JUDGMENT
A.P. Ravani, J.
1. The petitioner’s nephew, Mohmmed Hanif Bilabhai Memon, has been detained under the provisions of the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 (Act No. 7 of 1980), as per order dt. April 28, 1988. The order was. executed on July 5, 1988. The petitioner has challenged the legality and validity of the order by filing this petition.
2. It is disclosed in the grounds of detention that on Nov. 26, 1987 the police raided the residential premises of the detenu and on search it was found that there was one barrel containing pamolene oil and there were some tins also. There was about 180 kgs. of pamolene oil in the barrel. Two filled tins of pamolene oil were lying near the barrel On seeing the police the detenu tried to escape, but he was arrested. Before the staff of the Directorate of Civil Supplies the detenu had given statement. Therein he admitted that he was dealing in pamolene oil for last about one month prior to the date of search; that he was not holding any licence or permit to deal in pamolene oil; that he was purchasing the pamolene oil at the rate of Rs. 3600/- per barrel and then the same was being filled in tins which were being sole at the rate of Rs. 338 to Rs. 339A per tin. Thus he was earning Rs. 30/- to Rs. 35 per tin. It is also disclosed that pamolene oil was being obtained with the help of Ramaji Sunaji who in turn used to procure pamolene oil from brokers Galbaji Hemaji and Kapurji Navaji. It was also disclosed that aforesaid Galbaji Hemaji and Kapurji Naveji had received pamolene oil from the dealers of fair price shops. The aforesaid pamolene oil was sold by the detenu. In respect of this sale no bills were issued nor any accounts were maintained. It was therefore alleged that the detenu was guilty of storing pamolene oil in excess of 10 kg. which was the permissible limit up to which one may store pamolene oil. It was also disclosed that for the pamolene oil sold, no books of accounts were maintained that while indulging in such activity the detenu had abetted brokers Ramaji Sunaji, Galbaji Hemaji and Kapurji Navaji. It was also alleged that while indulging in such activity statutory provisions of Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 were directly or indirectly contravened and of fence under the aforesaid Act was committed. The detaining authority came to the conclusion that with a view to preventing the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodity i.e. edible oil (pamolene) essential to the community it was necessary to detain him am hence passed the order dt. April 28, .1988 The petitioner has challenged the legality and validity of the aforesaid order.
3. It is contended that the provisions of Sections 3(4) of the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 have not been complied with inasmuch as the State Government has failed to report to the Central Govt. within seven days from the date of the order. In the affidavit-in-reply filed by one Shri M. D. Makwana, Depuly Secretary to Government of Gujarat, Food and Civil Supplies Department, Sachivalaya, Gandhinagar it is stated that the fact of detention was reported to the Central Government on April 28, 1988 i.e. the date on which the order was passed. The learned Counsel for the Central Government has produced on record a copy of the telex message received by him wherein it is stated that the State Government reported the fact to the Central Government vide letter dt. April 28, 1988 and the same was received on May 4, 1988. Be it noted that in respect of the alleged illegal transactions certain other persons have been detained by orders passed on the same date. All these persons have challenged the legality and validity of the detention order. By filing special criminal application No. 489 of 1988 one Kapurji Navaji has challenged the order of his detention. Therein also this contention is taken. In the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the Central Government in that petition, the aforesaid facts have been stated. The telex message as well as a copy of the affidavit-in-reply filed in the aforesaid petition have been shown to the learned Counsel for the petitioner. We do no see any reason to doubt the telex message, much more so in view of the affidavit-in-reply filed in the above petition. By consent of the! parties, the averments made in affidavit-in-reply in the cognate petit on have been referred to. Assuming that the same cannot be relied upon, even then in view of the telex message and the statement made by the counsel for the respondents we hold that the provisions of Section 3(4) of the Act have been sufficiently complied with. In above view of the matter there is sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section 3(4) of the Act. Similar view is taken in the aforesaid petition also, which has been decided by this Court on September 20, 1988.
4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the State Government is required to send the report to the Central Government. While sending the report the State Government made translation of the Gujarati documents into English. It is contended that the translation has not been supplied to the detenu. It is contended that had the detenu been served with the translated copies of documents he would have been in a position to show as to whether the translation was correct or not. It is an admitted position that the translated documents have not been supplied to the petitioner detenu. We have not been pointed out any provision of law under which the translated copies of the original documents are required to be supplied to the detenu. The detenu is required to be supplied copies of documents containing basic facts constituting grounds of detention and not all the subsidiary facts and other particulars, on which reliance is placed by the detaining authority, while arriving at the necessary satisfaction. This is the requirement as laid down under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. It is so held by Supreme Court in the case of Hansmukh v. State of Gujarat . It is not necessary that the translation of documents which may be sent to the Central Government by the State Government is also required to be supplied to the detenu. There is no right whatsoever, either statutory of constitutional, vested in the detenu to demand that he be supplied with copies of translated documents. Constitutional requirement is that of communication of grounds of detention to the detenu in the language which the detenu understands. This cannot be carried further and extended to claim that the documents be also supplied in the language which the detaining authority understands and in which he transacts his administrative business. For such claim there is no rational and/or legitimate basis. On the contrary it would amount to absurdity. The detenu is required to be communicated the grounds. He is not concerned or at any rate he is not to understand, nor is he to be communicated the manner and method in which the detaining authority understands the material placed before him. Detenu’s right to make adequate and effective representation depends upon the communication of grounds of detention in the language which the detenu understands and not upon the language which the detaining authority understands. Hence the ground is rejected.
5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the case was not referred to the Advisory Board within the stipulated period and the Advisory Board has not given its report before the stipulated period. In this connection we have seen the original file. It is abundantly clear that the petitioner was detained on July 6, 1988. Reference was made to the Advisory Board on July 22, 1988. The Advisory Board has rendered its opinion on Aug. 19, 1988. We have shown the relevant papers of the file to the learned Counsel for the petitioner also. In above view of the matter, there is sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section 10 of the Act inasmuch as the reference is required to be made within three weeks from the date of detention and the Advisory Board is required to render its opinion within seven weeks. If one refers to the aforesaid dates it is abundantly clear that the statutory requirement is complied with.
6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order of detention is dt. April 28, 1988 while the same has been executed on July 6, 1988. In his submission no efforts were made to execute the order. There is unreasonable and inordinate delay in executing the order and on account of this delay, live link between the detention and the order of detention is snapped and therefore the satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority at the time of passing the order cannot be said to have remained in tact when the order was executed. Therefore, the satisfaction stands vitiated and the order of detention also stands vitiated. In support of the aforesaid argument the learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sk. Nizamuddin v. State of West Bengal . We are afraid, the decision is absolutely irrelavant and we do not understand why the decision has been cited at all. In that case the detenu was arrested in connection with a criminal case on April 14, 1973. Since the witnesses were not willing to depose against him he was discharged from the criminal case. The detention order was passed on Sept. 10, 1973, The subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate was based on the solitary incident of the criminal case pertaining to theft in which he was discharged. After passing of the order of discharge from the criminal case, the petitioner was detained on Nov. 23, 1973. In that case the Supreme Court held that it could not be said that the District Magistrate applied his mind and arrived at a real and genuine satisfaction that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner. Delayed execution of the detention order was considered as a circumstance which raised doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate. In this case it is not even argued that on account of the delay in passing the order of detention the genuineness of the satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority stands vitiated. Simply because delay in execution of the order was considered to be an added ground for raising doubt on the genuineness of the satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority, the decision does not become relevant in support of the argument that on account of the delay in execution of the order, the satisfaction stands vitiated. Hence no further discussion is necessary as far as this decision is concerned.
7. The learned Counsel for the respondents relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. State of Tamil Nadu . Therein, in para 6 of the judgment the Supreme Court inter alia observed that there must be a ‘live and proximate link’ between the grounds of detention alleged by the detaining authority and the avowed purpose of detentioa The Court in appropriate cases may assume that the link is ‘snapped’ if there is a long and unexplained delay between the date of the order of detention and the arrest of the detenu. In such a case the Court may strike down the order of detention, unless the grounds indicate a fresh application of the mind of the detaining authority to the new situation and the changed circumstances. But where the delay is not only adequately explained but is found to be the result of the recalcitrant or refractory conduct of the detenu in evading arrest, there is warrant to consider that he ‘link’ is not snapped but strengthened In the instant case one Shri D. N. Majumdur, Police Sub Inspector, Crime Branch, Ahmedabad, has filed affidavit and has stated that after receipt of necessary instructions from the Commissioner of Police, regarding the order of detention he had enquired at the place of the detenu on April 28, 1988 and thereafter on April 29,1988, May 1, 1988, May 25,1988. May 28, 1988, May 30, 1988, June 12, 1988, June 19, 1988 and on July 5, 1988. It was only on July 6, 1988 the detenu could be found and on that date only the order could be executed. There is no reason to disbelieve the affidavit filed by the Police Sub Inspector. Moreover, in the facts and circumstances of the case it is reasonable to infer that when other persons who were involved in the same transactions and in respect of whom orders of detention were passed on the same date and were executed within two or three days from the date of passing of the order, the present detenu would have come to know about the same and thereafter would have concealed himself or would have remained away from the sight of the police. In the grounds of detention also it is disclosed : hat prior to the date of detention the detenu had indulged in illegal activity of procuring six barrels of pamolene oil, and one more barrel was also procured Therefore it can never be said that when such well-organised activity of withdrawing pamolene oil from Government godowns with the help of brokers was going on, delay of one or two months in executing the order would snap the link v with the grounds of detention. Moreover, the delay is fully explained. We do not see any reason to disbelieve the affidavit file by the Police Sub Inspector concerned.
8. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that certain documents have not been supplied at all and therefore the detenu’s right to make effective representation has been infracted and therefore) the continued detention is required to be declared illegal and void. In this connection affidavit in reply is filed and therein it is pointed out that the documents about which complaint is made have as a matter of fact been supplied and they are at pages 17 to 23. In this view of the matter it is found that the aforesaid ground has been raised on facts non-existing. Hence the same is required to be mentioned only for the purpose of being rejected.
9. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the detenu had submitted a representation to the Advisory Board when he appeared before the Advisory Board. That representation was jointly addressed to the Advisory Board as well as to the Secretary, Ministry of Civil Supplies, Shastri Bhavan, New Delhi. Therefore, it is submitted that it was the bounden duty of the Advisory Board to transmit it to the Central Government. In the alternative it is submitted that in case it is held that it was not the duty of the Advisory Board to send it to the Central Government, then when the Advisory Board sends its report to the State Government this representation would also have formed part of the said report At the time of consideration of the report of the Advisory Board the State Government ought to have taken the same into consideration. Since it was also addressed to the Central Government it was the bounden duty of the State Government to send it to the Central Government. The argument, to say the least is fantastic. It is an admitted position that no representation whatsoever had been submitted by the detenu to any of the authorities, i.e. the jail authority or the Advisory Board specifically mentioning that copy of the representation was being submitted to that particular authority, with a view that the same may be sent to the Central Government. What was submitted to the Advisory Board was the representation which was required to be considered by the Advisory Board, Simply because it was also addressed to the Central Government it was not at all necessary for the Advisory Board to assume that the detenu had not sent the! representation to the authority to whom it was specifically addressed, Similarly it was also not necessary for the State Government to imagine that detenu had not sent the representation to the Central Government and therefore it must take upon itself the task of sending the representation to the Central Government. Even if the State Government knew that the representation jointly addressed to the Central Government and to the Advisory Board was not sent to the Central Government, it was under no obligation to send the same to the Central Government, because there is nothing to indicate that any copy of the representation was ever submitted to the State Government with a request that the same may be forwarded to the Central Government. Affording an opportunity to make representation does not mean that the authority concerned should play the role of an adviser or helper of the detenu, Unless there is anything specific to indicate that the State Government was expressly requested to transmit the representation to the Central Government no such obligation or duty arises on the part of the State Government. There is no such provision in law and no such duty or obligation can be read in any of the provisions of law.
10. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of West Bengal and in the case of Devji Vallabhbhai v. Administrator, Goa, Daman and Diu . In the case of Jayanarayan Sukul (supra) four principles have been laid by the Supreme Court with regard to the representation; namely,
(i) The appropriate authority is bound to give an opportunity to the detenu to make a presentation and to consider the representation of the detenu as early as possible.
(ii) The consideration of the representation of the detenu by the appropriate authority is entirely independent of any action by the Advisory Board including the consideration of the representation of the detenu by the Advisory Board.
(iii) There should not be any delay in the matter of consideration.
(iv) The appropriate Government is to exercise its opinion and judgment on the representation before sending the case along with the detenu’s representation to the Advisory Board.
11. From the aforesaid principles no duty or obligation of the State Government can be read so as to transmit the representation to the Central Government which reaches to it in the file of the Advisory Board even though there is no such request made by the detenu to the State Government. In the case of Devji Vallabhbhai Tandel (supra) in para 14 of the judgment the Supreme Court observed that it would be open to the detenu to send the representation by any other communicating media but the opportunity to make a representation does not Comprehend an oral hearing. Reliance is placed on this observation and it is sought to be argued that the representation was sought to be sent through the Advisory Board, then to the State Government and thereafter to the Central Government. As stated hereinabove the argument is far-fetched and fantastic. Neither the Advisory Board nor the State Government can be said to be a communicating media, much more so when the copy of the representation does not indicate that the particular representation was made and submitted so that the same can be sent to the Central Government. In this view of the matter even if it is stated that a copy of the representation submitted was meant for Central Government then also it would not be the duty either that of the Advisory Board or that of the State Government to send or transmit the representation to the authority to whom it is addressed. It is for the detenu to submit his representation to the appropriate authority, who, under law, is bound to send representation to the authority to whom it is addressed. As per the condition of detention, the jail authority, i.e. the Superintendent of the Jail concerned where the detenu is detained, is bound to receive the representation from the detenu and send the same immediately to the authority to whom it is addressed. It may be noted that in the grounds of detention also it is stated and the detenu is informed that the representation is to be made through the Jail authority. Therefore, the detenu cannot be permitted to throw the representation to any authority whomsoever and then contend that the authority whosoever comes in possession of the same must make arrangement for its transmission to the authority/ies to whom iris addressed.
12. The learned Counsel for the petitioner extensively argued the point based on the provisions of Section 3(1)(a) and 3(1)(b) urging that specific provision should have been referred to in the order of detention. However, he has not pressed this point and has fairly conceded that the point may not be dealt with at all.
13. No other contention is raised. There is no substance in the petition. Hence rejected. Rule discharged.