PETITIONER: RAJ NARAIN Vs. RESPONDENT: SMT. INDIRA NEHRU GANDHI AND ANR. DATE OF JUDGMENT15/03/1972 BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN CITATION: 1972 AIR 1302 1972 SCR (3) 841 1972 SCC (3) 580 CITATOR INFO : RF 1975 SC2299 (434) RF 1976 SC1187 (6) RF 1991 SC1557 (13,18) ACT: Representation of the People Act, 1951--Section 86(5)--Scope- --Pleadings relating to corrupt Practice--Better Particulars of charges may he introduced by amendment of pleadings. Election Petition--Interrogatories--code of Civil Procedure 1908--Order XI r. 1-Interrogatories must have reasonable close connection with "any matters in question." HEADNOTE: While a corrupt practice has got to be strictly proved it does not follow that a pleading in an election petition should receive a strict construction. The object of section 86(5) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, is to see that a person accused of a corrupt practice must know precisely what he is accused of so that he may have the opportunity to meet the allegations made against him. If the accusation made is nebulous and is capable of being made use of for establishing more than one charge or if it does not make out a corrupt practice at all then the charge fails at the threshold. So long as the charge levelled is beyond doubt, s. 86(5) is satisfied; rest is mere refinement; they either pertain to the region of particulars or evidence. Under s. 86(5), if corrupt practice is alleged in the ' petition, the particulars of such corrupt practice may amended or amplified for ensuring a fair and effective trial that is, more and better particulars of the charge may be given later, even after the period of limitation; but if a corrupt practice is not previously alleged in the petition, an amendment which will have the effect of introducing particulars of such a corrupt practice, will not be permitted, after the period of limitation, because, it would tantamount to making a fresh petition. [847 G] The appellant, in his election petition, challenging the validity of the election of respondent No. 1, alleged that the respondent obtained the assistance of K when he was still a Gazetted Officer in the Government of India for the furtherance of the prospects of her election and that K organised the electioneering work for her during the entire period even before the filing of the nomination paper. The petition did not set out specifically that when the respondent obtained the assistance of K, she was a "candidate", nor did it state the date on which K was entrusted with the electioneering work. The respondent filed an appli- cation under 0. XI, Code of Civil Procedure, for sitting aside the interrogatories served on her by the appellant. The trial court set aside some of the interrogatories and struck out the issues relating to corrupt practice on the basis that the facts stated in the petition did not disclose the corrupt practice which were the subject matter of the issues. The Court also dismissed the appellant's application for amending the election petition, on the ground that the appellant was seeking to add material facts and hence they could not be accepted after the period of limitation for filing the election petition. HELD (i) that the trial court was not justified in striking out the issues relating to corrupt practice. The allegations in the petition bring 842 out all ingredients of the corrupt practice alleged though they are lacking in better particulars such as the date on which the respondent became a candidate and the date on which K was entrusted with the responsibility of organising the electioneering work of the respondent. The absence of these particulars does not per, se invalidate 'the charge. [1849 G] Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh, [1957] S.C.R. 370; Sainant N. Balakrishna etc. v. George Fernandez and ors. etc. [1969] 3 S.C.R. 603 and Hardwari Lal v. Kanwal Singh, [1972] S.C.C. 214, referred to. (ii) that the question as to when K's resignation became effective has to be examined with reference to his conditions of service and this having not been done the conclusion of the trial judge in this regard had to be, ignored. [852) D-E] Raj Kumar v. Union of India, [1968] 3 S.C.R. 857, referred to. Quaere : Whether a government servant's resignation can be accepted with effect from an earlier date and whether such an acceptance has any validity in considering a corrupt practice under s. 123(7). (iii) that the amendments asked for should have been allowed. election petition is not liable to be dismissed in limine because full particulars of corrupt practice alleged are not set out. If an objection was taken, and the tribunal was of the view that the full particulars have not been set out, the petitioner has to be given in opportunity to amend or amplify the particulars. [853 B] Shri Balwan Singh v. Shri Lakshmi Narain and ors., [1960] 3 S.C.R. 91, referred to. (iv) that the trial court was right in striking out the interrogatories. The interrogatories served must have reasonable close connection with any matters in question." Questions that may be relevant during cross examination are not necessarily relevant as interrogatories. [853 H] JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 108 and
109 of 1972.
Appeals by special leave from the orders dated November 27.
1971 and December 22, 1971 of, the Allahabad High Court it,.
Applications Nos. A- 112 and A- 141 in Election Petition
No. 5 of 1971, respectively.
S. V.Gupte,. J. P. Goyal, K. N. Tripathi, R. C.
Srivastava, .S.’ S. Khanduja, and R. A. Gupta, for the
appellant (in both the appeals)
C, K. Daphtary, S. C. Khare, Yogeshwar Prasad, S. K. Bagga
and S.Bagga, for respondent No. 1 (in both the appeals).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hegde, J. These. appeals by special leave arise from the election
petition filed by be, appellant challenging the validity, of the
election-of respondent No. 1 (who will hereinafter be referred to
843
as the respondent) to the Lok Sabha from Rae Bareilly consti-
tuency, in the General Election to the Lok Sabha held in- March.
1971.
After the pleadings of the parties were completed and the issues
framed, the appellant applied to the court under Order Xi of The
Civil Procedure, Code for leave to deliver interrogatories in
writing for the examination of the respondent. The respondent
objected to the same on the ground that the provisions of 0. XI.
C.P.C. cannot be applied to election petitions. In her
objection-statement, the respondent reserved her right to object
to the interrogatories sought to be served at a later stage.
The application filed by the appellant for leave ‘to serve
interrogatories on the respondent was heard by Broome J. The
learned Judge by his order dated September 14, 1971 overruled the
objections of the respondent and directed as follows :
“Accordingly I allow the application A-29 and grant
leave to the petitioner to deliver the accompanying
interrogatories for the examination of respondent
No. 1. The affidavit in reply shall be filed by 4-
10-1971.”
The respondent appealed against that order to this Court after
obtaining special leave. That appeal was withdrawn during the
course of the hearing.
During the pendency of that appeal, the respondent filed an
application before the High Court under rule 7, Order Xi. C.P.C.
praying that the interrogatories served on her may be set aside
as they were “unreasonable, vexatious, oppressive, unnecessary
and irrelevant”. As many as 31 interrogatories had been served
on the respondent. All these interrogatories related to Issues 1
to 3. The appellant objected to each one of them. At the hearing
of that petition, it appears it was contended on behalf, of the
respondent that the allegations in the election petition did not
afford any basis for Issues 1 to 3. Consequently the interro-
gatories served were irrelevant as well as unnecessary. The
entire argument before the trial judge proceeded on the basis
that the, facts stated in the petition did not disclose the
corrupt practices which were the subject-matter of Issues 1 to 3.
The learned judge accepted that contention and set aside some of
the interrogatories served on the respondent. Proceeding
further, he struck out Issues 1 to 3. Thereafter the appellant
applied to that court for amendment of paragraphs 2 and 5 of the
election petition by giving better particulars. The learned
judge rejected that application on the sole ,round that by the
amendment in question, the appellant was seeking to add to
material facts and hence, they cannot-be accepted after the
period of limitation for filing the, election, petition. Civil
Appeal, No. 108 of 1972 is
844
directed against the order setting aside the interrogatories
served .and the striking out of Issues 1 to 3 and Civil Appeal
No. 109 of 1972 arises from the order rejecting the application
seeking permission to amend the election petition.
Issue No. 2 had not been pressed before the trial court nor was
it pressed before us. Therefore we need not consider whether
that issue should be restored. Issue No. 3 is largely consequen-
tial to Issue No. 2 though a portion of that issue bears on Issue
No. 1. Hence at present we are only concerned with Issue No. 1
and that portion of the third issue which has a bearing on Issue
No. 1. Both those aspects will be covered if issue No. 1 is
recast thus
“Whether respondent No. 1 obtained and procured the
assistance of Yashpal Kapur in furtherance of the
prospects of her election while he was still a
Gazetted Officer in the service of Government of
India. If so, from what date ?”
We can now leave out of consideration Issue No. 3.
The main question to be decided in these appeals is whether the
allegations made in the election petition can be said to disclose
the corrupt practice which is the subject matter of Issue .No. 1.
Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (lo be
hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) begins by saying that “The
following shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for the
,purposes of this Act”.
Sub-s. (7) of s. 123 to the extent material for our present
purpose reads :
“The obtaining or procuring or abetting or attempt-
ing to obtain or procure by a candidate or his
agent or, by any other person with the consent of a
candidate or his election agent, any assistance
(other than the giving of vote) for the furtherance
of the prospects of that candidate’s election, from
any person in the service of the Government and
belonging to any of The following ‘classes, namely
(4) gazetted officers;
The appellant’s contention is that the respondent after she be-
came a candidate in The election in question obtained the
services
845
of Yashpal Kapur when he was still a gazetted officer in the
Government of India for the furtherance of the propects of her
election. In order to establish that plea, he must plead and
prove
(1) That the respondent obtained the assistance
of Yashpal Kapur when he was a gazetted officer;
(2) That the assistance obtained by her was for
the furtherance of the prospects of her election
and
(3) That she obtained that assistance after she
became a candidate.
A candidate is defined in s. 79(b) of the Act.
That section says :
” candidate’ means, a person who has been or
claims to have been duty nominated as a candidate
at any election and any such person shall be deemed
to have been a candidate as from the time when,
with the election in prospect, he began to hold
himself out as a prospective candidate.
The respondent became a candidate within the first part of 79(b)
when she was nominated on February 1, 1971. But if she had held
herself out as a prospective candidate with the election in
prospect before her nomination, she must be deemed to have become
a candidate from the date she so held out.
In order lo establish his plea, the appellant has to establish
that the assistance of Yashpal Kapur was obtained when he still
was a government servant and at the time such an assistance was
obtained, the respondent had become a candidate.
Now let us turn to the averments in the election petition which
alone is relevant for finding out whether the corrupt practice
referred to in Issue No. 1 is made out. Relevant averments are
said to be in paragraphs 2, 5 and 6. They read as follows :
“2 That the respondent No. 1 Shrimati Indira Nehru
Gandhi and the respondent No. 2 Swami Advaita Nand
were also candidates in the said election from the
22-Rae Bareili Parliamentary constituency for the
Lok Sabha.
“5 That the said Shri Yashpal Kapur was Gazetted
Officer in the Government of India, holding the
post of an officer on Special Duty. The respondent
No. 1 Shrimati Indira Nehru .Gandhi obtained and
procured ,the assistance of the said Shri Yashpal
Kapur for the furtherance of the prospects of her
election from the 8-L1061Sup.Cl/73
846
constituency aforesaid inasmuch as the said Shri
Yashpal Kapur was a gazetted officer in the service
of the Government of India when his assistance was
obtained and procured (a corrupt practice under
section 123(7) of the R.P. Act, 1951 was committed
by the respondent No. 1 Shrimati Indira Nehru
Gandhi. The said Shri Yashpal Kapur on the
directions of Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi
organised the electioneering work for her in the
constituency as her election agent during the
entire period from even before the tiling of the
nomination paper the filing(?) the counting and the
declaration of the result of the election. The
election of the respondent No. 1 is liable to be
declared void on the ground of the commission of
this corrupt practice under section 100(1)(b) of
‘the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951.
6. That as the petition’s candidature was being
supported not only by Samyukta Socialist Party to
which the petitioner belonged but also by the Jan
Sangh, the Indian National Congress (Organization),
Bhartiya Kranti Dal and the Swatantra Parties and
since the candidature of respondent No. 1, Shrimati
Indira Nehru Gandhi was being supported by the
Muslim Majlis, Muslim League and the Communist
Party of India (it was apprehended by Shrimati
lndira Nehru Gandhi and her election agent Shri
Yashpal Kapur that an overwhelming majority of
Hindu voters migh cast their votes for the
petitioner against Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi.
It was accordingly decided by them to induce the
respondent No. 2 Swami Advaitanand to also stand as
a candidate in the election. The said Shri Yashpal
Kapur, the election agent of Shrimati Indira Nehru
Gandhi offered and paid a sum of Rs. 50,000/- to
the respondent No. 2 Swami Advaitanand as a gift
with the object of directly including him to stand
as a candidate at the said Selection. The offer
and payment of the amount of Rs. 50,000/- was made
by the said Shri Yashpal Kapur to Swami Advaitanand
on the 28th January 1971 in the town of Rae Barlow.
A corrupt practice of ‘bribery under section 123
(1) (A) (a) was thus committed by Shri Yashpal
Kapur, election agent of Sm. Indira Nehru Gandhi
and her election is therefore liable to be declared
void under section 100 (1 ) of the R.P. Act.”
It is true that the election petition nowhere specifically say
,as to when the appellant became a “candidate”. But it
is clear
847
from a reading of paragraphs 5 and 6 that according to the appel-
lant, the respondent became a “candidate” even before she was
nominated on February 1, 1971. The petition proceeds on that
basis. It is not clear from the petition that how long before
her nomination ,he respondent held herself out as a prospective
candidate. But all the same, it is obvious from those averments
that the respondent is alleged to have obtained the assistance of
Yashpal Kapur when he continued to be a gazetted. officer for
organizing her electioneering work. The expression “electioneer-
ing” is explained in Universal English Dictionary as “act of
canvassing for votes, speaking in public and otherwise promoting
the election of a particular candidate for Parliament”.
Reference to Yashpal Kapur as an election agent on a date prior
to the date when he was appointed as such-his nomination Lis an
election agent could not have been done before February 1, 1971
is clearly a misnomer but that is irrelevant. The in paragraph 5
of the election petition that Yashpal appellants organised the
electioneeing work in the constituency a at the direction of the
respondent even before her nomination and agent the reference to
her candidature in January in paragraph shall that according to
the petitioner ‘the respondent was a “candidate” even before her
nomination and. further that she obtained the assistance of
Yashpal Kapur when he was still a gazetted officer. There is no
gainsayirng the fact that the election petition was not
artistically drawn LIP. That unfortunately is the case with most
of our pleadings. But if the petition is read reasonably, as it
should it is clear that the allegation of the petitioner is that
the service of Yashpal Kapur were obtained by the respondent when
she had already become a candidate and when she so obtained his
assistance, Yashpal Kapur was still a gazetted officer.’ It is
true (hat one of the ingredients of the corrupt practice alleged
i.c. that when ‘the respondent obtained the assistance of Kapur,
she was a candidate is not specifically set out in the petition
but from ‘the allegations made, it flows as a necessary
implication. While a corrupt practice has got to be strictly
proved but from that it does not follow that a pleading in an
election preceding should receive a strict construction. This
Court has held that even a defective charge does not vitiate a
criminal trial unless it is proved that the same has prejudiced
the accused. If a pleading on a reasonable construction could
sustain the action, the court should accept that construction.
The courts are reluctant to frustrate an action on technical
grounds. The charge of corrupt practice in an election ‘Is a
very serious charge. Purity of election is the very essence of
real democracy. The charge in question has been denied by the
respondent. It has yet to be proved. It may or may not be
proved. The allegations made by the appellant may ultimately the
proved to be wholly devoid of truth. But
848
the question is whether the appellant should be refused an oppor-
tunity to prove his allegations ? Should the court refuse to en-
quire into those allegations merely because the appellant or
Someone who prepared his brief did not know the language of the
law. We have no hesitation in answering those questions in the
negative. The implications of the rule of law are manifold.
It was contended on behalf of the respondent that the relevant
provisions of the Act precluded the appellant from proving his
allegations. Therefore let us look at those provisions in the
Act i.e. Clauses (a) and (b) of S. 83(1) and cl. (5) of s. 86 for
finding out whether the charge has to be rejected in limine.
Section 8 3 (1 ) (a) and (b) read
“(1) An election petition-
(a) shall contain a concise statement of the
material facts on which the petitioner relies;
(b) shall set forth full particulars of any
corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges,
including as full a statement as possible of the
names of (the parties alleged to have committed
such corrupt practice and the date and place of the
commission of each such practice.
Sub-s. (5) of s. 86 prescribes :
“The High Court may upon such terms as to costs and
otherwise as it may deem fit, allow the particulars
of any corrupt practice alleged in the petition to
be amended or amplified in such manner as may in
its o pinion be necessary for ensuring a fair and
effective trial of the petition but shall not allow
any amendment of the petition which will have the
effect of introducing particulars of a corrupt
practice not previously alleged in the petition.”
From these two provisions, it follows that if the allegations
made regarding a corrupt practice do not disclose the constituent
parts of the corrupt practice alleged, the same will not be
allowed to be proved and further those allegations cannot be
amended after the period of limitation for filing an election
petition-, but the court may allow particulars of any corrupt
practice alleged in the petition to be amended or amplified. The
scope of these provisions has been considered in several deci-
sions of this Court. The leading decision on this point is
Harish indra Bajpai v. Trilok Singh(1). It is not necessary to
go to that decision as the ratio of that decisions has been
elaborately
(1) [1957] S.C.R. 370.
849
explained by this Court in Samant N. Balakrishna etc. v. George
Fernandez and ors. etc.(1). Dealing with the scope of ss. 83 and
86(5), this Court observed that s. 83 requires that the petition
must contain a concise statement of the material facts on which
the petitioner relies and the fullest possible particulars of
the, corrupt practice alleged. ‘Material facts’ and
‘particulars’ may overlap but the word ‘material’ shows that the
ground of corrupt practice and the facts necessary to formulate a
complete cause, of action must be stated. The function of the
particulars is to present as full a picture of the cause of
action as to make the opposite party understand the case he will
have to meet. Unders. 86(5), if corrupt practice is alleged in
the petition, the particulars of such corrupt practice may be
amended or amplified for ensuring a fair and effective trial,
that is, more and better particulars of the charge may be given
later, even after the period o’ limitation; but if a corrupt
practice is not previously alleged in the petition, an amendment
which will have the effect of introducing particulars of such a
corrupt practice will not be permitted, after the period of
limitation, because, it would tantamount to making a fresh
petition. The same view was taken by this Court in Hardwari Lal
v. Kanwal Singh(3). From these decisions, it follows that facts
stated in the petition relating to any corrupt practice must be
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. In other words the
facts must bring out all the ingredients of the corrupt practice
alleged. If the facts stated fail to satisfy the hat requirement
then they do not give rise, to a triable issue. Such a defect
cannot be cured by any amendment after the period of limitation
for filing the election petition. But even if all the material
facts are stated in the election petition. For a proper trial
better particulars may still be required. If those particulars
are not set out in the election petition, they may be
incorporated into the election petition with the permission of
the court even after the period of limitation. The controversy in
this case is whether the election petition discloses a cause of
action for trying Issue No. 1. We think it does. The-
allegations made in paragraphs 2, .5 and 6 of the petition, if
read together do show that the allegation against the respondent
is that she obtained the assistance of Yashpal Kapur, a gazetted
officer, to support her candidature by organising her
electioneering work. These allegations bring out all the
ingredients of the corrupt practice alleged though they are
lacking in better particulars such as the date on which the
respondent became a candidate and the date on which Yashpal Kapur
was entrusted with the responsibility of organizing the
electioneering work of the respondent. The absence of those
particulars does not per se invalidate the charge. They can be
Supplied even now with the permission of the Court. In this con-
(1) [1969] 3 S.C.R. 603.
(2) [1972] S.C.C. 14.
850
nection it is necessary to mention that the respondent in her
written statement did not say that the allegations in question
did not raise a triable issue. No such objection appears to have
been taken at the time of the framing of the issues or in any of
her pleadings. It seems that the objection was taken up for the
first time when the petition to set aside the interrogatories
was heard. We are saying all these only ,to show as to how the
parties understood the allegations at the earlier stages, of the
proceedings.
Rules of pleadings are intended as aids for a fair trial and for
reaching a just decision. An action at law should not be equated
to a game of chess. Provisions of law are not mere formulaes to
be observed as rituals. Beneath the words of a provision of law.
generally speaking,, there lies a juristic principle. It is the
duty ‘ of the court to ascertain that principle and implement it.
What then is the principle underlying s. 86(5)? In our opinion
the aim of that section is to see that a person accused of a
corrupt practice must know precisely what he is accused of so
that he may have the opportunity to meet the allegations made
against him. If the accusation made is nebulous and is capable
of being made use of for establishing more than one charge or if
it does not make out a corrupt practice at all then the charge
fails at the very threshold. So long, as the charge levelled is
beyond doubt. s. 86(5) is satisfied; rest is mere refinement.
They either pertain to the region of particulars or evidence.
That section is not designed to interdict a mere clumsy pleading
like the petition before us. The purpose of that section is to
see that every charge of corrupt practice should be brought
before the court before the prescribed period of limitation and
none thereafter so that the trial of the case may not be
converted into a persecution by adding more and more charges or
by converting one charg another as the trial proceeds. The best
illustration of the problem that s. 86(5) tries to meet is found
in, Hardwatri Lal’s case (supra). The allegations made in
paragraph 16 of the petition ,therein were as follows :
“That the respondent committed the corrupt practice
of obtaining and procuring or- attempting to obtain
and procure the assistance for the furtherance of
the prospects of his election from the following,
persons who are in the service of the Government
and belonging to the prohibited classes within the
meaning of section 123 (7) of the Act-
1. Shri Chand Ram Rathi, Lecturer in Political
Science, Government College, Gurgaon.
2.Shri Gulab Singh, B.A.B.Ed., Govt. High School
Jharsa (Gurgaon).
851
3. Pt. Bhim Singh, Asstt. Sub-inspector, Police
Security Lines, Lytton Road, New Delhi.
4 .Ch. Chhatar Singh, M.A.B.T., Teacher, V.& P.O.
Bharai via Bahadurgarh, District Rohtak.
5. Ch. Mukhtiar Singh, Inspector of Police,
Delhi-
6. Ch. Raghbir Singh, M.A., B.T., Bahadurgarh.
The respondent has written letters under his own
signatures to the above Government servants
soliciting their help and assistance in furtherance
of the prospects of his election.”
These were all the material facts stated in the petition. From
those averments, it was not possible to make out from whom among
the government servants mentioned, the returned candidate alleged
to have obtained or procured assistance for the furtherance of
the prospects of his election and who are those from whom he is
alleged to have attempted to obtain and procure the assistance
for the said purpose. That petition was also silent as regards
the type of assistance obtained or procured or attempted to be
oil gained or procured. In that case, it was necessary to state
the type of assistance obtained or procured or attempted to be
obtained or procured because a candidate can take the assistance.
of government servants in certain respects. The allegations made
in the petition were so elastic that it could have been used for
establishing multitude of charges, leaving it free to the
petitioner to pick and choose the charge he is in a position to
establish. That was an intolerable position for his opponent. In
substance. the petitioner therein had merely quoted the relevant
provision of law; he bad failed to state the material fact,, Lo
bring out the charge sought to be levelled. He had cast a wide
net. This is not so in the case before us. Herein all the in-
gredients of the corrupt practice viz. (1) that the respondent
obtained the assistance of Kapur; (2) Kapur was a government
servant and (3) his services were obtained in support of the
candidature of the respondent by organising her election compaign
are mentioned in the petition. The question when the respondent
became a candidate is merely a matter of evidence.
For the reasons mentioned above, we think that the learned judge
was not justified in striking out Issue No. 1. On the other hand.
he should have reframed that issue, as mentioned earlier. Before
leaving- this question, it is necessary to mention one other
fact. Yashpal Kapur appears to have tendered his resignation to
the office he was holding on January 13, 1971. The certified
copy of the notification produced shows that the President
accepted his resignation on the 25th of January ’71 and the same
was
852
gazetted on February 6, 1971. The order of the President shows
that he accepted Yashpal Kapur’s resignation with effect from
January 14, 1971. The learned trial judge without examining the
true effect of the President’s order has abruptly come to the
conclusion that Yashpal Kapur’s resignation became effective as
from January 14, 1971. This conclusion, in our opinion, requires
re examination. It is necessary to examine whether a government
servant’s resignation can be accepted with effect from an earlier
date. At any rate whether such an acceptance has any validity in
considering a corrupt practice under S. 123(7). If such a course
is permissible, it might enable the government to defeat the
mandate of S. 123(7). The question as to when a government
servant’s resignation becomes effective came up for consideration
by this Court in Raj Kumar v. Union of India(1). Therein this
Court ruled that when a public servant has invited by his letter
of resignation the determination of his employment, his service
normally stands terminated from the date on which the letter of
resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority and, in the
absence of any law or statutory rule governing the conditions of
his service, to the contrary, it will not be open to the public
servant to withdraw his resignation after it is accepted by the
appropriate authority. Hence the question as to when Yashpal
Kapur’s resignation became effective will have to be examined
with reference to his conditions of service. This examination
having nor been done, the conclusion of the learned trial judge
that it became effective on January 14, 1971, has to be ignored.
For the foregoing reasons, we set aside the order of the trial
judge striking out Issue No. 1 and the last part of Issue No.3
and restore Issue No. 1 as amended by us.
Now coming to the appeal against the’ order on the amendment
application, the learned trial judge disallowed the amendments
sought on the sole ground that if those amendments are allowed,
it will amount to amending the statement of material facts and
The same is not permissible in view of S. 86(5). We have already
found that that conclusion of the learned trial judge is not
correct. The amendment application was moved even before the
trial of the case commenced. It is not shown how the amendments
sought in respect of paragraphs 2 and 5 of the petition can
prejudice the case of the respondent. They are merely clarifica-
tory in character. This Court ruled in Shri Balwan Singh v. Shri
Lakshmi Narain and ors.(2) that an election petition was not
liable to be dismissed in limine because full particulars of
corrupt practice alleged were not set out. It further observed
that if an objection was taken and the tribunal was of the view
that the full particulars have not been set out, the. petitioner
had
(1) [1963] 3 S.C.R.857.
(2) [1960] 3 S.C. R. 9 1.
853
to be given an opportunity to amend or amplify the particulars.
It was only in the event of non-compliance with the order to
supply the particulars that the charge which remained vague could
be struck out. In that case The amendment was sought after the
evidence was closed in the case. This Court allowed the same.
Courts are ordinarily liberal in allowing amendment of pleadings
unless it results in prejudicing the case of the opposite party.
Any inconvenience caused by an amendment can always be compen-
sated by costs. We think that the amendments asked for, should
have been Allowed and we allow the same. The election petition
will be accordingly amended and the respondent will be afforded
an opportunity to file any additional written statement, if she
so desires.
as 31 interrogatories have been served on the respondent as men-
tioned earlier. Out of them Nos. 24 to 30 have been allowed,
Hence we need not consider them. Interrogatories Nos. 19 to 23
relate to Issue No. 2. Therefore they are rightly struck out. We
now come to interrogatories Nos. 1 to 18 and 31. We have
carefully examined those interrogatories. None of them touch the
core of the allegations relating to commission of the corrupt
practice which is the subject matter of Issue No. 1. They merely
touch the fringe of the matter.
Order XI, r. 1, C.P.C. provides
“In any suit the plaintiff or defendant by leave of
the Court may deliver interrogatories in writing
for the examination of the opposite parties or any
one or more of such parties and such
interrogatories when delivered shall have a note at
the foot thereof stating which of such
interrogatories each of such person is required to
answer; Provided that no party shall deliver more
than one set of interrogatories to the same party
without an order for that purpose.
Provided also that interrogatories which do not
relate to any matters in question in the suit shall
be deemed irrelevant, notwithstanding that they
might be admissible on the oral cross-examination
of a witness.”
Questions that may be relevant during cross-examination are not
necessarily relevant as interrogatories. The only questions that
are relevant as interrogatories are those relating to “any
matters in question”. The interrogatories served must have,
reasonably close connection with “matters in question”. Viewed
thus, interrogatories 1 to 18 as well as 31 must be held to
irrelevant.
854
In the result Civil Appeal No. 108 of 1972 is allowed to the
extent mentioned above. In other respects the same is dismissed.
Civil APpeal No. .109 of 1972 is allowed in full. In the circum-
stances of these cases, we make no order as to costs.
K. B. N.
Civil Appeal No. 108 of 1972 allowed in part.
Civil Appeal No. 109 of 1972 allowed.
855