PETITIONER: RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, JAIPUR Vs. RESPONDENT: SMT. POONAM PAHWA AND ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/07/1997 BENCH: G. N. RAY, G. T. NANAVATI ACT: HEADNOTE: JUDGMENT:
PRESENT:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.N. Ray
Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.T. Nanavati
Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, Sr. Adv (A.C.), Gopal Singh, Anis Ahmad,
Sushil Kumar Jain, Advs. with him for the appellant
D.P. Mukherjee, Adv.(Ms. Lalita Kaushik) Adv. (NP) for the
Respondents. Nos.4-6
J U D G M E N T
The following Judgment of the Court was delivered:
G.N. RAY, J.
Leave granted. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
The question that calls for the decision of this Court
is whether Order XXI Rule 1 (2) Code of Civil Procedure is
applicable in respect of the claim under Section 110 [c] of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and whether it was justified in
awarding interest on the decretal amount from June 26, 1986
(the date of deposit of the decretal amount in court) to
April 19, 1989 (when decree holder came to know about the
deposit of the amount)?
The relevant facts of the case are that an accident had
taken place May 7, 1983 in which one Shri Subhash Chand
Pahwa who was travelling in the bus belonging to the
appellant Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation from
Jaipur to Delhi died due to accident by colliding with a
truck. A claim petition was filed on August 23, 1983 by
respondent No. 1, 2 and 3, namely, the widow, minor son and
daughter of the deceased against the appellant and
respondent No.4, Shri Deepak Thakur who was the driver of
Truck No. HRU 2995, respondent No.5, Shri Durga Prasad
Parnami, the owner of the said truck, respondent No.6 M/s
New Delhi Assurance Company limited and respondent No.7, Ami
Chand being the driver of bus No. RNB 7720 of the Rajasthan
State Road Transport Corporation.
The Accidents Claim Tribunal passed an award in favour
of the claimants, namely, Smt. Poonam Pahwa and her minor
son and daughter and against the respondent including the
appellant Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) for a sum of
Rs.2.5 lacs with 12% interest from the date of filing of the
claim petition till actual realisation.
The appellant-Corporation deposited a cheque of Rs.
3,36,111.30 on June 27, 1986 in the executing Court
comprising the decretal award of compensation and interest
calculated on the decretal award upto the date of deposit of
the said decretal amount. It is an admitted position that
decree holder were not informed either by the Court or by
the judgment debtor about the deposit of the said sum of Rs.
3,36,111.30 on June 27, 1986 and the decree holders came to
know about such deposit only on April 19, 1989. The decree
holders, therefore, made a claim for further interest at the
said rate of 12% from the date of deposit till the decree
holder got the information about such deposit made by the
judgment debtors. Such claim was opposed by the appellant-
Corporation by contending inter alia that there was no
obligation of the appellant Corporation to give intimation
to the decree holders about the deposit made by the
Corporation and the provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 (2) of
the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable in respect of
the award passed by the Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal and
in any event if the Court had failed to give the intimation
of such deposit, the judgment debtors would not suffer any
prejudice on account of the mistake committed by the court.
Such contentions, however, have been rejected by the
Tribunal in the execution proceedings. The appellant-
Corporation thereafter moved a Revision petition before the
Punjab and Haryana High Court against the order passed by
executing court for depositing further sum on account of the
interest to be paid by the judgment debtors from the date of
deposit of the said decretal amount till the date when
decree holders had got the information of such deposit. By
the impugned judgment, the Review Petition has been
dismissed by the High Court.
Mr. S. K. Jain, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant, has submitted that order XXI Rule 1 (2) of the
Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable in respect with
the claim made under Section 110 [C] of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1939. Mr. Jain has referred to the provisions of
Section 110 [C] of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 which reads
as under.
“1) In holding any enquiry under
Section 110-B the claims tribunal
may subject to any rules that may
be made in this behalf, follow such
summary procedure as it thinks fit,
2) The Claims Tribunal shall have
all the powers a Civil Court for
the purpose of taking evidence on
oath and of enforcing the
attendance of witnesses and of
compelling the discovery and
production of documents and
material objects and for such other
purposes as may be prescribed, and
the claims Tribunal shall be deemed
to be a Civil Court for all the
purposes of Section 195 and Chapter
XXXV of Criminal procedure Code
1898 (Act 5 of 1988).”
Rules have been framed under Section 111 A of the Motor
Vehicles Act. Rule 20 of the said Rules prescribes that
Order X, Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30 Order IX, Order XXXIII
Rules 1 to 3 should be applicable in the proceedings before
Claims Tribunal.
The Punjab Government vide its Notification No. GSR
68/CA4/39/SIII-Adm/(I) 68 dated June 21, 1968 amended Rule
20 to the following effect.
“In the Punjab Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal Rules, 1969 in Rule
20 between the words and figure
Order XVII and Order XXXIIO, the
word and figure Order XXI shall be
inserted.”
Mr. Jain has contended that the said amendment of Rule
20 had not been incorporated in the Rules applicable in the
State of Haryana. Hence, in respect of the claim petition on
account of accident taking place in the State of Haryana,
the provision of Order XXI of the Code of civil Procedure
has no manner of application. Mr. Jain has also submitted
that in any event, the judgment debtor had deposited the
decretal amount and such judgment debtor had no obligation
to give notice to the decree holders about making such
deposit. He has submitted even if the Court had a duty to
inform the decree holders about such deposit, for the
failure of the Court, no liability can be fastened on the
judgment debtor. Mr. Jain has submitted that although the
Tribunal rightly indicated the principle of law that nobody
should suffer on account of the mistake of the Court, the
Tribunal erred in awarding interest for the said period
against the judgment debtor even though the judgment debtor
did not commit the mistake but deposited the entire decretal
amount.
Mr. Jain has submitted that even though the provisions
of order XXI was not applicable in respect of the said claim
petition because amendment of Rule 20 in the State of Punjab
by making Order 21 Civil Procedure Code expressly applicable
in 1968 had not been incorporated in Rules applicable in
Hrayana, it has been erroneously held that provisions of
Order XXi Civil Procedure Code are applicable. He has,
therefore, submitted that impugned decision in awarding
further interest for the period between the date of deposit
and the date on which the decree holders not the information
about the deposit was illegal and wholly unjustified and
therefore, this appeal should be allowed setting asided the
impugned judgment.
Shri D. P. Mukherjee, learned counsel appearing for
respondent No. 6 namely, M/s New Delhi Assurance Company
Limited and Ms. Lalita Kaushik, learned counsel appearing
for the respondent Nos. 4 and 5, namely, the driver and
owner of the said truck, however, did not advance any
submission presumably because such respondents are not
directly concerned with the impugned decision.
Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, learned Senior counsel at the
request of this Court, has appeared as amicus curiae in this
appeal. Dr. Dhavan has submitted that by GSR 20/CA-4/39-S
111A/72 dated January 28, 1972 Haryana has adopted the
Punjab Motor Vehicles Rules by indicating: In Haryana the
Punjab Motor Vehicles Claims Tribunal Rules, 1964 adopted
after substituting the word Haryana for Punjab in Rule 1
Clause (b) and in Rule 2 Clause (b).” Order XXI Civil
Procedure Code was inserted in Rule 20 in the State of
Punjab by amendment made on June 21, 1968 and published in
Gazette on July 12, 1968. As the Haryana has adopted the
Punjab Rules in 1972 by implication it will mean that Punjab
Rules as stood amended on the date of adoption of Punjab
Rules in Haryana in 1972, was applicable in the State of
Haryana. Dr. Dhavan has submitted that in the impugned
decision, no reference to 1972 notification of the Haryana
Government has been made and only reference is to the
judgments of Punjab and Haryana High Court of 1968 and 1970
(1968 ACT 360(DB) and (AIR 1970 Punjab 506).
Dr. Dhavan has submitted that if Order XXI of Civil
Procedure code is expressly applicable, law is well settled
that the judgment debtor has obligation to notify the date
of deposit of decretal amount to the decree holder. But even
if Order XXI Civil Procedure Code is not expressly
applicable, the Tribunal having been exclusively vested with
the power of adjudication of the claims arising out of
accident of motor vehicles, it has to decide such claims
fairly and reasonably by applying the underlying principles
of the Civil Procedure Code.
Dr. Dhavan has submitted that the question, therefore,
requires to be considered in this case is:-
1) Is the Civil Procedure Code or
the principles underlying the
provisions of the Code to be
followed in the absence of any
specific incorporation of the
provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure particularly where a
selective incorporation has been
made and some provisions of the
Code have been incorporated but the
relevant provisions of Order XXI
have not been incorporated
specifically?
2) Should the rule of notice in
Order XXI Rule 1 (2) be applied
where no specific incorporation of
the said rule has been made and
what rules to be applied where
there is lacuna in the procedure?
Dr. Dhavan has submitted that as an adjudicating
authority of the claim arising out of motor vehicle
accident, the Tribunal has a duty to act judicially and
fairly by following the principles underlying the Code of
Civil Procedure as a bench mark for fairness unless any
particular rule of the Code of Civil Procedure has been
specially excluded. Dr. Dhavan has submitted that in the
instant case, there is no dispute that the procedure of the
judgment debtor’s giving notice to the decree holder was not
followed. It is also not disputed that the executing court
did not inform the decree holder. The Claims Tribunal has
been declared to be civil court for the purposes of taking
evidence on oath, forcing attendance of witnesses, discovery
and production of documents and such matters as may be
prescribed and also for the purposes of Section 195 and
Chapter XXXV of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1988 as
contained in Section 110 [c] of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
and corresponding Section 169 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988. Under the rule making power under the said Motor
Vehicles Act, the State Government can inter alia lay down
the procedure to be followed by the tribunal and the powers
vested in a civil court which may be exercised by the Claims
Tribunal. Rule 20 of the Motor Vehicles Act states that the
Code of Civil Procedure will apply in certain cases. The
following provisions of the First Schedule to the Code of
Civil Procedure 1908 shall in so far as may be applied to
proceedings before the Claims Tribunal, namely, Order V,
Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30, Order IX, Order XIII, Rules 3 to
10, Order XVI Rules 2 to 21, Order XVII, and Order XXXIII,
Rules 1 to 3. Amendment to Rule 20 has been made in
different states. In the State of Punjab, Order XXI was
inserted in Rule 20 June 21, 1968 and published in the
Gazette on July 12, 1968. As already indicated, the State of
Haryana adopted the Punjab Rules in 1972 after the inclusion
of Order XXI in the Punjab Rules in 1968, by GSR 20/CA-
4/39/S111A/72 dated January 28, 1972.
Dr. Dhavan has submitted that the Motor Vehicles
legislation creates a Claims Tribunal which is a body for
the purpose of adjudicating claims and it is headed by
qualified legal personnel and it has a duty to give parties
a chance to be heard and make an award determining the
amount of compensation. For the said contention, Dr. Dhavan
has drawn the attention of the Court to Section 110 of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and corresponding Section 165 of
the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988. Dr. Dhavan has submitted
that the Motor Accidents Claim Tribunals are in lieu of
Civil Courts by excluding the jurisdiction of civil courts.
For such contention, reference has been made to Section 110
F of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and corresponding Section
175 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Dr. dhavan has
submitted that it will, therefore, appear that the Tribunal
has a duty to act judicially in a fair manner consistent
with the statutory scheme that ousts the jurisdiction of the
civil Courts. Dr. dhavan has submitted that procedurally the
Tribunal is supposed to act by way of summary procedure as
it thinks fit (Section 110 C of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and
Section 169 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988). Dr. Dhavan has
also contended that the rule making power makes a
distinction between the procedure to be followed and the
powers vested in a civil court which may be exercised by a
Claims Tribunal and any other matter that my be prescribed.
(Section 111A of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and Section 176 of
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988). Dr. Dhavan has submitted that
even if certain empowerments in the code of Civil Procedure
are not made, the procedure may be prescribed or not, the
procedure to be followed must be fair. Dr. Dhavan has
submitted that the criteria for determining the right
procedure are the Civil Procedure Code and Criminal
Procedure Code. In practice, the principles underlying the
Civil Procedure code. In practice, the principles underlying
the Civil Procedure code and the general law have been
followed as being consistent with public policy and due
process.
Referring to Wade’s Administrative Law (7th Edition
page 931), Dr. Dhavan has contended that more generally,
following the tribunalization of justice, there is a need
that the tribunals that are set up should be commensurate to
the task.
Dr. Dhavan has submitted that the need for a fair
procedure stems from the following sources:
i) Justice, equity and good
conscience- it is a part of Indian
Law and must be deemed to have
continued by virtue of Article 372
of the Constitution.
ii) Article, 21 as interpreted by
this Court after Maneka Gandhi’s
case (1978 () SCR 621) mandates a
fair procedure.
iii) The principles of natural
justice are founded on fairness, a
right to be heard and dealt with
fairly.
It has also been submitted by Dr. Dhavan that as a
matter of rule of law, where the right to adjudicate one’s
disputes is taken away from a court of law, the alternative
dispute settlement mechanism must be fair. For this
contention, Dr. Dhavan has drawn the attention of the Court
to the decisions in Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui & Ors. Vs. Union
of India & Ors. (1994 (6) SCC 630 at pp. 412, 422), Magan
Lal Chagganlal (P) Ltd. Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater
Bombay and Ors. (1975 (1) SCR at pp. 23, 24, 55), in Re
Supreme Court The Special Courts Bill, 1978 (1979 (2) SCR
476, 532, 571, 573). Dr. Dhavan has also submitted that the
underlying principles of general law have been made
applicable on the flooring that they are consistent with the
public policy. In support of this contention, Dr. Dhavan has
referred to the decision of this Court in P. Sambamurty &
Ors. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. (1987 (1) SCC 362)
where the application under Order XXIII in the writ
proceedings has been upheld. Dr. Dhavan has submitted that
the practice of this Court and the High Courts has been to
incorporate general principles underlying the provisions of
Civil Procedure code even though such provisions of the code
have not been specifically incorporated in the Motor
Vehicles Act and the Rules. In this connection, Dr Dhavan
has referred to the decision in State of Haryana Vs.
Darshana Devi (1979 (2) SCC 236) where Order XXXIII dealing
with the provisions for suing as forma pauperis has been
made applicable in the proceedings before the Tribunal. Dr.
Dhavan has also referred to the decision in Bhagwati Devi
Vs. L G. Goel (1983 ACJ 123 SC) where it has been held
following the principle in Darshana Devi, that claims
tribunals are courts within the meaning of Section 25 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. Dr. Dhavan has also referred to a
number of decisions of various High Courts where the
application of the principles underlying the Civil Procedure
code have been invoked in the endeavour to make the
procedure of the Tribunal workable and fair.
In K. Narayan Reddiar vs. P. Venugopala Reddiar (1976
ACJ 474 at 483 (AP) – general provisions of the C. P. Code
have been made applicable to the Motor Accidents Claim
Tribunal on the footing that the Tribunal has the trappings
of the Court. Application of underlying principles of C. P.
Code has also been made in the decisions in Amarjit Kaur Vs.
Vanguard Insurance Co. Ltd. (1969 ACJ 286), Jai Singh Vs.
V.N.A. Subramaniam (1983 ACJ 1), M/s South Indian Insurance
Co. Vs. Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, J & K & Other (AIR
1973 JK 38), New India Assurance Co. Vs. Punjab Roadways
(AIR 1964 Pubjab 235), Bihar Cooperative Motor Vehicles
Insurance Society Vs. Rameshwar Raut (AIR 1970 Patna 172),
and Madras Motor and General Insurance Co. Vs. K. Gopala
Mudaliar (1972 ACJ 135 Madras). Similarly, the application
of provisions in respect of filing additional statements
under Order VIII Rule 9 has been made in South Indian
Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Lakshmi and Ors. (1967 ACJ 153).
Application of provisions on power to issue Commissions has
been made in M. K. Krishnan Nair Vs. Pankaj Jethalal Sha
(AIR 1979 Madras 259).
Dr. Dhavan has submitted that Order XXI Rule 1 provides
for that:
i) the obligation to pay interest
continues unit notice is given to
the judgment debtor
ii) the payment into court does not
constitute a payment for the
decretal amount with interest
iii) the judgment debtor may treat
the said payment as towards
interest, with the result that the
principal amount is still due
iv) any payment into court without
notice does not amount to payment
in full satisfaction of the decree
and interest will continue until
notice is given (Order XXI Rule 1
(4) Civil Procedure code)
Dr. Dhavan has also submitted that the failure of not
giving notice is not a technical matter but constitutes an
important principle of fairness.
Dr. Dhavan has lastly submitted that admittedly the
judgment debtor did not vie notice for the decretal amount
being deposited in Court even though the judgment debtor had
an obligation under Order XXI Rule 1 code of Civil Procedure
to give such specific notice of the date of deposit of the
decretal amount to the decree holder. The judgment debtor,
therefore cannot avoid the liability by contending that it
was the duty of the Court to intimate and if the Court has
committed the mistake in not informing the decree holder,
the judgment debtor cannot suffer on account of the laches
of the Court. Dr. Dhavan has submitted that since Rule 20
was amended by the State of Punjab in 1968 and Haryana has
adopted the said rule in 1972, it should be held that the
Haryana has adopted Rule 20 with all amendments incorporated
in Punjab Rules on the date adoption of Punjab Rule by
Haryana. Hence, the liability under Order XX Rule 1 Code of
Civil Procedure because of the express application of Order
XXI in the Punjab Rules since adopted by State of Haryana
cannot be evaded by the Judgment debtor.
Dr. Dhavan has further submitted that even if it is
assumed that the State of Haryana has adopted the Punjab
Rules of 1964 without amendment effected subsequently in
1968 by which order XXI Civil Procedure Code has been made
expressly applicable, the Tribunal had the authority to
apply the underlying principle of Order XXI Rule 1 of Civil
Procedure code in awarding interest against the judgment
debtor because such principle under Order XXI Rule 1 is
consistent with justice and fairplay and the Tribunal having
been vested with exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate the
claims arising out of motor accidents, has to act fairly and
reasonably in resolving the claim. Therefore, the impugned
judgment is quite legal and valid and interference against
the said decision is not called for.
After giving our careful consideration to the facts and
circumstances of the case and the submission made by the
learned counsel for the appellant and by Dr. Dhavan, the
learned Senior counsel appearing as amicus curiae in this
appeal, it appears to us that the State of Haryana has
adopted the Punjab Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules
1964 by substituting the word ‘Haryana’ for Punjab in Rule 1
Clause (b) and in Rule 2 Clause (b). Such adoption in the
Punjab Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, 1964 was made on
January 20, 1972. In the Punjab Motor Accidents Claims
Tribunal Rules 1964, amendment was effected on June 21, 1968
by inserting Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure in
Rule 20 framed under Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. In our view,
Dr. Dhavan is justified in his submission that when Haryana
has adopted the Punjab Motor Accidents Rules in 1972, it
must be held that it has adopted the Punjab Rules as it
stood on the date of adoption, namely, January 20, 1972.
Order XXI of the Code of Civil procedure has been expressly
made applicable in Punjab Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal
Rules by amending the Punjab Rules in June 1968 which was
published in Gazette on July 12, 1968. Therefore, by
adopting the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1964 in
1972, it should be held that Haryana has adopted the Punjab
Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1964 as stood amended
on the date of adoption. In this connection, reference may
be made to the decision of this court in Mahindra and
Mahindra Vs. Union of India (1979 (2) SCC 529) and Bolani
Ores Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa (1974 (2) SCC 777). In
Mahindra and Mahindra’s case, it has been held that if there
is mere reference to a provision of statute in another
without incorporation then unless a different intention
clearly appears, Section 8 (1) of General Clauses Act would
apply and the reference would be construed as a reference to
the provision as may be in force from time to time in the
former statute. But if a provisions of one statue is
incorporated in another, any subsequent amendment in the
former statute or even its total repeal would not affect the
provision as incorporated in the latter statute.
In the decision in Bolani Ores case, the question came
up for consideration of this court as to whether the
definition of ‘motor vehicles’ in Section 2 (18) of the
Bihar and Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1930 as
incorporated in Orissa by the Orissa Amendment Act of 1940
will include the definition of ‘motor vehicles’ in the Motor
Vehicles Act as amended in 1986. It has been held by this
Court that incorporation of the definition of ‘motor
vehicles’ in the Orissa Taxation Act would not be affected
by subsequent amendment of the definition of ‘motor vehicle’
in the Motor Vehicles Act. In appreciating the definition of
‘motor vehicle’ as incorporated by the Taxation Act, regard
must be had to the intention of the legislature in adopting
such a method, its purpose and intendment as also the
definition of the Motor Vehicles Act. It has also been
indicated that nature of tax under the Taxation Act must
remain compensatory and regulatory in character. If a
vehicle does not use the public road, it cannot be taxed.
Therefore, legislature only intended to incorporate by
reference to the definition of motor vehicles as in 1940.
There is nothing to indicate that in Haryana the Punjab
Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1964 without the
amendment effected in the said Rules after 1964 were
adopted. Hence, when Punjab Motor Accident Claims Tribunal
Rules were adopted by only referring the Rules and not by
expressly indicating that the said Punjab Rules of 1964 as
it stood in 1964 were only adopted, it must be held that the
Punjab Rules as stood amended on the date of adoption by
Haryana are applicable in the State of Haryana. It cannot
also be held that there was a legislative intendment to
restrict the Punjab Rules in its application in Haryana only
to the extent of Punjab Rules of 1964. The amendment in
Punjab Rules in 1968 was made in order to bring in effect
the procedural law being followed by the civil courts for
ensuring fair trial and justice by inserting Order XXI Civil
Procedure Code. In this connection, reference may be made to
a decision of a seven Judges’ Bench of this Court in State
of Maharashtra Vs. Madhavrao Damodar Patil and Anr. etc.
(AIR 1968 SC 1395). The question arose for consideration by
this Court in the said case was whether amendments effected
in the Maharashtra State Agricultural Land (Ceiling on
Holdings) Act, 1961 have the protection for being included
in Ninth Schedule of the Constitution when for inclusion in
Ninth Schedule, only the said principal Act of 1961 was
mentioned without mentioning the amendment acts. It has been
held by this Court in the said decision that although for
some purposes an amending Act retains its individuality but
his, however, does not lead to conclusion that when an Act
is referred to, it is not intended to include the amendments
made in it. Therefore, the amendments effected in the said
Maharashtra State Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings)
Act, 1961 will also get the protection for being included in
the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution.
Order XXI Rule 1 Civil Procedure code as amended in
1976 expressly provides that the judgment debtor shall give
notice of the deposit of the decretal amount to the decree
holder dither through the Court or directly to the decree
holder. The obligation of giving the notice to the decree
holder is not absolved by simply depositing the amount
without taking steps to ensure service of the notice of such
deposit to the decree holder through Court or otherwise.
Therefore, the appellant cannot escape its liability to pay
interest to the decree holder for the period between the
date of deposit of the decretal amount and the date of
notice of such deposit of the decree holder.
Even if it is assumed that by adopting the Punjab Motor
Accidents Claims Tribunal rules 1964 the subsequent
amendments effected in the said Rules were not adopted or
incorporated by the State of Haryana and therefore, Order
XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be held to be
expressly applicable in the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal
Rules of Haryana, the appellant in our view, can be fastened
with the liability to pay interest for the aforesaid period
on account of not giving notice of the deposit of the
decretal amount to the decree holder by applying the
underlying principles of Order XXI Rule 1 of Civil Procedure
code. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has been
constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act to adjudicate the
disputer arising out of claims on account of motor
accidents. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has been
constituted by giving the exclusive jurisdiction to
determine such disputes by excluding the jurisdiction of
civil courts. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal being a
statutory Judicial Tribunal specifically constituted for
adjudicating the claims arising out of Motor accidents have
trappings of the Court. In Bhagwati Devi’s case (supra) this
Court has applied the provisions of Section 25 of Civil
Procedure code for transferring the case from one Court to
another by indicating that the Motor Accidents Claims
Tribunals are courts within the meaning of Section 25 of the
Civil Procedure code. In Darshana Devi’s case (supra), this
court also applied Order XXIII dealing with the provisions
fro suing by an indigent person in forma pauperis even
though in Rule 20, neither order XXIII nor Section 25 of
Civil Procedure code have been made expressly applicable.
Dr. Dhavan has taken pains in referring to number of
decisions of various High Courts where the underlying
principles of Civil Procedure Code have been made applicable
in the proceedings before the statutory judicial tribunals
on the footing that such provisions of Civil procedure code
are based on equitable principles for ensuring fair trial.
In Mathunni Mathai Vs. Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd.
and Ors. (1995 (4) SCC 26), it has been held that Order XXI
Rule 1 as amended in 1976 is applicable in executing the
award made under the Land Acquisition Act after indicating
the principle that if the decretal amount is deposited by
the judgment debtor pursuant to the order of the Court and
the judgment debtor has not given notice of such deposit to
the decree holder and also does not specify the manner in
which the amount should be appropriated, the decree holder
will be entitled to appropriate the amount deposited by the
judgment debtor towards interest and other expenses and the
decree holder is not bound to adjust the same towards the
principal.
In Prem Nath Kapur and another Vs. National Fertilizers
Corporation of India and others (1996 (2) SCC 71), the
decision in Mathunni Mathai’s case has been expressly
overruled by a three Judges’ Bench of this Court on the
finding that Order XXI Rule 1 being inconsistent with the
provisions contained in Section 34 and 28 of the Land
Acquisition Act, Such provision of Civil Procedure code
cannot be extended to the execution of award made under the
Land Acquisition Act. Dr. Dhavan has rightly contended that
in Prem Nath’s case non applicability of Order XXI Rule 1
Civil Procedure code on the score of inconsistency with
provisions of Land Acquisition Act relating to awards under
the said Act has been indicated and for the said reason,
applicability of Order XXI, Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code as
held in Mathunni’s case has been overruled. But
applicability of Order XXI Rule 1 Civil Procedure code in
other cases has not been doubted and the principle indicated
in Mathunni’s case has also not been discarded. On the
contrary, it has been held in Prem Nath’s case that the
decision of this Court in Meghraj Vs. Bayabai (1969 (2) SCC
274) since relied in Mathunni’s case is applicable to a
debtor and creditor in an ordinary civil suit governed by
Civil Procedure Code.
It appears to us that the provisions of Order XXI Rule
1 are not in any way inconsistent with the provisions for
awarding just and fair compensation in Motor Accident
Claims. The real purpose of awarding just and fair
compensation to the victim of the accident or the legal
heirs of such victim will be fulfilled by applying the
principle of Order XXI Rule 1 Civil Procedure code so that
the awardee is not deprived of the opportunity of gainfully
utilising the amount under the award for want of notice
about the deposit made by judgment debtor resulting in the
sum remaining unutilised. In our view, therefore, there is
no difficulty to apply the underlying principles under Order
XXI, Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code in executing the award of
compensation passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal
and the Tribunal must be held to be competent to invoke the
beneficial provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 Civil Procedure
Code.
We may indicate here that before the amendment of Order
XXI Rule 1 Civil Procedure code by the Amending Act, 1976 on
the question of liability of the judgment debtor to give
notice when the decretal amount is deposited in Court, The
High Courts took different views. In Laxminarayan Ganeshdas
Vs. Ghasiraam Dalchan Palaliwal (AIR 1939 Nagpur 191), it
has been held that where a decree orders the payment of a
sum of money awarding interest until payment and the money
is paid by payment into Court under the provision of Order
XXI Rule 1, the interest does not run until notice has been
given to the decree holder under Order XXI Rule 1 (2) but
ceases to run from the date of such payment. Such view of
the Nagpur High Court was dissented from in a later decision
by the Kerala High Court in State of Kerala Vs. Mahadeva
Iyer (AIR 1969 Kerala 8). The kerala High Court in the said
decision has held that where the interest is awarded by the
decree on the decretal amount until payment, it does not
cease to run merely by reason of the making of the deposit
of the decretal amount into court unless it is followed up
by the service of notice as required by Clause (2). It is
only when the fact of deposit is brought to the knowledge of
the decree holder by service of such notice that the deposit
will amount to payment within the meaning of Order XXI Rule
1. In taking the said view, the Kerala High Court has relied
on the decision of other High Courts (AIR 1932 Calcutta 111,
AIR 1951 Bombay 394, AIR 1952 Travancore Cochin 236, AIR
1955 Madh Bha 126, AIR 1956 Travancore Cochin 46).
After the amendment of Order XXI Rule 1 in 1976, there
is no scope for any controversy as to the liability of the
judgment debtor when the decretal amount is deposited in
Court but the notice of such deposit is not given to the
decree holder. It is imperative that the judgment debtor has
to give notice to the decree holder about deposit for the
decretal amount. Since motor accident in the instant case,
had taken place on May 7, 1983, Order XXI Rule 1 as amended
in 1976 is clearly applicable. Even otherwise also, the
provision of Order XXI Rule 1 being a procedural law,
amended provisions of Order XXI Rule 1 are applicable even
if the accident had taken place prior to 1976 because such
amendment of procedural law is retrospective in its
operation.
In the aforesaid circumstances, no interference is
called for against the impugned decision and the appeal is
dismissed, without however any order as to cost. Before we
part, we intend to place on record our deep appreciation for
the valuable assistance rendered by Dr. Dhavan who has taken
pains in assisting the Court by appearing as an amicus
curiae.