(d) appointment, promotion and
seniority of judicial officers;
(e) withholding of promotion,
supersession or reduction of
judicial officer;
(f) removal or dismissal of any
judicial officer;
(g) compulsory retirement of
Judicial officer otherwise than by
way of punishment;
(h) important questions of policy
or those affecting the powers and
status of the court laid before the
Court by Chief Justice or any other
Judge;
(i) matters connected with the
Supreme Court;
(j) annual administration report;
(k) matters upon which the
Government desires the opinion of
the Court, if such matter is
considered fit to b e laid before
the Court by the Chief Justice; and
(l) any matter which the Chief
Justice or the Administrative
Committee, as constituted under
Rule 16, may consider fit to be
laid before them for consideration.
3.2 Effect of any irregularity in
or omission to follow the
procedure laid down in this
Chapter – (1) No irregularity
in, or omission to follow, the
procedure laid down in thin
Chapter shall affect the
validity of any order passed
or anything done under these
Rules .
(2) For the removal of doubt, it is
hereby mentioned that all
administrative work disposed of by
the Chief Justice, the
Administrative Judge or Judges to
whom the work has been assigned by
the Chief Justice for disposal
shall be deemed to be disposed of
by the Court.
A perusal of these rules show that matters where all
the Judges are required to be consulted, namely, those which
have been brought to the Full Court, are enumerated in Rule
15. With regard to the judicial officers it is clauses (c)
to (g) which are relevant. It is only if a judicial officer
is to be removed or dismissed that the matter has to be
brought before the Full Court. Under clause (i) if the Chief
Justice desires then any matter can be listed before t he
Full Court. Every complaint received against a judicial
officer is not required to be brought before the Full Court
unless and until the question of removal or dismissal of the
judicial officer arises. It was competent for the Chief
Justice especially in view of the provision of sub rule (2)
of Rule 32, while dealing with the complaint received
against the petitioner, to decide that no action thereon was
called for. No illegality or impropriety was, therefore,
committed by the Chief Justice when he decided on 31st
January, 1994 that the complaint of Vijay Singh did not call
for any disciplinary action against the petitioner. It is
only if the Chief Justice was of the view that disciplinary
action may be called for t hat, by virtue of clauses (e),
(f) and (g) the matter would have required to be brought
before the Full Court. That apart, the Chief Justice could
under clause (I) have brought the complaint to the notice of
the Full Court, but he chose not to do so. This was because
he was apparently satisfied about the hollowness of the
complaint on the basis of the preliminary report of the
Additional Registrar (Vigilance) which was received by him.
We express no opinion on the question whether for good
and sufficient reasons the Full Court can ever over-rule or
recall an earlier decision of the Chief Justice. But the
fact that the preliminary report was not brought to the
notice of the Full Court, which the Chief Justice was not
bound do, could not be reason for recalling the order dated
31st January, 1994 of the then Chief Justice.
Another error which was committed was that the Court in
its resolution of 30th November, 1994 took into
consideration the complaint of Vijay Singh even though the
same was not supported by an affidavit. The Chief Justice
had by his order dated 12th May, 1994, decided that no
complaint against a judicial officer should be entertained
unless it is supported by an affidavit. Though this was an
administrative order it was passed by the Chief Justice in
exercise of the powers conferred on him by Rule 32(2) of the
said Rules. There was no reasons to why this order should
have been ignored and the complaint of Vijay Singh
entertained even though it was not supported by an
affidavit. The resolution of 30th November, 1994 also states
that some of the judges have received fresh complaints
against the petitioner making serious charges of corruption.
No particulars are indicated as to which complaints were
received by which judge. It is evident from the wording of
these minutes that what those complaints were, were not even
known to all the members of the Full Court when they passed
the resolution on 30th November, 1994. We have, therefore,
no doubt that when a valid decision had been taken by the
then Chief Justice on 31st January 1994 exonerating t he
petitioner there was no valid reason in law for the Full
Court to revoke that decision.
Second Submission:
During the course of hearing Mr. Aruneshwar Gupta,
learned counsel for the respondent produced in court the
original file containing the complaints received and the
proceedings of the aforesaid Three Judge Committee. We have
carefully examined the said file in order to satisfy
ourselves whether the Committee was fair and judicious in
the task which was entrusted to it. Without going into
minute details, the file reveals following facts which speak
for themselves.
On the letter dated 37th October, 1994, the Chief
Justice made a note dated 27th October, 1994 calling for a
report. But the first note of the registry relating to the
letter dated 27th October, 1994 of Justice Kokje is dated
9th November, 1994. The suggestion made in this note was
that the file be sent to vigilance cell because that dealt
with the complaints received against the judicial officers.
The next note also dated 9th November, 1994 of the vigilance
cell states that its report is placed along with the note.
This is followed by a note also of 9th November, 1994 of the
Chief Justice stating that “put up in next Full Court”.
Curiously enough the report mentioned in the note of the
vigilance cell is not on the record filed in court though it
purported to be a part of vigilance section’s note. There is
then an undated note which appears to be the minutes of a
meeting of the Three Judge Committee which is in the file in
which it is, inter alia, stated that initially it has been
decided to call seven witnesses for their examination
relating to various charges against the petitioner. The
Committee also decided to call for the valuation of the
house belonging to the petitioner from the Valuation Cell of
the Income-tax Department as well as the Chief Engineer,
PWD, Rajasthan, Jaipur. These minutes are signed by all the
three judges of the committee. There is then a confidential
note dated 9th December, 1994 signed by Justice Arora
directing the registry to summon four witnesses mentioned
therein for 19th December, 1994 and three other witnesses
named therein for 20th December, 1994 . The file discloses
that as on 30th November, 1994 there were written complaints
made by seven persons against the petitioner apart from the
complaint of 19th September, 1993 of Vijay Singh. The other
complaints are either dated 26th November, 1994 or 30th
November, 1994 or are undated. Even though there were seven
complainants only three of them were summoned as witnesses.
There is no indication as to why four other persons were not
summoned. Of these seven witnesses who were summoned only
three, including two of the complainants, were examined. Two
other persons who were examined were those in respect of
whom no summons were ordered to be issued. Thus the
Committee examined five witnesses out of which M.R. Mitruka
and Vijay Singh were the two complainants, K.R. Jatav is the
only other witness who was summoned vide order dated 9th
December, 1994. N.K. Mahamwal and O.P. Sharma were examined
even though they were neither the complainants as on 30th
November, 1994 nor had been summoned vide order dated 9th
December, 1994.
Before adverting to these five witnesses it is
important to note that the file contains copies of the
summons dated 9th December, 1994 issued to the seven
witnesses but, curiously enough, not even a single copy of
the summons bears an endorsement of the receipt by any
witness. The file also does not contain any other document
showing that the witnesses to whom summons had been issued
were served at the addresses contained in the summons. This
fact is important to note because it has been contended by
Mr. Kailash Vasudev, learned counsel for the petitioner,
which contention we will consider later, that Vijay Singh
who is described in the complaint and is stated to have been
examined by the Committee was not a lawyer and Vijay Singh,
to whom summons were alleged to have been issued at the Bar
room address, was a non existent person. The file of the
Committee also includes written complaints in the form of
affidavits of five other persons. Two of them are dated 31st
December, 1994, one 1st January, 1995 and another is dated
2nd January, 1995. When the Full Court had on 30th November,
1994 stated that the Committee was to go into the complaint
of Vijay Singh and any other complaint received by the
Judges, it is not understandable as to why any complaint
received after 30th November, 1994 was entertained by the
Committee. Another important feature to note is that apart
from Vijay Singh’s complaint of 1993 all the other
complaints are either undated or received after this Court’s
judgment of 22nd November, 1994.
Another notable feature of the Enquiry Committee’s
report is that though a Three Judge Committee was
constituted the witnesses to whom summons were issued on 9th
December, 1994 appear to have been selected by the local
judge Justice Arora. The examination of witnesses took place
on 20th and 21st December, 1994 at Jodhpur and 29th
December, 1994 at Jaipur. What is, however, revealed from
the file is that these witnesses were examined only by two
of the Three Judges and Justice Sethna did not take part in
the examination of the witnesses and was not present at the
time of the examination even though he has signed the final
report.
The only complaint before the Full Court on 30th
November, 1994 was that of Vijay Singh. In the affidavit in
rejoinder the petitioner has averred that the complaint was
stated to have been made by Vijay Singh of Rajasthan
Judicial Liberation Front. The person who was examined by
the Committee was Vijay Singh son of Madan Singh resident of
179, Kalidas Marg, Beni Park, Jaipur. It is contended by the
petitioner that no person by the name of Vijay Singh resides
at the said address and there is no such front called
Rajasthan Judicial Liberation Front. In support of this
averment reliance is placed on a report of the SHO, PS, Beni
Park, Jaipur, company of which has been filed in Court along
with its English translation, which inter alia states that
on verification it has been found that there is no plot no.
179, Kalidas Marg, Beni Park, Jaipur. This report further
states that plot no. 179, Sindhi Colony, Jaipur, is owned by
one Tulsi Ram and plot no, 179 Indira Colony by Shambu
Dayal and in both these plots Vijay Singh son of Madan Singh
did not reside. The petitioner has also filed certificate
from Rajasthan High Court Bar Association, Jaipur, District
Advocates Bar Association, Beni Park, Jaipur and the Bar
Association District Court dated 31st October, 1995, 27th
October, 1995 and 17th October, 1995, respectively and in
each of these certificates it has been stated that no person
by the name of Vijay Singh son of Madan Singh resident of
179, Kalidas Marg, Beni Park, Jaipur, is a member of their
association. Lastly an affidavit of Vijay Singh Sharma
(Brahmin by caste) son of K.M. Sharma, Advocate has been
filed in which he has stated that he has not filed any
complaint against the petitioner and that to the best of his
knowledge no other person by the name of Vijay Singh Sharma
was practising in the District Court or at Jaipur. Even
though this rejoinder affidavit was filed in this Court on
14th November, 1995, none of the averments contained therein
in relation to Vijay Singh or other persons who spoke
against the petitioner have been rebutted by the respondents
either by filing a sur rejoinder or even at the time of
arguments. This would clearly show that Vijay Singh who was
examined by the Committee was certainly not an advocate and
was in all probabilities an impostor. Who that person was
who was examined by the Committee remains unexplained.
It appears that the Committee was only looking for a
person who was ready to depose against the petitioner even
if he be an imposter. This conclusion is further
strengthened by the selection of four other persons by the
Committee whose evidence is on record. Of these M.R. Mitruka
had filed a complaint dated 30th November, 1994 supported by
an affidavit dated 1st December, 1994 which means that on
the day when the Full Court passed the resolution on 30th
November, 1994 the complaint along with the affidavit could
not have been on the record. This witness who had chosen to
file an affidavit against the petitioner after the Full
Court resolution on 30th November, 1994 was an ex member of
the Rajasthan Judicial Service who had been removed from the
service in 1982. The petitioner herein had conducted a
preliminary enquiry in the charges which had been framed
against Mitruka and it is after the receipt of the
preliminary report of the petitioner that regular
departmental proceedings against him were initiated
culminating in awarding the punishment of removal from
service by the Full Court of the Rajasthan High Court. The
other person chosen to be summoned by the Committee was K.R.
Jatav, also belonging to the judicial service. There were
some allegations against him and the petitioner, when he was
posted as Registrar (Vigilance) had conducted a preliminary
enquiry as a result whereof he was awarded the penalty of
censure. Subsequently some more complaints were received
against K.R. Jatav and on further enquiry by the petitioner
disciplinary action was taken against him and he was
superseded on the basis of this report and bad ACRs. He
obviously was inimical towards the petitioner. N.K. Mahamwal
is also a member of the Rajasthan Judicial Service against
whom complaints were made by the members of the Bar alleging
misbehaviour towards advocates which has resulted in a
preliminary enquiry being conducted by the petitioner when
he was posted as Registrar (Vigilance). As a result thereof
N.K. Mahamwal was transferred. Later another complaint
against him was received for misbehaviour with the advocates
and litigants and again on the report of the petitioner a
warning was administered to Mahamwal. At the time when the
petitioner was posted as District Judge, Udaipur, he had
also reported against the bad behaviour of Mahamwal who was
posted as Munsif Magistrate under his charge. As a result of
all this N.K. Mahamwal had been superseded and many of his
juniors had been promoted. He, therefore, obviously must
have borne grudge against the petitioner. O.P.Sharma’s, the
last witness to the examined also belongs to the Rajasthan
Higher Service against whom two complaints were received
when the petitioner was posted as Registrar (Vigilance).
There were serious complaints in relation to O.P. Sharma’s
integrity which were received by the High Court and one such
complaint had been received by t he petitioner when he was
working as Additional District Judge, Jaipur city which was
forwarded by him to the Additional Registrar (Vigilance)
which had resulted in a preliminary enquiry and a subsequent
disciplinary proceedings against him. It is further seen
that of all the affidavits in the form of complaints which
were received by the Committee after 30th November 1994, two
of them were from those persons who were formerly members of
the Rajasthan Judicial Service who had been removed. One of
them had sought voluntary retirement after he had been
superseded on account of poor service record and the other
was compulsorily retired by the High Court. The third
affidavit dated 2nd January, 1995 was of yet another
judicial officer against whom disciplinary proceedings had
been initiated and an FIR had been lodged in respect of the
alleged murder of the husband.
Based on such type of evidence the Committee submitted
its report on 4th January, 1995 signed by all the three
Judges. It is but natural that highest standard of integrity
is expected of and is required to be maintained by every
judicial officer. It is with this in view that even though
the impugned initiation of proceedings is being alleged to
be for mala fide reasons that it is proper to see whether
the allegations against the petitioner were such which in
any way warranted the holding of a disciplinary proceeding.
We have, therefore, carefully seen the report of the
Committee and the complaints against the petitioner in order
to satisfy ourselves whether there was any cogent material
which warranted initiation of disciplinary proceedings. We
do not find, after such examination, that any material
existed which could justify the initiation of the impugned
action. The allegations against the petitioner were
generally vague or were such which stood explained from the
record itself or were such which did not show that the
petitioner had committed any irregularity, leave alone
illegality. For example one of the main allegations against
the petitioner was of his having committed irregularity in
obtaining loan for constructing a house. Apart from the fact
that this loan was sanctioned by the then Chief Justice, the
petitioner has with the assistance of the loan constructed
the house and is living there and the loan amount already
stands returned. In such circumstances for the Committee to
come to a conclusion that the disciplinary proceedings
should be initiated was clearly unwarranted.
Apart from the non-judicious manner in which the Three
Judge Committee conducted the enquiry the sequence of
events, which bears repetition, shows that being piqued with
this Court’s judgment quashing the first departmental
enquiry the High Court, with a few functionaries playing an
active role, left no stone unturned with a view to victimise
the petitioner. On 21st October, 1994 the High Court
suspended the petitioner and decided to hold the first
departmental enquiry. On 24th October, 1994 this suspension
was challenged by way of a writ petition in this Court in
which this Court on 7th November, 1994 issued show cause
notice to the High Court. Suddenly we find on the High Court
record Justice Kokje’s letter dated 27th October, 1994
forwarding to the then Chief Justice the old complaint of
Vijay Singh. The Chief Justice makes an endorsement on this
letter on the same date – thereby showing the sense of
urgency. First office note is written only on 9th November,
1994, after issuance of notice by this Court in the writ
petition filed by the petitioner. The fact that it is only
on 30th November, 1994, after the decision of this Court on
22nd November, 1994, that the Full Court fixed up the matter
lends credence to the petitioner’s submission that the dates
which appear on record may not be real. This is more so when
we find that none of the documents in the form of complaints
allegedly received by the Judges bear any endorsement as to
the date of receipt of the same. To crown it all the second
round started on a complaint of Vijay Singh stated to have
been received by Justice Kokje on or before 27th October,
1994. This complaint had been circulated in September, 1993
amongst all the then Judges of the High Court and in respect
of which order was passed by the them Chief Justice and the
matter was closed on 31st January, 1994. Respondents’
counsel could give no explanation as to how Justice Kokje
got this complaint against the petitioner some time before
27th October 1994 when he was transferred to the Rajasthan
High Court only on 28th April, 1994. At that time the
petitioner had ceased to be the Registrar of the High Court
with effect from 1st February, 1994. It is obvious that a
copy of this complaint was handed over to Justice Kokje by
some one who was interested in harming the petitioner and
thereupon the second round of action against the petitioner
commenced with Justice Kokje being made one of the members
of the Three Judge Committee.
We have no manner of doubt that there was a complete
lack of bona fides on the part of the High Court when it
decided on 5th January, 1995 to institute disciplinary
proceedings against the petitioner. On this ground alone the
petitioner is entitled to succeed.
Conclusions :
Normally enquiry committees are set up in order to
ascertain correct facts. Here, however, we have a situation
where a committee consisting of a local judge and two
transferred judges was set up with the local judge sitting
alone and collecting a menagerie of witnesses who had a
grudge against the petitioner and were thus sure to depose
against him. Some of these witnesses were those who had not
sent any complaint against the petitioner prior to 30th
November, 1994 and it is only the local judge who, wanting
to gather statements against the petitioner, could have
known whom to approach and call for evidence. Of the two
transferred judges who were members of the committee, one
never took part in any proceeding when evidence was recorded
between 20th February and 2nd January, 1995. Yet he signs
the report dated 4th January, 1995. The other transferee
judge is the person who set the ball rolling with his
conjuring up Vijay Singh’s complaint which had originally
been circulated long before the judge’s transfer to
Rajasthan. The respondent’s counsel was unable to explain as
to how this complaint was conveniently placed in this
judge’s hand. It is evident that there was a deliberate
design to bring to a premature end the judicial career of
the petitioner, whose name, at that time, was being actively
considered for elevation as High Court Judge. This is
apparent from the fact that in the resolutions dated 30th
November, 1994 and 5th January, 1995 it was resolved by the
Full Court that the President of India and the Chief Justice
of India should be informed about the holding of the
departmental enquiry against the petitioner. Acting on the
basis of the Committee’s blased report the Full Court, we
are sad to note, continued in similar vein and proceeded to
nail the petitioner by taking a decision which lacked
objectivity. Apparently stung by the judgment dated 22nd
November, 1994 of this Court it retaliated by launching a
fresh set of charges against the petitioner clearly with a
view to ruin his judicial career. We have no doubt that the
action taken by the court was not bona fide and amounts to
victimisation. This is certainly not expected from a
judicial forum, least of all the High Court, which is
expected to discharge its administrative duties as fairly
and objectively as it is required to discharge its judicial
functions.
The proceedings of the meeting of the Full Court are
normally supposed to be confidential. How is it then that a
number of complaints were received against the petitioner at
about that time, i.e., 30th November, 1994. Some of the
complaints on the file of the Three Judge Committee are
undated and it is not known when they were received. On two
complaints the date is 26th November, 1994, but they do not
have supporting affidavits. It is, therefore, possible that
these complaints may have been ante-dated specially when
none of these complaints bear an endorsement signifying the
date of their receipt. The complaint of Mitruka is dated
30th November, 1994 but the affidavit supporting is dated
1st December, 1994. The fact that an enquiry was going to be
conducted against the petitioner was not publicly advertised
which could have resulted in complaints being filed, how is
it then that after the judgment of this Court on 22nd
November, 1994 and about the time the resolution dated 30th
November, 1994 was passed, unsolicited complaints started
coming in. We have no doubt that all these complaints were
procured solely with a view to show that a part from the
original complaint of Vijay Singh there were other
complaints against the petitioner which represented new
material justifying a fresh enquiry. These complaints, some
of them being made by discredited persons containing vague
and general allegations could not, in our view, be regarded
as fresh material which required disciplinary proceedings
being initiated. The said complaints did not merit any
serious considerations and reference to them by the High
Court was uncalled for. In this connection we reiterate the
sentiments expressed by this Court while allowing the
petitioner’s writ petitions on the earlier occasion when at
page 716 of the report it was observed as follows :
“This case leaves us very sad.
Entrustment of the `control’ of the
subordinate judiciary to the High
Courts by enactment of the relevant
provisions in the Constitution of
India, particularly Article 235
therein is for the purpose of
ensuring their independence and
protection from executive
interference. At a time when
fairness and non-arbitrariness are
the essential requirements of every
administrative State action, it is
more so for any administrative act
of the Judges. It is necessary that
members of the subordinate
judiciary get no occasion to think
otherwise. We are afraid, this
incident appears to shake this
faith. We do hope it is an
inadvertent exception.”
We are sorry to note that the said hope stands belied
and notwithstanding the aforesaid observations the High
Court acted in the manner which can only be termed as
arbitrary and unwarranted, to say the least.
For the aforesaid reasons this writ petition is
allowed. The entire disciplinary proceedings initiated by
the High Court against the petitioner together with the Full
Court’s resolutions dated 30th November, 1994; 5th January,
1995 and 6th January, 1995 are quashed. We also direct the
respondents – High Court of Rajasthan to pay Rs. 20,000/- as
costs to the petitioner.