PETITIONER: RAILWAY BOARD, REPRESENTING THE UNION OFINDIA, NEW DELHI AND Vs. RESPONDENT: NIRANJAN SINGH DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/02/1969 BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. SIKRI, S.M. BACHAWAT, R.S. CITATION: 1969 AIR 966 1969 SCR (3) 548 1969 SCC (1) 502 CITATOR INFO : D 1972 SC1792 (14) RF 1972 SC1975 (9) R 1973 SC 87 (32) F 1975 SC2151 (22) F 1989 SC1185 (25) RF 1989 SC1854 (20) ACT: Constitution of India, Art. 226-Whether High Court in exercise of certiorari jurisdiction can interfere with finding of disciplinary authority-Art. 19(1) (a), (b) (c) and (3)-If violated by General Manager of Railway prohibiting meetings of employees on Railway premises. Removal-Order of-Based on a number of grounds of which one not sustainable-If order liable to be struck down. HEADNOTE: The respondent was a permanent employee of the Northern Railway and was served with a charge sheet in November, 1956, which levelled two charges against him. He was accused of having been instrumental in compelling the shut- down of an air compressor and, in contravention of a direction given by the General Manager, Northern Railway, on June 19, 1956, of having addressed a number of meetings within the Railway premises. An enquiry committee after investigating the charges came to the' conclusion that the respondent was not proved beyond all reasonable doubt but that the 'respondent was guilty of the second charge. The General Manager, who was the disciplinary authority, after examining the report of the committee, accepted its findings on the second charge but differing from its conclusion on the first charge tentatively came to the conclusion that the respondent was guilty of that charge as well. After the issue of a show-cause notice to the respondent and the 'rejection of his explanation, the General Manager directed, by an order of August 20, 1957, that the respondent be removed from service. The respondent challenged the order of his removal by a writ petition. The petition was allowed and an appeal to a Division Bench was dismissed. The questions for decision in the appeal to this Court were (i) whether the High Court was within its jurisdiction in the exercise of its powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution to set aside the conclusion reached by the General Manager on the first charge; (ii) whether the appellate court was right in its view that if an order of removal is based on number of grounds and one or more of those grounds are found to be unsustainable, the order is liable to be struck down; and (iii) whether the direction issued by the General Manager on June 19, 1956 was violative of Art. 19(1) (a) to (c) and (3). It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the rights guaranteed under Art. 19(1) (a), (b) & (c) are inviolable and they cannot be interfered with except in accordance with sub-articles 2, 3 & 4 of Art. 19; that the Railway workers had a right to assembly in any place they chose and could express their views so long they did not disturb the work going on in the premises. HELD : Allowing the appeal and dismissing the writ petition : (i) The High Court exceeded its powers in interfering with the findings of the General Manager on the first charge. It was open to the General Manager to accept the evidence which the, Enquiry Committee had rejected on the first charge and he was not bound by the conclusions reached by the corn- 549 mittee. On the facts in the present case it could not be said that the finding ofthe disciplinary authority was not supported by any evidence nor could it be said that no reasonable person could have reached such a finding. Hence the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority must prevail and the High Court in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction could not have interfered with its conclusion. [552 A-C] Union of India v. H. C. Goel, [1964] 4 S.C.R. 718; Syed Yakoob v. K. S. Radhakrishnan & Ors., [1964] 5 S.C.R. 64; relied on. (ii)There was no force in the contention that the punishment imposed could not be sustained if it was held that one of the two charges on the basis of which it was imposed, was unsustainable. If the order in an enquiry under Art. 311 can be supported on any finding as substantial misdemeanor for which the punishment imposed can lawfully be impose it is not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in imposing the punishment in question [552 G] State of Orissa v. Bidyabhan Mohapatra, [1962] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 648; followed. (iii)The General Manager's direction prohibiting the holding of meetings within the Railway premises was not violative of Art. 19(1). The Northern Railway was the owner of the premises in question and was entitled to enjoy its property in the same manner as any private individual subject to only such restriction as the law or the usage, may place on them. There is no 'fundamental right for any one to hold meetings in Government premises. Freedom of speech, freedom, to assemble peacefully and the freedom to form Associations or Unions does not mean that these rights can be exercised by the citizens in whatever place they please. The exercise of those freedoms will come to an end as soon as the right of some one else to hold his property intervenes. Such a limitation is inherent in the exercise of those rights. The validity of that limitation is not to be judged by the tests prescribed by Sub-Arts. (2) and (3) of Art. 19. [554 D] Marsh v. Alabama, 90 Law Edn. P. 265, Tucker v. State of Texas. 90 Law Edn. p. 274); distinguished. JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1206 of 1966.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated, January 14, 1963
of the Punjab High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 36-D
of 1962.
G. R. Rajagopaul, A. S. Nanbiar and s. P. Nayar, for the
appellants.
R. K. Garg and S. C. Agarwal, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hegde, J This appeal was brought after obtaining from the
High Court a certificate under Art. 132 and 133(1)(c) of the
Constitution before formulating the points arising for
decision, it would be convenient to set out the necessary
facts.
550
The respondent was holding a permanent post in the Northern
Railway. He was a Trade Union worker. On November 7, 1956
a charge-sheet was served on him levelling two charges
against him. Under the first charge, he was accused of
having been instrumental in compelling the air compressor
being shut down at about 8.15 a.m. on May 31, 1956. Under
the second charge he was accused of having contravened the
direction given by the General Manager, Northern Railway as
per his letter No. 961/E/O(Evi) dated June 19, 1956 by
addressing meetings with in the railway premises on June 23,
1956, June 25, 1956, July 24, 1956, July 25, 1956 and July
27, 1956. On these charges he was called upon to show-cause
why he should not be removed from service under Rule 1708 of
the Indian Railway Establishment Code Vol. 1 or punished
with any lesser penalties specified in Rule 1702. After
receiving his explanation an enquiry committee consisting of
three officers was appointed to enquire into the charges.
The said committee came to the conclusion that the first
charge was not proved beyond all reasonable doubt but he was
guilty of the second,charge. The Disciplinary Authority
i.e. the General Manager remitted the case back to the
enquiry committee for submitting a fresh report after
examining the witnesses mentioned in his order. Even after
examining those witnesses the enquiry committee adhered to
its earlier conclusions. After examining the reports of the
enquiry committee, the General Manager as per his order of
May 25, 1957 accepted its finding on the second charge but
differing from its conclusion on the first charge-
tentatively came to the conclusion that the respondent was
guilty of that charge as well. As a result thereof he
ordered the issue of ‘a notice to the respondent to show-
cause why he should not be removed from service. The
respondent submitted his exPlanation to the show-cause
notice. The General Manager did not accept his explanation
and by his order of August 20, 1957 be ,directed that the
respondent be removed from service. The respondent
challenged that decision before the High Court of Punjab by
means of a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
The single judge of the High Court who heard the petition
opined that the General Manager was not right in holding on
the material on record that the first charge is established
and on the second charge he held that the General Manager’s
direction as per his letter of June 19, 1956 is void as
being violative of Art. 19(1) of the Constitution. On
appeal the appellate court upheld the conclusion of the
learned single judge on the first charge but it was unable
to accept his finding that the order of the General Manager
of June 19, 1956 was violative of Art. 19(1) of the
Constitution. AR the same it affirmed the decision of the
learned single judge with these observations
“It is by now a generally recognised principle
that where an order such as an order of
detention or removal
551
from service is based on a number of grounds,
and one or more of these grounds disappear it
becomes difficult to uphold the order when it
is not clear to what extent it was based on
the ground found to be bad.”
The findings of the learned single judge as well as the
judges of the appellate court were challenged before us by
the appellant. It was urged on its behalf that the finding
of the General Manager on the first charge being a finding
of fact, the same not having been held either not supported
by any evidence. or as perverse, it was not open to the High
Court to review the evidence afresh and come to a conclusion
of its own. It was further urged on its behalf that the
opinion of the Appellate Court that if one of the several
charges on the basis of which a punishment is imposed is
held to be unsustainable, the punishment imposed should be
set aside as it is not known whether the authority in
question would have imposed the impugned punishment without
that charge having been established, does not represent the
correct legal position as expounded by this Court. The
learned Counsel for the respondent not only supported the
conclusions of the appellate court, he also strongly
commended for our acceptance the finding- of the learned
single judge that General Manager’s direction contained in
his letter- of June 19, 1956 was violative of Art. 19(1) (a)
to (c).
The questions that arise for decision in this appeal are (1)
whether the High Court was within its jurisdiction in the
exercise of its powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution to
set aside the conclusion reached by the General Manager on
the first charge, (2) whether the direction issued by the
General Manager on June 19, 1956 is violative of Art. 19(1)
a to (c) and (3) whether the appellate court was right in
its view that if an order of removal is based on number of
grounds and one or more of those grounds are found to be
unsustainable, the order is liable to be struck down.
Now coming to the first charge, we may first set out the un-
disputed facts. On May 31, 1956, the Union of which the
respondent was the Vice-President declared a token strike.
The strike in question was declared by the respondent and he
took a leading part in it. During the time of the strike
the compressor was not worked. The enquiry committee came
to the conclusion and that conclusion was neither challenged
before the High Court nor before this Court that the
compressor driver must have started the compressor in the
East Compressor House at 8-00 hrs. and there must have been
certain circumstances which made the driver to shut it off
at 8-15 hrs. The only question for decision is whether the
respondent was responsible for shutting it off. Two wit-
nesses namely Subrati, the compressor Driver and Rameshwar,
his Assistant emphatically stated- before the enquiry
committee
552
that it was the respondent who led a group of strikers and
compelled them to close down the compressor. The enquiry
committee felt that their evidence cannot be accepted at its
face value as they were not able to name any other person in
the group. But the General Manager did not agree with the
enquiry on that point. He fully accepted: their evidence.
It was open to the General Manager to do so. He was not
bound by the conclusions reached by the enquiry committee,
see Union of India v. H. C. Goel(1). This is not a case
where it can be said that the finding of the Disciplinary
Authority is not supported by any evidence nor can it be
said that no reasonable person could have reached such a
finding. Hence the conclusion reached by the Disciplinary
Authority should prevail and the High Court in the exercise
of its Certiorari jurisdiction could not have interfered
with its conclusion, see Syed Yakoob v. K. S. Radhakrishnan
and Ors.(2).
It was next contended that in arriving at his conclusion on
the first charge the General Manager had relied on the
hearsay evidence given by De Mellow and hence his conclusion
is vitiated. The evidence of the witnesses examined during
the enquiry is not before us. Hence it is not possible to
accept the contention that De Mellow’s evidence was hearsay.
In this view it is not necessary to go into the question
whether hearsay evidence can be relied ow at all in an
enquiry under Art. 311 and if so within what limits. Some
of the inferences drawn by the General Manager were objected
to by the learned Counsel for the respondent. They appear
to be inferences of fact, evidently drawn from the material
before him and as such cannot be properly objected to. It
Was open to him to draw those inferences.
For the reasons mentioned above, we hold that the$ High
Court exceeded its powers in interfering with the finding of
the General Manager on the first charge.
Before we take up for consideration point No. 2 formulated
above, it would be convenient to deal with point No. 3. It
was not disputed before us that the first charge levelled
against the respondent is a serious charge and it would have
been appropriate for the General Manager to remove the
respondent from service on the basis of his finding on that
charge. But we were told that we cannot assume that the
General Manager would have inflicted that punishment solely
on the basis of that charge and consequently we cannot
sustain the punishment imposed if we hold that one of the
two charges on the basis of which it was imposed is
unsustainable. This contention cannot be accepted in view
of the decision of this Court in State of Orissa v.
Bidyabhan Mohapatra(3) wherein it was held that if the order
in an enquiry under Art. 311 can be supported on any finding
as substantial mis-
(2)[1964] 5 S.C.R. 64.
(1) [1964] 4 S.C.R. 718.
(3) [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 648.
553
demeanour for which the punishment imposed can lawfully be
unposed it is not for the Court to consider whether that
ground alone would have’ weighed with the authority in
imposing the punishment in question.
Now we come to the second charge. In order to examine the
contentions of Mr. Garg, the learned Counsel for the
respondent relatingto that charge, it is necessary to set
out the circular issued by theGeneral Manager on June
19, 1956. That was a circular issuedto all the heads of
the departments. It reads :
“It has been brought to notice that in a
number of cases railway employees have held
meetings inside railway premises such as
inside workshops, inside stores depots and
within office compounds. It may be pointed
out that this practice is extremely
objectionable and has to be stopped forthwith.
AR staff may be warned that if any one of them
is found organising or attending a meeting
inside railway premises or at places of work,
he will render himself liable to severe
disciplinary action as such action on his part
will amount to misconduct arising out of
violation of administrative instructions.
Meetings of workers can be held on open
grounds away’ from places of work with the
permission of the railway authorities
concerned if such open grounds fall within
railway boundary.
You are to note these instructions very
carefully and to ensure their strict
compliance in future.
Please acknowledge receipt.”
The direction with which we are concerned in this appeal is
that which prohibits the holding of meetings within the
railway premises including open grounds forming part of
those premises. That direction does not deprive. the
workers any of the freedoms guaranteed to them under-Art.
19(1). It merely prohibits them from exercising any of
them within the railway premises. What is prohibited is
the holding of meetings for any purpose within thethe
railway premises. The question is whether such a direction
is violative-of Art. 19(1) ? In the instant casewe are
concerned with the meetings held outside the main time
office and it was not denied that that place formed part of
the railway premises.
It was strenuously urged on behalf of the respondent that
the rights guaranteed under Art. 19(1) (a), (b) and (c) are
inviolable and they cannot be interfered with excepting in
accordance with sub-Arts. 2, 3 and 4 of the said Art.
According to Mr. Garg the railway workers have a right to
assemble in any place they choose and give expression to
their views so long as they do not disturb the work going on
in the premises and that right is guaranteed to them under
our Constitution.
554
It was not disputed that the Northern Railway is the owner
of the premises in question. The fact that the Indian
Railways are State Undertakings does not affect their right
to enjoy their properties in the same manner as any private
individual may do subject only to such restrictions as the
law or the usage may place on the. Hence unless it is shown
that either under law or because of some usage the railway
servants have a right to hold their meetings in railway
premises, we see no basis for objecting to the direction
given by the General Manager. There is no fundamental right
for anyone to hold meetings in government premises. If it
is otherwise there is bound to be chaos in our offices. The
fact that those who work in a public office can go there
does not confer on them the right of holding a meeting at
that office even if it be the, most convenient place to do
so.
It is true that the freedoms guaranteed under our
Constitution are very valuable freedoms and this Court would
resist abridging the ambit of those freedoms except to the
extent permitted by the Constitution. The fact that the
citizens of this country have freedom of speech, freedom to
assemble peaceably and freedom to form- associations or
unions does not mean that they can exercise those freedoms
in whatever place they please. The exercise of those
freedoms will come to an end as soon as the ‘right of some-
one else to hold his property intervenes. Such a limitation
is inherent in the exercise of those ‘rights. The validity
of that limitation is not to be judged by the tests
prescribed by Sub-Arts. (2) and (3) of Art. 19. In other
words the contents of the freedoms guaranteed under cls.
(a), (b) and (c), the only freedoms with which we are
concerned in this appeal,.do not include the right to
exercise them in the properties belonging to others. If Mr.
Garg is right in his contentions then a citizen of this
country in the exercise of his right under cls. (d) and (e)
of Art. 19(1) could move about freely in a public-office or
even reside there unless there exists some law imposing
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of those rights.
In support of his contention Mr. Garg strongly relied on the
decisions of the Supreme Court of United States of America
in Marsh v. Alabama(1) and Tucker v. State of Texas(2)
Tucker’s case was decided on the basis of the rule laid down
in Marsh’s case. Hence it is not necessary to consider it
separately. In Marsh’s case the Supreme Court laid down
that the constitutional ,guarantees of freedoms of press and
of religion precludes the enforcement against one who
undertook to distribute religious literature on a street of
a company-owned town, contrary to the wishes of the town’s
management, of a state statute making it a crime to enter or
remain on the premises of another after having been
(1) 90, Law ed. p. 265.
(2) 90, Law ecd. p. 274.
555
warned not to, do so. In order to appreciate this decision
it is necessary to bear in mind the facts of the case.
The appellant thereinwas a Jehovahs Witness who came
into the sidewalk of a privatetown situate near the
post office and undertook to distribute religious
literature. In the store the corporation had posted a
notice which read as follows:-
“This Is Private Property and Without Written
Permission, No Street, or House Vendor, Agent
or Solicitation of Any Kind Will Be
Permitted.”
The appellant was warned that she should not distribute the
literature without a permit and told that no permit would be
issued to her. She protested that the company rule could
not be constitutionally applied so as to prohibit her from
distributing religious writings. )When she was asked to
leave the sidewalk and Chicka-saw she declined. The deputy
sheriff arrested her and she was charged in the state court
for violating the law. The town in question is described in
the judgment thus:
“The town, a suburb of Mobile, Alabama,. known
as Chicka-saw, is owned by the Gulf Ship
building Corporation. Except for that it has
all the characteristics of any other American
town. The property consists of residential
buildings, streets, a system of ” sewers, a
sewage disposal plant and a “business block on
which business places are situated.. A deputy
of the Mobile County Sheriff, paid by the
company, serves as the town’s policeman.
Merchants and service establishments have
rented the stores and business places on the
business block and the United States uses one
of the places as a post office from which six
carriers deliver mail to the people of
Chickasaw and the adjacent area. The town and
the surrounding neighborhood, which cannot be
distinguished from the gulf property by anyone
not familiar with the property lines, are
thickly settled, and according to all
indications the residents use the business
block as their regular shopping center. To do
so, they now, as they have for many years,
make use of a company-owned paved street and
sidewalk located alongside the store fronts in
order to enter and leave the stores and the
post office. Intersecting company-owned roads
at each end of the business block lead into a
four-lane public highway which runs parallel
to the business block at a distance of thirty
feet. There is nothing to stop highway
traffic from coming into the business block
and upon arrival a traveller may make free use
of the facilities available there. In short
the town and its shopping district are
accessible to and freely used by the public in
general and there is nothing to distinguish
556
them from any other town and shopping centre
except the fact that the title to the property
belongs to a private corporation.”
From the above description it is clear that
the roads and sidewalks in that town had been
dedicated for public use. It is in that
context Justice Black observed:
“The more an owner, for his advantage, opens
up his property for use by the public in
general, the more do his rights,, become
circumscribed by the statutory and
constitutional rights of those who use it.”
The learned Judge further observed :
“We do not think it-makes, any significant
constitutional difference as to the
relationship between the rights of the owner
and those of the public that here the State,
instead of permitting the corporation to
operate a highway, permitted it to use its
property as a , town operate a ‘business
block’ in, the town and a street and sidewalk
on that business block. . . .
As we have heretofore stated, the town of
Chickasaw does not function differently from
any other town. The “business block” serves
as the community shopping centre and is freely
accessible and open to the people in the area
and those passing through. The managers
appointed by the corporation cannot curtail
the liberty of press and religion of these
people consistently with the purposes of the
constitutional guarantees and a state statute,
as the one here involved, which enforces such
action by criminally punishing those who
attempt to distribute religious literature
clearly violates the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution.”
In our opinion the rule laid down in Marsh’s case does not
apply to the facts of this case. ‘Me premises with which we
are concerned in this appeal unlike the roads and sidewalks
of Chickasaw town were not open for use of the general
public. They were intended for certain specified public
purposes. They could not be used for any other purpose
except with the permission of the concerned authority.
Neither the language of Art. 19(1) nor the purpose behind it
lend support to the contentions of Mr. Garg. On the other
hand their acceptance might lead to the confusion in public
offices. Hence we are unable to accept them.
In the result the appeal is allowed and the writ petition
missed but in the circumstances of the case we direct the
parties to bear their own costs throughout.
P.K.P.S. Appeal allowed.
557