High Court Jharkhand High Court

Ragho Sharan Singh vs Bharat Coking Coal Limited on 27 March, 2009

Jharkhand High Court
Ragho Sharan Singh vs Bharat Coking Coal Limited on 27 March, 2009
               IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                                    W.P. (S) No. 5193 of 2008
                                               ---
Ragho Sharan Singh                                                                   Petitioner
                                         Versus
Bharat Coking Coal Limited through its
Chairman cum Managing Director and others                                 Respondents
                                            ---
CORAM:               HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D.G.R. PATNAIK
                                            ---
For the Petitioner:  Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, Sr. Advocate, Mr. Saurav Arun, Advocate
For the Respondents: Mr. Anoop Kumar Mehta and Mr. Amit Kumar Sinha, Advocates
                                            ---
                                          CAV ORDER
                                                 ---
Reserved On: 19.03.2009                                   Pronounced On: _22.03.2009
                                             ---
9. 22.3.2009

The petitioner was appointed in the establishment of the respondent BCCL in the
year 1974. At the time of his appointment, his service record was opened wherein his date of
birth was recorded as 27.12.1957 and the same date of birth was entered in Form-B Register,
Service Excerpt and NEIS Form. As per the aforesaid entry, the petitioner is expected to
superannuate in December 2017.

2. The grievance of the petitioner is that he was unexpectedly served with the notice dated
27.5.2008 (Annexure-9) intimating that he would attain the age of superannuation i.e. 60 years
on 30.11.2008, as per the entry recorded in respect of his date of birth in his service records.

Petitioner’s claim in this writ application is for quashing the aforesaid notice (Annexure-

9) and also for directing the respondents to correct the entry regarding his date of birth and
record the same as 27.12.1957 instead of 25.11.1948 and allow the petitioner to continue in
service till he attains the age of 60 years as counted from 27.12.1957.

3. Counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent BCCL, wherein grounds
advanced by the petitioner, has been denied and disputed.

4. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent
BCCL.

5. Sri A.K.Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner was
initially appointed on 27.12.1974 as a time rated worker. Subsequently, a new Form-B Register
was prepared by the BCCL in which his date of birth was recorded as 27.12.1957. Learned
counsel submits that after having accepted this entry as the correct entry of the petitioner’s date
of birth, and continuing with the same for more than 25 years, the respondents are now wanting
to change the entry by referring the petitioner’s case to the Date of Birth Committee (DOBC).
Such action on the part of the respondents, according to the learned counsel, is totally arbitrary
and illegal since the petitioner was neither served with any notice, nor was he informed that the
respondents had contemplated to change the entry regarding his date of birth in his service
records. Learned counsel adds further that by obtaining a misleading report from the DOB
Committee, that too behind the back of the petitioner, the respondents have now arbitrarily and
illegally proceeded to change the date of birth of the petitioner after more than 25 years.

6. Shri A.K. Mehta, learned counsel for the respondents, submits on the other hand, that the
present writ application is not maintainable since the petitioner has sought for change in the
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entry regarding his date of birth at the fag end of his service. Learned counsel explains that the
petitioner was initially appointed under the erstwhile National Coal Development Corporation
Limited (NCDC) at Sudamdih Shaft Mine. Prior to his appointment, he was medically examined
on 25.12.1974 and upon such examination, the Civil Surgeon had recorded the petitioner’s age
as 26 years. Learned counsel would explain that though subsequently, in the Form-B Register,
the petitioner’s date of birth was recorded as 27.12.1957, but later on when the error was
detected, the petitioner’s case was referred to the Date of Birth Committee, which on
examination of the records of the petitioner, had concluded that the date of birth of the petitioner
is 25.12.1948 and not 25.12.1957. Upon communication of the above conclusion of the DOB
Committee, the respondents had made the correction of the entry of the petitioner’s date of birth
in the Form-B Register and had also communicated the decision of the DOB Committee to the
petitioner vide letter dated 18/21.02.2000 (Annexure-2). Learned counsel adds that even though,
such communication was conveyed to the petitioner vide Annexure-2 dated 21.2.2000, but he
had never raised any grievance against the correction of the entry of his date of birth and it is
now at the belated stage and at the fag end of his service, that the petitioner has chosen to agitate
the correction of the entry of his date of birth.

Learned counsel would explain further that the petitioner’s claim that his date of birth is
27.12.1957, cannot be accepted in view of the fact that by counting his age, according to this
date of birth, he would have been less than 17 years of age at the time of his induction in service
in the year 1974, whereas the minimum prescribed age of appointment of workers under the
Mines Act and Rules thereunder is 18 years.

7. Contradicting the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents, learned counsel
for the petitioner would want to explain that the respondents cannot place any reliance upon the
purported medical certificate (Annexure-A) since, firstly it is not a certificate of date of birth and
secondly, the entry of the age is not based upon any authentic document or assessment. Rather,
even as the entry declares, the age was assessed on the basis of physical appearance only.
Learned counsel adds that the purported decision of the DOB Committee has not been produced
by the respondents on the false plea that the same was seized by the D.G.M.S. and the same has
now been lost.

8. From the rival submissions of the parties, the admitted facts which emerge are that the
petitioner was appointed under the respondents in December 1974. A service book, known as
Form-B Register was opened by the respondents for the petitioner in which his date of birth was
recorded as 27.12.1957. After more than 25 years, respondents have sought to change the entry
on the ground that the Date of Birth Committee had decided that the petitioner’s date of birth
should have been recorded as 25.12.1948.

Admittedly, while referring the petitioner’s case to the DOB Committee, no prior notice
was given to the petitioner. Furthermore, even the Date of Birth Committee did not issue any
notice to the petitioner to offer his explanation against the proposed change in the entry
regarding his date of birth, as appearing in the Form-B Register. Furthermore, the respondents
after having accepted the entry regarding his date of birth appearing in the Form-B Register as
25.12.1957 have continued to treat the same date of birth as correct for more than 26 years.

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It is apparent from the above that the respondents BCCL have unilaterally taken its
decision to change the entry regarding the petitioner’s date of birth in the Form-B Register
without giving any prior notice to him. It is for the respondents to explain as to how and on what
basis, the petitioner’s date of birth as 25.12.1957 was entered in the Form-B Register even
though, as contended by the respondents, the medical certificate (Annexure-A) was available
with them. In this context, it is relevant to note that the purported medical certificate (Annexure-
A) does not bear the signature or thumb impression of the petitioner, not does it appear to be an
authentic document. It is also relevant to note that even by the counter-affidavit and the
submission made on behalf of the respondents, the employer has not been able to show any
genuine basis or justification or any occasion for reassessment of the petitioner’s age and for
referring his case to the DOB Committee after more than 25 years of acceptance of the entry
which was initially recorded in the Form-B Register.

A similar issue came up for consideration before this court in the case of Baij Nath
Mahato vs. M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd and others
[2008(2) JLJR 308]. The court had
observed that the fact that the date of birth of the writ petitioner was recorded in the statutory
Form-B Register and in the identity card issued to him, continued undisputed for 29 years and
there being no justification for making reassessment of the age of the employee, the act of
forcibly superannuating the employee, that too without issuing any prior notice to him and
without affording him any opportunity of being heard, was totally arbitrary and illegal. The
same ratio applies to the facts of the present case also.

9. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that in the instant case,
petitioner has raised a dispute of fact which cannot be addressed by this court in exercise of its
writ jurisdiction is not tenable. In the case of State of Orissa vs. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei and
others
[AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1969], the Supreme Court has held that even administrative
orders which involve civil consequences, have to be passed consistently with the rules of
natural justice. The order of compulsory retirement based on a certain disputed date of birth, can
certainly be judicially reviewed where such an order is violative of the principles of natural
justice and passed without affording any opportunity to the employee of being heard. The same
view was taken by this court in the case of Narayan Das Vs. Jharkhand State Electricity
Board, Ranchi and others [2005 (2) JLJR 488] and again in the case of Jagdish Paswan vs.
Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Ranchi and others
[2005(2) JLJR 518] and also by the
Division Bench of this court in the case of Sunder Pandit vs. Jharkhand State Electricity
Board, Ranchi and others
[2006 (1) JLJR 326].

10. In the light of the above discussions, I find merit in this application. Accordingly, this
writ application is allowed in terms of the relief sought for by the petitioner. The impugned
notice (Annexure-9), as issued by the respondent no. 6, is hereby quashed. Respondents are
directed to restore the original entry of the petitioner’s date of birth made in the Form-B
Register as 27.12.1957 and treat the same for the purpose of computing the date of his
superannuation.

(D.G.R. Patnaik, J)

Ranjeet/A.F.R.