ORDER
1. Raj Kumar petitioner was a tenant in respect of a gallery of shop No. 4531, situated at Bhatinda. The premises in dispute were obtained on lease by him on Oct. 1, 1964, on a yearly rent of Rs. 650/-. On Feb. 26, 1972 the landlord-respondent filed an application under s. 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949(hereinafter called the Act) for ejectment of the petitioner on the grounds that he had not paid rent from July 1971 onwards and that he had sub–let a part of the shop to M/s. Singla Brothers and its partners Gopi Ram and Murli Dhar, respondents 2 to 4 without the consent of the landlord.
2. The petitioner paid the rent due with interest and costs of the application to the landlord on the first date of hearing. On merits, he denied that he had sublet the premises in dispute to anybody and asserted that Kasturi Lal was a partner in his firm. The learned Rent Controller framed the following issues on the pleas raised by the parties:–
1. Whether the application is not liable to be amended in view of the legal objections raised in the written statement?
2. Whether Kishori Lal (Kasthuri Lal) partner of respondent No. 1 is a necessary party, if so its effect? Or
3. Whether Raj Kumar has sub–let a portion of shop in dispute to respondents Nos. 2 to 4? If so its effect?
4. Whether the respondent No. 1 is a bad tenant? If so, its effect?
5. Relief.
On the basis of decision given on issue No. 2, Kasturi Lal was held not to be a necessary party to the proceedings. On issue No. 3, it was decided that the petitioner had sublet a portion of the shop to respondents 2 to 4 and on that basis, order for his ejectment was passed. The appeal filed by him was dismissed by the Appellate Authority.
3. In this petition it has been argued on behalf of the petitioner that burden of proving subletting remains on the landlord and there can be no subletting unless complete possession of the premises in dispute had been handed over by the tenant to the sub–tenant in return for valuable consideration. He further argued that law recognises a distinction between a lease and a licence and the evidence produced by the respondent, at best, shows that he was a licencee. In support of his contention the learned counsel has placed reliance upon Dev Dutt Verma v. Ajit Singh, 1965 Cur LJ 341(Punj): Smt. Shanti Devi v. Puran Chand, 1975 RCJ 651(Punj), Smt. Krishnawati v. Hans Raj, 1975 Ren CJ 164: (AIR 1974 SC 280) and Smt. Parkash Wanti v. Rattan Lal Jain, 1976 RCJ 87(Punj). On the question, whether this Court can interfere on the revisional side, or not, the learned counsel has cited Damadilal v. Parashram, AIR 1976 SC 2229 in which it has been laid down that if important evidence led by a party was not considered by the Appellate Authority, it was open to the High Court to interfere in revision. Normally speaking, this Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under S. 15(5) of the Act does not indulge in reappraisal of evidence, but since Shri Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged that important documentary evidence produced by the petitioner has been overlooked by the Appellate Authority. I allowed him to address arguments on merits as well.
4. So far as the landlord is concerned, he relied upon the statement made by A. C. Jaiswal (P. W. 1) who was in–charge of the Telegraph Office, Bhatinda and who produced official record to prove that M/s. Singla Brothers, Bhatinda had got telegraphic address registered with his Department on May 12, 1971 for one year on payment of the prescribed fee. He also produced a copy of order Ex. P–A which was passed by the Department in this regard. This order does not mention in terms that it had been passed in respect of shop No. 4531 situated at Bhatinda. However, this order was passed on the basis of application marked A, which purports to have been by one Murli Dhar, styling himself as a representative of M/s. Singla Brothers, Bhatinda. The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that since Murli Dhar has not been produced in the witness–box, the application marked A could not have been read into evidence by the learned Courts below. Strictly speaking, the learned counsel is right in saying so, but I see no reason why this application be not looked into in order to interpret the order Ex. P–A passed by the Department, especially when this application had come from proper custody. It is settled law that it is open to a Court to look into the pleadings of the parties for the purpose of interpreting a decree. I see no reason why this principle be not extended to the said order as well. Be that as it may, the landlord–respondent also produced Naresh Kumar (a. W. 3) who is a peon of the P. & T. Department and who stated that he had been delivering telegrams meant for M/s. Singla Brothers at the premises in dispute. He has also produced Sita Ram (A. W. 2) who stated on oath that he had worked as a part–time munim of M/s. Singla Brothers who are occupying a part of the premises in dispute. The aforesaid evidence produced by the landlord–respondent had established that the petitioner had allowed another firm to use his premises. The only thing to be seen is whether such a user amounted to the creation of a lease or a licence. In a matter like this, the plea raised by the tenant-petitioners has to be considered with greater care and caution. If he had come forth with the please he had simply allowed M/s. Singla Brothers the facility of receiving telegrams at this address, the claim made by the landlord–respondent would have been defeated. I, however, find that in the written statement the petitioner made a complete denial of the fact that M/s. Singla Brothers were allowed to use these premises. Whether M/s. Singla Brothers were parting with some money for the user of the disputed premises or not, is a fact which is within the special knowledge of the petitioner and the partners of M/s. Singla Brothers. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act lays down that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act lays down that the Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. The partners of M/s. Singla Brothers are not shown to have any relationship with the petitioner and in normal course of business a tenant does not like anybody else to occupy or use the premises without payment of any consideration. It is particularly so with regard to the cases which are governed by the Act, because a tenant knows that subletting constitutes a ground for his ejectment.
5. The petitioner himself entered into the witness–box as R. W. 2. When cross–examined, he admitted that there was a bath–room attached to the premises in dispute which he was using as a godown and he had set up a partition wall in the premises in dispute for using a part thereof as a bath–room. When there was a regular bath room already available, I fail to see how the necessity of using that as a godown arose when another bath–room had to be created out of the main room. These circumstances show that the partition wall was constructed in the main room in order to accommodate M/s. Singla Brothers as sub–tenants. Even though the original burden lies on the landlord to prove that the tenant had parted with possession of the premises for valuable consideration, yet on the facts and circumstances of the present case, I hold that it is open to the landlord to claim the benefit of Ss. 106 and 114 of the Indian Evidence Act for urging that he had discharged the initial onus which lay upon him of proving these facts. In a civil dispute modus operandi never remains constant and goes on shifting. Once the landlord–respondent had discharged the initial burden, then it was the duty of the petitioner to prove by such evidence as was sufficient to discharge the onus which had come to lie on him. When the tenant–petitioner told a blatant lie in the written statement that he had not sublet the premises to M/s. Singla Brothers and in his statement in Court, he said that he did not know M/s. Singla Brothers, it would be impossible for him to urge that the burden which lay upon him stood discharged.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner drew my pointed attention to a passage occurring in Dev Dutt Verma’s case (1965 Cur LJ 341)(Punj)(supra) in which an observation had been made that even when a tenant sets up a wrong and false plea, it should not be taken notice of. I may, however, add that, that the observation was made in relation to the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case and cannot be regarded as a general rule for guidance in all such cases. It is the primary duty of the Courts of law to sift the truth and if a party is allowed to tell lies and to go with it, the courts instead of facilitating their own task would be making it much more difficult. Besides, it would encourage litigants to set up false pleas.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that he had produced a large number of documents which show that he had been receiving documents at these premises from various businessmen. According to him, if this evidence were to be looked into, it would completely demolish the case of the landlord–respondent. However, I do not agree with him. If the main room of the premises in dispute was partitioned, as has been held by me above and only a part of it had been sublet to M/s. Singla Brothers, the petitioner still could receive documents at the same address, and yet there would be subletting of a part of the premises. The authorities cited by him regarding the necessity of proving of handing over of possession of the premises sublet for a valuable consideration, were based on different facts have no application to the facts of the instant case in which a room, on being partitioned, is being sublet to a sub-tenant.
8. No other point was urged before me.
9. For the reasons mentioned above, this petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel’s fee assessed at Rs. 300/-only.
10. Petition dismissed.