ORDER
Kedambady Jagannatha Shetty, J.
1. These two Revision Petitions arising out of two orders of the Appellate Authority reversing the common order passed by the Land Tribunal, as such these Petitions are disposed of by a common order.
3. This has been challenged by the third respondent in two appeals before the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority has in both the appeals formulated the following point for its consideration:-
“Whether the Land Tribunal was right in granting occupancy right in favour of the 1st respondent in respect of S.Nos. 109, 110 and 111 of Chandakavadi village and S.Nos. 211, 212 and 213 of Kodimole village, Chamarajanagar Taluk (in AACC 433/87 and AACC 433/87)?”
4. The Appellate Authority on consideration of both oral as well as documentary evidence has held that the alleged lease is only on contract for fruit bearing trees, viz,, coconut, arecanuts etc., and as such it is not a lease of land. Relying on a Decision of this Court in W.P.No. 5598 of 1977 reported in Short Notes No. 15 in Karnataka Law Journal Hemadevappa v. Land Tribunal DD 24-1-1979 it has observed that the Decision fully applies to the facts of the case and as such it is not possible to hold that the petitioner is a tenant of the land in question. In the penultimate paragraph of the judgment of the Appellate Authority, it has been observed that:
“For the reasons stated above, we are of the opinion that the agreement under which the 1st respondent came into possession of the lands in question is only a contract to gather fruits in the trees standing in the land and it is not a lease to cultivate the land…….. In the result we are unable to sustain the orders of the Land Tribunal granting tenancy rights to the first respondent in S.Nos.109, 110/1, 111/1, 211, 212 and 213.
Hence, we allow the appeal and order that the order of the Land Tribunal granting occupancy right in favour of the first respondent in S.Nos.109, 110 and 111 (in CRP 3641/1989) and S.Nos. 211, 212 and 213 (in CRP 3642/1989) of Kodimole village, Chamarajanagar Taluk is hereby set aside.”
Hence, these Revision Petitions by the petitioner,
8. Let me consider the conflicting contentions of the parties.
10. In view of the conflicting contentions of the parties, it is necessary to consider the recitals of the Agreements, dated 11-2-1960, 10-1-1958 and 18-10-1965 and other evidence adduced by the parties.
number of fruits of a certain value.
12. In this context, the learned Counsel for the respondent has relied on the Decision of this Court in Hemadevappa v. Land Tribunal, Maddur. The facts of that case are identical to the present case. In that Decision it is observed thus:-
“The lands formed a grove consisting of mango and tamarind trees, yielding coconut trees and young coconut plants. R-2 was given the right to gather the usufruct from the coconut trees on his giving certain number of coconuts of a certain value. The tamarind trees, mango trees and the newly planted coconut plants were not included in the agreement of lease and the right to enjoy them was retained by the lessor. Held what was granted to R-2 was the right to collect coconuts from yielding trees and not the land as such. Direction in the lease to R-2 to plough the lands without causing any harm to the newly planted coconuts plants, to remove weed and to preserve the land and to repair the fence, must be read in the context of what was given to R-2. Hence, R-2 was not a tenant within Section 2-A(34) and the lands were not tenanted lands within Section 44 of the Act.”
The Appellate Authority relying on the said Decision has held that the petitioner is not a tenant of the land in question.
“Where a lease was for five years on an yearly basis, merely because the rentals amount for the period of 5 years had been paid in advance and there was a recital that after the expiry of five years possession of the land must be given to the landlord, it cannot be said that the same have the effect of converting the lease into a mortgage. In view of Section 6 of the Act the recital to surrender possession after 5 years can have no consequence.”
This Decision has no application to the facts of the case.
The next Decision i.e., Balesha Ram’s case is also of no help to the petitioner. In that Decision, it is held thus:-
“Even if the land was not in the actual possession of the tenant immediately prior to first March, 1974, if it was a tenanted land, it vests in the State Government. That the land cannot be registered in favour of the tenant who was not in actual possession immediately prior to first March, 1974 is not relevant for the purpose of deciding the question as to whether the land stands vested in the State Government under Section 44 of the Act.”
“A tenant who was lawfully entitled to cultivate the land personally immediately prior to the commencement of the Amendment Act, but was wrongfully prevented from doing so, is not entitled to registration of occupany rights under Section 45 of the Act.”
15. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has cited the Decision of this Court in Venkatappa Ningappa’s case, cited above, in support of his submission of deemed tenant. That was the case in which the petitioner was cultivating the land under a hired labour in the absence of personal supervision of the owner which came to be held that the petitioner’s cultivation does not amount to cultivation by hired labour and petitioner would be a deemed tenant under Section 4(b) of the Act. It is observed therein that “if the ingredient or element of personal cultivation is lacking in the case of a so called cultivation by hired labour, it will inevitably lead to the conclusion that it is not a case of hired labour, but of a deemed tenant.” In the instant case, lands in question were not given for cultivation. The Decision relied on by the petitioner is of no assistance to him. It is distinguishable on facts of these cases.
“A deemed tenant belongs to a class different from the class to which a tenant who holds lands on a lease belongs and the attributes of a deemed tenancy are different from those of a tenancy on a lease.
It is not enough for a defendant to say that he holds lands on lease from the owners, and if that plea fails, it is not open to him to contend that he belongs to the category of deemed tenants. Unless there is a plea and proof that the defendant belongs to the category of deemed tenants, it will be too late for him on the failure of the plea that there was an express lease, to fall back on the plea of deemed tenancy.”
The contention of Mr.Shevgoor, learned Counsel for the respondent is well founded. The petitioner having failed to establish that he holds lands on lease from the respondent, it is not open to him to contend that he belongs to the category of deemed tenant. Moreover, there is no plea and proof that the petitioner belongs to the category of deemed tenant.
17. The Appellate Authority on consideration of oral and documentary evidence has come to the conclusion that the petitioner is not a tenant and is not entitled to occupancy right. This finding of fact is that of the final Court of fact. The scope of Revision under Section 121A of the Act is limited and does not extend to re-appreciation of fact. In the Decision reported in THIMMAMMA v. SIDDARANGAIAH, , this Court has held that “it is thus clear that the scope of Revision under Section 121-A of the Act is limited and does not extend to re-appreciation of facts.”
18. The learned Counsel Mr. S.P.Shankar, appearing for the petitioner, has, no doubt, put forth persuasive arguments and also made gallant attempts to show that the order of the Appellate Authority suffers from illegality and irregularity in its proceedings. I do not find any illegality in the order of the Appellant Authority nor any irregularity in its proceedings.
19. For the reasons stated above, these Revision Petitions fail and are rejected.
In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case, no order as to costs.