CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 8263 of 2001 PETITIONER: Rai Vimal Krishna & Ors. RESPONDENT: Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/07/2003 BENCH: Ruma Pal & B.N.Srikrishna. JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
RUMA PAL, J
This case relates to the assessment of the appellants’
holdings in Patna under the Patna Municipal Corporation Act,
1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
A brief survey of the relevant provisions of the Act is
necessary before considering the facts of the case since the
appellants’ grievances are that the provisions of the Act have
not been followed in assessing the appellants’ properties to tax.
The Act, which came into force on 15th August 1952, was
passed to consolidate and amend the law relating to the
municipal affairs of the town and suburbs of Patna. Section
123 of the Act allows the Corporation, with the previous
approval of the State Government, to impose various taxes and
fees. We are concerned with clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section
123 which provide for the imposition of property tax, water tax
and latrine tax on holdings situated within Patna – the tax being
assessed on the annual letting value. Section 130 provides
that the annual value of a holding shall be deemed to be the
gross annual rental at which the holding may reasonably be
expected to let. This however is subject to rules that may be
prescribed by the State Government. Any tax which is
assessed on the annual value of a holding, other than the
latrine tax or drainage tax, is payable by the owner of the
holding within the Corporation. The latrine or drainage tax is
payable by the persons in actual occupation of such holdings.
(Section 132 (1), (2)).
Section 133 provides for the preparation of a Valuation
List in four stages: — (I) determination to impose a tax to be
assessed on the annual value of holdings (II) inquiry to be held
by the Chief Executive Officer (III) the determination of the
annual value of all holdings and (IV) the entry of the value in a
valuation list. The percentage at which tax is payable is fixed
under section 136 by the Corporation on the basis of reports
submitted by the Chief Executive Officer and the Standing
Committee. This relates to stage (I) of section 133. For the
purposes of stage (II) the Chief Executive Officer may require
owners or occupiers, or both, of holdings to furnish him with
returns of the rent or annual value thereof and such other
particulars as he may require for the preparation of the
valuation list. The Chief Executive Officer is also empowered to
inspect or cause any holding to be inspected and measured, if
necessary, after giving notice to the occupier. (Section 134).
The preparation of the Assessment List follows the Valuation
List. This is done under section 137 which also sets out the
particulars which must be contained therein namely:
(a) the name of the street in which the
holding is situated.
(b) the number of the holding on the
register;
(c) a description of the holding;
(d) the annual value of the holding;
(e) the name of the owner and occupier;
(f) the amount of tax payable for the year;
(g) the amount of quarterly instalment; and
(h) if the holding is exempted from
assessment, a notice to that effect.
Both the Valuation and the Assessment Lists should
ordinarily be prepared once in every five years under section
138 (1). In terms of the proviso to section 138 (1) “in between
the two general assessments, the State Government may, on
the recommendation of the Corporation, authorise it to prepare
a fresh assessment list in respect of any specified area within
the Corporation”. Every valuation and assessment list is, under
Section 138(2), valid “from the date on which the list takes
effect in the Corporation and until the first day of the quarter
next following the completion of a new list”. This is subject to
any alteration which may be made under Section 139 and to
the result of any objection to the valuation or assessment by
any person under section 150.
The next relevant provision is section 149. Since the main
plank of the appellants argument is based on this section it is
quoted verbatim:
“149. Publication of notice of assessment –
(1) When the assessment list mentioned in
section 137 has been prepared or revised, the
Chief Executive Officer shall sign the same,
and shall give public notice, by beat of drum
and by playcards posted in conspicuous
places throughout Patna, or when any part of
Patna has been assessed, then in that part of
Patna, where the said list may be inspected.
(2) The Chief Executive Officer shall also in
all cases in which any property is for the first
time assessed or the assessment is increased
give notice thereof to the owner of the
property.”
This section envisages that the assessment list which has
been prepared or revised, must be signed by the Chief
Executive Officer. After this the Chief Executive Officer is
required to give public notice of the Assessment List. The
mode of giving public notice is “by beat of drum” and “by
placards”, the latter of which is required to be posted in
conspicuous places throughout Patna. It needs to be
emphasised that the section also provides for assessment of a
part of Patna, in which case the placards are required to be
posted in conspicuous places in that part. The object of the
publication appears from the last part of sub section (1) of
section 149 and that is so that “the said list may be inspected”.
We may mention here that the question which arises for
consideration in connection with this section is whether the
mode of giving public notice of the assessment list is mandatory
or directory. According to the appellant the mode is mandatory.
They have sought to buttress their argument by referring to
section 150 which reads:
“150. Application for review.- (1) Any person
who is dissatisfied with the amount assessed
upon him or the valuation or assessment of
any holding, or who disputes his occupation of
any holding, or his liability to be assessed,
may apply to the Chief Executive Officer or an
officer empowered in this behalf by the State
Government to review the amount of
assessment, or valuation, or to exempt him
from the assessment or tax.
(2) All such applications containing objections
shall be made in writing within thirty days after
the publication of the notice referred to in sub-
section (1) of section 149, or after receipt of
the notice referred to in sub-section (2) of that
section, if such notice is received after the
publication of the notice referred to in sub-
section (1) of the said section.
Provided that the Chief Executive Officer
may, if he thinks fit extend the said period of
thirty days to a period not exceeding sixty
days”.
It is pointed out that the period of limitation for filing an
application for review under this section is computed from the
date of publication of the notice. An owner gets an extended
period of limitation provided he receives the notice under sub
section (2) of section 149 after the publication. Thus,
publication must take place.
If objections to the valuation and assessment lists are
filed under Section 150, they are required to be disposed of by
the Chief Executive Officer after giving the objector an
opportunity of being heard under section 151. Sub-section (3)
of section 151 requires that when the objection has been
determined, an order passed on such objection shall be
recorded in the register and, if necessary, an amendment
made in the assessment list in accordance with the order
passed on the objection. This order of the Chief Executive
Officer may be appealed from by any person who is dissatisfied
with it, under section 152. The appeal lies to the District Judge
whose decision under section 152 (1) “shall be final”. During
the pendency of the appeal, the tax payable in terms of the
order appealed against may be levied and realised. However if
ultimately the District Judge decides in favour of the objector,
the chief executive officer “shall refund to the person from
whom the same has been levied or realised, the amount of tax
or instalment, or the excess thereof over the amount properly
leviable in accordance with such final decision, as the case may
be, or adjust such excess amount against any future demand”.
Every valuation made by the Chief Executive Officer
under section 153 is final subject to the provisions of sections
151 and 152. In other words until and unless an order is
passed under section 151 (3) by the Chief Executive Officer or
under section 152 by the District Judge, the valuation made by
the Chief Executive Officer must prevail. Finally when the
objections have been determined, and appeals disposed of,
the assessment list shall be authenticated by the Chief
Executive Officer in the manner specified. The importance of
the authentication lies in the fact that under subsection (2) of
section 154, the assessment list shall be “conclusive evidence
of the amount of holding tax leviable on each holding within
Patna in the financial year to which the list relates”.
This, in brief, is an overview of the provisions which are
relevant for the disposal of this appeal.
The undisputed factual situation is that an assessment
list was prepared for the year 1978 — 79. The appellants
objected to the assessment list under section 150. The
objections were rejected by the Chief Executive Officer under
Section 151. The appellants preferred appeals before the
District Judge under section 152. The appeals are pending.
During the pendency of the appeals, the Corporation has been
realising or at least seeking to realise the taxes from the
appellants on the basis of the order of the Chief Executive
Officer.
With effect from 13th October 1993, in exercise of
powers conferred by section 227 read with sub-sections (1) and
(2) of section 130 of the Act, the Government of Bihar made
the Assessment of Annual Rental Value Of Holding Rules, 1993
(hereinafter referred to as the Rules). By the Rules, the method
of determining annual rental value in connection with each
holding separately was done away with. Holdings in the
Corporation were classified on the basis of situation, use and
type of construction. For the purpose of calculation of annual
rental value of holdings, the method was simplified so that it
was computable only on the measurement of the carpet area.
In addition the percentage at which holding tax, water tax and
latrine tax is to be levied, has also been specified. After the
publication of the Rules, the Corporation issued two
notifications pursuant to Rules 3(2) and 5(1). By the first
notification, the Corporation classified the several roads in
Patna city into three categories. It is not necessary for us to go
into details of this notification or the second notification which
was issued soon thereafter by the Corporation which specified
the rates of rental value per sq ft depending upon the situation,
use and nature of construction of the holdings. These Rules
and the two notifications were the subject matter of challenge
under Article 226 before the High Court. The Rules and the
notifications were struck down by the High Court as being
unconstitutional. The decision of the High Court was reversed
by this Court in State of Bihar V. S.K.P. Sinha: (1995) 3
Supreme Court Cases 86. This Court while upholding the
constitutional validity of the Rules also upheld the two
notifications.
As a result of the 1993 Rules, the provisions of sections
130 and 136 are no longer relevant for our purposes as they
have laid down a different method of valuation and assessment.
There is no dispute that the Corporation followed the Rules and
the notifications issued thereunder in preparing Valuation and
Assessment Lists thereby revising the holding tax for the first
time since 1978-79. However, the process was not completed
in respect of the entire area covered by the Act at the same
time, but in three phases. According to the Corporation, this
was because they were understaffed and were otherwise
administratively handicapped. Three notices were published
under section 149 (1), not by way of “beat of drum” nor by
posting placards at conspicuous places, but by publication in
the newspapers. Each of the three notices referred to separate
areas of Patna and were dated 26 December 1993, 1st
October 1995 and 30th December 1995 respectively. In
addition separate notices were issued to the owners of holdings
as and when the area in which a particular holding was situated
was notified. The appellants also received notices under
section 149 (2). In 1995, they filed objections under Section
150. The objections have not yet been disposed of by the Chief
Executive Officer. However, the Corporation has continued to
realise tax from the owners on the basis of the assessment list
as published.
The appellants filed a writ petition in the High Court in
which they claimed: first, that the provisions of sections 133,134
and 137 of the Act had not been followed by the Corporation in
the matter of preparation of the valuation and assessment list;
second, that publication of notice of assessment had not been
done in the manner prescribed by section 149 (1) of the Act;
third, that the assessment list could not be prepared piecemeal
at different times for different properties in a discriminatory
manner and, fourth that the new rate of tax could take effect
only after the objections under section 150 had been decided
by the Chief Executive Officer. They accordingly prayed, inter
alia, for a direction on the Corporation to prepare an
assessment list in accordance with the provisions of sections
133,137,138, 149,150,151 and other provisions of the Act and
to levy, assess and recover the tax only after the disposal of the
objections under section 150. The appellants also sought the
quashing of notices dated 26th December 1993, 1st October
1995 and 30th December 1995.
As far as the first submission was concerned, the High
Court rejected it saying, “…. It is not disputed that those steps
are now required to be taken as per provisions laid down in the
1993 Rules and such steps have been taken by the Corporation
accordingly”.
The High Court accepted the second contention of the
appellants that the mode of publication of the assessment list
prescribed under section 149 (1) of the Act was mandatory.
Nevertheless, since the appellants had admittedly received
notices under section 149 (2) and had filed applications for
review under section 150, the High Court held “in the facts of
the case the irregularity in publication of notice under section
149 (1) of the Act is not of any consequence so far as the
petitioners are concerned, so as to warrant any interference in
the matter by this Court and at this stage.”
The third submission was not accepted as the High
Court held that section 149 (1) itself provided for area-wise
assessments in respect of parts of Patna. The High Court also
accepted the explanation given by the Corporation that they
had given different publications for different areas since they
did not have sufficient working hands and because of other
administrative difficulties. Further, it held that since there was
no allegation of any mala fides, “the action of the respondents
is saved in this case but keeping in view the spirit of Article 14
of the Constitution of India in any view they would be well
advised to take prompt steps in advance so that a general
assessment for the entire area under the Corporation may be
made effective from one date”.
The fourth submission of the appellants was not
considered. However the High Court directed “the concerned
authority “to dispose of the petitioners’ applications
expeditiously and in any case within three months from the date
of production/communication of a copy of this order”.
Each of the four submissions made by the appellants
before the High Court have been reiterated before us.
The submission of the appellants that the Corporation
was bound to comply with the provisions of the Act for valuation
and assessment before publishing the assessment list is
unacceptable in view of the promulgation of the 1993 Rules,
and the notifications issued thereunder, the validity of all of
which has been upheld by this Court. It is not in dispute that
the valuations have been made and assessments have been
prepared strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed
by the 1993 Rules read with the two notifications.
The next submission of the appellants that the
Corporation does not have the power to issue separate
assessment lists in respect of different kinds of properties in
different areas is also not tenable. The 1993 Rules and the
notifications issued thereunder clearly provide for assessment
based on the localities as well as different kinds of properties,
classified according to its user and the type of construction.
Additionally, the proviso to section 138 (1) expressly indicates
that assessment lists may be prepared in respect of a specified
area within the Corporation. Finally, Section 149 sub-section (1)
itself shows that assessment lists may be made in respect of
“any part of Patna”.
The decision of this Court in Shibji Khestshi Tacker v.
The Commissioner of Dhanbad Municipality and Others
1978 (2) SCC 167 has taken a similar view while interpreting
Section 106 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipalities Act, 1922
which has been replaced by Section 138 of the present Act.
Section 106 of the 1922 Act provided:
“(1) New Valuation and assessment list shall
ordinarily be prepared, in the same manner as
the original lists, once in every five years.
(2) Subject to any alteration or amendment
made under Section 107 and to the result of
any application under Section 116, every
valuation and assessment entered in a
valuation or assessment list shall be valid
from the date on which the list takes effect in
the municipality and until the first day of the
April next following the completion of a new
list”.
The owner of the particular holding in that case had been
assessed to tax under an earlier assessment list. In the
subsequent list, the holding had not been mentioned. It was
contended that since assessment lists have to be prepared
once in every five years, the owner could not be assessed to
tax on the basis of the old assessment list. It was also
contended that only one assessment list could be prepared in
respect of the entire area covered by the 1922 Act. The
submission was rejected by this Court holding that the owner
continued to be liable under the earlier list and that:
“The language of Section 106 is flexible
enough to enable the Commissioners to leave
out for some good reason, any holding from
the revision of the valuation and assessment
lists. The word ‘ordinarily’ tones down the
force of ‘shall’ which immediately precedes it,
and indicates that the requirements with
regard to revision of the assessment in every
five years and to include all the holdings, are
not absolute but only directory and can be
departed from in extraordinary circumstances,
or in the case of particular holdings for good
reasons. This being the correct import of the
word ‘ordinarily’, it follows therefrom that in the
case of a holding which is excluded from the
quinquennial revision of assessment, the old
valuation and assessment lists do not lapse
but continue to remain in force till they are
altered or amended in accordance with the
procedure laid down in the Act. This position
of the law is clear from a reading of the last
clause of sub-section (2) of Section 106,
which provides that every valuation and
assessment entered in a valuation or
assessment list shall be valid from the date on
which the list takes effect in the municipality
and until the first day of April following the
completion of a new list. The key word
repeatedly occurring in the sub-section is ‘list’
which appears to have been advisedly used in
singular, in contradistinction to ‘lists’ employed
in plural, in sub-section (2). Such distinctive
use of the word ‘list’ in these sub-sections,
puts it beyond doubt that in respect of a
holding which, for some reason is not included
in the five yearly revision, the old valuation or
assessment list continues till a new list is
completed and the 1st day of April following
such completion is reached.”
To put it differently, there could be several assessment
lists operating in respect of different holdings in the municipal
area. The position has been clarified by the introduction of the
proviso to section 138(1) of the present Act, as we have already
noted.
The third submission of the appellants, relates to the
mode of publication of the assessment lists. That the mode of
publication is a procedural provision is self-evident. But is it a
mandatory provision? The High Court’s finding as to the nature
of the provision for publication under sub section (1) of section
149 is somewhat contradictory. While holding that the manner
of publication was mandatory and had to be complied with in
terms thereof, in a subsequent portion of the judgment, it was
held that it was a mere irregularity which could be waived. As
we read sub-section (1) of section 149, the Chief Executive
Officer is bound to give public notice of the assessment list.
The word “shall” makes that clear. However the word “shall”
does not qualify the next phrase which is separated from the
words “public notice” by a comma. The phrase separated is “by
beat of drum and by placards posted in conspicuous places
throughout Patna……….. …”. Generally speaking the object of
giving a notice is to draw the attention of the persons sought to
be affected to the matter notified. The purpose of specifying a
particular mode of giving notice is to raise a legal presumption
against such person of knowledge of the subject of the notice.
In other words, once the mode specified for giving notice is
complied with, the onus is on the persons notified to prove that
they were not aware of the subject matter of the notice. There
is otherwise no special sanctity given to the mode of service of
notice. The appellants have contended that even though
owners were served with individual notices under section
149(2), unless publication was made in the manner provided in
section 149(1) the occupants who were liable to pay water tax
and latrine tax would be seriously affected and would not have
an opportunity of challenging the imposition of the tax on them.
Incidentally, in the objections filed by the appellants their
contention is that the holdings owned by them were not liable to
payment of latrine tax or water tax because neither of the
services were available. However, the matter has to be
decided as a principle and not with reference to the appellants’
case.
Nobody disputes that publication and the giving of notice
to persons likely to be affected by the assessment list is a must.
The appellants have admitted publication of the assessment
lists in three newspapers. It is not their case that such
publication did not serve the purpose of notifying those who
might be affected by the assessment lists, of their existence.
Indeed it appears to us that the requirement to notify people by
beat of drum is an anachronism which appears to be
inappropriate in the present day and age in a large city like
Patna. The High Court’s apprehension that “holding this
provision as directory is likely to cause confusion and mischief
in future and it is not for this Court to substitute the wisdom of
the legislature with its own by holding that notice by newspaper
will be sufficient in place of notice of the spot by beat of drum
and placards” is unfounded both in law and in fact. It is an
elementary principle of interpretation that words in statutory
provisions take their colour from their context and object,
keeping pace with the time when the word is being construed.
When or where no other means of effective publication is
available, no doubt, announcing the assessment list by beat of
drum and by displaying placards would have to be complied
with. Where equally efficacious, if not better, modes of
publication are available, it would be ridiculous to insist on an
obsolete form of publication as if it were a ritual. Had the High
Court found that publication by newspapers was not effective
enough to notify the public, the assessment list could not be
given effect to unless publication were properly made. There is
no such finding. On the other hand publication through
newspapers is now an accepted form of giving general
notice. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the
portion of section 149 (1) which deals with the manner of
publication, as opposed to the requirement for publication per
se, is directory. Since there has been sufficient compliance in
effecting the intention of the legislature to give notice to the
public at large in the city of Patna, we cannot hold that the
assessment lists prepared on the basis of the 1993 Rules are
required to be set aside.
This view finds support from the decisions of this Court,
decisions which were, in our opinion, wrongly brushed aside by
the High Court. In the Municipal Council, Khurai Vs Kamal
Kumar and another reported in (1965) 2 SCR. 653, on which
the High Court has relied, there was no publication of the notice
at all. An assessment list had been prepared and published on
6 March 1963. There were several objections lodged against
the assessment list. The rate of assessment was however
subsequently revised. On the basis of the revision, a
subcommittee appointed by the Municipal Council, considered
the objections and completed its revision. The final list was
published. There were further complaints. The final list was
suspended. The Municipal Council then decided to amend the
list. This amendment was not published. Nor was the final list
as amended published. This Court held that as no opportunity
had been granted to the assessees to object to the
assessment lists as amended, the assessment list had not
been prepared in accordance with law. The decision is
factually distinguishable. Since in that case there was no
publication at all, the Court was not called upon to consider the
question whether an alternative and equally effective mode of
publication would have sufficed.
This in fact was the exact question which had been
decided by a bench of five judges in the case of Raza Buland
Sugar Co.Ltd. Vs. Municipal Board, Rampur reported in
1965 (1) SCR. 970. In that case municipal water tax was
sought to be levied under section 131 of the U. P. Municipalities
Act, 1916. In terms of section 131 (3), the Municipal Board was
required to publish its proposal relating to the tax and the draft
Rules in connection therewith along with the notice in the
specified format. Section 94 (3) provided for the manner of
publication of the resolution of the municipal board. The
method of publication prescribed was “in a local paper
published in Hindi and where there is no such local paper, in
such manner as the State Government may, by general or
special order, direct”. The publication was made in a local
paper published in Urdu. Wanchoo, J., speaking for the
majority held that the provision for publication contained in
section 131 (3) was mandatory but the mode of publication
provided in section 94 (3) was not. Therefore the publication in
an Urdu newspaper was held to be sufficient and in substantial
compliance with section 94 (3). This conclusion was arrived at
despite the use of the word “shall” in section 94 (3). This is
what the Court said:
“The question whether a particular
provision of a statute which on the face
of it appears mandatory, inasmuch as it
uses the word “shall” – as in the present
case –is merely directory cannot be
resolved by laying down any general
rule and depends upon the facts of each
case and for that purpose the object of
the statute in making the provision is the
determining factor. The purpose for
which the provision has been made and
its nature, the intention of the legislature
in making the provision, the serious
general inconvenience or injustice to
persons resulting from whether the
provision is read one way or the other,
the relation of the particular provision to
other provisions dealing with the same
subject and other considerations which
may arise on the facts of a particular
case including the language of the
provision, have all to be taken into
account in arriving at the conclusion
whether a particular provision is
mandatory or directory.
….. As we have said already the
essence of s. 131 (3) is that there
should be publication of the proposals
and draft rules so that the tax payers
have an opportunity of objecting to
them, and that is provided in what we
have called the first part of s.141(3); that
is mandatory. But the manner of
publication provided by s.94(3) which
we have called the second part of
s.131(3) appears to be directory and so
long as it is substantially complied with
that would be enough for the purpose of
providing the tax payers a reasonable
opportunity of making their objections.
We are therefore of the opinion that the
manner of publication provided in
s.131(3) is directory.”
Again in 1996 this Court in State Bank of Patiala and
others Vs S. K. Sharma (1996) 3 SCC. 364 had to interpret a
regulation framed in connection with a departmental inquiry.
The regulation required that the inquiring authority “shall also
record an order that the officer may for the purpose of preparing
his defence :
“(3) be supplied with copies of
statements of witnesses, if any,
recorded earlier and the inquiry officer
shall furnish such copies not later than
three days before the commencement of
the examination of the witnesses by the
inquiring authority”.
Copies of the statements of the witnesses were not
supplied to the charged officer. However the officer had been
permitted to inspect and take notes of the statements of the
witnesses more than three days prior to the examination of the
witnesses. The entire inquiry was challenged by the charged
officer as being vitiated, by reason of the non-supply of the
statements in compliance with the regulation. The challenge
was rejected by this Court by holding that the provision was not
of a mandatory character and that it had to be examined from
the standpoint of substantial compliance and unless prejudice
had been caused by the non-compliance, the action would be
sustained. (See also Venkataswamappa V. Special Deputy
Commissioner (Revenue 1997 9 SCC 128).
With the greatest respect, we would adopt the reasoning
of the aforesaid two decisions of this Court in rejecting the
appellants’ submission that the mode of publication prescribed
in section 149(1) as opposed to publication itself, was
mandatory and hold that the publication in the newspapers was
in substantial compliance with the requirements of the sub-
section.
Apart from any other consideration, it certainly did not lie
in the mouth of the appellants to contend that adequate notice
was not given. They were admittedly given notice under
section 149 (2) and they have also filed their objections under
section 150 to the assessment list.
This brings us to the last submission of the appellants that
there cannot be any recovery of the tax on the basis of the
assessment list so published unless the appellants objections
were disposed of under section 151. We were at first inclined
to hold in the appellants favour. But a closer scrutiny of the
provisions of the Act has persuaded us to reject the
submission. Once we have held that the assessment list had
been properly prepared in the sense that there had been no
legal flaw in its preparation and publication, the valuation as
mentioned in the assessment list must be given effect to till the
time it is revised or amended under sections 151 or 152. In
Shibji Khestshi Tacker v. The Commissioners of Dhanbad
(supra) it was said that valuation and assessment lists remain
in force until they are altered or amended in accordance with
the procedure laid down in the Act. Alteration or amendment
can take place pursuant to an order under sections 151 or 152.
This is also clear from section 153 which says that “every
valuation made by the Chief Executive Officer — — shall, subject
to the provisions of sections 151 and 152, be final”. The phrase
‘subject to’ means that until and unless the assessment list is
revised or amended under section 151 or 152, the assessment
list would continue to be final. This reading is in keeping with
sub section (2) of section 138 which provides that every
valuation and assessment list shall be valid from the date on
which the list takes effect in the Corporation and until the first
day of the quarter next following the competition of a new list,
thus indicating that an assessment list is valid from the date of
its completion. Such an assessment list is subject to “any
alteration or amendment made” and to the result of any
application under Section 150. What needs to be emphasised
is that the assessment list as prepared is valid and is
unaffected by the mere filing of an application under Section
150. If the result of the application is in favour of the owner,
the assessment list must be amended to give effect to such
result. Unless the application of the appellants under Section
150 ends in a result which is different from the assessment list,
the assessment list would continue to be operative, and the
respondent can recover taxes on the basis of the assessment
and valuation list despite the filing of objections under Section
150. Besides the reference to both sections 151 and 152 in
Section 153 makes it clear that the same incidence relating to
the recovery of taxes pending either the determination of the
objections under section 151 or the adjudication of the appeal
under section 152, would prevail. If this construction is not put
on section 153, it would mean that by merely filing an
objection, the objector would be able to effectively stop the
realisation of tax on the basis of the assessment list until such
time as his objection is heard and decided. This could not have
been legislatively intended. As has been seen in this case that
although the appellants had filed their objections in 1995, they
are still pending. We, therefore, conclude that it is open to the
Corporation to recover the tax as determined on the basis of
the impugned assessment lists pending disposal of the
appellants’ applications under Section 151, until and unless, by
virtue of an order under Section 151 or 152 passed thereon, the
assessment list is amended or altered.
The appellants’ final grievance is in respect of the non
disposal of the objections filed in respect of the assessment
lists under the 1993 Rules. As far as they are concerned, the
High Court has already directed the disposal of the same by the
concerned authority within a time frame. We see no reason to
interfere with this direction.
For the reasons aforesaid we dismiss this appeal and
affirm the decision of the High Court, albeit for reasons which
are different, with costs.