BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
DATED: 18/10/2011
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.CHANDRU
W.P.(MD)No.3887 of 2011
W.P.(MD)No.3888 to 3897 of 2011
R.Kannan ... Petitioner in
W.P.No.3887 of 2011
N.Ravi ... Petitioner in
W.P.No.3888 of 2011
N.Karuppaiah ... Petitioner in
W.P.No.3889 of 2011
G.Rajendran ... Petitioner in
W.P.No.3890 of 2011
Muthu ... Petitioner in
W.P.No.3891 of 2011
Manickam ... Petitioner in
W.P.No.3892 of 2011
R.Sasivarnam ... Petitioner in
W.P.No.3893 of 2011
M.Raman ... Petitioner in
W.P.No.3894 of 2011
Karthikeya Rajadurai ... Petitioner in
W.P.No.3895 of 2011
R.Amsalakshmi ... Petitioner in
W.P.No.3896 of 2011
M.I.Arulandham ... Petitioner in
W.P.No.3897 of 2011
vs.
1.The State of Tamil Nadu,
Rep. by its Secretary to Government
Industries,
Labour and Co-operation Department,
Secretariat,
Chennai.
2.The Director,
Small Industries Development Corporation
(SIDCO), Thondi Road,
Sivaganga,
Sivaganga District. ... Respondents in all
the Writ Petitions.
COMMON PRAYER
Writ Petitions are filed under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, praying for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus, directing the 1st
respondent herein to exercise the power vested under Section 48-B read with
Section 16-B of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 as amended by the Land Acquisition
(Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act 1996 (Tamil Nadu Act 16 of 1997) in the light of the
order, dated 28.11.2003 passed in W.P.Nos.46292, 37302, 46288, 46286, 46289,
46285, 38789, 46283, 46287, 46291, 46293 and 46290 of 2002 respectively on the
file of the Honourable High Court, Madras and by considering the applications
submitted by the petitioners on 29.12.2009, 16.09.2004 and 21.06.2004
respectively.
!For Petitioner ... Mr.B.S.Meltiue
^For R - 1 ... Mr.M.Govindan,
Special Government Pleader.
For R - 2 ... Ms.T.Kaviya for
(in all the WPs) Mr.K.Mahendran
******
:ORDER
The petitioners are having the second round of litigation. In the
earlier round of litigation, they filed writ petitions before the Principal Seat
in the year 2002 seeking to challenge the acquisition proceedings taken by the
State Government acquiring the petitioners’ land in favour of Small Industries
Development Corporation. Those writ petitions came to be dismissed by this
Court. At that time, the petitioners contended that they were owners of the
land holding Cowle patta and possession was not taken over. But the seventh
respondent therein, Small Industries Development Corporation (SIDCO), the second
respondent herein appeared before this Court and informed that major portions of
the land were utilized and as per the Government Policy, trees have been planted
and as and when necessary, such lands shall be utilized. The counter affidavit
filed by the SIDCO, the 7th respondent therein asserted that since they are the
requisitioning body and compensation was paid and the writ petitions having been
filed after a long period, the writ petitions were not maintainable. This Court
after recording the same held that the petitioners are not entitled to challenge
the impugned acquisition made in favour of the SIDCO. However, it was stated
that if the land was not utilized, it is open to the petitioners to approach the
State Government by filing appropriate application under Section 48-B of the
Land Acquisition Act as amended by the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act 16 of 1997.
2. It was pursuant to the observation made by the learned Judge, the
petitioners sent representations to the Small Industries Department seeking for
the return of the land. They also stated in the representation that the Revenue
Divisional Officer and the District Revenue Officer, Sivangai District have
recommended their cases.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners produced a copy of an office
note stating that the Revenue Divisional Officer and the District Revenue
Officer, Sivangai District have recommended their cases. But it is unfortunate
such a recommendation furnished by unauthorized authorities, for the purpose
exercising of power under Section 48-B is being produced. It is very clear that
if the requisitioning body was not using the land for the purpose for which it
was acquired and if such authority returned the land to the State Government and
the State Government on taking a decision in respect of the utilisation of the
land for any other public purpose, then, if it is considered that the land
should be returned to the original owners it may do so after recovering the
compensation paid as well as the interest on the said amount. The Revenue
Divisional Officer and the District Revenue Officer, Sivangai District have no
right over the said land as it had already given to SIDCO.
4. When the matter came up on 01.04.2011, notice of motion was
ordered in the writ petitions. On behalf of the second respondent Ms.T.Kaviya,
representing for Mr.K.Mahendran, learned counsel appeared and she stated that
their clients are utilizing the lands. In the earlier round of litigation,
their stand was recorded by the learned Judge in the Principal Seat at Paragraph
No.3 of the said order and it reads as follows:
“3. The contentions raised by the petitioners have been resisted by the
learned counsels appearing for the State Government as well as appearing for the
Small Industries Development Corporation (SIDCO). It is contended by them that
possession had been taken earlier and major portion of the land had been
utilized and in respect of other portion, as per the Government policy, trees
have been planted and as and when necessary, such lands would be utilized. It
is also been indicated in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the
contesting respondent/SIDCO that compensation had been paid and at any rate, the
writ petition having been filed after a long gap of about four decades, it
should be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.”
Therefore, there cannot be any second round of litigation to invoke the power
under Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act 1984.
5. In this context, it is necessary to refer certain decisions of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tamil Nadu Housing
Board v. Keeravani Ammal and Ors reported in 2007 (2) CTC 447 in paragraph 11
had observed as follows:-
“…Section 48-B introduced into the Act in the State of Tamil Nadu is an
exception to this rule. Such a provision has to be strictly construed and strict
compliance with its terms insisted upon. Whether such a provision can be
challenged for its validity, we are not called upon to decide here.”
6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tamil Nadu Housing Board v.
L.Chandrasekaran and Ors reported in 2010 (2) SCC 786, dealt with the scope of
Section 48-B and has considered all the cases arising out of reconveyance. In
paragraphs 28 and 29, it was observed as follows:-
“28. It need no emphasis that in exercise of power under Section 48-B of
the Act, the Government can release the acquired land only till the same
continues to vest in it and that too if it is satisfied that the acquired land
is not needed for the purpose for which it was acquired or for any other public
purpose. To put it differently, if the acquired land has already been
transferred to other agency, the Government cannot exercise power under Section
48-B of the Act and re-convey the same to the original owner. In any case, the
Government cannot be compelled to re-convey the land to the original owner if
the same can be utilized for any public purpose other than the one for which it
was acquired.
(Emphasis added)
29. Before concluding, we may notice the judgment of this Court in Tamil
Nadu Housing Board v. Keeravani Ammal (supra). The question considered in that
case was whether the Division Bench of the High Court could direct release of
the acquired land which had been transferred to the appellant-Board. While
setting aside the impugned order, this Court observed: (SCC pp.261-62, paras 13-
16)
“13.It is clearly pleaded by the State and the Tamil Nadu Housing Board that the
scheme had not been suspended or abandoned and that the lands acquired are very
much needed for the implementation of the scheme and the steps in that regard
have already been taken. In the light of this position, it is not open to the
Court to assume that the project has been abandoned merely because another piece
of land in the adjacent village had been released from acquisition in the light
of orders of the Court. It could not be assumed that the whole of the project
had been abandoned or has become unworkable. It depends upon the purpose for
which the land is acquired. As we see it, we find no impediment in the lands in
question being utilised for the purpose of putting up a multi-storied building
containing small flats, intended as the public purpose when the acquisition was
notified. Therefore, the High Court clearly erred in proceeding as if the scheme
stood abandoned. This was an unwarranted assumption on the part of the Court,
which has no foundation in the pleadings and the materials produced in the case.
The Court should have at least insisted on production of materials to
substantiate a claim of abandonment.
14.We have already noticed that in the writ petition, there are no sufficient
allegations justifying interference by the Court. Mere claim of possession by
the writ petitioners is not a foundation on which the relief now granted could
have been rested either by the learned Single Judge or by the Division Bench of
the High Court. On the materials, no right to relief has been established by the
writ petitioners.
15.We may also notice that once a piece of land has been duly acquired under the
Land Acquisition Act, the land becomes the property of the State. The State can
dispose of the property thereafter or convey it to anyone, if the land is not
needed for the purpose for which it was acquired, only for the market value that
may be fetched for the property as on the date of conveyance. The doctrine of
public trust would disable the State from giving back the property for anything
less than the market value. In State of Kerala v. M.Bhaskaran Pillai (1997) 5
SCC 432 in a similar situation, this Court observed : (SCC p.433, para 4)
“4…..The question emerges whether the Government can assign the land to the
erstwhile owners? It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a public
purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be
used for any other public purpose. In case there is no other public purpose for
which the land is needed, then instead of disposal by way of sale to the
erstwhile owner, the land should be put to public auction and the amount fetched
in the public auction can be better utilised for the public purpose envisaged in
the Directive Principles of the Constitution. In the present case, what we find
is that the executive order is not in consonance with the provision of the Act
and is, therefore, invalid. Under these circumstances, the Division Bench is
well justified in declaring the executive order as invalid. Whatever assignment
is made, should be for a public purpose. Otherwise, the land of the Government
should be sold only through the public auctions so that the public also gets
benefited by getting a higher value.”
16.Section 48-B introduced into the Act in the State of Tamil Nadu is an
exception to this rule. Such a provision has to be strictly construed and strict
compliance with its terms insisted upon. Whether such a provision can be
challenged for its validity, we are not called upon to decide here. ”
8. In view of the above, there is no case made out to entertain the
writ petitions. Hence, these writ petitions stand dismissed. No costs.
vsm
To
1.The Secretary,
Government of Tamil Nadu Industries,
Labour and Co-operation Department,
Secretariat,
Chennai.
2.The Director,
Small Industries Development Corporation
(SIDCO), Thondi Road,
Sivaganga,
Sivaganga District.