JUDGMENT
D.L. Mehta, J.
1. There has been a rapid development of road transport during the past few years and much increase in the number of motor vehicles on the road. The incidence of road accidents by motor vehicles has reached a serious proportion. It is said that the number of fatal accidents has been around 55,000 per year. The victims of these accidents are generally pedestrians belonging to less affluent sections of the society. The provisions of the Act as to compensation in respect of the accidents can be availed of only in cases of accidents which may be proved to have taken place as a result of wrongful act or negligence on the part of the owners or the driver of the vehicle concerned. Sometimes it is very difficult to secure adequate evidence or identity of the vehicle. It is well known that, generally, hit and run is the attitude of the drivers and the identity of the vehicle involved in the accident is not known. For this very reason, a new Chapter VII-A for the payment of compensation in certain cases of accident without proof of fault or negligence was inserted in the Act of 1939 vide Amendment Act No. 47 of 1982.
2. Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 could not serve the cause of the public and for this reason the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has been enacted to serve the cause of the society. Thus, the legislation relating to the motor vehicles and compensation is the beneficial legislation enacted by the Parliament for the benefit of the pedestrians, passengers and other victims of the accident. This directs the Court to interpret the beneficial legislation in favour of the victims of the accident.
3. This appeal is directed against the award dated 16.1.1988 passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Sawaimadhopur, Camp Gangapur City, by which the Tribunal passed an award of Rs. 92,000/- against the appellants and respondent No. 4, Raman Lal. Further directions were given that the respondent No. 4 and the present appellant will be liable to pay interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum.
4. Brief facts of the case are that on 28th October, 1979, Gyan Singh and Man Singh were going in tractor No. RJD 8476 form Mahuwa towards Pachena. At about 8 a.m. while they were crossing the river Gambhiri, bus No. RSR 6314 came from the back side and dashed against tractor No. RJD 8476 resulting in the death of Gyan Singh and serious injuries to Man Singh. The Claim petition was submitted and a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- was Claimed on account of the injuries sustained by Man Singh and a sum of Rs. 2,10,500/- was Claimed on account of the death of Gyan Singh. A total Claim of Rs. 4,10,500/- was submitted before the Tribunal.
5. On behalf of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, as usual, a written statement was submitted and the factor of accident was also denied. It was stated that the accident has not taken place and the vehicle No. RSR 6314 has not dashed against the tractor as stated by the petitioner.
6. On behalf of the respondents, preliminary objection was taken that joint Claim by , the legal representatives of the deceased Gyan Singh and injured Man Singh cannot be filed. This preliminary objection was raised before the Tribunal and the Tribunal also held the joint Claim is not maintainable. This compelled Man Singh to withdraw his Claim to avoid the plea of limitation which could be raised against other family members, namely, the legal representatives of deceased Gyan Singh.
7. This type of technical attitude of the Court is resulting in injustice to the needy and, in fact, the law which is to be applied for the benefit of the poor victims is not applied in a way which was enacted by the Parliament. There is a need that the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the State should take note of such decisions and he should organise the training camps and reorientation courses for giving some training to the judicial officers who have to deal with such cases immediately after their promotion from Chief Judicial Magistrate or Additional District Judge. There is a need of the society that the Judges should have a humane approach and they should have the attitude to work for the society and they should not be technical or hyper-technical in the performance of their duties. It is said that the Courts are for the rich and not for the poor. I will like to observe that there is a need for the change of approach, to make it in conformity with the directions given in the Constitution, particularly Chapter IV and Preamble of the Constitution.
8. The law does not prohibit filing of the joint Claim by the persons who have suffered injuries or death in the course of the same accident. On the contrary, it reduces the work load of the Court and it will not be necessary to produce the evidence relating to the accident and negligence of the driver etc. in other Claim. There is a justification for filing of the joint Claim and the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the Claim of Man Singh and legal representatives of deceased Gyan Singh cannot be allowed to continue jointly. I can only say at this stage that poor Man Singh has suffered and he has not filed a separate Claim. He may do so and the Tribunal should be liberal in dealing with his Claim in the matter condo nation of delay as poverty is one of the factors which prevents everyone to approach the Court and, in fact, the poverty is resulting in unequal opportunity and the paper tiger of equality is for exhibition in the books, but there is no rearing tiger of equality to fight against inequality. For the reasons mentioned above, I am of the view that the learned Tribunal has taken unwarranted approach in the matter of holding that the joint Claim was filed by the victims of the same accident.
9. The second question is about the approach of the Welfare State and particularly the corporate body like Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation. It does not befit to a Welfare State to plead the case in way which may not be in the interest of the society. To start by saying that the accident has not occurred on account of the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle of Roadways and further to say that the vehicle was not involved and, in the alternative, to say that if the vehicle was involved, there was a case of contributory negligence and to deny every fact mentioned in the petition, does not give a good reputation to the Corporation like State Road Transport Corporation. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Narain Shanker 1980 ACJ 41 (SC) decided on 30th January, 1980, has deprecated the practice of contesting such cases and has remarked that the need of the time is that the Corporation should not enter into callous litigation, but should give greater attention to the efficiency of service, including insistence on competent, cautious and responsible driving. This holds good even up to this date to a great extent and the need of the time is that the Road Transport Corporation should have the humane approach and act like general Insurance Companies. It is expected from the Welfare State corporate bodies that they will devise a method for the settlement of the cases outside the Court and they may rush at the door of the victim and pay compensation without inviting him to the Court.
10. On behalf of the State Road Transport Corporation, Mr. R.R.L. Gupta cited before me the following cases in which the multiplier has been adopted as under:
S.No Age Multiplie Ruling
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1. 18 20 Kanniammal v. Prabhakar 1989 ACJ 489 (Madras).
2. 19 1/2 20 Om Parkash Bhatia v. Jagir Singh 1989 ACJ 68 (P&H)
3. 20 12 State of Kerala v. Karthiyani 1989 ACJ 16 (Kerala).
4. 20 16 Surjit Kaur v. Darshan Singh 1989 ACJ 335 (P&H)
5. 21 16 New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Ansuya 1989 ACJ 400 (AP).
6. 22 10 Devji v. Anwarkhan 1989 ACJ 567 (MP).
7. 23 22 Kela Devi v. Delhi Kashmir Goods Transport Co.
1989 ACJ 369 (Delhi).
8. 25 16 M.P. Electricity Board v. Baisaikhia 1989 ACJ 197 (MP).
9. 25 16 Kanta Kuthiala v. Haryana Roadways through. G.M.
1989 ACJ 331 (P&H).
10. 27 16 Bimla Devi Aggarwal v. Ganda Singh 1989 ACJ 481 (P&H).
11. 29 20 Shiela Devi v. Jagir Singh 1989 ACJ 359 (Delhi).
12. 32 16 Union of India v. Kusum Sharma 1989 ACJ 260 (J&K).
13. 34 13.80 A. Rajam v. M. Manikya Reddy 1989 ACJ 542 (AP).
14. 35 16 Krishan Lal v. Shakuntla Devi 1989 ACJ 232 (P&H).
15 35 15 Santosh v. General Manager M.P.S.R.T.C. 1989 ACJ 572 (MP).
16. 37 20 Meera Devi v. Depot Manager U.P.R.C. 1989 ACJ 493
(Rajasthan).
17. 38 16 State of Orissa v. Nalini Kumari Patnaik 1989 ACJ 126
(Orissa).
18. 38 16 Secretary, Ministry of Cmmunications, Government of India v.
Amar Kaur 1989 ACJ 82 (P&H).
19. 42 20 Chandro Devi v. Jit Singh 1989 ACJ 41 (Delhi).
20. 45 15 New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Mohinder Kuar 1989 ACJ
343 (Rajasthan).
21. 23 15 Ram Autar Suresh Kumar v. Kanta Devi l989 ACJ 814 (Delhi).
22. 25 10 Chandan v. Kanwarlal 1989 ACJ 816 (Delhi).
23. 26 20 Charanjit Kaur v. Union of India 1989 ACJ 663 (P&H).
24. 29 16 Rekha Mothsara v. Ram Phal 1989 ACJ 929 (P&H).
25. 32 16 Union of India v. Rama Devi 1989 ACJ 935 (P&H).
26. 35 20 Hamirpur Transport Co-op. Society Ltd. v. Parveen Lata
Kapoor 1989 ACJ 905 (HP).
27. 36 16 Vijay Chopra v. Udham Singh 1989 ACJ 589 (P&H).
28. 39 16 Juliundur Transport Co-op. Society Ltd. v. Raj Wali 1989 ACJ
901 (P&H).
29. 40 12.79 Nirmala Narsava v. Vilas Ramachandra Shangda 1989 ACJ
715 (AP).
30. 40 16 Maya Devi v. Sohan Singh 1989 ACJ 1011 (P&H).
31. 41 14 R.J. Padmakumari v. Pallavan Transport Corporation 1989
ACJ 774 (Madras).
32. 42 12(16) Shakunt v. Lal Singh 1989 ACJ 983 (P&H).
33. 43 12 Goodwill Exports v. Jayammal 1989 ACJ 636 (Madras).
34. 24 20 Meera Bai v. Mishri Lal .
35. 24 16 Surjit Pavitar Singh v. State of Punjab 1990 ACJ
156 (P&H).
36. 25 18 Kannekanti Varamma v. PULI Ramakotaiah .
37. 25 22 Union of India v. Sudhir Khanna .
38. 26 18 Krshna Chadha v. National Carriers .
39. 27 20 Bisarti Bai v. Madhya Pradesh State Road Trans.
Corporation .
40. 29 15 K.K. Jain v. Masroor Anwar . (Multiplier
reduced from 28 to 15)
41. 29 20 Fazal Hussain v. Kalu Khan .
42. 29 15 Maharashtra S.R.T.C. v. Tulsabai Tukaram Kadave 1990 ACJ
523 (Bombay).
11. Similarly, in the follwing cases the multiplier applied more than 20 years.
43. 21 25 D.T.C. v. Rattan Chand 1989 ACJ 593 (Delhi).
44. 22 30 Tara Chand v. Chokali 1989 ACJ 802 (Rajasthan).
45. 25 32 Abdul Rahman v. Dayaram 1989 ACJ 806 (Bombay).
46. 35 25 D.T.C. v. Kamlesh Arora 1989 ACJ 1034 (Delhi).
47. 45 25 U.P.S.R.T.C. v.Haseen Fatma 1989 ACJ 630 (Allahabad).
(Award reduced by 1/3.-Hence multiplier comes to 16-17)
12. Mr. Gupta has also cited some other cases of different High Courts in which the Court has taken into consideration the multiplier higher than 20.
13. In the case of Sulochana v. R.S.R.T.C. 1989 ACJ 638 (Rajasthan), this Court has taken into consideration the multiplier of 34 years. Deceased Suresh Kumer was 26 years old and multiplier of 34 years was considered taking into consideration the age of 60 years.
14. In the case of Jyotsna Dey v. State of Assam 1987 ACJ 172 (SC) Hon’ble Supreme Court-took into consideration the age as 70 years and taking note of the fact that deceased was 45 years of age has taken into consideration 25 years’ multiplier, i.e., 70-45-25 years.
15. In the case of Lalita v. Devi Sahai 1987 ACJ 241 (Rajasthan), the multiplier has been taken as 40 years. In the instantcase, the deceased was of tender age of 23 years and the Court came of the conclusion that at least for forty years the deceased might have maintained his family.
16. In the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Jhami Bai 1987 ACJ 496 (Rajasthan) this Court has taken into consideration the expectancy of life as 65 to 70 years and adopted multiplier of 25 for a deceased aged 35 to 37 years.
17. In the case of Shiela Devi v.Jagir Singh 1989 ACJ 359 (Delhi) Delhi High Court adopted multiplier of 32 (Sic. 20) years.
18. In the case of R.S.R.T.C. v. Pista Aggarwal 1986 ACJ 23 (Rajasthan) the age of the deceased in the said case was 32 years. This Court held that the working expectancy should be 65 years and adopted the multiplier method by taking the age 32 to 60 years and awarded 28 years’ multiplier. It was also submitted that this case has been approved by the Division Bench of this Court.
19. Our economy is a developing economy and is not a developed economy. Banking insttutions have also not taken so much deep roots in the villages. The systems 6f consideration at the time of assessment of compensation prevalent are: (i) interest theory mehtod; (ii) multiplier method taking into consideration the expected earning period; and (iii) other allied social factors.
20. The interest theory method is mainly rejected on account of the speculative prices, inflation, fluctuating banking rates, the uncertainty of investments and other allied matters. One must understand what is the phenomenon of economic life of the country. Today, it was reported in the papers and particularly Hindustan Times and Indian Express that after June the increase in the price of the commodities is within the range of 30 per cent. I will not like to say about the correctness of the paper reporting, but the fact that remains for consideration is that the prices are increasing, the money value is going down and the inflation is going towards the peak and may touch the sky. In such conditions we should not also forget that before five years what was the value of rupee qua dollar and what is the value of the rupee qua dollar today. Practically, the value of the rupee qua dollar has gone down ncarabout 50 per cent. In such circumstances, to adopt the interest theory method (Sic. is a bit risky).
21. The second consideration is also the age factor. Why a person who is earning Rs. 2,000/- at the age of 28 is getting the same amount which his counterpart with the legal representatives of the other deceased who at the age of 35 was getting. Even if we take into consideration the age expectancy period then problem will be the same. If a person is expected to work up to the age of 60 and the s at the-age of 28 years, he may be getting multiplier of32. Similarly, a person who is earning the same amount dies at the age of 35, multiplier of 25 years will be reasonable, but, whereas a person earning the same amount at the age of 45 the s, naturally the multiplier will be 15 years. If this method is not adopted, the question will be argued in a different way. They will say what is the criterion of applying Article 14 in the matter of adopting the multiplier and what should be the quality and how all will get equal treatment before law. So, the equal treatment requires that working expectancy of life will be taken into consideration and that will be the real multiplier which should be adopted ordinarily in all cases. So, there may not be a complaint of unequal treatment amongst the equals or equal treatment amongst unequal. For this reason also I am of the view that the working expectancy period should be the foundation for determination of the multiplier and out of the working life expectancy period, the present age should be deducted. We should not also forget the future prospectives of the deceased. A man cannot remain static and in the same position throughout the life. It is said that if one is satisfied in his life it is equivalent to death ‘shanti mrityu ka dusra nam hai. While considering this factor of expectancy of life generally we take the materialistic working life of a man. Our Indian culture is based on ‘ashram vyavastha’ and, in the present day, ordinarily, up to the age of 60 or 65, the man works for the family, for the development of the children and betterment of the life. Thereafter he starts thinking of the future life. So in any case, the expectancy of life cannot be and should not be taken below 60; as far as the working life is concerned, it may be 65 also. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of the life of a person who is leading and, for this reason, I am of the view that the multiplier system should be adopted without taking into consideration the interest method which is considered sometimes as suitable. A man who the d in 1980 might be contributing towards his family Rs. 1,000/-. Today, Rs. 1,000/-will not suffice, because it has the value of less than Rs. 500/- and for this reason, I reject the theory of interest method and adopt the theory multiplier system based on the doctrine of equity, equality and necessity. I used the word ‘necessity’ because I am taking into consideration the perpetual phenomenon of devaluation, inflation in prices, high cost index, etc., required for leading an average social life in the society. For this reason I take into consideration that the interest theory method cannot be accepted nor for all purposes it can be said that 2.0 years’ multiplier should be accepted and no higher multiplier should be given. In the instant case, the cross-objection was filed by the respondents, but the same was not filed with in time. It was submitted that the service on the Claimants was effected at their village, but they failed to contact their Advocate till 8.11.1988. It was also submitted that the Claimants are illiterate persons who are living in the village. It was also submitted that the father of the deceased was looking after the interest of his daughter-in-law as well as the mother of the deceased. While taking into consideration the social conditions prevailing in the society and particularly in the districts of Bharatpur and Sawaimadhopur, one cannot forget that even today burka and parda systems aer prevailing. A judicial notice should be taken and the same applies in the instant case. I will like to condone the delay in the filing of the cross-objection. It will not be out of place here to mention that a beneficial legislation should be interpreted and applied for the society. The Court should be very liberal in applying the law and interpreting the law for the benefit of the victims of the accident. Apart from that, we must not forget that under Order 41, Rule 33, Civil Procedure Code, Appellate Court has power to pass any decree and make any order which ought ot have been passed or made and to pass and make such further or other decree or order, as the case may be, and this power may be exercised by Court notwithstanding that the appeal is a part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of any of the respondents orpartics, although such respondents or parties may not have filed the appeal or cross-objection. Thus, this rule empowers the Court to pass any order which ought to have been passed by the Tribunal even without an appeal or without the cross-objection.
22. I had the opportunity to deal with the provisions of Order 41, Rule 33, Civil Procedure Code, in the case of Murari Lal v. Gomati Devi 1986 ACJ 316 (Rajasthan). It was held that the provisions of Order 41, Rule 33 can be applied. From the bare reading of Order 41, Rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Code, I am convinced that the wide wording was intended to empower the Appellate Court to make whatever order it thinks fit, not only between the appellant and the respondents but also between the respondents and the respondents. It also empowers the Appellate Court not only to give or refuse to give relief to the appellant by allowing or dismissing the appeal and also to give such other reliefs to any of the respondents as the case may require.
23. Thus, the law, particularly the law relating to compensation, directs the Court to deliver justice according to the needs of the litigants without entering into the technicalities of law and should base its judgment on equity to deliver justice to the litigants. I am also extending the benefit fo Rule 33 of Order 41 to the respondents to meet the ends of justice though not required to do so, because I have already condoned the delay in filing the cross-objection.
24. One of the points which has been argued is the possibility of remarriage. To deny compensation on the ground of possibility of the remarriage of the widow is against the public policy and may be violative of Section 23 of the Contract Act. One must also understand that there was a time when the widow marriage was prohibited. Now the society has recognised that the remarriagae is the necessity of the life and a widow and particularly the young widow cannot be asked to lead a life of a widow and should remain throughout within the four walls of the house. Parliament in its wisdom enacted the Hindu Marriage Act and Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and codified the Hindu Law. After the death of the husband, under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act wife becomes an absolute owner of the property of the husband. Similarly, now there is no restriction on the widow remarriage. On the contrary, the society feels that the widow remarriage is the need of the society and for the welfare of the weaker Sections of the society. If the Courts start thinking about the possibility of remarriage, then the whole purpose of the legislation will be frustrated and it will remind us of the talk of the 19th Century when we arc thinking of moving into the 21st Century. So, the argument about the possibility of remarriage cannot be accepted at all in the present-day society. On the contrary, I am of the view that even after remarriage, the wife is entitled to get compensation to which she is entitled in the normal course of life. One of the factors is that in the remarriage ordinarily, you cannot get a good partner like the earlier one and burns of the widowhood still remain in the widow even after the remarriage and she has to face the society. So the question of marriage or possibility of remarriage does not come in the way at all and compensation should not be based on the question of marriage or possibility of remarriage.
25. Mr. Gupta has rightly argued only on the point of quantum of compensation and he has not taken the point of negligence of the driver. I am happy that Mr. Gupta understood the thinking of the Court and has not adopted the arguments which were adopted before the Claims Tribunal. Such arguments which were not taken in the written statements are slur on the working of welfare corporate body like Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and it reflects that Raiasthan Roadways acts without humane approach and does not move with the times for the welfare of the society. On the contrary, sometimes the Corporation acts in a way which cannot be expected even from a private party.
26. In the present case the Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the deceased was of the age of about 30 years. The father of the deceased has shown the age of the deceased as 27 years. The Tribunal also came to the conclusion that in the post-mortem report the approximate age has been shown as 30 years. Approximate age as shown in the post mortem report cannot be accepted unless proved and there is no reason to disbelieve the statement of the father. For this reason, I accept the statement and hold that the age of the deceased was 27 years at the time of accident.
27. As far as the income of the deceased is concerned, the father of the deceased has said that deceased was earning Rs. 1,000/- per month from the tractor. The other witness Man Singh has also stated that the deceased was earning about Rs. 3,000/- per month. Man Singh has also stated that they decree aged used to give Rs. 300/- per month to him. It will not be out of place here to mention that it has come on record that the deceased had the agricultural land and he was also earning out of the agricultural land as income from the agriculture cannot be less than Rs. 400/- per month.
28. On behalf of the respondents none has appeared in the witness-box to dispute the income. The driver has stated that the tractor was registerd in the name of his father and deceased has two brothers. So, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that out of Rs. 1,000/- as stated by the father only Rs. 500/- should be taken as compensation. A family having a tractor stands on better footing and there is no reason to disbelieve this fact that Gyan Singh used to give Rs. 300/- p.m. to Man Singh who has appeared in the witness-box. Thus, I am of the view that the Tribunal has taken the view which is not warranted and ordinarily, the income of the deceased cannot be less than Rs. 1,000/- including the income from agriculture and other sources. Deceased had a wife and mother. Father was alive, so naturally he will have to spend some amount on the mother. Even if it is assumed that the deceased was spending Rs. 400/- per month on his person even then, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the deceased was not spending less than Rs. 600/- per month for the family. Thus, the amount of compensation can be on higher side. Wife has stated that she was getting regularly Rs. 700/- p.m. from her husband. Taking into consideration all factors, I hold that deceased was giving at least Rs. 600/- per month to his family. Taking the working expectancy age of the deceased as 65 years, I reduce 27 years out of it for the purpose of arriving at the compensation figure; so, the expectancy figure should be 38 years. Even by giving a margin of three years in favour of the appellant-Corporation one cannot think that the expectancy period will be less than 35 years. So, the respondents are entitled to get 35 x Rs. 7,200/- = Rs. 2,52,000/-. Out of this amount, I think the mother should not get more than 20 per cent and rest of the amount should be paid to the young wife.
29. Now, I will take into consideration the uncertainties of life and lump sum payment to be made. On account of lump sum payment and uncertainties of life, I direct that 15 per cent amount should be deducted out of compensation amount of Rs. 2,52,000/-. Thus after 15 per cent deduction the net amount payable to the wife and mother will be Rs. 2,14,200/-. Out of this amount 80 per cent should be paid to the wife and 20 per cent should paid to mother. In addition to this amount, the wife shall be entitled to get Rs. 10,000/- on account of consortium and loss of life and mother will be entitled to get Rs. 3,000/- on this amount. Thus, the total amount payable to the mother will be Rs. 45,840/- and the total amount payable to the wife will be Rs. 1,81,360/-. The respondents will be entitled to 12 per cent interest on the amount of compensation from the date of the application.
The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
