JUDGMENT
Jawahar Lal Gupta, J.
1. The petitioner was recruited as a constable on October 2, 1989. Vide order dated March 7, 1992, he was discharged from service. It was indicated in the order that the petitioner had absented himself on different occasions. Thus, it was concluded that he was not likely to become a good police officer. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner submitted a representation. It appears that this representation was rejected vide order dated September 11, 1992. A copy of this order was sent to him vide endorsement No. 23109, dated September 15, 1992. Vide letter dated March 8, 1994, the petitioner was informed that his representation had already been rejected vide office order dated September 11, 1992. A copy of this letter is on record as Annexure P-4 with the writ petition. The petitioner submitted another representation to the Director General of Police. Accordingly, vide letter dated 31.10.1994, the petitioner was informed that the Deputy Inspector General had already rejected his representation vide order dated September 11, 1992 and January 12, 1993. In spite of that it was said that “revision-cum-petition (sic.) will be considered by this office on merits. Matriculation Certificate is not attached with his character roll”. In response to this communication the petitioner forwarded his matriculation certificate vide letter dated August 24, 1995. Therefore, vide letter dated November 5, 1997, the petitioner was informed that his revision petition has been considered and filed as “no revision petition lies against the order of discharge under PPR 12.21.” Hence this petition.
2. The petitioner prays that the orders dated March 7, 1992 vide which he was discharged from service and the order dated March 8, 1994 and November 5, 1997 vide which his representation had been rejected by the Deputy Inspector General and the Director General of Police be quashed.
3. We have heard Mr. I.S. Balhara, learned counsel for the petitioner.
4. Admittedly, the petitioner was discharged vide order dated March 7, 1992. This order had been passed under the provisions of Rule 12.21, Punjab Police Rules, 1934, Volume 2. Rule 12.21 inter alia provides that a constable who is found unlikely to prove an efficient police officer may be discharged by the Superintendent at any time within three years of enrolment. It has been further provided that “there shall be no appeal against an order of discharge under this rule.” In the present case the petitioner was discharged in exercise of the power under Rule 12.21. The order was conveyed to him vide endorsement dated March 7, 1992. The rule clearly provides that no appeal shall lie against an order of discharge. It appears that the petitioner had submitted some representation which according to the communication from the Deputy Inspector General had been rejected vide order dated September 11, 1992. Mr. Balhara submits that the petitioner had not received this letter. Assuming it to be so, yet his representation was again rejected vide letter dated March 8, 1994. A copy of this communication has been produced as Annexure P-4 with the writ petition. Still the petitioner did not challenge the order either before the High Court by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or before the Civil Court by filing a civil suit. Instead he chose to submit a representation to the Director General of Police. Even though, initially the representation was considered yet it was ultimately rejected on the ground that no revision petition lies against an order of discharge. This is in strict conformity with the provisions of Rule 12.21. In the process more than five years have elapsed since the order of discharge was passed. Today, even if a civil suit is filed, the respondents are entitled to raise the plea of limitation. In such a situation we are not inclined to exercise our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
5. Mr. Balhara states that the department has in certain cases invalidated the order of discharge. It may be so. Even in the present case it appears that the petitioner had submitted some representation through the Minister for Agriculture. A copy of the letter dated March 8, 1994 was forwarded to the Additional Secretary to the Agriculture Minister, Government of India, New Delhi with reference to his D.O. No. 456 dated 27.1.1994. This, however, cannot mean that the provisions of Rule 12.21 which clearly provides that there shall be no appeal have to be ignored or that repeated representations have to be considered by the respondent department.
6. Mr. Balhara has further submitted that the order is per se stigmatic. It is, thus, void.
7. A perusal of the order shows that the petitioner after his recruitment on October 2, 1989 had started remaining absent since April 28, 1990. He was found to be absent on different occasions for different intervals of time. It has not been shown that the petitioner had a good cause for absence. It appears that the petitioner had no regard for the discipline of the service to which he belonged. In this situation it is not surprising that the authority had come to the conclusion that the petitioner was not likely to become a good police officer. Resultantly, keeping in view the facts and especially when the petitioner has given no explanation for his absence from duty, we think that he is not entitled to the grant of any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
8. At this stage, Mr. Balhara has submitted that Article 226 prescribes no period of limitation. Consequently, the petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner had waited for the decision of his representation by the Director General of Police. He has approached this Court soon after the order was conveyed to him on November 5, 1997.
9. We are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel. It is undoubtedly correct that Article 226 does not lay down a specific period of limitation. Yet it cannot be said that a citizen has a right to approach the court as and when he chooses. In State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. v. Bhai Lal Bhai and Ors., A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1006, it was inter alia held by their Lordships that “the power to give relief under Article 226 is a discretionary power. Among the several matters which the High Courts rightly take into consideration in the exercise of that discretion is the delay made by the aggrieved party in seeking this special remedy and what excuse there is for it……………..(the Court)……………It may, however, be stated as a general rule that if there has been unreasonable delay the Court ought not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party by this extra ordinary remedy……………Again, where even if there is no such delay the Government or the statutory authority against whom the consequential relief is prayed for raises a prima facie triable issue as regards the availability of such relief on the merits on the grounds like limitation, the court should ordinarily refuse to issue the writ.” In this case relief was declined by the Apex Court on the ground of delay. Similar is the situation in the present case. A triable issue of limitation clearly arises. If a suit was to be filed after the expiry of three years, the respondents would have been entitled to raise the plea of limitation. The limitation had apparently expired on March 6, 1995. The writ petition was presented to this Court on January 19, 1998. It was highly belated.
10. As regards the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the representation was rejected by the Director General of Police on November 5, 1997, it may only be mentioned that under the provisions of Rule 12.21, Punjab Police Rules, no appeal/revision lies. Consequently, the time spent in submitting repeated representations in spite of the specific provisions can be no excuse for the long delay.
11. No other point has been raised.
12. In view of above, there is no merit in this writ petition. It is consequently dismissed in limine.