ORDER
1. The appellant was aggrieved of the order dated 14.5.1997 whereby by invoking paragraph 28 of the Certified Standing Orders, his service was terminated. The writ petition filed by the appellant before the learned Single Judge of this Court under article 226 of the Constitution was dismissed vide judgment dated 20.11.2001.
2. We have heard the detailed arguments of the learned counsel for the parties. The only ground on which we feel fully convinced and satisfied is that the termination order dated 14.5.1997 was not passed properly as it was based on the invocation of paragraph 28 of the Certified Standing Orders and that prior to the passing of the aforesaid impugned order, the procedure prescribed in paragraph 27 of the Certified Standing Orders with relation to the imposition of the penalty was not at all invoked by the respondents. The order dated 14.5.1997 while purportedly invoking Paragraph 28 even though uses the expression that the appellant may cause harm to the members of the headquarters team, or influence the events or may even corrupt witnesses, this appears to us to be a bald assertion made only to circumvent the requirement of holding inquiry as prescribed by Paragraph 27.
3. Actually, we have not been able to find any supporting material justifying the
invocation of Paragraph 28. None was brought to our notice either. Paragraph 28 of the Certified Standing Orders reads thus :–
“Clause 28. Special Procedure in certain cases. Where a workman has been convicted for a criminal offence in a court of law or where the Chairman/Managing Director of the Company is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that it is expedient or against of security to continue to employ the workman may be removed or discharged from service without following the procedure laid down in Standing Order No. 27.”
4. A bare reading of Para 28 suggests that a workman may be removed or discharged from service without following the procedure laid down in Para 27 relating to enquiry etc. after the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Company is satisfied, by reasons to be recorded in writing that it is inexpedient to hold such inquiry or that it is against the interest of security to continue to employ a workman. The expression ‘inexpedient’ has direct relation with the holding of the inquiry. There is no recording of finding that the competent authority ever thought that the holding of the inquiry was inexpedient. Similarly, it has not been recorded by the competent authority that it would be against the interest of security to continue the employment of the workman. Mere ipse dixit or bald assertion cannot be a substitute for the mandatory requirement of law. especially when the resultant consequence is as harsh as removal of a person from service.
5. On the basis of the aforesaid observations, therefore, we are convinced that the impugned termination order suffers from the clear vice of arbitrariness and total improper exercise of jurisdiction and authority because of invocation of Paragraph 28 and by doing away with the requirement of holding inquiry in terms of Para 27.
6. The Judgment of the learned Single Judge passed in CWJC No. 1268 of 2001 is. accordingly, set aside. The impugned order dated 14.5.1997 is also set aside and quashed. The setting aside of the impugned order, however, as is evidently clear being based on the wrong invocation of Para 28 of the certified standing orders would not come in the way of the respondents, if they think so, to proceed against the appellant-writ
petitioner de novo in accordance with law on the basis of the observations made herein above.
7. Before parting, however, we wish to observe that if ever the respondents decide to proceed afresh against the petitioner- appellant, they shall always keep in mind the extent of punishment/penalty imposed on other employees similarly situated as the appellant was with respect to the transaction in question and the respondents may consider the punishment/penalty imposed on others as a guiding factor, keeping the principles of proportionateness in view.
8. The appeal is allowed. No order as to costs. Setting aside of the impugned order dated 14.5.1997 is with all consequences.