ORDER
1. All these petitions can be conveniently disposed of as the facts involved are almost identical. The petitioner has purchased some pockets of land from different individuals and all these individuals were in fact assigned lands by the State Government under a specific order. These lands were assigned free of cost to the assignees by the State Government and the State Government also executed a patta in respect of these lands. The assignment was conditional. The relevant condition of the patta was “If the assignee should alienate the lands assigned within a period of 10 years from the date of order of assignment the assignment will be liable to be cancelled without payment of any compensation for improvements”. The petitioner’s purchase of lands from the assignees 8 in number are all admittedly within 10 years of the assignment and that is the admitted position. Notices therefore came to be
sent to the petitioner as also the original assignees to show cause as to why the assignments should not be cancelled any why the Government should not resume the said lands. Eight different revenue cases were instituted and it is in admitted position that the notices were served on all the assignees as also the petitioner, who was the transferee from the assignees in all the eight cases. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Kodaikanal passed a common order holding that the Board Standing Order No.15 concerning the assignment and the special conditions imposed as per Form D were breached. Inasmuch as the assignees had alienated the land and parted with the possession of the same within 10 years from the date of order of assignment. A finding was given that there was a breach of this condition.. A further finding was given that the assignees were not in possession of the lands which were assigned to them, and as such the lands were liable to be resumed after cancellation of the said assignment. The Revenue Divisional Officer passed the following order:
“It is hereby ordered that the assignment of the aforesaid lands shall be cancelled and the said lands shall be repossessed within 30 days, an appeal shall be maintainable before the District Revenue Officer, Dindigul”.
Needless to mention that eight appeals came to be filed before the District Revenue Officer, Dindigul rejected all the 8 appeals. He also confirmed the finding that the condition of the assignment was breached. It was tried to be suggested before these revenue authorities that in fact after the sale in favour of the petitioner, the State Government had collected land revenue from the petitioner and in respect of the same the State Government not only recorded the name of the petitioner in the revenue papers, but also accepted the land revenue from the petitioner-purchaser, and therefore, the State Government was estopped now from taking any action of resumption. These two orders are now challenged by these group of petitions, wherein the petitioner is common.
2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner invited my attention towards clause 15 of the Board Standing Order, more particularly at clause (f) which runs as under:
“Assignments whether of ordinary land or of valuable land in these areas, will be subject to the condition that the lands shall not be alienated to any person (whether a member of the depressed classes or not) in any manner before the expiry of ten years from the date of the grant nor even thereafter, except to other members of these classes”.
The rule further says,
“If the condition of non-alienation is violated or if the land ceases to be owned by the assignee or his legal heirs or (after the ten years) other members of their class, owing to sale by process of law or otherwise, or if default is made in the payment of the Government revenue on the dates prescribed, the grant will be liable to be resumed by the Government who will be entitled to re-enter and take possession of the land without payment of any compensation or refund of the purchase money”.
Learned counsel would further argue that the conditions attached with patta are nothing but a natural fall out of the rules quoted above and the learned counsel more particularly invited the attention of the court to condition No.11 of the patta. This condition is quoted for the sake of convenience.
“In the event of the assignee acting in violation of any of the conditions aforesaid. Government will impose compensation amounts to be paid by the assignee. Further, the Government will be entitled to cancel the assignment and re-enter the above lands. The lands will thereafter vest with the Government conclusively. The assignee will not be entitled to any compensation”. (Italics supplied by me).
The contention of the learned counsel is that this condition No.11 and the aforequoted clause regarding the ban of alienation and the effect thereof, should be read together in conjunction and not disjunctively. It is the argument of the learned counsel that the Government could take the action of cancellation of assignment and resumption of the possession only within the 10 years of the assignment. Learned counsel canvassed this on the basis of the words “the lands will thereafter vest with the Government conclusively”. The contention is that if the vesting is to be the natural effect, then such effect can take place only within 10 years and not thereafter. Learned Government Advocate supports the orders and submits that the language of the patta conditions or of the B.S.O. rules does not permit any such interpretation and therefore, the action taken is perfectly within the scope of the Government’s powers.
3. For the sake of facts, it will be better to see the dates. The assignment was on 31.8.1973. The sales were made in all the cases on 19.6.1982 barring one where the sale was made in the year 1977. The notice to show cause was however served for the first time on 2.3.1988. It is on the basis of this notice the revenue cases were initiated and decided. Learned counsel therefore submits that this notice dated 2.3.1988 could not have been served after a period of more than ten years and any action which the Government had in its contemplation could have been only within ten years of the assignment only. Considering the language of rule 15(f) and the further clause as also the conditions of the patta, it is difficult to accept the contention that the Government has to take the action of cancellation of assignment only within 10 years from the date of the original order of assignment. What is provided in the condition of patta is that, if the assignee should alienate the land assigned within a period of 10 years from the date of order of assignment, then the assignment would be liable to be cancelled. Therefore it is imperative that the action could not be initiated prior to 10 years. If the alienation is within the period of 10 years, then the Government may initiate any action and there is no period of limitation prescribed for taking such an action. In the present case it seems that it came to the knowledge of the Government that the conditions of the assignment were breached because of the alienation and it was therefore, the Government initiated the action. Learned counsel goes on further to say that if this is the interpretation given, then the Government would be in a position to take the action any time and there would be no reasonable time limit. I am afraid that the argument is not sound for the simple reason that where any limitation has to be read there has to be a
specific mention of the same in the language of the statute or the rules as the case may be. There is no such mention.
4. That apart a late action by the Government in this case has not prejudiced the petitioner. On the other hand, he is benefitted by continuing in possession of the lands and reaping benefits therefrom. No prejudice is either pleaded or even displayed at the stage of arguments. The Apex Court has held in M/s. Hindustan Times Ltd. v. Union of India and others, that only a prejudice of irretrievable nature on account of delay on the part of Government to take an action, which was duly proved, would entitle a party for a relief against such action. Such is clearly not a case here.
5. Learned counsel then invited my attention to a decision of this court in Ramadoss, B. v. The Land Commissioner, Ezhilagam, Chepauk, Madras, 1990 W.L.R. 427 where Rule 11(3) of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Disposal of Surplus Land) Rules was dealt with for consideration. The rule was specific and the very language of the rule suggested that any action which the Commissioner has to take has to be within a period of five years from the date of the order of assignment or the date of the order of the appellate authority as the case may be and in pursuance of such action the Commissioner may set aside, cancel, revise or in any way modify the order of assignment, There being a specific provision of limitation on the powers of such cancellation apparent in the language of the Rule 11(3), the learned single Judge of this court held that the said power could be exercised only within five years and not thereafter. I am afraid the language of the rule is completely different from the language of the clause 15(f) of the Board Standing Order as also the language of the conditions of patta. In that view of the matter it would be difficult to hold that the Government could initiate the action only within 10 years from the date of assignment. The learned counsel also invited my attention to a ruling of the Supreme Court in Collector of Central Excise v. M/s. M.M. Rubber & Co., particularly at the observations made by the Apex Court in paragraph 12, where the words appeared that ‘if there is a time limit prescribed by the statute, then the action will have to be taken only within the time limit’. Unfortunately for the petitioner such wordings prescribing time limit for taking action are conspicuously absent in the rules or conditions of patta. Learned counsel also invited my attention to a decision in Pt. Chet Ram Vashist v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi, and particularly the observations made at page 434. However, I find that the factual matrix of that case is entirely different from the present one, and therefore, the case is not applicable at all.
6. In this view of the matter, the writ petitions have no merit and will
have to be dismissed. The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed, but
without any order as to costs. Consequently, W.M.P. Nos.1748 to 1755/89 are
also dismissed.