ORDER
1. This is a suit for recovery of Rs. 2,00,000/- as damages for malicious prosecution of the plaintiff by the defendant. I may mention that the defendant in this suit was duly served and had put in appearance through Mr. N. B. Sinha, Advocate and had obtained adjournments for filing the written statement but finally on May 8, 1987, a last opportunity was granted to the defendant for filing the written statement subject to payment of Rs. 500 / – as costs. It appears that the defendant had prepared the written statement and had supplied copy of the same to counsel for the plaintiff but the costs which were imposed vide order dated May 8, 1987, were not paid and the Court on August 4, 1987, declined the request for another adjournment made on behalf of the defendant for paying the costs and for filing the written statement. Counsel for the defendant had been appearing on some of the dates fixed for recording evidence but later on counsel for the defendant had stopped appearing in the case and the defendant has not taken any steps whatsoever for setting aside of the order by which he was not granted any further time for filing the written statement and for payment of costs. So, the defendant is ex parte in this suit.
2. The plaintiff has submitted his own affidavit and affidavits of Mohd. Suleman, Vidya Bhushan Misra, Sint. Shanta Parmar and Sudhir Jain in support of his case who have been also examined in Court and deposed that they reiterate the contents of the said affidavits and prayed that the same may be read as part of their respective testimony.
3. Facts which have emerged out from the said affidavits and the documents proved are that the plaintiff is academically highly qualified as he holds a degree in Master of Arts in Psychology and has been carrying on business as building contractor being approved as a Class PWD contractor in Punjab and Delhi and he and his wife and his son being regularly assessed to income-tax since 1956 and was also having a factory under the name and style 6 of Multi favor Activities at NOIDA and is 6 owning 33, Bangalow. Road, Delhi and is also a social worker and is also General Secretary of NOIDA Industrialists Association which is registered under the Indian Societies Act having registered office at H-25, Connaught Circus, New Delhi and Branch Office at NOIDA. According to the plaintiff, he, as General Secretary, has been helping in the redressal of grievances of the industrialists of NOIDA and he has been also practicing as an industrial consultant under the name and style of R. K. Consultant Bureau. It is mentioned that Sint. Shanta Parmar is having a factory in the property bearing No. W-43, Sector XI, NOIDA, belonging to the defendant and she is inducted in the said premises by the defendant as tenant and she is carrying on manufacturing business. Defendant was keen to have Smt. Shan ta Parmar vacate his premises and had approached the plaintiff for rendering some assistance in the matter whereas Sint. Shanta Parmar had been also approaching the plaintiff complaining about harassment she was suffering at the hands of the defendant. Plaintiff is stated to have refused to render any help to the defendant in harassing his tenant Smt. Shanta Parmar. So, it is averred that the defendant was very much, annoyed with the plaintiff and out of malice the defendant is stated to have lodged a false complaint under Ss. 147, 323, 504 and 506, 1. P.C. in which he cited the plaintiff as one of the co-accused along with his son and tenant Sint. Shanta Parmar and some other persons. The averments made in the said complaint were that on May 31, 1985, the accused had held out threats to the defendant and had hurled filthy abuses and had beaten the defendant. In the said complaint the Magistrate 1st Class of Ghaziabad had issued nonbailable warrants against the plaintiff which defendant tried to serve on the plaintiff with the aid of the police at the factory premises of plaintiff’s wife and also at the residents address of the plaintiff at Delhi but the plaintiff was not available, so was not arrested. The defendant is stated to have then collected various persons at the said places and held out threats against the plaintiff and proclaimed that the plaintiff was a criminal and was evading arrest.
4. One of the accused Sint. Shanta Parmar filed a revision petition in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Ghaziabad, against the order of the Magistrate by which summons and non-bailable warrants had been issued against the accused and vide order dated December 21, 1985, the revision petition was accepted and the complaint was quashed. It was held by the Additional Sessions Judge that a completely false complaint had been lodged by the defendant and he also found that in evidence the defendant came up with the story that the said occurrence of beating occurred on June 1, 1985, whereas in the complaint the date of occurrence given was May 31, 1985. So, it is pleaded by the plaintiff and his witnesses that due to this malicious prosecution the plaintiff’s reputation had suffered in the eyes of his friends, relations, colleagues and his employees and the plaintiff was lowered in their esteem and he has also suffered mentally and humiliated by being maliciously prosecuted inasmuch as non-bailable warrants were issued against him. Plaintiff had served a notice dated October 24, 1986, on the defendant claiming damages of Rs. 2,00,000/-.
5. Ex. P20 is the complaint lodged by the defendant and before the Magistrate. Exs. P21 to P25 are copies of various orders made by the Magistrate in the said complaint including the orders for issuance, of nonbailable warrants against the plaintiff. Ex. P26 is the copy of the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge whereby the complaint was quashed. From the testimony of the witnesses mentioned above, the aforesaid facts have been proved which stand unrebutted. Plaintiff has also proved in this case documents Exs. PI to P18 which show that the plaintiff is an income-tax payer and is a businessman of repute and has been acting as General Secretary of the said Association. In order to succeed in an action for malicious prosecution the plaintiff was to prove only that he was prosecuted by the defendant and the prosecution ended in the plaintiff’s favor and that defendant had acted without reasonable and probable cause and was actuated by malice in launching the criminal prosecution. From the evidence led by the plaintiff it is amply proved that the plaintiff was prosecuted by the defendant maliciously without any reasonable and probable cause and the prosecution ended in plaintiff’s favor. Defendant had an ulterior motive for prosecuting the plaintiff and his tenant and other persons so as to put pressure on them to get his premises vacated from the tenant. Plaintiff was joined as an accused as the defendant could not persuade the plaintiff to render help to the defendant in getting the premises illegally vacated from the tenant Smt. Shama Parmar. Defendant had obviously no reasonable and probable cause for launching the said prosecution when in fact, no such occurrence had taken place on May 31, 1985. He had concocted the occurrence having little regard for the truth and was exposed when he gave the statement before the Magistrate where he shifted the occurrence to June 1, 1985 and the Additional Sessions Judge went on to quash the said proceedings holding that it was a false complaint brought by the defendant. By suffering ex parte proceedings in the present case the defendant, in my view, has left no choice with the Court but to give a finding that the defendant has prosecuted the plaintiff maliciously without there being any reasonable or probable cause. 1, hence, hold accordingly.
6. As far as damages are concerned, the plaintiff has not faced the trial and had not incurred any expenditure in defending the complaint in the Court of law. However, there is evidence led by the plaintiff which I have no reason to doubt that the plaintiffs reputation has suffered because of said malicious prosecution brought by the defendant inasmuch as the defendant had tried to serve non bailable warrants of arrest on the plaintiff and on finding that plaintiff was not available he had tried to show the plaintiff as a criminal and absconder from law by his utterances while trying to serve the said warrants in presence of the workers of the plaintiff and other persons. In an action for malicious prosecution the damages would represent first the general damages, a solarium for injured feelings and reputation. The second would be special damages for actual damages incurred by the plaintiff as a pecuniary loss. In the present case, the plaintiff is claiming g6neral damages because of his being humiliated and harassed by such malicious pro secution and his esteem having been lowered in the eyes of his relations and friends. As far as quantum of the said general damage is concerned, I thi – nk the plaintiff has brought the claim of Rs. 2,00,000/- which assessment of damages is on a very higher side. Counsel for the plaintiff has made reference to Smt. Manijeh v. Sohrab Peshottan Kotwal, , wherein it has been held that in an action for malicious prosecution vindictive damages are permissible. The learned Judge has referred to the law laid down in 10Halsbury’s Laws of England, p. 87, para 108 in this repsect. He has also cited Lala Punnalal v. Kasturichand Ramaji, AIR 1946 Mad 147, in which it was held that exemplary damages are consolatory rather than penal, resting upon the principle that, where there is malice, the mental pain caused to the plaintiff must be taken note of and a solarium awarded for it. It was held that the exemplary damages for torts can be awarded not only under English law but also under the Indian law in cases where the defendant has acted contenaciously.
7. Keeping in view the status occupied by the plaintiff in the society, I think Rupees 1,00,000/- would be sufficient amount of damages which plaintiff is entitled. So, I decree the suit for recovery of Rs. 1,00,000/with proportionate costs against the defendant and also grant interest @ 9% per annum, from the date of the institution of the suit till payment, on the said amount.
8. Suit decreed.