JUDGMENT
V.S. Aggarwal, J.
1. Petitioner Raghbir Singh has filed the present writ petition invoking Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing the order passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hisar and also the order dismissing/terminating the services of the petitioner dated 11.12.1989. 2. Some of the relevant facts can well be delineated. The petitioner was appointed as a Field Inspector (Junior) in the service of the Haryana State Co-operative Supply and Marketing Federation Limited (for short respondent-Federation). He was selected by the Board of Directors of the respondent-Federation. The Board of Directors of respondent-Federation is only empowered to appoint the Field Inspectors under the Common Cadre Rules known as “The Haryana State Supply and Marketing Cooperation Service (Common Cadre) Rules, 1969. While the petitioner was posted as Field Inspector at Fatehabad in the year 1974, his services were terminated on 22.1.1974 by the Managing Director of the respondent-Federation presumably on the basis of a confidential letter written by the District Manager, Hafed, Sirsa. It had been written that the staff of Cotton Corporation of India and Hafed staff were indulging in mal practice and committed a fraud at Fatehabad in connivance with the kacha Artias of the Mandi. As against the petitioner, it was further reported that he was quarreling at about 9.00 P.M. with Avinash Chander in the office of the society over the distribution of the money and Moman Singh, Peon of the society who was present there, was bribed with Rs. 100/- by Raghbir Singh for not disclosing as to what had transpired between him and the other persons. The peon, however, disclosed about the said fact. The petitioner had represented that he is being victimised. The Managing Director thereupon had issued fresh appointment letter to the petitioner from 15.5.1975 instead of cancelling the earlier order terminating his services dated 22.1.1974.
3. Subsequently, the Managing Director of the respondent-Federation issued a charge sheet to the petitioner. The subject matter of the same was identical. On basis of it the services of the petitioner were terminated. After a period of 4 years, the petitioner was issued another charge sheet on 8.11.1978 pointing various irregularities. The petitioner had submitted the reply. The services of the petitioner were terminated on 11.12.1980. A reference was made to the Labour Court. Respondent No. 2 after recording of some evidence concluded that services of the petitioner were terminated in a legal and valid manner.
4. By virtue of the present writ petition, the petitioner assails the order terminating his services and also the award of the Labour Court. It is alleged that no Enquiry Officer was appointed nor any enquiry was conducted to look into the allegations against the petitioner when his services were terminated. It is also the petitioner’s assertion that he was appointed by the Board of Directors who alone could pass the orders terminating his services. It has been alleged further that the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, did not hold any enquiry under the Industrial Disputes Act. He only acted on basis of the documents tendered by the District Manager and decided the reference. When the petitioner felt that the management had not led any evidence and the matter was likely to be decided by the Presiding Officer in the absence of evidence, he submitted an application to lead evidence to rebut the charges. No order was passed and no opportunity was given to the petitioner.
5. In the written statement filed, the respondent-Federation has contested the petition. It has been asserted that charge sheet had been served on the petitioner. The reply filed by the petitioner was duly considered. After full consideration, a show cause notice was issued and the competent authority dealt both the charge sheets. Thereafter, the punishment had been imposed taking stock of the facts. Oral enquiry was not necessary because effective opportunity had been provided to the petitioner. Principles of natural justice thus were not violated. It was denied that the Managing Director had not appointed the petitioner. On behalf of the respondents it had been asserted that it was the Managing Director who had issued the appointment letter and thus was competent to terminate the services,
6. Rejoinder was filed by the petitioner. It was reiterated that enquiry was necessary and it is a mandatory provision that enquiry as such should be conducted. He insisted that Board of Directors could terminate the services because he was interviewed by the Board of Directors on 27.4.1972 and thus the Board was the Appointing Authority.
7. During the course of arguments, on behalf of the petitioner no dispute was raised regarding the right of the Managing Director to terminate his services. .
8. The first and foremost question that came up for consideration was as to whether it was necessary to hold an enquiry before terminating the services of the petitioner or not? Before the Labour Court reply had been filed. Therein the respondent-Federation had pleaded :-
“3. That para No. 3 of the claim petition is absolutely wrong and incorrect. It is denied and is not admitted. The dismissal of the petitioner is legal and justified and charge sheet was served upon the employee (petitioner), but the employee failed to explain the charges levelled against him. The charges levelled against him were very clear and the petitioner even could not put up his defence as such no enquiry was warranted. The records made by the delinquent forms the basis of the charge and he is asked to explain every circumstances. In the circumstances the principles of natural justice are complied with and examination of witness is not at all essential.
4. That para No. 4 of the claim petition is absolutely wrong and incorrect. It is denied and is not admitted. The dismissal is according to the terms and conditions of the appointment and in accordance with law. A short note regarding dismissal of the workman is enclosed and it is prayed that Hon’ble Court should hold enquiry under Section 11 of I.D. Act in the charges levelled against the petitioner as shown in the short note if so feel necessary and respondent be allowed to lead the evidence to prove the charges.”
It is abundantly clear that before the Labour Court the plea was raised that no such enquiry had been conducted. It has only been stated that a show cause notice had been issued and thus the principles’ of natural justice have been complied with. This is clear from subsequent paragraph of the reply that in the alternative it had even been prayed that enquiry may now be held under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. Even in the present written statement it has not specifically been asserted that enquiry as such had been held or any particular Enquiry Officer had been appointed. During the course of arguments, the respondents were directed to produce the enquiry file. The learned counsel had taken couple of adjournments and pointed that same is not traceable. It is abundantly clear from aforesaid that no enquiry had been held nor any Enquiry Officer appointed.
9. Reference in this connection can well be made to the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Vidya Rani v. The State of Haryana and Ors., 1996(3) Recent Services Judgments 336. The petitioner herein had been appointed as Anganwari worker. She had challenged the order terminating her services on the ground that no enquiry was held and the principles of natural justice have been violated. This Court quashed the order holding that the order had been passed by way of punishment. The services were terminated without recording any evidence in the departmental proceedings nor any opportunity in this regard had been given. The precise findings are:-
“It is not in dispute that although show cause notices were issued to the petitioner broadly indicating the nature of allegations levelled against her but no regular inquiry was held by the respondents before dispensing with the services of the petitioner. It is not in dispute that no formal charge sheet was served upon the petitioner, no evidence was produced in a departmental inquiry and no opportunity was given to the petitioner to produce defence evidence. In the Managing Director, U.P. Warehousing Corporation and Ors. v. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 840, their Lordships of the Supreme court have laid down that even in case where provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India are not applicable and there are no statutory rules which regulate the holding of departmental inquiry, the employer is duty bound to comply with the minimum requirement of principles of natural justice. According to the Supreme Court, the employer is required to serve a charge-sheet, give opportunity to the employee to file reply, produce evidence, given an opportunity to the employee to cross-examine the witnesses produced in support of the charges and also to give an opportunity to the delinquent to produce defence evidence.”
Keeping in view the same, the said contention of the petitioner must prevail.
10. However, on behalf of the respondents it was urged that in any case, the respondents had led evidence under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act and the learned Labour Court had also gone into the said controversy. In the award that has been passed it has been recorded:-
“Even otherwise also if we assume for the sake of argument that there was some technical defect in the enquiry held by the department the whole conduct of the petitioner as proved from the documents shows that he is a person, who should have been removed from service much earlier, while he was at Bhiwani, the petitioner prepared fictitious permits for the sale of gram seed and then sold about 40 bags of gram seed in the black market. The document in this regard are Ex. M-12 and M-11 and these documents shows that the management had found truth in the allegations that the gram seed was sold in black by the petitioner in fictitious names.
As regards the unauthorised sale of patri, the petitioner alleged in his reply. Ex. M-6 that the patri was sold by the Manager in whose custody it was lying and the Manager had asked him (petitioner) to collect the money from the party. He admitted that the amount of sale price of patri of Rs. 500/- was deposited with the society by him. The petitioner denied that he was guilty of sale of patri and embezzlement but the allegations themselves prove that there is no truth in the version of the petitioner. The Manager would not sell the patri in this way and ask the petitioner to collect the money from the parties concerned. The very fact that the petitioner deposited the amount of sale price of patri goes to show that it was he, who had mis-appropriated the amount and was, therefore, forced to deposit the amount.”
11. With respect to the controversy such an evidence could be recorded or not, no dispute had been raised. However, what is material is if the Labour Court had gone into that controversy or not. Perusal of the record reveals that only one witness had been re-corded who produced certain documents. Seemingly they were not formally proved. The petitioner had asked for a chance to lead certain evidence and even filed an application, copy of which is Annexure P-6. Petitioner’s contention is that the said application was not decided. In the written statement filed this fact had not been denied specifically. It must, therefore, he held that with respect to the controversy raised that such an evidence could be led in terms of Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, no proper evidence had been allowed to be proved. The Supreme Court in the case of Neeta Kaplish v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court and Anr., 1998(10) Supreme Laws Today 52 was concerned with a similar controversy. It was held:-
“Having regard to the findings recorded by the Labour Court that the domestic enquiry was not properly and fairly held and an effective opportunity of hearing was not given to the appellant, the Labour Court was right in calling upon the Management to lead fresh evidence. Since, the management did not lead any fresh evidence on merits, the appellant was well within her right to say that she, too, would not lead any fresh evidence. But, for that reason, her claim could not be rejected. Rather, she was entitled to be granted relief then and there. However, having regard to the entire circumstances of the case particularly when the Labour Court had itself found that the enquiry was not fairly and properly held, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and that of the Labour Court and remand the case back to the Labour Court to decide the case afresh after requiring the parties to lead fresh evidence on merits in pursuance of its order dated 21.11.1995.”
In face of the aforesaid it is obvious that no proper enquiry as such had been held. It is in the fitness of things that both the parties should be given proper opportunity to lead evidence. But the matter has to be remitted back to the Labour Court.
12. It is true that many years have elapsed. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed and the matter is remanded back to the Labour Court. The learned Labour Court will complete the enquiry with respect to the dispute within six months from the first date of hearing. The parties are directed to appear before the learned Labour Court on November 25, 1999.