ORDER
AR. Lakshmanan, J.
1. The tenant is the petitioner in this revision. The respondent/landlord filed RCOP No. 1 of 1987 on the file of the Rent Controller/District Munsif. Nagapattinam, for eviction against the tenant under Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Tamilnadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). According to the landlord, he requires the building for his own occupation and also in order to store the produce from his agricultural lands situate in Keezhavalakudi village. He contended that the property in question was allotted to him in a Partition between himself and the other members of his family and that though he is employed and residing at Madras, he intended to shift his wife and children to Nagapattinam to supervise the lands in Keezhakavalkudi villages the lands, if let out for lease, would cause prejudice and hardship to him. It is also his case that he proposed to visit Nagapattinam frequently. The tenant contested the eviction petition on the ground that there was bone fide in the requirement of the landlord for recovery of the building in question as he is being employed and residing at Madras for a long time, that the eviction petition is not maintainable on the ground that the building in question was let out to the tenant for running a recreation club, which is for a non-residential purpose, that the premises being let out to the recreation club, the club should have been made as a party- respondent in the eviction petition and that the impleading of the petitioner herein alone in his individual capacity as a respondent in the eviction petition is not in accordance with law and as such, the eviction petition is not maintainable. The learned Rent Controller though held that the building was leased out to the tenant only in his individual capacity and that the building in question was leased out for a residential purpose, how ever, held that the requirement for own occupation by the landlord is not bona fide. The landlord preferred RCA No. 1 of 1988 on the file of the Appellate Authority Subradinate Judge Naapattinam under Section 23(1)(b) of the Act and challenged the finding of the Rent Controller in so far as the reasoning that the requirement was not bona fide is concerned. The learned Appellate Authority confirmed the order of the Rent Controller in regard to his finding viz., maintainability of the petition and the joinder of party viz.. the Recreation club as respondent in the eviction petition. However, the learned Appellate Authority has reversed the order of the Rent Controller in regard to the bona fide requirement of the premises on the ground that it was natural in these days of Record of Tenancy Act prevailing in East Thanjavur District where if the agricultural lands are leased out to the tenant, there is no possibility of recovering the same and in view of that there is every justification and bona fide in the claim of the landlord to seek eviction of the premises for his own occupation to supervise his lands. Thus, the learned Appellate Authority completely accepted the bona fide requirement of the demised building by the landlord and ordered eviction. The learned Appellate Authority has also held that a building can not be treated as residential or non-residential on the basis of usage or for the purpose for which it is let out but as contemplated by the Act a building can be called residential or non-residential on the basis of structural or physical features of the building. Aggrieved against the order of the Appellate Authority, the tenant preferred the above revision.
2. I have heard Mr. S. Veeraraghavan, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. R. Krishnamurthy, learned Senior counsel for the respondent.
3. In this revision, Mr. S. Veeraraghavan, learned counsel for the petitioner/tenant raised three contentions for my consideration. They are,
i. Can a non-residential building be requisitioned for a residential purpose?
ii. There is no bona fide on the part of the landlord to require the building for his own occupation.
iii. The lease is for a non residential purpose in favour of Royal Recreation Club and therefore, the recreation club, which is the lessee, ought to have been made as a party respondent represented by its Secretary R.T. Rajamanickam.
4. Mr. S. Veeraraghavan invited my attention to the averments made in RCOP No. 1 of 1987 to show that the building was leased out to Royal Recreation Club for a non-residential purpose by the mother and brother of the respondent landlord and that the building is being used for non-residential purpose for several years. In this connection, he also refers to the evidence of the landlord about the availability of the name board “Royal Recreation Club” in the building in question. The tenant stated in para 3 of his counter that in the demised premises a recreation club in the name of Royal Recreation Club is functioning for the past 19 years. The tenant has also taken the plea of mis-joinder and non-joinder of parties. Mr. S. Veeraraghavan would further contend that the landlord has not obtained the prior permission of the Rent Controller to convert a non-residential building into a residential building as contemplated under Section 14(3) of the Act.
5. The Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority, relied upon the decision reported in Busching Schmitz Pvt. Ltd. v. R.T. Menghani in deciding the question whether the building is leased out for a residential and non-residential purpose. According to Mr. S. Veeraraghavan, the above decision refers to the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, where a building is classified into residential, commercial and other purposes, and therefore, that decision has been mis-quoted by the authorities below and therefore, both the authorities have erred in relying upon the same. He would submit that under the Act, a distinction between a residential and a non-residential building is compartmentalised. He also relied on the full Bench decision of our high court reported in T. Dakshinamurthi v. Thulja Bai . Following three decisions are also relevant according to the learned counsel for the petitioner/tenant viz., V. Balakrishna Menon v. M.A.K. Govindan (92 L.W.56 – rendered by Ismail, J. as he then was), Rangaswami Reddiar v. Minor N. Jayaraj (1978 TLNJ 9) Rendered By Ismail J., as he then was) and T.N. Lakshmanan v. M/s, S.P. Hajee Alavudeen Saheb Sons (1980 (I) MLJ 9) rendered by R. Sengottuvelan, J).
6. Therefore, it is submitted by Mr. S. Veeraraghavan, learned counsel for the tenant, that both the authorities have erred in relying upon and observing that residential and non residential depends upon the nature of the building and how it can be altered. According to the learned counsel this decision is not applicable to the Madras Act where residential and non- residential are distinctly different and that the object of the lease overlaps only when a building is not given for a definite purpose. He would submit that in the instant case, there is ample evidence to show mat the demised premises was rented only for non-residential purpose and therefore, on the basis of the evidence tendered, both the authorities below ought to have accepted the contention of the tenant.
7. To substantiate his contention that the requirement of the landlord is not bona fide. Mr. S. veeraraghavan pointed out the dismissal of RCOP No. 13 of 1980 and RCA No. 72 of 1980 filed by the mother and elder brother of the landlord earlier and the finding of the authorities below that the suit premises was not a residential premises. This fact according to Mr. S. Veeraraghavan, emphasises that there was and there is a club functioning in the suit premises and it also goes to prove that the club has not been made as a party. At the time of hearing, he also placed before me an order passed by this court in W.P.No. 4894 of 1986 wherein the revision petitioner was described as the Secretary of Royal Recreation Club. That writ petition was dismissed by this court. This document according to Mr. S. Veeraraghavan, will strengthen the tenants contention that even in 1986, Royal Recreation Club was in existence in the demised premises and that the writ proceedings were initiated by the Club represented by its Secretary. He invited my attention to the evidence of the tenant that the rental agreement was signed by the past secretary and the present secretary only on behalf of the club. Therefore, it should be inferred from the decision , that the burden of proof is on the landlord to prove his claim that the lease was in respect of an individual and not to the recreation club.
Mr. S. Veeraraghavan would finally contend that the revision petition should be allowed.
8. Though it is contended that the building was leased out to the club for a non-residential purpose viz.. running a Recreation Club, the tenant has not filed any document to show that the lease was in respect of a non-residential purpose. No document was filed to substantiate this contention. The tenant has not produced the rent agreement either before the Rent Controller or before the Appellate Authority and not even before this court. Though it is contended that the same is with the landlord, the tenant has not taken any steps to summon the same before the authorities below. Therefore, there is no substance in the contention of the tenant that the eviction petition is hit by the non-joinder or mis-joinder of parties. Hence, I have no hesitation in rejecting the said contention.
9. Mr. R. Krishnamurthi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the landlord, submitted that to assess whether a building is residential or non-residential, one must go through the physical features and structures of the building and not on the basis of the purpose for which it is let out or on the basis of the usage of the building. However, the learned counsel for the tenant has relied upon the full Bench decision of this court , which has been subsequently followed in 92, Law Weekly, 56 and 1980 (I) MLJ 9. No doubt all these cases support the case of the tenant. Before adverting to the applicability of these decisions, to the case on hand, it is just and necessary to look into the relevant provisions of the Act, which contemplate residential and non-residential buildings. Nowhere in the Act there is no (sic) definition with regard to residential and non-residential” are found in the preamble to the Act, which reads thus:
“An act to amend and consolidate the law relating to the regulation of the letting of residential and non-residential buildings and the control of the rents of such buildings and the prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants there from in the State of Tamilnadu”.
10. It is a well established principle of judicial interpretation that a court may certainly look into the full length title of an Act and its preamble in order to appreciate the intendment and tenor of the enacted statute. The term ‘residential” building and non -residential building is employed in Section 3 of the Act, which deals with regard to notice of vacancy. Explanation I to sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act reads as follows:
” A landlord who. having obtained possession (i) of a residential building under sub-section (3) of Section 10 lets the whole or part of it to a tenant: or
(ii) of a non-residential building under sub-section (3) of Section 10 lets the whole or part of it to a tenant, shall be deemed to have failed to give notice under this section”.
11. Section 4 of the Act deals with fixation of fair rent. The words ‘residential” and non-residential’ are found in the said section. The second Proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the Act reads thus:
“Provided further that the cost of provision of amenities specified in Schedule 1 shall not exceed –
i) in the case of any residential building, fifteen percent; and
ii) in the case of any non-residential building, twenty five percent, of the cost of site in which the building is constructed, and the cost of construction of the building as determined under this section”.
12. Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act contemplates a petition for eviction for owners occupation and Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act contemplates a petition for eviction of non-residential buildings. Section 14 of the Act is yet another important section to be noticed, which helps the landlord to recover possession for earning out repairs and for earning out demolition and reconstruction. Section 14H) .of the Act contemplates conversion of a residential building into a nonresidential building and vice versa and it runs thus
“Nothing contained in this section shall entitle the landlord who has recovered possession of the building for repairs to convert a residential building into a non-residential building or a non residential building into a residential building unless such conversion is permitted by the Controller at the time of passing an order under sub-section (1)”
13. The next section to be noticed is Section 21 of the Act which deals with conversion into non-residential buildings. It reads as follows:
“No residential building shall be converted into a nonresidential building except with the permission in writing of the Controller”
A residential building can be converted into a non-residential building only with permission in writing of the Controller, who is defined under the Act as the person appointed under the Act to perform the functions of a Controller under the Act.
14. The question, therefore, arises for my consideration is as to whether a building can be called as residential or non- residential on the basis of usage or for the purpose for which it is let, or the Act contemplates distinction on the basis of structural or physical features of the building. The decision to be rendered by me in paragraphs infra will be the answer to the contentions raised by Mr. S. Veeraraghavan, learned counsel for the tenant.
15. Let me now proceed to deal with the above aspect. I have already dealt with the various provisions of the Act. more particularly Sections 14(3) and 21 of the Act from which is clear that the distinction is based upon structure-wise or physical features of the building and not by mere usage or for the purpose for which it is let out. Section 14(3) of the Act referred to supra contemplates conversion of a residential building into non-residential building and vice versa. This provision con templates the structural alteration in the case of conversion of one building into another or vice versa and not on the basis of purpose test. Section 21 of the Act also contemplates conversion of residential building into non- residential with the permission of the Controller. Therefore, I have to see what is meant by conversion.
16. The Supreme Court had occasion to interpret the word conversion” in the case reported in P. Kesavan v. Ammukutty Amma . The above case was directed against the orders of the High Court of Kerala filed by the heirs of the original tenant. The landlord wanted the premises in question for his own use and occupation. The Rent Controller granted such permission. The Appellate Authority, upholding the order of the Rent Controller, maintained the order of eviction. The Revisional Authority also dismissed the revision petition holding that it was difficult to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the authorities below on the bona fide need of the landlord for his own occupation. The tenant went before the High Court in revision and the High court also dismissed the revision upholding the order of the Rent Controller, Appellate Authority and the revisional authority.
17. Before the Supreme court, among other things, it was urged that the building in question was used for non*residential purpose by the tenant and the bona fide need of the landlord was for use and occupation of the landlord and his family, which is a residential purpose. It was submitted that such a need can not justify in that case the eviction of the tenant. It was also submitted that Section 17 of the Act prohibited such conversion. While interpreting the word “conversion” the Supreme Court held as follows:
“It appears clear that this conversion as contemplated for which permission was required is conversion by the tenant and can not be a conversion by the landlord, quite apart from the fact that in this case there was no conversion of the building sought. The building was used for non-residential purpose and the purpose for which the building was sought was for residential purpose. It appears to us mat putting to a different purpose the user of the building is not a conversion of the building as such. It has been found that the building as it is without any structural change can be put to residential purpose. There was no conversion of the building as such involved “in this case but a change of user of the building”.
18. An identical question arose before the Supreme court as to whether a building can be characterised as a residential or non- residential building on the basis of mere usage or the purpose for which it is let out. We can usefulK refer to the decision reported in Busching Schmitz Pvt Ltd v. P.t. Menghani . The question that was posed for consideration before the Supreme Court is as follows:
“Is the purpose of the lease decisive of the character of the accommodation”,
while answering the said question, the Supreme court held as follows:
“Guided by this project oriented approach, we reject the rival extreme positions urged before us by Shri Nariman and Shri Jain. Residential premises are not only those which are let out for residential purposes as the appellant would have it. Nor do they cover all kinds of structures where humans may “manage to dwell. If a beautiful bungalow were let out to a businessman to run a show room or to a meditational group or music society for meditation or musical uses, it remains none-the-less a residential accommodation. Otherwise, premises may one day be residential, another day commercial and, on yet a later day, religious. Use or purpose of the letting is no conclusive test. Likewise, the feet that many poor persons may sleep under bridges or live in large hume pipes or crawl into verandahs of shops and bazars can not make them residential premises. That is a case or reductio ad absurdum… The house we are considering was built on land given for constructing a residence, is being used even now for residence, is suitable otherwise for residence and is being creditably demanded for the respondent’s residence. Residential suitability being the basic consideration, this building fills the bill. Nothing said in the affidavit-in- opposition puts it “out of the pale of residential accommodation. A building which reasonably accommodates a residential user is a residential accommodation – nothing less, nothing else. The circum stances of the landlord are not altogether out of place in reaching a right judgment. The “purpose test” will enable Officers who own houses to defeat the Government by pleading that they do not own “residential premises” because the lease is for commercial use, built though it was and suitable though it is, for residence”.
The above cited two decisions of the Supreme Court clearly laid down that the usage or purpose test is not at all a criteria to find out whether a building is a residential or non-residential but one must go by structural and physical features of the building to find out whether it is a residential or non- residential building.
19. Strong reliance was placed by Mr.S. Veeraraghavan on the Full Bench decision of this court , which had taken a contra view to hold a building a residential or non-residential on the basis of usage or for the purpose for which it was let out and not by structural or physical features of the building. The only question in that case was, whether the building, which was the subject matter of application, is a residential or a non-residential building. In that case, the building was being used for the residence of the petitioner. It was let out to a tenant, who was carrying on business in Chappals, and thereafter to the present tenant for his business in hides and skins. Structurally, the building appears to have been meant for residence rather than for earning on business. The Chief Judge, Court of Small causes, held that as it was once used for residential purpose and was structurally such that it must have been intended for residence, mere use for a number of years as a non-residential building would not make it non-residential and therefore, it must be deemed to be a residential building. In coming to this conclusion, the Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes, was largely influenced by the observations made by the High Court in a decision to which P.V. Rajamannar, C.J, was a parts in CMP No. 6150 of 1948. In that case, the building was actually being used as a restaurant at the time of application for eviction, but by its nature and by its structure, it was a residential building. Both the Rent Controller and Appellate Authority held that it was a residential building. P.V. Rajamannar, C.J. said that at one time he was inclined to think that the conversion contemplated was by means of a structural alteration. But, his attention was drawn to the decision reported in Williams v. Perry (1924 (1) K.B. 936, in which Swift, J. observed as follows:
“I can see no reason why a dwelling house should not be converted into business premises just as much by the agreement of the parties and their user as by structural alteration”
These remarks appeared to the Honourable Chief Justice to show a way out of the difficulty. The learned Chief Justice has observed that he expressed more than once the desirability of the Legislature clarifying the position of the definition of a residential building but evidently there is no attempt in that direction. Therefore, the learned Chief Justice felt that it is desirable that there should be an authoritative ruling laying down at least certain broad tests to find out if a building is or is not a residential building within the meaning of the Act. Thereupon, the petition was posted before a Full Bench was called upon to decide the reference whether the premises in the possession of the tenant are in the nature of a non-residential building of which it is not open to the landlord to ask for possession under Section 7(3)(a)(i) of the Madras Act-25 of 1949 (Madras Buildings Lease and Rent Control Act). The question before the Full Bench was, whether the view which favours regard for the original structural design or the view which emphasises the importance of the letting of the building as for a residential purposes is to be preferred. The Full Bench has also noticed two material provisions. They are provisos 2 and 3 of Section 3(5) of the 1949, Act, which run as follows:
“Provided further that if die building is a residential building, it shall not be converted into a non-residential building unless the permission in writing of the Controller is obtained under Section 11, sub-section (1);
Provided also that no structural alterations shall be made in the building unless the consent of the landlord is also obtained therefor”.
It is useful to refer in this context paragraph 15 of the judgment, which runs as follows:
“It seems to us, therefore, that what is at the inception a residential building may well become a non-residential by force of the terms of a letting and that any conversion, after the letting, of a residential building into a non-residential may well take place within and only within the limits which the statute prescribes. That if prior to a letting a building happens to have been of one character, it must for ever “keep that character irrespective of what the effect of the letting or of the acts of parties subsequent to the Jetting may be, seems to our minds to be a difficult if not impossible, position, having regard to the considerations above set forth. The original design of the structure may have been one suitable to residence, but if by the letting it became non-residential in character, there is no reason why one may not take it as such for the purpose of Section 7, subsection (3). It seems to us that if a landlord has let out a building for a residential or non-residential purpose as the case may be, it is only fair that when he seeks an order directing the tenant to put him in possession of the property, he has to show that he fulfils the requirements of sub-clause (i) or (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 7. Having Jet out the building as for a non-residential purpose, it would be unfair if we were allowed to urge
“the requirement of the building for his own occupation, which is really a condition of his seeking to recover a residential building let out by him. The purpose of the letting and the condition of the landlords recovery have a like reference to a residential or non-residential purpose according as a given case falls under sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii) of Sub-section 3(a) of Section 7”.
20. I have already extracted provisos 2 and 3 of Section 3(5) of the Madras Act. The third proviso to Section 3(5) of the Madras Act specifically contemplates structural alterations of the residential building into a non-residential building, which can be done only with the consent of the landlord, whereas the second Proviso is general in nature. Therefore, in the third proviso as that there was a specific reference to structural alternation, the Full Bench had taken the view the third proviso being specific with regard to structural alteration and the second proviso being general in nature, it includes all kinds of conversion, viz., even by the usage or the purpose for which it is let. The full Bench has held as follows:
“…that the two Proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 3 as amended, when read together, suggest that the conversion of a residential building into a no-residential building need not always be by structural alterations, but mat if the conversion is by such alterations, the consent of the landlord, in addition to the permission in writing of the Controller, is also a pre- requisite for Such a conversion”.
21. Thus, it is clear from the view expressed by the Full Bench in the above case that the said view was rendered on the basis of the Proviso that existed in the 1949 Act. Apart from relying upon these Provisos, the Full Bench had also relied on some English decisions in reaching this conclusion. The Full Bench has also relied upon the case of Williams v. Perry (1924 (1) KB 936) Hyman v. Steward (1925 (2) KB 702) and Vickery v. Martin (1944) (1) KB 679).
22. It must, therefore, be noticed that these two provisions are not in the present statute and for conversion of building into a residential and non-residential, there are two provisions in the present Act viz.. Section 21. which is corresponding t Section 11(1) of the Madras Act, and Section 14(3). Therefore, any interpretation that was turned upon these two provisos have no bearing to the present context of the Act and is distinguishable on facts and in law which was prevailing then. Section 14(3) of the Act contemplates only structural or physical alteration and not conversion as contemplated under the old Madras Act. Therefore, as combined reading of Sections 14(3) and 21 of the Act would, in my opinion, only go to show that the Act contemplates conversion by way or physical or structural alteration and not on the basis of usage or the purpose for which it is let out. In other words, the usage or purpose test, which is laid down by the full Bench of this court in , which is heavily relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner/tenant was traced upon the 1949 Act and the present decisions were rendered by both the lower authorities only in the context of the provisions of the present Act. I have already referred to he decision of the Supreme Court in , wherein the word “conversion” had been the subject matter of interpretation by the Apex Court. Therefore, in view of the amended provisions and the law of the land laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid two decisions, the decision of the Full Bench of this court in , laying emphasis upon the usage or purpose test, based upon the 1949 Act, is not relevant for a reference in the present context.
23. Two other decisions relied on by Mr. S. Veeraraghavan reported in 92, Law Weekly 56 and 1980 (1) MLJ 9, have in turn derived strength from the Full Bench decision in , for their conclusion to find out whether the building is a residential or a non-residential one. Therefore, these two decisions may not be of any assistance to the petitioner/tenant. I have already distinguished the Full Bench decision of this court in , on facts and on law since the said case was decided based upon the 1949 Act.
24. Under Article 141 of the constitution of India, the law declared by the Supreme Curt is made the law of the land and one the law has been so declared by the Supreme Court, it is no longer possible to hang on to views expressed earlier by this court or by any other High Court running contrary to the said law on the simple ground that these vies were not analysed, touched upon, referred to and over-ruled specifically by the Supreme Court while declaring the law. This is of no consequence at all. As rightly pointed out by Mr. R. Krishnamurthi, the very provisions relied on by the Full Bench for interpretation is no more in the statute book. Now that the Supreme Court in the two decisions referred to above laid down that the usage or purpose test is not a conclusive test to decide whether a building is residential or non-residential, but only physical feature or structure of the building is relevant factor, applying the above test I have now to se whether the premises which was let out to the tenant is a structure wise residential or non-residential building.
25. In the instant case, the authorities below have concurrently taken the view that structure-wise, the let out building is a residential one and fit for residential accommodation. Therefore, I hold that by applying the law laid down in . the application for eviction by the landlord in this case under Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act is maintainable. This apart when both the authorities below have concurrently taken the view that the application is maintainable of facts and on law, such a concurrent factual finding does not warrant interference by this court while exercising revisional jurisdiction, though very wide, under Section 25 of the Act.
26. Mr.S. Veeraraghavean contended that the tenant is actually running a Recreation Club, a non-residential purpose, for the last so many years, I have already pointed out that though the tenant claims that mere is a lease agreement in respect of the building in question such an agreement is not at all forthcoming. The lease was given only to an individual. No evidence worth mentioning was placed before the authorities below and also before this court to show that the lease was given for a non- residential or a commercial purpose. Learned Counsel for the landlord would submit that the Recreation Club, for which the premises is now said to be used by the tenant, cannot be construed as ‘business’ for the purpose of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. I am in entire agreement with the contention/of the landlord. By no stretch of imagination, the term ‘Recreation’ can be said to be a ‘business’ so as to attract Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act.
27. In Webster’s Encyclopaedia unabridged Dictionary of the english language, the meaning for the word ‘Recreation’ has been given as follows:
“Refreshment by means of some pastime, agreeable exercise or the like as after work; a pastime, diversion, exercise or other affording relaxation and enjoyment; an Act of recreating or the stage of being recreated”
whereas, the Supreme Court has explained the meaning of the word business” in , as follows:
“Business too is a word of wide import. In one sense, it includes all occupations and professions. But in the collection of the terms and their definitions, these terms have a definite economic content of a particular type and on the authorities of this court they have been uniformly accepted as excluding professions and are only concerned with the production, distribution and consumption of wealth and the production and availability of material services”.
28. the Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Reprint Edition 1987, at page 164, the word ‘business’ has been explained as follow s:
“It is not wide enough to include the case of literary or scientific institution, not carried on for gain”.
It is not in evidence that the tenant by running a recreation club earned any profit or gain, which are the elements to attract the word “business. In my opinion, recreation club cannot at all be construed as a business and consequently, the premises let out, even assuming without admitting, for a Recreation purpose cannot be construed the let out or for the purpose of business so as to call the premises a non-residential premises. I, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that the application for eviction under Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act is maintainable.
29. Coming to the question of bona fide requirement of the building by the landlord, the Rent Controller doubted the bona fide requirement of the landlord on the ground that as the landlord was being employed and residing at Madras, it cannot be believed that he might sent his wife and children to reside at Nagapattinam, a mofussil area, and look after his agricultural lands in a village, does not seem to be natural but, however, on appeal, the Appellate Authority reversed this finding and ordered eviction on a careful consideration of the factual and legal aspects of the matter, as prayed for by the landlord. The reasons adduced by the Appellate Authority, to my mind, are just and acceptable and stand to reason. It is natural for the owners of agricultural lands to look after their lands by themselves as it is impossible to the land owners to recover the lands from the tenants if leased out to them, in view of the stringent provisions of the Record of Tenancy Act. The finding of the Appellate Authority that the requirement of the landlord seeking eviction was natural and bona fide, does not call for any interference. The landlord seeks eviction of the demised building only for the purpose of looking after his agricultural lands, which were given to him in a partition, and also to put his wife and children to look after those lands. This, to my mind, appears to be real and natural. There is no reason to disbelieve the version of the landlord. Nagapattinam is also a bus business locality and the district headquarters of the then East Thanjavur District now known as Nagapattinam Quaide-Millath District. According to the landlord, the lands are situate only a Few kilo meters away from the headquarters. The landlord has also stated that he proposed to visit frequently his wife and children, who will be stationed at Nagapattinam permanently to look after his lands.
30. The decision cited by Mr. S. Veeraraghavan, reported in 1986 (II) MLJ 39, in my opinion, will be of no held to him. In that judgment, M.N. Chandurkar, C.J., has observed that it is not for the Rent Control Authorities to decide as to where a landlord should stay and unless it is found that the claim of the landlord that he wants to shift from a place in the mofussil to the City of Madras was not bona fide, there was no justification for rejecting the case of the landlord on the ground that the landlord had been staying in the mofussil for about 20 years.
31. Citing the above decision, Mr. S. Veeraraghavan contended that no person who is living in a City like Madras would be willing to shift from Madras to Nagapattinam since the atmosphere may not be suitable to them. Therefore, Mr. S. Veeraraghavan contended that it is improbable that the landlord, who is an employee of a Company at Madras, would shift his family from Madras to Nagapattinam and that the eviction petition has been filed only as a muse to evict the tenant. As pointed out by M.N.Chandurkar M.N. Chandurkar, C.J., in 1986 (II) MLJ 39, it is not for the Rent Control Authorities to decide as to where a landlord should say. I have already found that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide and hence, this decision will be of no assistance to the tenant. There is a tread now-a-days amongst the people who work in the City in companies and other Governmental Offices to take their accommodation only in the mofussil because of various reasons such as non-availability of accommodation, cost of living, sky high rental rates, minimum rental advance of 6 to 10 months, etc., etc. The court can take judicial notice that thousands and thousands of people come to the city every day by train and by other mode of conveyance to attend their official duties in the city and return to their destination in the evening.
32. I have also no hesitation in rejecting the contention of Mr. S. Veeraraghavan, mat the requirement of the building by the landlord for his personal occupation might not be bona fide in view of the dismissal of the earlier application for eviction by his brother. Each case has to be decided on its own merits and circumstances. Admittedly, the respondent has filed the present eviction petition only after the allotment of landed property to his share in the family partition. Another suggestion made by Mr. S. Veeraraghavean that the landlord might own a house in the village itself where the lands are situate instead of at Nagapattinam is also stated to be only rejected. As pointed out by M.N. Chandurkar, C.J., it is not for the authorities or for this court or to the tenant to suggest as to where the landlord should reside. There is no reason to discredit the testimony of the landlord that lack of personal attention in respect of Pannai cultivation of the land has resulted in loss and that therefore, the landlord had decided to shift his wife and children to Nagapattinam so that his wife may directly attend to Panni Cultivation assisted by the periodical visits of the landlord to Nagapattinam.
33. For the fore-going reasons, I am of the view that there are no merits in this revisions either in law or on facts. Therefore, the Civil Revision Petition foils and is accordingly dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.